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S. K. DAS



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FOREWORD

In the unavoidable absence from India of the President of the Indian Philosophical Congress Committee, I beg to apologise for the delay, on account of circumstances over which I had no control, in the publication of the Proceedings of the Fifth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Lahore in December, 1929. I take this opportunity of tendering grateful thanks of the Committee for the generous assistance, received so far for the fourth time, to the Syndicate of the Calcutta University, and of recording my personal appreciation of the unfailing courtesy and co-operation of the officers of the Calcutta University Press.

S. K. DAS



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ADDRESS OF THE GENERAL PRESIDENT

By

DR. W. S. URQUHART, M.A., D.LITT., D.D., D.L.,

*Principal, Scottish Church College, and Ex-Vice-Chancellor,
Calcutta University.*

A good deal has been said recently in the public press about the number of conferences and congresses meeting in Lahore, and it is significant that the cause of philosophy has been able to hold its own and the interest in it has not been crowded out by other interests. Yet it is also significant that in the list of gatherings given in some of the newspapers the name of the Philosophical Congress did not find a place. This omission seems to me to be symbolic and to indicate that, while philosophy cannot be denied its portion in the fundamental scheme of arrangements either for Lahore or for the universe, it does not get the full share of open recognition which it ought to have in modern times. It is pushed into the background, and as Kant asked the reason of the failure of metaphysics in the merely intellectual sphere, so the question may be put as to the reason of its comparative want of influence in the broader sphere of life.

I do not know that I am willing to subscribe to the philosophically pessimistic creed that the influence of philosophy is gradually diminishing. I am inclined to think, however, that the influence is decidedly less obvious than it was some time ago. Its popularity as a subject of University study is not what it was,

and the number of students who take this subject in an academic course is probably about a third of what it was some twenty years ago. Of course this may be all to the good, and lessening extensivity may mean greater intensity of study. It may also be argued that students are not yet sufficiently mature to be reckoned as typical judges of the true value of a study in the later and more general estimate of the community, but after all the students of to-day are the leaders of the thought to-morrow, and if a sadly diminishing number of them is being philosophically trained the outlook is not good for the philosophical attitude and capacity of the people as a whole.

It can hardly be denied that conditions have changed since the days of Plato, who thought that state to be most happy whose rulers were possessed of philosophical ability, and who was willing to commit the destinies of the peoples to their charge. Times have changed too since the still earlier beginning of philosophical speculation in this country when the philosopher had a dignity and an influence such as few other lands have assigned to him. What is the reason of this change which the centuries have wrought, if we are correct in describing the direction of the tendency.

It might be useful to look at the nature of the studies which have ousted philosophy from the place of honour which once it held. Turn again to the partialities of students, not confining yourselves merely to the younger students, and you find that the study of the particular sciences has developed enormously and often at the expense of broader philosophical studies which might act as a bond amongst them. The subject-matter of the sciences seems to be confined within more manageable limits, to give promise of more definite results, and to have more practical bearing upon life. Again in our colleges the classes in economics are filled to overflowing, also at the expense of the philosophical classes. It is felt that the economics, especially if allied to political philosophy, is more calculated to fit men for success in life, more calculated to promote the industrial welfare of the country

or to fit men for fulfilling the functions of useful citizens. Again, coming nearer to the borders of philosophy proper, you find an intense and growing interest in psychological study, especially in its physiological aspects. Does it not seem as if men were saying to themselves that they wished to begin with studies nearer to themselves, where they could be sure of facts, that they were endeavouring to get guidance merely from an analysis of human nature, without venturing to launch out beyond themselves, as if they had returned to the cautionary attitude of Hume who thought that his line was too short to fathom the immense abysses beneath which reality might—but also might not—lie.

So the conclusion would seem to be that philosophy is neglected because it is too little practical, or because it has had or can have so little success even in regard to its own essential purpose of reaching the fundamental reality of the universe. A narrowing of the field of human interest is thus becoming manifest. Men will not travel far into speculative regions because it is more useful to remain at home, or because they do not think that it is possible to do anything else but remain at home. The spirit of adventurousness has decreased and parochialism is prevalent in the provinces of the mind. Such an attitude is either gladly accepted or sadly acquiesced in, according as the practical mood or the pessimistic mood gains the upper hand.

Now the question I wish to put before you is this. Must philosophy calmly submit to this charge of being either unpractical or impotent? It is a question which may perhaps fitly be put to you by one who in recent months has been so fully occupied in activities which I may describe, not as unphilosophical, but as not fully philosophical, that specialist or concentrated study has been rendered impossible for him, and his ears have become unfamiliar with the language of the schools or the technicalities of philosophical terminology. I have thus been almost forced into the position of a layman in philosophy, and one result of this is that I feel that I am a most unworthy occupant of this chair to which you have done me the great honour of calling me. Another

result is that my interest in what might be called specialist philosophy has somewhat lessened at the present time, and I am more disposed to reflect upon the practical influence upon life of philosophy and the philosophical material which is latent in the proceedings of public bodies.

Some of you will no doubt say that this is a useless enquiry because philosophy was never meant to be practical and you hold that its chief glory lies in the fact that it is far removed from the dust and heat of the conflicts of life. You say that it is degraded if it is dragged down into the market-place, it retains its value only in detachment, and it exerts what influence it may have only through the maintenance of a philosophic calm in which conclusions may be reached about the eternal realities, uninfluenced by the confusions which result from the pressure and hurry of ordinary occupations. Let this garment of philosophic detachment, it is urged, continue to be wrapped about the philosopher.

Now I consider that this is a somewhat old-fashioned view about the relation of philosophy to life. It means that we have too readily acquiesced in the division of human interests into the theoretical and the practical, and the result has been to the detriment of both aspects. Philosophy is perhaps primarily theoretical, but if in this aspect it is separated off too abruptly from the practical, the energy of the thought itself which dwells within the theoretical sphere is weakened and it fails to reach satisfactorily even its own proper goal. There are signs that we are transcending this division, and one indication is the waning popularity of the intellectualistic school associated with the names of Bradley and Bosanquet, and the growing emphasis upon more activist factors in philosophical construction. I spoke, therefore, of the division as reflecting a somewhat old-fashioned view, but this statement is perhaps hardly correct if we take longer views and bring under consideration some of the earliest conceptions of philosophy both in the East and in the West. It can hardly be gainsaid that one of the outstanding characteristics of the

philosophy of both Plato and Aristotle is their grasp of the conception of the wholeness of life and their desire to apply philosophical principles to the guidance of even the practical life. The good in Plato was comprehensive and not merely intellectual, and amongst Aristotle's principal works are treatises upon Ethics and Politics. In the working out of their system they may not always have escaped the dualism between the theoretical and the practical, but their intention was clearly in the direction of unity. In ancient India also was it not the ideal that philosophy should be in close alliance with religion, should dominate the whole of life? The *shastras* which contained philosophical speculation were intimately bound up with the *shastras* which afforded guidance for the ordinary life of the householder, and however much the philosopher may have allowed himself to become detached from the world and absorbed in abstract mystical speculation, and however much the ordinary citizen may have become engrossed with ritual and domestic details of lesser significance to the sacrifice of the more properly philosophical attitude, I cannot think that this ideal has ever been lost sight of.

In remedy of this unnecessary divorce, it seems to me that a way of approach towards more organic unity may be found in the recovery of and re-emphasis upon the older alliance between the philosophy and religion. I consider it unfortunate that any antagonism should have seemed to grow up between these two aspects of human activity, that they should have been compared with one another as if they were rivals, and that philosophy should have been placed above religion as if the philosopher had reached a higher level than the merely religious man. There is a tendency sometimes to object to the application of any religious test in the estimation of a philosophy and to argue that if a philosophical position fails to satisfy the religious requirements of men, this is so much the worse for religion and definitely indicates that the religious attitude is not the highest which it is possible for men to occupy. Prof. Radhakrishnan,

for example, holds that if we remain at the religious level we shall be involved in a dilemma. "If God is perfect," he says, "religion is impossible. If God is imperfect, religion is ineffective" (97). "The end of religion is the transcendence of religion" and again "Religious worship has to be accepted until the perfect condition is reached." Mr. Kirtikar in his *Studies in the Vedānta* is even more emphatic and asks rather indignantly, "Is philosophic truth to be sacrificed lest its recognition might shake the very foundations of religion?" (106.) Yet these two authors themselves do not seem to be wholly satisfied with this position. Prof. Radhakrishnan in the same earlier book says that "true religion and true philosophy will agree" and his later writings evince a still strong desire to identify religion and philosophy, while Mr. Kirtikar accepts as one of the excellences of the Vedānta, its capacity for developing the highest religious spirit. Yet I do not admit that this identification and this acceptance should be effected only by placing religion in a definitely subordinate position or that reconciliation should be brought about necessarily by means of a religion turned philosophy rather than by philosophy turned religion. I consider that religion should in its own rights be regarded as a suitable criterion of the worth of a philosophical conception, and that when a philosophy fails to satisfy religious requirements, we should not be content to abandon the religious test but should be as ready to ask whether the philosophical conception does not require modification just because of this failure to satisfy religious needs. I think that religion, because it is based upon the relation of the whole man to the eternal and fundamental reality, has a right to a share in our determination and description of that reality if we keep in view the necessity of satisfying all sides of our being,—which necessity religion emphasises,—we shall reach a conception of the ultimate which will contain within it a more comprehensive explanation of the world in which we live and will not involve a turning away on our part from that world or compel philosophy to a repudiation of any claim to the control of practice

of life. I am not setting the various aspects of our being in a competitive relation to one another and pleading that we should turn away from the claims of reason that we may satisfy the emotions and the will. It is not a case of the heart having reasons which the reason never knew, but rather I plead for organisation of our faculties that they may act in co-operation with each other. I am convinced, as Prof. Alexander puts it, that "The world is not what it is merely for intellect alone; its *nisus* towards what is higher enters into its constitution, it affects the mind by ways other than cognition, though interpretable in the ways of cognition." Religion, with its stress upon union or communion with the divine, points the way also to the highest philosophical position, and teaches us that it is not by abstraction from or by the thinning down of experience that we shall reach God, but rather by taking with us the fulness of human nature, and entertaining the idea that this nature in all its manifoldness is the reproduction of the divine. We shall thus understand something more of the simplicity of the divine nature which is not a simplicity of emptiness but of organic fulness. Not by knowing many things but by knowing much of the one Reality, shall we come nearer to our goal, shall we "clasp of Truth the central core" and "hold fast that centre's central sense An atom there shall fill thee more Than realms on Truth's circumference." Philosophy is just the intellectualised aspect of the fulness of the content of religion, and it is by recognition of this that philosophy will recover its control of life.

If philosophy is regarded as a separate discipline, severely intellectual, it is bound to fall into negations and abstractions resulting in detachment from life. There is nothing either great or small, and yet in our philosophy we have tended to emphasise the infinitely great or the infinitely small, oblivious of what lies between. We negate the ordinary and then we wonder why philosophy is out of touch with life, which is the organising of the ordinary. Apply this thought to some

of the problems of our own time. Take, for example, the youth movement. How can its enthusiastic supporters do anything but look askance at philosophy if the latter can find no room in its fundamental thinking for the conception of life? It is more life and fuller that youth wants, and yet philosophy has been too often a meditation upon death, and through its devotion to abstractions has inculcated a deadening down of our faculties of perception and of enjoyment if we desire to reach the completest contact with reality. I do not think that philosophers ought to look down from a superior height upon such movements as these, but they can only come into touch with them and be capable of helping them to worthier aims and endeavours if the philosophers get a grip of some positive reality and show how it can be so developed as to explain and also control the movements of new life which are pulsing through the veins of so many of those with whom we are associated. Philosophy can be of little use in modern life if it conceives that it is its duty always to suppress emotion by means of argument instead of to see that emotion presents a material which may be sublimated but not necessarily destroyed by philosophy. There must be a philosophical recognition of the saying of Keats "Axioms are not axioms until they are proved upon our pulses." Again philosophy has tended too much to the abstract universal, even in regard to practical maxims. It is a common criticism of Kant, *e.g.*, that he pays more attention to the form than to the matter of morality, but, while theoretically critical of his universal maxim that we should act so that the maxim of our own will may become a universal law, we are often apt to apply it practically with the very same ruthlessness to which we object in him. Take again the youth movement, as it happens to be at present a popular topic. Philosophers might be tempted to frown it out of existence, simply because it could not be universalised without an unfair sacrifice of age to youth. But here we would be paying too much attention to the mere form of Kant's universal rule, rather than to its underlying meaning,

viz., an emphasis upon the worth of every human personality. If we lay emphasis upon the concreteness of this conception rather than upon the abstractions of the general rule, we shall be in a better position to be guides, philosophers and friends even to those who overtly are contemptuous of philosophy. We shall understand that this movement is a revolt against those who have *undervalued the personality of youth*, and shall be able to point out that the personality characteristic of one generation can be properly developed only along with an adequate respect for the personalities of older men. We shall thus be able to take up a positive and constructive attitude instead of a negative and destructive attitude.

The same requirement may be illustrated by its application to the conception of nationality. Political leaders might be greatly benefited by the application of philosophical principles to their ideals. But philosophy must cease to be abstract if it is to be of any use. An abstract philosophy will simply brush aside all questions about nationalism as being concerned merely with "names and forms" and therefore beneath the notice of those who would occupy the highest point of view. Or they will apply again the maxim of Kant, and point out that nationality is an unsatisfactory practical conception because it cannot be universalised. But here again a further and more concrete study will remind us of Kant's further conception of a 'kingdom of ends' and will lead us on to the conceptions of organism and organisation, teaching us by the way that the nearer loyalty is not inconsistent with devotion to a universal ideal, and warning us against selfishness and the disregard of other people's interests in all our politics. Those who remain devoted to an abstract philosophy, cannot be leaders of the people, and yet why should not philosophers who have reconstructed their philosophy on a more organic basis and draw their problems from practical life, be leaders of the people, saving them from the destructive antagonisms which are so harmful instead of remaining coldly indifferent? I believe that the peace of the

world has been disturbed by the unphilosophical attitude of the leaders on both sides in many political conflicts. I believe that there is room for a philosophical interpretation of many of the principles, underlying the League of Nations for example, and that philosophers would be much better employed if they turned their attention in this direction than they are in many of the abstract disquisitions of which they are so fond. They might not readily get a hearing from the politicians of either party, because they are regarded as useless and unpractical people, but that is due to the bad tradition they have inherited, and what I am pleading for is this that philosophers should so criticise and reconstruct their fundamental positions that they will feel that they are impelled by their very philosophical views to a more practical attitude to life, and that they can derive from their speculative thinking something that will be of use to the people round about them.¹

There is the greatest need of philosophers at the present time—need for men who will pay attention to facts and to all the facts, need for balanced judgment upon these facts, need for the weighing of evidence carefully and considerately, need for the control of the passions by the philosophical mind, need for a conception of the universal which will not allow of the undue dominance of any particular and sectional interests, need for a recapture of that spiritual interest which will destroy the cheap cynicism which thinks that in any reconstruction of society only material consequences are worthy of consideration. Philosophy must cease from its preoccupation with merely petty questions and obtain a grasp upon reality fully conceived—intellectually, emotionally, volitionally and spiritually—if it is to render that adequate service to humanity which may be expected of it.²

¹ There have been such philosophers in other countries, *e.g.*, the late Lord Haldane and Earl Balfour.

² Why should not philosophical ideals exercise influence in this country also ?

RAPPROCHEMENT' BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

(Presidential Address.)

By

PROF. A. R. WADIA, B.A. (CANTAB.), BAR.-AT-LAW.

It is a very common idea that metaphysics has no freshness about it, that its only delight is to weave theories about problems as old as itself. Superficially there is a good deal to support this idea, but no one who thinks can fail to see how each generation has its own problems to face and how in every fresh environment the old problems gain a new meaning and need solutions in harmony with the demands of the age. It is from this standpoint that I propose to deal with what seems to me to be the fundamental need of metaphysics in the whole world to-day, for philosophy has always been international and to-day more so than ever before. This need is the mutual understanding of the scientist and the philosopher. To bring this out, I shall linger over the history of this relationship just for a few minutes. In India till but recently this particular problem had no existence, for our traditions never gave to science any but a subordinate place in the scheme of life or of knowledge. But Europe has had a different tale to tell which has not failed to affect us in India. In Europe the conflict between philosophy and religion has been historic, older even than Christianity. It has been generally a conflict between reason and faith, between the spirit of free inquiry and dogma. In this conflict philosophers and scientists knew no rivalry.

They were allies in a righteous battle, comrades alike in their victories and in their sufferings. Men like Bruno and Galileo, Kepler and Newton, who made the history of science, were proud to be known as philosophers. And men who built up the philosophical systems of modern times occupy an honoured place in the history of science and mathematics. But in the hour of victory the allies through the ages fell apart. As dogmatism in religion receded, the pressure of a common foe ceased to operate, and the aims of the philosopher and the scientist fell apart. The divergence impressed the public all the more, because science has had a number of brilliant victories to its credit, which have transformed the civilisation of the world, while metaphysics has done nothing to dazzle an uncritical world, and superficially again has had nothing to show but an internecine war between the Realist and the Idealist, the Sceptic and the Pragmatist. Subsequent to the epoch-making work of Darwin and the great technological triumphs which followed in the wake of pure science, the scientist became conscious of his own power and importance, and developed a contempt for both religion and metaphysics. The metaphysician was not altogether free from blame, for he had developed an ill-concealed contempt for the scientist, who was supposed to be dabbling with mere matter and knew not the higher values of life. It is this phase of the conflict which has had its echoes in our country, and the scientist and the metaphysician each pursues his own way, each thinking that his sphere of work is the more important. I frankly think this is a defect, for I believe that the two spheres of work are not really different; they need each other. Hence I feel the need to-day for a rapprochement between philosophy and science. The time is favourable, for both sides have begun to feel the exhaustion of a profitless conflict, and sobered by thought and experience they seek a common platform or at least a common standpoint from which they could measure the inter-relatedness of their worlds.

It used to be a boast of the scientist, especially of the physicist, that he was dealing with nothing abstract, that his subject-matter was concrete, something tangible, something ponderable. He had a very definite conception of matter, something static and absolute ; of space and time within which framework the molecules of matter led a joyous existence. Even the biologist was looking forward to the day when he could resolve the mystery of life into a play of mere chemico-physical combination. The psychologist cherished a hope that the day was not faroff when the mind-activity would be effectually reduced to the physiological activity of the brain. It was hoped that the metaphysician would be persuaded of the futility of his ways and lead a more useful life. But fortunately or unfortunately, as often before in human history, time has not brought fulfilment, but wisdom born of disappointment. The psychologist with the discovery of the unconscious has found his subject growing more complex and baffling instead of being simplified. The biologist has begun to despair of reducing life to a chemico-physical combination, and would fain echo the words of Dr. J. S. Haldane : " The conclusion forced upon me in the course of a life devoted to natural science is that the universe as it is assumed to be in physical science is only an idealized world, while the real universe is the spiritual universe in which spiritual values count for everything."* Even the old orthodox physicist has found his world of solid matter and an absolute space and an absolute time resolved into an imperceptible energy and space-times as various as the observers. Prof. Eddington assures us that " the law of gravitation is not a law in the sense that it restricts the possible behaviour of the substratum of the world, it is merely the definition of a vacuum. We need not regard matter as a foreign entity causing a disturbance in the gravitational field ; the disturbance is matter. In the same way we do not regard light as an intruder in the electromagnetic field,

causing the electromagnetic force to oscillate along its path, the oscillations constituting the light. Nor is heat a fluid causing agitation of the molecules of a body, the agitation is heat " (pp. 190-191, *Space, Time and Gravitation*). We are told that " matter is a symptom, not a cause." We have been accustomed to regard gravitation as one of the bed-rocks of knowledge. But to-day we are gravely told that text-books on Physics twenty years hence will not care so much as to make even a mention of gravitation. We have been regarding mathematics as the very soul of exactitude. Spinoza was head over ears in love with it. Kant declared that a science is a science only in so far as it has mathematics in it. Bertrand Russell would have all philosophy reduced to logic, which is but an *alter ego* of mathematics. Books on Physics are literally bespattered with mathematical symbols. But a mathematician like Eddington's is suspected to be " never so happy as when he does not know what he is talking about," a privilege which used to be considered a monopoly of the sinful metaphysician. It has come to be seen that mathematics as such is exact just because it has not necessarily to do with reality. It is an abstraction, eminently useful as a weapon for the most abstruse calculations, but thoroughly useless for giving us an insight into the significance of the world of our experience. Thus we find that the very physics which was setting the pace for all advance in knowledge has itself been overtaken by a revolution and has been forced to substitute relative standards for the old absolute ones. To-day we find a certain similarity in the net conclusions to which both metaphysics and science can be reduced. Einstein's revolution in the world of science has had its counterpart in the Bergsonian revolution in the world of metaphysics. With the conception of a Reality completed and perfect in itself the metaphysical Absolute was condemned to eternal stagnation. But when the reality is seen to be mobile, there is no end to its concrete freshness. Philosophy as a knowledge of the life of the eternal itself become eternal, for it has to interpret each

generation to itself, and ideas like words grow in meaning and in the range of their application. Thus it is that the antithesis of an unprogressive metaphysics and an eternally progressive science loses all its force.

It is a still more healthy sign of our times that both scientists and philosophers to-day—exceptions of course apart—have become conscious of their mutual limitations. The proud claim of science that it has conquered nature or that it is on the way to conquer it, turns out to be an idle boast. “The advance of scientific knowledge,” says Dr. Haldane, “does not seem to make either our universe or our life in it any less mysterious” (p. 165, *The Sciences and Philosophy*), and Dr. Haldane has been a life-long physiologist. A life-long chemist like Mr. Soddy does not hesitate to describe “the triumphs of science over Nature till now” as merely resembling “somewhat school-boy successes,” (p. 246, *Matter and Energy*). Prof. Eddington in his *Space, Time and Gravitation* writes: “All through the world runs that unknown content, which must surely be the stuff of our consciousness. Here is a hint of aspects deep within the world of physics and yet unattainable by the methods of physics. And, moreover, we have found that where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has put into nature” (pp. 200-201). In his *Nature of the Physical World* he says: “We believe we understand the nature of an ordinary table whereas the nature of human personality is altogether mysterious. We never have that intimate contact with space and tables which would make us realise how mysterious they are; we have direct knowledge of time and of the human spirit which makes us reject as inadequate that merely symbolic conception of the world which is so often mistaken for an insight into its nature.” And this from one who has all his life been a mathematician and a physicist primarily, and a philosopher only because of the urge of truth. A similar strain runs through several others, who begin with science and are propelled by the logic of facts to philosophy.

On the side of philosophy too we are not wanting in philosophers who have been content to learn as much from science as possible. Dr. Alexander and Prof. Broad, Prof. Whitehead and the Hon'ble Mr. Bertrand Russell have striven to rear their philosophy on the basis of science. I cannot say that they have worked on lines which commend themselves to me as correct, but they belie the idea that metaphysicians are essentially so perverse as to dream away in a world of their own, more keen on squaring the world with their ideas than on squaring their ideas with the living world. Whatever the inherent defects of their philosophic thought, they have shown that philosophy cannot put on airs of superiority, but must learn to co-operate with science in the service of knowledge.

There are two possible directions in which metaphysics can react to science. It can follow the method of science or absorb the knowledge of science so as to make it an integral part of itself. I shall try to show how the first is futile and the second is both possible and desirable.

Mathematics has a simplicity and an exactitude which have a weird fascination for many minds. In the early days of modern philosophy in Europe it had a hypnotising influence, the fruits of which we see partly in Descartes and fully in Spinoza. Mathematics creates its terms and so is in a position to manipulate them as it likes. They move about in a world which is not fettered by questions of what is real and unreal. For it -2 is as real as 2 and $\sqrt{2}$ is as significant as $\sqrt{4}$. Its very abstractness makes it a useful servant where abstractness is justifiable. Spinoza in spite of the general profundity of his thought failed to envisage the peculiar concreteness of philosophic thought, and so failed to see how the dogmatic procedure of geometry would bake no bread in philosophy. Even to-day among the great thinkers of Europe Spinoza is the only one who founded no school.

In our own time history seems to be repeating itself, for the progress of science looms large against the "barrenness" of

philosophy, and the success of science is all due to its predictions, which again are all due to the favour of mathematics. It would be surprising indeed if an attempt were not to be made to make philosophy progress through mathematics. Bertrand Russell's name immediately suggests itself in this connection. He has succeeded in putting fresh vigour into logic, but has not escaped the specialist's fallacy of reducing all knowledge to his special subject. Logic as an abstract discipline or instrument of thought stands to gain by the technique of mathematics, but logic cannot pretend to be a study of reality and hence cannot displace metaphysics. Russell's psychology goes back to the days of Hume and he thinks metaphysics has made no progress after Hume. It is no wonder if his own metaphysics is a mere twentieth century edition of Hume, dotting the i's and crossing the t's of the great prince of sceptics. Russell seems to succeed in his attempt, only because he is prepared to admit that there is no knowledge which rises above the level of mere probability. He seems to succeed, because in his own assumptions he can throw overboard the concepts of soul and God as useless lumber. It is easy to solve problems by denying them. And it is the privilege of mathematical philosophy to assume what it likes, to deduce what it likes, and even to ignore what it likes. But life is more complex than this, and the problem of reality is not a shuffling of symbols. If we are told that the method of philosophy should be the method of science, which is fundamentally the method of analysis, we have to be clear as to what we are analysing. Each science proceeds by an analysis of the data of its own peculiar subject-matter. It is permitted to abstract and, within the world of abstractions, it attains a power of manipulation which guarantees great success in practical application. But it remains a question whether we are any nearer understanding matter when we have analysed it into atoms, or life when we have dissected a living animal into all its component parts. Prof. Broad's distinction between Critical Philosophy and Speculative Philosophy is an attempt to

make philosophy "scientific" at the expense of its very life. His Critical Philosophy plays the rôle of a supervising officer to see that the concepts of the different sciences do not claim to be more than what they really are, a useful and necessary function indeed, but philosophy at its highest has another aim : to understand the significance and mutual implications of the whole world of existence. In this task mathematics and science cannot hope to play a domincering part, and therefore forsooth such philosophy, according to Prof. Broad, is only speculative. Verily the worship of science and the ghosts of abstractions have held us in thrall, if Prof. Broad's distinction were the last word in philosophy.

Thus we see that the method of abstraction, which is so fruitful in science when applied to philosophy lands us in Humian scepticism or a dogmatic materialism. The former marks the insolvency of human intellect, the latter constitutes a negation of all that is highest in human experience. Both appear plausible, because they proceed on the naïve assumption that the real is the sensible, and what cannot be dissected into parts cannot be real. This reminds me of a curious anecdote. A man was waxing eloquent about God, and a wag in the audience challenged him to show God or else he would refuse to believe in the existence of God. And the lecturer replied : " Young man, put your common sense on this table, and then I'll believe in its existence." Assume there is only matter, and then it is easy to prove that life and mind are unreal, for if they are real they come into conflict with our assumption; therefore they are unreal. To give the stamp of finality to such an argument, Spinozalike we may add the mystic symbols Q.E.D. And then there is nothing more to prove.

The nature and the requirements of metaphysics being different it needs a different method. As contrasted with the predominantly Analytic Method of science, I would call it the Synthetic Method. This method would cover Prof. Broad's Critical Philosophy, for it would have to co-ordinate the concepts

of the different sciences, and in this a certain amount of evaluation in terms of concreteness would be inevitable. It would bring out the significance of the physical concepts like matter, space, time, cause; the biological concepts like life and end; the psychological concepts like mind and conscious purpose; the ethical concepts like goodness and moral end; and social concepts like state and society. These concepts may conceivably fuse into some wide all-embracing concept like mind or God or Absolute or Deity. As to which it is to be is a matter of detail, to be judged in the last resort by the canons of logic and, what is infinitely more important, by the facts of experience.

If the metaphysical concepts require a proof, the only proof can be transcendental. It is one of the puzzles of philosophy as to why so acute a mind as Kant's failed to gauge the significance and the range of his own great discovery. His hesitancy in following his own logic and the pitiful contradictions of his Transcendental Dialectic which pursued him even to the pages of the *Critique of Judgment* may well cause bewilderment, but do not in the least affect the worth or the cogency of the mighty instrument forged by his titanic genius. What he sowed, Hegel reaped. Here again we may or may not agree with the net conclusions of what has come to be known as Hegelianism with its impossible triads and a stagnant Absolute, but this leaves unaffected the method. For all that it seeks to assert is that if X is given and is explicable *only* in terms of Y, then Y must be real. Oddly enough where Kant used this method most boldly, i.e., in connection with the Deduction of the Categories, it has proved of doubtful worth, and he hesitated to use it where he would have been justified in using it. This but shows the relative independence of method and content. For if a particular method inevitably led to certain particular conclusions, it would be legitimately suspected to be working in a vicious circle. If applying the transcendental method, we found that the concept of matter satisfactorily explained all the varied aspects of our experience, Materialism would have to be accepted

as the correct metaphysical theory. It is from this standpoint that there is something bracing in the clear-cut Materialism of the ancient Chārvākas or of Huxley and Haeckel in the last century, while Agnosticism, however honest it be, leaves behind a sense of intellectual starvation. That is why a philosophy like Russell's with all its acute analyses is so unsatisfactory, for it lacks the courage to tackle the ultimate *Why* of life. If he denies the ultimate rationality of things or leaves it as an open question beyond the range of human comprehension, he knocks the bottom out of his own *Free Man's Worship*, for our life in the last resort needs to be governed by an eternal *Yea*, not an indefinite *Nay*.

I pass on now to consider the second possible reaction of science to philosophy: How can the wealth of scientific knowledge be made to enrich the reservoirs of philosophy? *i.e.*, how does scientific knowledge affect the conclusions of philosophy? It would be waste of time to pretend that there is no difference whatever between knowledge in science and in philosophy. A science has its own particular sphere of work and its own particular standpoint. So it does not hesitate to ignore all other standpoints, not necessarily as false, but as irrelevant. So a science gives knowledge, but of different phases of reality at different levels. Philosophy is more ambitious. It seeks to study reality comprehensively in all its aspects at its highest level. Indeed in these days of extreme specialisation no one could be so foolhardy as to aim at making all knowledge his own. But a philosopher cannot but possess at least a working knowledge of the broad conclusions achieved by the different sciences, for only thus can he hope to ascertain the worth of different sciences. It would be facile indeed for a philosopher to pretend, and there have been many such, that science has nothing to do with philosophy, that philosophy has its own august sphere of work. But this is just the attitude which has gained for him the contempt of the scientist, because he has been content to speculate far away from the facts of

life, and so far away from the reality. That is the reason why it is worth our while to see as briefly as we can the present position of the main sciences.

It was not so long ago that physics was flattering itself that it was dealing with concrete facts with their nature rigid from age to age. Its emphasis lay on matter cast in the mould of an absolute space and an absolute time. But for some years past the concrete "matter" has been evaporating into invisible atoms and electrons, and it has become as subtle and as conceptual as the categories of philosophy. Einstein has robbed the classical physicist of his absolute space and time, and to-day relativity reigns supreme. Nothing is static. Everything is moving and time is inseparable from space, it is the fourth dimension of space. Prof. Whitehead, the philosopher of physics, says: "Nature is known to us in our experience as a complex of passing events. In this complex we discern definite mutual relations between component events, which we may call their relative positions, and these positions we express partly in terms of space and partly in terms of time. Also in addition to its mere relative position to other events, each particular event has its own peculiar character. In other words, nature is a structure of events and each event has position in this structure and its own peculiar character or quality" (p. 166, *The Concept of Nature*). Movement in the tiniest atom as in the biggest star: that is the order which reigns and rules in the world of physics.

Biology with its fixed number of species gave up its ghost long ago, not without a struggle though, a struggle which yet shows its head in an antiquated corner like Tennessy. To-day in spite of our finite intellect we are able to recreate the history of the world even at the epoch when man was not and the earth was dominated by the crawling reptiles. Darwin was not without a distinct leaning towards Naturalism, but while his work has not lost its epoch-making character, his authority has lost something of its old prestige. Lamarckianism has asserted itself in the field of biology and it has been seen more and more

that life needs a teleological category to explain itself. Attempts at reducing phenomena of life to chemical formulæ have so far shared the fate of the old alchemist's dreams of the philosopher's stone. And even bio-chemistry, which in its own way has justifiably been attaining great pre-eminence in our own day, is hardly likely to succeed in the attempt. Dr. Haldane ridicules the popular idea that the discovery of hormones and vitamins is "a great step towards a physico-chemical explanation of life." He proceeds to say "In actual fact, however, the more we discover as to the physiological necessity for the presence in the blood of various substances in specific amounts, often extremely small, the further are we from any physico-chemical understanding of life, since there is just so much more for the specific maintenance of which we have no physico-chemical explanation" (p. 199, *The Sciences and Philosophy*). He insinuates that "a meeting-point between biology and the physical sciences may at some time be found, there is no reason to doubt," but he slyly adds "we may confidently predict that if that meeting-point is found, and one of the two sciences is swallowed up, that one will not be biology" (p. 96).

As for psychology I explained my position two years ago at the Bombay session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. I argued then the great importance of psychology for philosophy, but ventured to throw a doubt on the extravagant claims made for the subject by some experimental psychologists. Nothing has happened in the meantime to make me change my views. When psychologists are inclined to make tall demands, it is good for them to see themselves as others see them. Dr. Haldane is guilty of exaggeration, and even perhaps of injustice, when he says: "...psychology as a branch of science is still on about the same level as chemistry was in the days of the alchemists" (p. 286), but I do know there are many scientists who look askance at psychology as an impudent upstart. I mention this not to disparage psychology, but to assert the uniqueness of its fundamental category: mind. What constitutes its scientific

weakness is in reality its philosophic strength, for just as biology has made good its independence of physics and chemistry, psychology has no need to hang down its head in shame, because there are insuperable difficulties in the path of reducing mind to mere physiological processes. Far from this modern psychology has been making good the unique character of mind with its ceaseless activity, which has given Bergson the starting-point in his great philosophic revolution.

If such be the case with the positive sciences, what wonder is there if the sphere of social life presents problems baffling alike in their complexity and in their shifting entities? Our knowledge of anthropology and ancient history has brought to light the kaleidoscopic changes which an uncertain environment and mysterious laws of heredity have wrought in human societies, focussing our attention on one stern lesson that societies which refuse to learn and to adapt themselves to the environment or force an uncongenial environment to adapt itself to their needs, are on the road to decline. This holds true of civilised as of uncivilised communities. A nation which in the pride of possession thinks it has attained an eminence beyond which it cannot and will not go, soon finds itself outstripped in the race of life by countries once ignored as barbarous. Those who merely seek to preserve lose what they have, for human spirit is jealous of itself and will not have anything to do with those who will not appreciate the elemental fact that it is essentially free and will not permit itself to be confined within the four walls of creeds and dogmas.

Such is the message of the world from the tiniest atom to the proudest society of human beings that tread the earth. How can metaphysics, which is philosophy *par excellence*, not be moved by this glorious panorama of throbbing, surging life, to which witness is borne by every science? What we need to-day, and especially in India, is a transvaluation of all values, especially of our old static conceptions of a reality, which is complete and perfect and changeless. Philosophy in India as in Europe has

inherited these conceptions from old traditions which had their birth in the requirements of knowledge. "Knowledge is of universals" is an old idea, and it is intelligible, if not pardonable, that philosophers interested primarily in knowing were led to ignore the rich, palpitating life around them, and set up the universals of knowledge, torn from life, as the very acme of existence. A tradition once started is hard to kill, and the philosophic tradition of a static reality was hardly challenged on any wide scale till Darwin's theory of evolution created such a furore that even metaphysics, after blundering in various directions, in the person of Bergson was constrained to take notice of how life, not abstract thought, works.

Bergson's *élan vital*, however, in its zest for creative freedom developed a prejudice against finalism and so presented the appearance of an evolutionary edition of Naturalism. He forgot the great teaching of the Greeks that the lower always finds its explanation in the higher and not *vice versa*. It is this idea which gives strength to the Neo-Idealism of our times, whatever be its other weaknesses. Croce, while despising science, has yet caught its message, while philosophers like Russell and Prof. Broad, who talk most of science miss its inner message. Russell as a mathematician has a native predilection for the world of physics and is less than just to the meaning of mind. He does not reduce it to matter, but it exists for him only in introspection and memory. "Mental events are events in a living brain, or, better in a region combining sensitivity and the law of learned reactions to a marked extent" (p. 292, *An Outline of Philosophy*). "Mind is merely a cross-section in a stream of physical causation, and there is nothing odd about its being both an effect and a cause in the physical world" (p. 156). It would be strange indeed if he were not aware that to-day "physics tells us nothing as to the intrinsic character of matter." But this has not led him to the old, but not the less true for that, view of mind as purpose. If he defines it in terms of memory and introspection, he cannot find it anywhere else than in a human being, and the world of

nature is left confronting the mind of man. In this he misses the fact that the lower is not apart from the higher and that the higher lives in the lower. This is the teaching not merely of the despised metaphysician, but of a physicist like Eddington and a physiologist and biologist like Haldane ; while Whitehead, a mathematician and philosopher like Russell himself, confining himself mainly to the philosophy of nature, does not attempt to throw mind overboard as a relic of old superstitions or a superfluous entity. Materialism has become impossible for us, not because there is a perceiving mind, human or divine, as Berkeley vainly thought, but because we find ourselves in the reign of law, which in the last resort can be nothing but the reign of mind. We ourselves are but an example of the reign of mind, perhaps the highest our finite intelligence can compass, but assuredly not the only example. This view is certainly panlogism. It may even be called pan-theism without the static associations of theism.

Our age needs to-day in the midst of the disintegration of our ordinary religious dogmas a fresh formulation of God. He cannot be less than mind, nor can He be more than mind as harmony is the widest sense of the term. As mind He is present everywhere. He is within us, as without us. But being within us He can be best comprehended in ourselves. This is the essence of Vedanta as I conceive it. Ordinary theisms like popular religions exalt God, only to make Him inaccessible and inscrutable. The inwardness of the Vedanta is exquisitely brought out in those lines of Kabir :

“ Kasturi kundal base, mrug dhunde ban mahi :
Aise ghat ghat Ram hai, pur danya dakhe nahi.”

i.e., “ There is musk in the abdomen of the deer,” says Kabir, “ and yet it imagines that the fragrance comes from without and hunts and hunts for it all over the forest.” So too God is within us, but we mortals pass Him by. For Vedanta there is no mere matter, there can be no mere matter, and so materialism is

impossible for it. But the extreme distrust of matter which Vedanta has been responsible for in our country is barely consistent with its idea that only Brahman is, and nothing else is. If this be so, there can be no matter which is not sanctified by the breath of the Brahman within it. This alone can justify the endless catholicity of Hindu worship, for the true Hindu soul goes beyond matter and sees the shining light of Brahman within it.

I feel that this is the truth which we in India are in a better position to appreciate. The psychological insight of the Upanishadic seer has found an empirical justification at the hands of Western science, among whose votaries are to be found Indians like Sir J. C. Bose breaking down the barrier between the vegetable and the animal worlds. When we have grasped the genuine significance of the thought of an all-pervading reality, we are logically bound to give up our epistemological prejudices of thought which conceives Reality as a static changeless entity. physics and biology, psychology and sociology proclaim to us movement as the eternal law of life, and metaphysics cannot ignore what they teach. They supply fresh grist to the metaphysical mill. I am not sure if even Lord Haldane with all his sympathy for science grasped the full significance of its message for philosophy, for I am frankly puzzled by the contradictions of his language. Thought is regarded by him as ever-developing, and yet he talks of thought, which is complete, perfect. Palpably he has not unmistakably got hold of the truth that Mind or Spirit can only live in eternal freshness and not in the tomb of completeness. The rapprochement between science and philosophy which I have been speaking about lies just in this that science is increasingly forced to raise philosophic questions, while philosophy, ever jealous of her great discovery of mind, sees herself more and more vindicated by the discoveries of science. Dr. Haldane is on surer ground than his brother when he says: "Philosophy, to be effective, must, however, be in constant living contact with the sciences, from which her questions come"

(p. 330, *The Sciences and Philosophy*), for he seeks to emphasize not merely the theoretical contact of the two, but the positive, common nature of the subject-matter of both. Science and philosophy have lived in vain, if by now we fail to see that both deal with the same living, palpitating reality ; they differ in their attitudes and their methods. Reality is one, as the Indian *rishis* saw, but its manifestations are many, as the West of to-day or rather of the immediate past has been emphasising. What we need to do is to synthesize the two views, not as a matter of mere speculation, divorced from facts but as a matter of concrete experience, of living facts in every nook and corner of this boundless universe.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL

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The doctrine of the Concrete Universal is admittedly Hegelian in origin—and may, indeed, be called the very ‘secret’ of Hegel—but the germ-plasm of the doctrine may be traced, with a fair degree of accuracy, to Spinoza’s distinction of the two stages of *ratio* and *scientia intuitiva*,¹ reinforced later by the Kantian distinction of Understanding and Reason, pointing, in the end, to the problematic and essentially negative concept of an *intellectus archetypus* or intuitive understanding. So far as Spinoza is concerned, the emphasis, however, is on the concrete nature of the individual rather than on the universal, and the emphasis is essentially misplaced in the contestable thesis that was worked out anew, in evident sympathy with the Spinozistic position, by Bradley and Bosanquet, especially the latter—the thesis, namely, that individuality is the true pattern and type of universality and that universality can be found only in the individual in proportion as it is truly individual. To start with Bradley, the problem that is staring him in the face is as to how in spite of recognised differences—‘differences forced together by an underlying identity, and a compromise between the plurality and the unity’ being—‘the essence of relation’²—Bradley can consistently

¹ *Vide Cogitata Metaphysica*, Pt. II, Ch. VII; *Short Treatise*, Pt. I, Ch. VI; also Duff, *Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy*, Ch. V.

² *Appearance and Reality* (2nd ed.), p. 180.

allow even 'the shade of diversity' or appearance of separateness to hold its own within the all-comprehending system, the Absolute, which alone is to be regarded as real. Thus, as a consequence of his denial of real plurality and separateness which 'exist only by means of relations,'¹ Bradley was constrained, along one line of reflexion, to disown the Hegelian 'identity-in-difference,' and to view the universals as merely self-identical characters. Without parrying the question like Bosanquet, who thinks that identity-in-difference must go 'in the end,'² Bradley acknowledges that 'identity obviously by its essence must be more or less abstract.'³ Nevertheless he insists, on the other hand, that it would be one of the coarsest of prejudices to suppose that sameness or identity excludes diversity, and that, on the contrary, 'sameness is real amid differences.' While it is true that 'that which is identical in quality must always, so far, be one and its division, in time or space or in several souls, does not take away its unity.' it is no less true that variety or diversity 'does make a difference to the identity, and without that difference and these modifications, the sameness is nothing.'⁴ Hence this fact of sameness through diversity points to a 'real unity, a concrete universal'⁵—'as the identity of analysis and synthesis' in which we may be said to have returned to truth and made our peace with reality.⁶

What, then, is the nature of this 'concrete universal'? The first thing to realise is, it is contended, that the universal as placed in opposition to the particulars, and the particulars, as placed in opposition to the universal, both involve contradiction and pass into each other. The true universal is

¹ *Ibid*, p. 350.

² *Logic* (2nd ed.). Vol. II, p. 279.

³ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 351.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 281.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 124.

⁶ *Principles of Logic*, Vol. II., p. 487.

rather the principle that permeates the particulars and that develops itself now into one and now into the other, and the idea appears to be that, if we had insight into the nature of the universal, we should see that all these differences arise out of it. And, following Hegel, Bradley and Bosanquet express this by saying that the true or concrete universal is the individual. Strictly speaking, 'the *abstract* universal and the *abstract* particular are what does not exist. The *concrete* particular and the *concrete* universal both have reality, and they are different names for the individual'—which is only 'the identity of universal and particular.'¹

Now, I begin by questioning the soundness of the principle to which both Bradley and Bosanquet alike subscribe—the principle, namely, in Bosanquet's words, that 'the key to all sound philosophy lies in taking the concrete universal, that is, the individual, as the true type of universality.'² Such a doctrine of the 'concrete universal' seems to me to involve the entire obliteration of all conceivable distinction between the universal and the particular as has hitherto been found to hold. The individual, in the sense of an independent substantive existent, vanishes and there is substituted in its place a phase in some whole, which is, in its turn, a phase in another, and so on, until ultimately the culmination is reached in the Absolute which is, in truth, only a huge particular. It will be sufficient here to urge two considerations.

In the first place, taking the term 'universal' in the ordinary sense, we need to distinguish the *act* of cognising a universal both from the universal itself and from the way in which that universal, in and through the act in question, is cognised. The mental act of cognising is undoubtedly concrete—a concrete event or occurrence—but it is, as such, neither a concept nor a universal. It is characterised, like every other concrete

¹ *Principles of Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 188, 189.

² *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 40.

fact, by a plurality of qualities which it has in common with other mental acts, but in itself, it is as definitely *particular* as any other fact or event in nature. A concept, on the contrary, is the way in which a universal is conceived—the mode in which it is grasped by thought,—and manifestly, is not to be confounded with the act through which it has been attained. As Bradley himself put it, a concept can, in no intelligible sense, be said to happen or have a definitely assignable place in the temporal series. But it is equally important to distinguish the concept from the universal of which it is the concept. A *concept* is doubtless a product of thought—of thought exercised upon a world of objects which are found to exhibit certain identities of character. Psychologically viewed the genesis of the concept may be traced to a process of the mind, which is at once analytic and synthetic—a process, on the one hand, of singling out what lies embedded in the complex structure of reality, and, on the other, of filiating or stringing together, so to speak, what appears here, there and everywhere under widely diversified conditions, and in numerical difference. The universal to which this concept refers is a quality or property characterising a number of particular entities, often widely separate from one another in time and space—a ‘pervasive character of things’ as Professor Alexander expresses it.¹ Surely, no mere synthesis of such concepts will enable us to reach, even at the furthest end of the road, the universal or the so-called ‘concrete universal,’ for the matter of that, which is taken to be the same as the individual.

In the second place, it is of essential importance to avoid the confusion, occasioned by ‘mere verbal analogy,’ as the late Prof. Cook Wilson has put it,² of ‘the unity of the universal in its particulars’ with ‘the unity of the individual substance as a unity of its attributes (or attribute-elements).’

¹ *Vide Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, N.S., XX, 1920, pp. 150-51.

² *Statement and Inference*, Vol. I, p. 158 n.

The source of this confusion is to be traced, of course, to a famous but none the less cryptic dictum of Hegel's in which he affirms that 'the universal is the ground and foundation, the root and substance of the individual,' that 'which permeates and includes in it everything particular.' This is, as the late lamented Professor L. T. Hobhouse justly complained, the much too prevalent tendency, in certain quarters, of identifying the universal with the concept of it. If one thinks of 'colour,' for example, as a characteristic of things in the physical world, to describe it as an individual wears at once the aspect of perversity and paradox. Appearing, as they do, here, there and everywhere under all sorts of varying conditions, colours exhibit no resemblance whatsoever to the unity and continuity of an individual thing. If, on the other hand, one chooses to think of the concept 'colour,' one can reasonably look upon it as a kind of schema, which in order to be realised must be filled in some definite way, but which as a *schema*, maintains its unity through its differences of expression. Thus, to describe a thing as having a specific colour will seem to be tantamount to placing it within the scope of this *schema*, and, as such, colour would be, in the words of Meredith, 'a spirit upon things by which they become expressive to the spirit.' Summarily speaking, the conceptual system is one thing and the reality to which it refers is another. Related to one another they certainly are, but the relation in question is obviously not one of identity. In the last analysis, then, the fallacy, lurking in this Hegelian doctrine of the 'concrete universal,' is that of attributing the unity, which, in a way, belongs to the concept, to the varied instances of the universal to which the concept refers. The real unity of a universal consists in identity of character—an identity which no doubt is realised in countless different instances,—but it does not most certainly consist in any substantive or causal continuity of the type exemplified in an existent individual. It seems to me, then, that although in a sense it may be legitimate to describe the inter-connected system

of reality—understanding by that, however, something very different from Bradley's 'supra-relational unity'—as an individual, we are bound to recognise that within this interconnected system, universals, relations and particulars have their place and are alike entitled to the designation 'real.'

It is for this reason that I find considerable difficulty in Prof. Stout's theory of the universal as the 'distributive unity of a class'—which, as a rebound from the somewhat dogmatic insistence on the tenet of the 'concrete universal,' commits the same fallacy of hypostatizing the universal that he begins by castigating in others. Accordingly, it is hardly fair on his part to convict the 'traditional view' of the error of hypostatization in its representation of the universal as a 'single indivisible entity' which as 'numerically the same in all' or 'ubiquitous without having parts or members' 'spreads undivided,' operates unspent.¹ While it is not denied that the traditional view is very often amenable to this charge, it can and does obviate this error so far as it keeps rigorously to the 'epistemic' issue proper and thus does not need to be superseded by Prof. Stout's peculiar view of the universal—which, as a remedy, turns out to be as bad as the disease itself.

What I am concerned to maintain, in the first instance, is that Prof. Stout's theory of the universal reveals on closer inspection, what I venture to think to be, an *ignoratio elenchi*. The decisive issue centred in the problem of universals is, as I conceive it, not whether characters or qualities are 'numerically same' or 'distinct,' 'locally separate' or not, but how in spite of numerical distinctness of concrete things or particulars, characters or qualities can yet have such sameness or identity as is predicable in the same sense and relation of their relevant particulars. In this matter Bradley's phrasing of the issue, quite irrespective of the solution offered by him, seems to be more to the point. Repudiating at the very start the 'existential' interpretation of the issue involved in 'numerical sameness' or

¹ *Relativity, Logic and Mysticism*, Supplementary Volume III, pp. 115-16.

'distinctness,'—"the idea that mere existence could be anything or could make anything the same or different, seems a sheer superstition" ¹—he holds all identity and continuity to be ideal, a matter of content. Then he proceeds to reinforce his own position by interpreting anew the Leibnitzian principle of the 'Identity of Indiscernibles' in words that bear full quotation in this context: "it is because the ideal content *seems* the same that we *therefore* assume it to be really identical, and identical in spite of change and diversity, despite the difference of its two presentations." ² When, therefore, Prof. Stout goes on to affirm ³ that 'the same indivisible quality cannot appear separately in different times and places' unless it is locally or temporally separate, he is only begging the question concerning the nature of universals at the very start, and precluding the very possibility of ever coming into close quarters with the nature of the universal. For, his contention virtually amounts to saying *totidem verbis* that a character which characterizes a particular must characterize a particular only and therefore must be only a particular—or, to use his own words: 'characters *as such* are instances of universals.' But the reasoning in this regard does not appear to be at all convincing. Simply because characters are never found except as characterising particulars, it by no means follows that characters are only *instances* of universals, *i.e.*, are 'particulars,' ⁴ or as one recent writer, ⁵ in avowed sympathy with Prof. Stout's view, concludes herefrom that 'what is in particulars is itself particular, a character such as a quality (or relation).' Such a conclusion, however, is altogether untenable. Straining the analogy between characters exemplified in concrete things and the things themselves, the mode of reasoning employed herein has been betrayed into a confusion

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 593.

² *Principles of Logic*, Vol. II, pp. 587-88.

³ *The Nature of Universals and Propositions* (Hertz Lecture).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁵ L. A. Reid, *Knowledge and Truth*, p. 190.

of the unity of the universal in its exemplifying particulars with the unity of the individual as a unity of its attributes. I do not offer to discuss here how far the conclusion has been influenced and precipitated by Prof. Stout's view of substance as nothing apart from its qualities. What I find to be one of the most fatal pitfalls in his argument is his faltering grip on the distinction between the identity of a 'continuant' and the identity of a 'recurrent' character,—a distinction which, thanks to Mr. Johnson, is so useful in determining the issue concerning universals. Indeed, the one essential aberration of Prof. Stout's theory, so far as I can make out, is that there could, according to it, be no 'unit classes' no universals with only one instance, inasmuch as the admission of such a universal would stultify the formula of 'the distributive unity' of a class. Yet there is absolutely no reason for refusing to admit the possibility of such universals.

While admitting that the traditional identity of differences is ill adapted, by reason of its inherent ambiguities, to express the nature of universals, I do not yet see how we can mend matters by making universality consist 'in the identity of a type, that is recurrent in separate particulars.'¹ This type, kind or pattern, we are told,² is strictly 'what is recurrent' in qualities and relations which "are, as existences always particular"—though "each is apprehensible only as a 'so-and-so,' as a 'such'"—and further, "the mode in which particulars are thus known is also the form in which they exist." Much as I agree with the general tenor of Prof. N. K. Smith's criticisms, I am yet bound to dissent from this way of putting the case. I fail to see in what way exactly the 'type,' beyond introducing needless complication and an abstraction of the third degree, can solve the outstanding difficulties of the problem. Cannot a recurring character, by the very fact of its recurrence, be that

¹ N. K. Smith, *The Nature of Universals*, 'Mind,' No. 144, p. 420.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 408, 420.

'pervasive character of things' which is essentially what we mean by the universal and thus dispense with the necessity of interpolating a 'type' into the analysis of the situation? Is not the nature of the 'universal' better expressed by 'the identity of recurrent character' than by the substantive unity of the 'type?' Moreover, it is essentially misleading to identify—no matter whether it is a particular or a universal of which you are speaking—"the mode in which things exist" with "the mode in which they are known." That is why we have the somewhat otiose bifurcation of qualities and relations into an existential aspect and an aspect of content or character, *i.e.*, 'so-and-so,' proceeding presumably from the belief in an existential status of universals, grounded in a 'theory of universals' which "does not require us to resort to any such doctrine¹ as the 'subsistence of universals.'" Though not propounding a doctrine or defining the realm of 'subsistents,' Prof. Smith himself is confronted with the need of recognising, all the same, such a realm—of which he has, at least provided a negative justification in the contrast that he draws between 'the actual' and the 'non-actual' universals. His failure to recognise the importance or the essentially negative concept of 'substance,' has not infrequently led him to confuse the universal with the concept of it, and the word 'type' is typical of this confusion. To sum up, therefore, what follows from a closer scrutiny of the doctrine of the 'concrete universal,' whether in the Hegelian or non-Hegelian version of it, is the total inaptness of its description as 'individual.' It is, in Bradley's opinion, the 'idea of system,' 'where difference and identity are two aspects of one process' exhibiting itself in the 'identity of analysis and synthesis' that is at bottom the notion of a perfected individuality—"the goal of our thoughts"² 'Our criterion,' in short, is 'this perfection'—which is but 'individuality or the idea of complete system.'³ Thus, Bradley is

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 405.

² *Principles of Logic*, Vol. II. pp. 487, 490.

³ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 542.

debarred, by his very definition of 'individuality,' from predicating it of any other being except the Absolute. What I contend, however, is that the universal can neither be concrete nor individual ; and therefore, to describe the individual as 'both a concrete particular and a concrete universal'—both being 'names of real existence' ¹—is but doing violence to language. To call an individual a concrete particular is something that one can readily understand, but in the same breath to designate an individual as a 'concrete universal' is perplexing in the extreme. It can only be entertained on the abrogation of the specific distinction between the universal and the particular. The perplexity is to be traced, however, to that cryptic dictum of Hegel's in which he holds that 'the universal is identical with itself, with the express qualification, that it simultaneously contains the particular and the individual.' Now the term 'contains' is singularly inappropriate in the context. It owes all its plausibility to a radical confusion of the "is" of predication with the "is" of equation or identity. To illustrate by Hegel's own example, Caius, Titus and Sempronius, as human beings, are each identical with the property of humanity, and thus humanity as a universal contains as its particulars Caius, Titus and Sempronius. But it is a mere truism that physical inclusion is one thing, and logical comprehension another—an individual inclusive of its properties is something fundamentally different from the universal as comprehending and manifesting itself in its particulars. It is far better to say, therefore, that the universal characterises the individual or the particular.

It is not at all difficult to see how this view reacts on the nature of the individual—representing it ultimately as a mere conflux or 'meeting-place' of universals. This is how the notion of the 'concrete universal' is obtained. But, as I have already argued, this is in effect to abolish the distinction between the universal and the individual. Individuals, in the Aristotelian

¹ *Principles of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 188.

sense of *πδωρη ουσία* are no mere combinations of, or complex, universals merely, simply because universals are not individuals, and no mere synthesis of "what" will bring us any the nearer to the concrete existence of an individual which we signify by the "that."

The root trouble for Bradley originates, however, from his systematic attempt to measure and define the concrete individual in terms of an abstract, formal individuality—the attempt, in other words, to reduce the substantive into the merely predicative. Hence the inadequacy, and the inevitable bankruptcy of the logical criterion of individuality 'under the double form of inclusiveness and harmony,'¹ that leads him to declare that nothing is, properly speaking, individual or perfect except the Absolute; for, this means no more than that Individuality is individual or that Perfection is perfect. Individuality is to be defined, if at all, from the human end, and not from the side of the Absolute, which remains, in spite of what one may contrive to say to the contrary, an abstract universal. Such a reversion of the philosophic method cannot but entail consequences that are disastrous, and however much Bradley may try to retrieve the situation by calling the individual the concrete universal, the concreteness of the individual evaporates in its reduction to the universal or, at the most, survives only in name. That is why he proceeds, with unsuspecting consistency, to equate the 'true individual' with 'system'² as equivalent expressions of the nature of Reality—though it is reckoned that 'a self-contained individual (like the System itself) remains in a sense an ideal.'³ Now 'system' even with a capital S, will ever fall far short of, and fail to express, that concrete wholeness which reveals itself in the individual. In itself 'system' is a very useful category, so far as it exhibits a far more complex and comprehensive unity than that we meet with in individuals. But that does by no

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 37.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ *Principles of Logic*, Vol. II (Terminal Essays), p. 668.

means imply that the more complex a unity is, the more concrete it necessarily is. Common sense would, however, declare that the relation is just the reverse. Nevertheless Bradley, no less than Bosanquet, is labouring under this very assumption, so far as they are bent upon resolving the difference of *kind*, that exists between the abstract and concrete, into one of *degrees* in completeness, and treating it like individuality, as a matter of degree, to be found in its perfection only in the Absolute. Measured by such a standard, the finite must necessarily appear to be abstract and ideal, and not, therefore, truly individual and concrete. There is, therefore, nothing strange that they should perpetually be talking of a concrete universal or concrete unity, when what they are evidently meaning all the time is simply a complex unity, or the unity of a system. Founding, as he does, his conception of unity on differences, that are only precarious and superficial, he fails to justify herein the character of true universality which consists, as Bosanquet phrased it, in 'sameness by means of the other.'

It is true that Bradley has declared no less emphatically than Bosanquet that 'there would be no meaning in sameness unless it were the identity of differences, the unity of elements which it holds together, but must not confound.'¹ But the real meaning of the 'sameness' which he has enshrined in his views of unity is to be recovered from the significant use of the metaphor of 'elements' and the curiously grudging and disparaging tone in which he habitually speaks of differences. Forsooth, in a system where 'difference itself is but phenomenal' and 'not ultimate'—in as much as 'plurality and separateness themselves exist only by means of relations'² that are unreal—what in reality we can be, and 'are asserting' is simply 'that *notwithstanding other aspects* this one aspect of sameness persists and is real.'³ But this is not assuredly what he originally meant by the true universal or unity in difference; as a matter of fact, it answers exactly to Bosanquet's definition of generality

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 348.

² *Ibid*, p. 350.

³ *Ibid*, p. 351 (*italics mine*).

as 'sameness in spite of the other.' What he was out to demonstrate and justify is the reality of the 'concrete universal' or 'unity in difference'; what he ended by demonstrating is the merely general or 'abstract universal.' That is why Bradley is so anxious to maintain the aspect of identity or sameness at the expense of differences, and regard universals as being identical in their diverse instances, so that ultimately he discovers the main evidence in justification of concrete universals not in recurrent characters common to separate existences—for such there are none—but in the self-identity of the 'continuant.' This is what he calls the true, that is to say, concrete universal which is also the individual or system of members, each of which is likewise a system in miniature. Once we set our foot on this path, we cannot hope to discover, even at the furthest end of it, anything which can, with strict justice, be called 'individual.' For once we start by de-realising or de-individualising the individual—in pursuance of some abstract idea of perfect individuality—it is vain to attempt to reconstitute, by a process of re-concretion that individual with which the so-called 'concrete universal' is seeking to re-unite. 'Try however much we may to persuade ourselves, by the delusive gospel of the 'concrete universal,' that this is the Individual we had been all along in search of, it shall,—to repeat his own verdict in another context,—'no more *make* that whole which commands our devotion, than some shredded dissection of human tatters is that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts found delightful.'¹ For, evidently, in this suicidal pursuit, the individual as a substantive existent has disappeared, and what we have instead is merely a phase of some universal which, again, in its turn is a phase of another universal until in the long run it reaches its consummation, in the manner of a 'note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss,'² in the Absolute as the one true Individual. It is futile to go on calling a mere synthesis of universals, however concretised,

¹ *Principles of Logic*, Vol. II.

² *Appearance and Reality*, p. 172.

an individual—for, so to insist would be more or less a fallacy of verbalism; nor would it do to claim it as the 'Paradise regained' for thought because, on his own showing, the 'Paradise to which one returns unless oneself could come back unchanged, is Paradise no longer.'¹

It is apparent, therefore, that following the lead of the category of 'identity in difference' one must terminate in something that is neither concrete nor individual, but is assuredly universal and, therefore, abstract. Though the notion of the 'concrete universal' as the true type of universality, is somewhat paradoxical, if not self-contradictory, it has nevertheless had an eventful history within as well as outside the Hegelian school proper. It may have fallen short of its immediate purpose—of substantiating the nature of Reality as Individual—but it may truly be said to have succeeded where it has failed, viz., in stressing the character of Reality as a concrete unity. It has influenced even such an un-Hegelian thinker as Professor Stout in his treatment of the universal as being concrete—the universal being 'the unity of a class as including its members or instances.' Now, this seems to be an extreme and literal carrying out, in an extensional reference, of the Hegelian view of 'the universal' as containing 'the particular and the individual.' It is true that Professor Stout stops short of extreme nominalism or particularism, and retrieves the situation by the admission of the universal as a 'distributive unity.' I have already commented upon the profound ambiguity lurking in the Hegelian dictum, and on the impropriety of an extensional rendering of the universal. What I am concerned to point out here is that the view of the universal as a 'distributive unity'—markedly the epithet 'distributive' as used in this context—is illustrative of that error of psychological and metaphysical hypostatisation of the universal into which many noted thinkers have slipped inadvertently. So construed his view is separated by a very thin margin from that of undisguised and avowed nominalism. Just as in Bradley's

¹ *Principles of Logic*, Vol. II, T. E., IV, p. 664.

rendering of it, the individual is dissolved into a collection of universals that are ultimately housed in the Absolute, so the universal, in Prof. Stout's version of it, is concretised—or, in other words, 'distributed' and instantialized—to the very detriment of its character as universal. But the ultimate sequel to both these characteristic attempts is the same, *viz.*, the abolition of the specific distinction between the universal and the particular. Here is clearly a meeting of extremes, which has an interesting parallel in the Hegelian school itself. It is an historic commonplace that the objective or absolute idealism of Hegel which is sometimes styled, though paradoxically, 'ideal-realism,' has in its ambition to be absolute or thorough-going frequently tended, on account of its much too pretentious 'Panlogismus,' to degenerate, as among the left-wing Hegelians and 'ultra-Hegelians,' into naturalism, historicism, or materialism of the most unmitigated type. That is indeed inevitable; an idealism that seeks, by its over-emphasis on the dictum 'all that is real is rational,' to obliterate the irreducible antithesis—I say, antithesis which must, at all costs, be maintained, although antagonism is denied—between the ideal and the actual, is sure to defeat its own end and is ultimately destined by its natural Nemesis to border upon a crude naturalism or materialism with its apotheosis of the actual. The modern Italian neo-Idealism which upholds the main Hegelian tradition seems to me to have been betrayed into the very same fallacy.

It is apparent that the doctrine of 'the concrete universal' as the very 'secret' of Hegel has, passing through its varying formulations in the Hegelian school, come perilously near the crass nominalism of what may be called Prof. Stout's concretism or particularism. For, what does his so-called 'distributive unity' amount to? It amounts to saying, in so many words, that the universal is a mere name for the totality of actual and possible instances, and as such, it is only nominally contra-distinguished from nominalism which it virtually is. It is, assuredly, straining the resources of language, and of ordinary speech, to

say that all that we mean by the proposition 'the rose is red' is that the adjective 'red' stands, not for the characteristic being of the universal 'red,' but, only and always, for all the actual and possible instances of red. Granted, further, that the 'distributive unity of a class' or kind 'is an ultimate and unanalysable type of unity,' how does it avail in enabling us to realise that the separate instances of 'red' are only instances of the universal 'red,' without a prior knowledge of that of which they are recognised to be the instances? How, in other words, do the instances come to be referred to the unity of one class if they have no common character except that of belonging to the class? The case for 'distributive unity' is only proved by a proleptic use of the terms employed; and it is made to rest ultimately upon what may, in all fairness, be described as a clear *ν'στερον πρστερον*. By no stretch of imagination can these diverse instances of 'red' be conceived to possess this characteristic prior to their classification, and cannot, therefore, serve as the basis of classification itself. Once it is clearly grasped that universals are integral to reality, and are to be interpreted not in a merely extensional manner—which has been found to be so forced and unnatural—but in a direct connotational reference, it is easier to realise that the unity of the universal is secured by the common character which is compatible with, and, in fact, pre-supposes diversity in respect of its exemplifying particulars. What is needed, therefore, is the whole-hearted recognition and consistent application of the notion of an inter-related system, for relatedness within a system as a category has been found to be much more fundamental, and ultimate, and essentially calculated to do justice to the reality of relations and characters than either of those of 'individuality,' 'identity-in-difference,' 'concrete universal' or even 'distributive unity.' What is the more noteworthy is that the unity which is characteristic of an articulate system is 'sameness by means of the other'—a phrase truly descriptive of individuality, not of universality as Bosanquet would have it—and therefore concrete.

PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE

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A distinction is found to be made now-a-days between Existence and Reality. The attempt is not quite new. It appears to have begun, in modern philosophy, from the time of Kant. What the recent writers have said on the subject can be summed up under two heads. Existence means either (a) occupation of a definite place in a system of reality, so that corresponding to different spheres of reality (logicians' universes of discourses) it is of different kinds; or (b) existence is regarded as a species of reality, so that everything existent is real, but not *vice versa*. This sort of distinction does not appear to have been made distinctly by any ancient writers, nor does it appear to be made by all modern thinkers. Mr. McTaggart, for instance, does not accept the distinction *in toto* in either of the senses stated above. The question therefore arises—Is there really any such distinction between existence and reality? If so, in what sense of the terms? The views of different writers may be due to the acceptance of different senses of the terms. And the terms, as a matter of fact, admit of different meanings. The matter is not therefore, so simple that it can be treated adequately within the scope of this short paper. Yet some preliminary work can be done on the subject, at least to give a definite shape to the question. And that is what will be attempted here so far as the problem of existence is concerned.

The problem is found to be handled, first, in the modern period, by John Locke, who appears to recognise a simple idea of existence given along with his ideas of sense and of reflection. But his language is somewhat obscure. He writes: "Existence and unity are two other ideas that are suggested to this understanding by every object without, and every idea within. When

ideas are in our minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us ; which is that they exist, or have existence ; and whatever we can consider as one thing, whether a real being or idea, suggests to the understanding the idea of unity." (Locke, '*Essay on the Human Understanding*,' Book II, Ch. VII, Sc. 7.) Here Locke lumps together two different things, existence and unity, and he appears to maintain that we have ideas of both 'suggested' to the mind by every other idea. But what exactly he means by the term 'suggested' is not made clear by him. According to the principle he observes elsewhere, we can interpret him as meaning that we have 'simple ideas' of them originally given along with other experiences. In other words, these two ideas are distinct in nature but their source is the same as that of other ideas. The idea of existence is thus an additional item in our experience of sensible objects as such. At least this is the sense in which his successor in the same school of thought understands him and exposes what he considers to be the error of Locke. Thus Hume writes in his '*Treatise of Human Nature*,' Part II, Section VI :

"There is no impression nor idea of any kind, of which we have any consciousness or memory, that is not conceived as existent ; and it is evident, that from this consciousness, the most perfect idea and assurance of *being* is derived. From hence we may form a dilemma, the most clear and conclusive that can be imagined, *viz.*, that since we never remember any idea or impression, without attributing existence to it, the idea of existence must either be derived from a distinct impression, conjoined with every perception or object of our thought, or must be the very same with the idea of perception or object."

"So far from there being any distinct impression attending every impression and every idea, that I do not think that there are any two distinct impressions which are inseparably conjoined.....And thus though every impression and idea we remember be considered as existent, the idea of existence is not derived from any particular impression."

“The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on any thing simple and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it, whatever we conceive we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form.”

From the above quotation it appears clearly that Hume does not admit a separate idea of existence as going with the experience of any object. The object, whatever it may be, whether perceived or conceived, is simply regarded as existent. In other words, to call anything an object of knowledge is to regard it as existent. He does not appear to make any distinction between existence and reality, nor does he appear to advocate exactly the view of existence as offered by Berkeley. Berkeley also does not recognise any distinction between them. But to him, existence as applied to sensitive objects is a *relation* in which an object stands to the perceiving mind. His “*esse est percipi*” points to this. But Berkeley does not keep to this one meaning of existence. As applied to the self, existence does not mean with him a relation of this kind which obtains between the *knower* and the *known*. To the self or spirit, according to him, belongs what may be called absolute existence, though subject to divine will, but to material objects only a relative one. This double sense given to this term, as applied to the self and to sensible objects, though it otherwise weakens his position, raises a fundamental question whether the order of existence is the same everywhere or whether there are different orders of it. Are we to keep to one meaning of the term, or does it admit of different meanings? On this question I do not say anything just at present. I would not only refer to the position of Kant, who appears to make a distinction between reality and existence by allotting them to different categories of the understanding. We find that he puts reality under the categories of quality, and existence under those of modality. According to his own scheme of division of judgments of

the understanding, Kant does not, of course, mean by reality here exactly what we take it to be when applied to the so-called different spheres of reality or to existence within any of the spheres. The distinction that he makes between the two categories may have consciously or unconsciously influenced views of the modern writers who would recognise a similar distinction. But Kant too does not appear to offer a very clear view of the distinction. He writes in his own quaint way :

" Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; that consequently, the conception of which indicates a being in time " (Book II, Chapter I, '*Critique of Pure Reason*').

He writes again at different places of the '*Critique*.'

" The scheme of reality is existence in a determined time." " That which coheres with the material condition of experience (sensation) is real."

Is not the influence of Hume also apparent in the passages quoted above? Kant appears to make here a distinction without a difference, and his actual position on the matter is difficult to make out consistently. However, he has made one important contribution to the subject far in advance of his predecessors of the empirical school. Locke recognises an idea of existence, but does not say anything definitely with regard to the original source of this idea. Hume therefore comes to shew consistently that there is no idea of existence, in addition to the impression perceived or idea conceived with which it is said to go. But the idea is there, as verified by our experience. We speak of things as existing or not existing, and this way of regarding things is at times of vital importance to us. There cannot be an innate idea of it for the empiricists; nor are the empiricists able to show from what experience in particular the idea comes originally. It must, therefore, have a peculiar origin from some

mysterious source. No wonder, therefore, that Kant was obliged to trace its origin to the inner (and to him the deeper) self of man—his Understanding or Pure Reason, as he would call it.

The reference made above to the views of the few thinkers, who, amongst others, are credited to have laid the foundation of modern philosophy, is sufficient to shew the complexity of the problem under consideration here. 'The question that may be raised at this point is whether there is any *one* definite meaning that can be given to the term 'existence.' It does not appear that we can. The term is not, as a matter of fact, used always in the same sense, and much of the confusion of thought on the subject that still goes on may be due to this fact. Different writers appear to emphasise different senses of the term, regarding the objects to which it is applied necessarily from their different aspects. And so they are all in a sense relatively and partially true in their respective views. But still the original idea, if there be any, underlying the diverse applications of the term has to be sought out. But where to find it? 'This question is partly psychological, partly philological. We have to find out on the one hand, what exactly goes on in the mind, if not consciously, always at least subconsciously, when we apply the term to any object of experience. We have also to trace out, on the other hand, what was the original meaning of the term when it was first applied by man to any object. I would only mention here that the term is not used always with full consciousness as to its real significance, and in many instances the use of the term is rather by way of analogy or metaphor. And there is no need also to use it always. We, as a matter of fact, are not constantly speaking of the existence of this or that, except on rare occasions of vital importance. Our interest often is in the objects themselves, rather than in their existence conceived abstractly. It is only in cases of doubt that we go to the length of attributing existence to an object. And in doing so, we but determine the case by its analogy to our other experiences which

bear in our mind the idea and to which perhaps we originally attributed existence. Take, for instance, the case of any sensible object in our surroundings. We either do not notice it or notice it when it comes into touch with some special interest of ours, the interest may be theoretical or practical. And finding that it satisfies certain spatial or temporal conditions of other objects which have similar characteristics and which have been also credited with existence, we at once take the present one to be an existent object, without caring to understand philosophically what I mean by calling it *existent*. Fortunately we are not always in the philosophic mood, otherwise life would perhaps have been impossible. But the spatial or temporal characteristics which go with things regarded as existent do not, by themselves, make up the idea. They are but signs which indicate existence. The source of the idea has thus to be sought elsewhere than in these signs. But where?

Kant was right so far in tracing this source, as I have said above, to our inner self. But in doing so, he appears to have missed the mark in spotting it in his abstract pure understanding. The category of existence, like all other categories we use in daily life, has its source in the inner concrete experiences of man—in his personal experiences, sensuous or otherwise. It is our own existence that we feel in ourselves first, and yet the idea thereof in our inner life is felt within us. And when we go to ascribe existence to other beings or things, no matter whether they be regarded as animate or inanimate (the distinction being of later origin both individually and racially), we do not invest them with an inner life like our own. Thus here, as elsewhere still, man has not yet come out of his original inevitable anthropomorphic stage. The idea of existence seems to be anthropomorphic, or more accurately *anthropopathic*. Whether the idea of Reality cannot also be traced similarly is a question of wider importance. This subject had better be left to abler hands for adequate treatment. I would now conclude by referring to the view of Max Müller, who in a way appears to support

my position from the philological aspect of the question. He writes in his Hibbert Lectures :

“ The root *as*, which still lives in our *he is*, is a very old root ; it existed in its abstract sense previous to the Aryan separation. Nevertheless, we know that *as*, before it could mean to be, meant to breathe.”

Here Max Müller tries to trace out the origin of the root idea underlying existence. He refers it to the idea of *breathing*, as the original meaning of *to be* signified by the Sanskrit root in the verb *asti*—*something is*. The writer thus finds in the original idea of existence an inner function of living beings as felt by themselves. So in a way this illustrates what I have suggested above. Whether Max Müller is here correct or not is left to abler philologists to decide. But the suggestion he makes is, I think, worth considering in connection with the problem of existence.

ACOSMISM

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Acosmism is described by Windelband as the doctrine that "the world of experience vanishes in and before the truly real" (*Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 80). This view has been shared by many eminent thinkers of India, e.g., Asvaghosha, Nāgārjuna, Gaudapāda, Saṅkara and the author of the *Yogavāsishtha*. We read in the *Mahāyānasaddhōtpāda śāstra* of Asvaghosha: "When the mind is stirred by the wind of ignorance (अविद्या) the waves of mentality make their appearance. These three (i.e., the mind, ignorance and mentality) however, have no (absolute) existence" (Suzuki: *Awakening of Faith*, p. 68). Nāgārjuna begins his famous *Mādhyamika sūtras* with a very bold statement: "There is no death, no birth, no destruction, no persistence; no oneness, no manyness, no coming in, no departing" (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, Vol. IV, p. 3). He holds that "The production, the stay and the destruction are all alike a magic scene (माया), like a dream, and like a Gandharvanagar" (city in sky) (*ibid*, VII, 34). Gaudapāda believes: "There is no dissolution, no creation, none in bondage; no pupilage, none desirous of liberation, none liberated. This is the absolute truth" (*Māṇḍukyakārikās*, II, 32). According to Saṅkara also "In reality (*paramārthatus*) there is nothing else besides Brahman alone. If we imagine we perceive a transformation (विकार) of Him into the world, a division (भेद) of Him into a plurality of individual souls, this depends on *Avidyā* (ignorance)" (Deussen: *The System of the Vedānta*, p. 302). In the *Yogavāsishtha* (III,

119, 25) Vasishtha is reported to have taught Ramachandra: "In the Ever-peaceful Absolute there is no cosmos at any time, nor even the name of the cosmos in the form in which it is experienced by us to exist." Here we propose to determine how far this view is tenable in the light of modern thought.

What is real and what is unreal?—is a very important question. How the question arises at all is described by William James, the great Psychologist: "The whole distinction of real or unreal is thus grounded on two mental facts—first, that we are liable to think differently of the same; and second, that when we have done so, we can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard" (*Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 290). It is exactly in this way that the question arises, whether the objective world is real or unreal. For, there are two ways of looking at it; one, as it is known to us at present, and, second, as it may be apart from our knowledge of it, and at all times. Now, what is regarded as real by me? "Any object," James points out, "which remains uncontradicted is *ipso facto* believed and posited as absolute reality" (*ibid*, p. 289); and further he says: "Each world while it is attended to is real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention" (*ibid*, p. 293). Speaking about what every individual takes to be real in spite of there being other possibilities, James says: "Whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real" (*ibid*, p. 295), and sums up the psychology of belief in one idea: "The *fons et origo* of all reality, whether from the absolute or practical point of view is thus subjective, is our selves. As thinkers with emotional reaction, we give what seems to us a still higher degree of reality to whatever thing we select and emphasise and turn to with a will" (*ibid*, p. 296). Schiller similarly holds: "In this selection of 'real' reality our interests, desires, and emotions mentally play a leading part...Individual minds differ as greatly in their acceptance of 'facts' as in other aspects..... Without a process of selection by us, there are no real facts for

us, and this whole process is immensely arbitrary " (*Studies in Humanism*, pp. 187, 188). " The real external world is the pragmatically effective part of our total experience " (*ibid*, p. 202). From these considerations Schiller comes to a very important conclusion that " Real " and " Unreal " are really distinctions of value *within experience*; the " unreal " is what may be safely ignored, and the " real " is what is better to recognise " (*ibid*, p. 480). " Our pragmatic realities need not be ultimate " (*ibid*, p. 475).

From the foregoing psychological considerations it follows that the objective world of every individual is real only in relation to his subjective interests, apart from which it may present quite a different appearance. There are as many worlds as the individuals with varying interests and purposes, and they change in accordance with the subjective changes of their experiences. This is why the Humanists hold that reality is in the making. The world of one individual is in its major part unreal to another, and of the same individual the present world is unreal at some time or other, when his interests and emotions are entirely different. The commonness of the world of many individuals is probably due to similarity of interest and value. There may be countless individuals here and now, so very different from us in their attitude and subjectivity, that their worlds are totally unreal to us and ours totally unreal to them. A slight change in our vision changes the entire world. The real world of dream is totally unreal when the centre of interests is directed from the mental towards the physical personality. A little change in the threshold of consciousness determined by our interests will open an entirely new world, which was unreal before, and will instantly efface out of vision that which was formerly real. There can be no doubt that if our vision could be all-comprehensive with the widest possible interests and universal love, the world will not be experienced by us then in the same manner as it is experienced now. Why should we then suppose that the world which is real to us, the finite and

individual centres of interests, is also real in the same way to the Absolute Experience. In the Absolute Experience, the facts that interpret themselves as my particular real world must be presented differently. A study of the same facts differently interpreted in waking and dream-consciousness will probably make the point intelligible. A slight scratch, for example, on the physical body lying in bed may be interpreted as a real cut of sword by the dreaming personality. A very little weight put upon the physical body may be interpreted by the dreaming personality as being pressed heavily by a rock. Many other wonderful experiments of this sort can be made to convince one that what is interpreted as a real world may be experienced and interpreted in an entirely different manner in another order of existence. An hour of waking consciousness may be experienced as a whole life-time by the dreaming personality. Our real time and space may probably be mere moments and points in some other grade or type of experience. Our "real" world, therefore, must be thought to be real only in relation to us, in whatever grade of experience we may be. It is psychologically absurd to expect it to be real in the same sense in the Absolute Experience. It may be present in the Absolute in so entirely a different manner, that it is hardly correct for us to say that the world that is real to us is real to the Absolute in the same manner. Acosmism is, therefore, a doctrine against which Psychology cannot say anything. Psychology on the other hand gives a support to it. Even a great physicist of modern times, Eddington, comes to a conclusion in one of his famous works, which gives much support to acosmism: "The absolute world is of so different a nature, that the relative world, with which we are acquainted, seems almost like a dream" (Eddington: *Space, Time and Gravitation*, p. 14).

Going deeper than what the Psychologists usually go to,—into the epistemological examination of the objective world of our experience from out of which our subjective interests create a "real" world of psychology, we learn that the world of our experience is so different in nature from the real world without the mind

that our experience seems to be nothing more than a dream. With a slight change in our senses with regard to their number or constitution, this objective dream of ours would change immensely. It will become quite another to a differently constituted mind. This is not inconceivable. Even here and now there might be experienced several kinds of worlds existing simultaneously and interpenetratingly with one another, and yet quite unreal to the minds differently constituted from those to which they are real. If all of us had X-ray sight, for example, our world would be found inhabited not by bodies of the nature we see, but by skeletons only. How can we then expect that the Absolute consciousness, which is very much different from our present consciousness, would be conscious of things as we are conscious of them, that the world in the Absolute Experience would be as it is in ours, who are limited forms of the Absolute, viewing it in our own way and from our own particular points of view? In the whole things must be present in a much different way, and a way different from that in which they are present to us, so that we can safely say that the world real to, and experienced by, us is unreal to, and is not experienced by, the Absolute. "The Absolute Consciousness of the Whole," as Kingsland points out, "would be the unconsciousness of any *thing* ; it would be the absence of any objective universe" (*Rational Mysticism*, p. 371). That the vision of an objective world is relative to the activity of mind, that it is absent when the activity of the mind is absent, as the author of the *Yogavāsistha* points out, is evident from the fact that no objective world is experienced when the mind comes naturally to rest in deep sleep, and is brought to rest in *Samādhi*. The Absolute as such, in Itself, is the deepest Reality, the Ocean of Consciousness, within which waves of mind rise and fall, but which as a whole neither rises nor falls. It is, as Pramathanath Mukhopadhyaya has put it, "level of no stress, zero potential, absolute homogeneity, all consciousness, all being, and all bliss" (*Approaches to Truth*, p. 420). How can, then, we think that *our* world is Real to the Absolute ?

It may, however, be objected that the world or even the countless worlds and minds to which they are relative do not, and cannot exist, outside the Absolute. And when they are in the Absolute, how can their reality (existence) be denied? It is, no doubt, true that they exist within the Absolute, a fact which nobody can dare deny, but they cannot be said to be existing there in the form we experience them. The Absolute being the ultimate source and ground of all these relative appearances and of many others, their opposites and antitheses, all the multiplicity of appearances gets fused and blended into a Homogeneous Whole, like the colours of spectrum into white sun-light.

VALUE AND THE NATURE OF REALITY

By

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Impulses and desires play an important part in human life. Modern Psychology has done a great service in emphasising the dominant character of the conative aspect of mental experience. On account of the undisputed supremacy of Physical Sciences, during the last two centuries, cognition has all along enjoyed a status of respectability, while feeling and conation have borne the stigma of vulgarity, of course, with a heroic resignation, which has begun to bear fruit after all. Science wants us to be impersonal, to get rid of the last vestige of emotional susceptibility and to convert ourselves into dispassionate vehicles of mere cognitional processes. The rise and growth of human sciences, on the foundations of modern psychology, have brought to the front the emotional and volitional aspects of human life. Values have begun to claim a decent place in philosophical speculation. We find thinkers of all denominations, whether Idealists or Realists or Humanists, tackling the problem of values and trying to solve it, on the pattern of their respective outlooks on the nature of reality.

What are these Values after all ?

The simplest way to answer the question is to say that whatever satisfies our desires, or needs or wants directly or indirectly is a value. Whatever other characteristics value may have, it satisfies a personal being in some form or other.

As Sellars puts it, "Whatever attracts the individual or the group, so that it is selected and plays a part in life is a value."

This conception of value is liable to cause misunderstanding. It may lead to subjective interpretation. It may be thought that values are created by desire. From this point of view an object may undergo variation in respect of its valuelessness, from time to time. The subjective view introduces the element of instability and impermanence in the conception of value and even makes the phenomenon of desiring wholly unintelligible. If desire or interest determines value, how is desire determined in its turn? Why do we desire certain things and are repelled from others? If it be said that we desire things because they are valuable, we shall be moving in a vicious circle. We can, however, get out of this circle by putting an objective interpretation upon our valuational experience.

Amongst the Realists, who make so much of the theory of independence in epistemological discussions, there are some like Perry and Alexander who are not prepared to assign an absolutely independent ontological status to values; others, however, such as Russell, Moore and Laird, regard the tertiary qualities as altogether independent of consciousness. The present writer is prepared to side with the latter class of Realists, to the extent of regarding values as totally independent of human consciousness whether individual or collective. It may be pointed out, by the way, that in the present paper the difference between instrumental values and intrinsic values will be ignored. Values, strictly speaking, are always intrinsic. Extra-intrinsic values, are spoken of as values only metaphorically. They shine, like the moon, with the borrowed light of intrinsic values. However necessary the distinction may be in other respects, it serves no useful purpose to introduce it into the discussion of the nature of values, their status and function in reality as a whole.

It had already been said that some Realists regard values as the resultant of interaction between external objects and an appreciating consciousness. We may take Alexander as the

typical representative of this view. To quote his own words a rose "would be red whether known to me or another and before there were eyes to see it.....but it is not beautiful except for a contemplating mind." Human appreciation according to him, is an essential ingredient of the constitution of all values, though it is not the only ingredient. Besides the human element, there is also "some character" in the valued thing, which is the object of an act of appreciation. This character, as he says later on, is "coherence within the object of value." There is very little to differ from in what he says so far, but it is difficult to follow him intelligently when he says that "coherence is not something which is already in the things themselves but is born along with the act of appreciation. Values are, therefore, mental inventions, though like inventions, their materials are independent of the inventions."

The two statements coming close one after the other appear to involve a contradiction. If coherence is a character of the thing "which qualifies it to be the object of collective appreciation" it should be independently present in the object to be appreciated by consciousness. If it comes into being at the time of appreciation, it was not present in the object before the act of appreciation was effected. It is a misnomer, therefore, to call it the character of the object if it is a character that has been projected into the object from the side of consciousness. There is nothing whatsoever in the object corresponding to the experience of value and thus it becomes entirely a subjective phenomenon. As a consequence value is reduced to a variable characteristic of objects which comes and goes along with the appearance and exit of human appreciation.

Values may, therefore, be treated as either subjective or objective. It is difficult to conceive an intermediate mode of interpretation, in which the subjective and the objective factors play an equally important part. It is irrelevant to the issue to declare that values are like inventions and like them mental. Inventions after they have become a public affair,

are not tainted with subjectivity any longer. The subjective factor remains as long as inventions are in the process of taking shape. Can it be said in the case of values also, that when once they have been hatched, they can continue to have an objective existence of their own? An invention remains even after the inventor is dead and gone. Would values continue to exist objectively, if all minds were by some mysterious force, kidnapped from the face of the earth? If they continue to enjoy objective existence, Alexander's theory would be tenable no longer. Values, therefore, are completely objective, as objective as the primary and secondary qualities of things. They belong to the system of reality. They exist whether they are appreciated or not. They depend upon human consciousness only for appreciation and recognition and not for existence. Reality consists of facts and their relations as well as values. In order to attain a comprehensive view of reality, the factual and valuational elements should be recognised and harmonised. The values represent goals or ends of human endeavour, and human personality can attain to more or less complete expression only through identification with and realization of these values. Human minds do not bring them into existence, though the dawn of reflective consciousness leads to the discovery and recognition of these values as the dynamic, and meaningful aspects of our universe. The relation between desire and value is, that value is apprehended through the medium of desire as perceptual and relational aspects of the universe are apprehended through the instrumentality of sense and thought processes. Experience is more extensive than mere knowing, and contact with reality can be effected through the emotional and volitional aspects of our mind, as well, though thought no doubt plays a very important part in giving a vocal expression and harmonious arrangement to the truths discovered through different sources.

Alexander says that a proposition is true, if believed, and an object beautiful, if felt. It may be said that a proposition is

true, even if nobody believes it. Given a certain proposition and the system of reality in which that proposition is formulated it must be either true or false, no matter whether anybody appreciates the truth of that proposition. The goodness of an act similarly depends upon its characteristic to lead to a harmonious adjustment of the diverse interests of the individual and the social environment, regardless of the fact whether a person appreciates this characteristic or not. The same can be said of other values as well.

Assuming that values have an independent ontological status, it may be next asked: what rôle do they play in the determination of reality? Sciences content themselves with describing the causal relations of natural phenomena. Scientific knowledge is practically useful. It also extends our intellectual horizon, by presenting us with a stupendous network of events causally related to one another. Mere causal explanation, however, cannot give ultimate satisfaction. Here we have difference of opinion. Extremists of the type of Bertrand Russell, refuse to assign any significance or purposiveness to the manifestations of nature. They do not believe that nature, as it is, would lead to the realization of the highest good. The Idealists on the other hand believe in the possibility of interpreting the nature of ultimate reality in the light of some spiritual principle or a power that shapes the world in accordance with the highest values.

According to Russell "man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving and that the whole temple of man's achievement must be inevitably buried beneath the debris of a Universe in ruins." It is a note of extreme pessimism. Science has taught Russell to expect nothing but evil from the universe, but all scientists are not like him filled with dismay and dark forebodings as to the destiny of the Universe. It is not a postulate of physical science to believe that there is nothing but blind forces operating in a blind fashion and leading to meaningless fortuitous results.

The following quotation from Laird's "*Modern Problems in Philosophy*" is very relevant to the issue under discussion. "Think for example," he says, "of a bank or university. The bank from one point of view expresses itself in the movements of bank messengers, in shipment of specie, in occasional raids of masked men with revolvers, in the teller's deft manipulation of pieces of paper, in the filling of ledgers with many black marks. An observer at a great distance, to whom these events were as remote as protons and electrons are to us, could make nothing of these events, but we could find it as hard to explain them adequately in this physical fashion, as to account for the existence of *As you like it* without the Spiritual Shakespeare to account for the play." 70264

The question whether there is any significance in the operations of nature cannot be shelved off by making categorical statements to the effect that man and "his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collo-cations of atoms." Is the emergence of purpose and value at certain points in the universe an inexplicable novelty which we should accept with natural piety and which is absolutely unconnected with any basic aspect of the universe from which it sprouts forth? When a tree bears a certain fruit, we think that the form of the fruit is determined by the nature of the tree itself. Is it absurd to similarly think that the flowering of the primeval stuff in the form of minds and purposes and values points to the presence of a principle, at the heart of reality, which guides the course of evolution along lines that have manifested themselves in the actual unfoldment of the evolutionary scheme.

The assumption of a principle of purposiveness at the heart of reality is justified on empirical grounds. We say that there is purposiveness in nature, because we meet with purposes and adaptations in the universe. The aspect of purposiveness is manifest in human beings, lower animals and plants and may be detected in regions below the level of life; in short, we find

'purposiveness' where we come across adaptation and this feature of the things extends over a much wider range than we imagine.

No systematic account of the nature of ultimate reality can be complete, which leaves out the category of purposiveness as a fundamental or basic concept of interpretation. To import this category at a later stage, as Alexander does, while the earlier stages of evolution, proceeding as they do in a well ordered manner, presuppose it, is to do violence to the requirements of consistent thinking. If Alexander had added purposiveness as an indissoluble factor along with space-time, to serve as the primordial stuff, his metaphysical system would have been less open to objection than it now is. I think, in this respect, the scheme of evolution as formulated by the Sāṅkhya system of Indian philosophy is more satisfactory. Sāṅkhya believes in the threefold *Guṇas* or aspects of the fundamental stuff which is called *Pradhāna* in Sāṅkhya terminology. The three *Guṇas* are *Tamas* (inertia or space), *Rajas* (the principle of movement or time) and *Sattva* (the principle of purposiveness or harmony). In Alexander's philosophy space and time are inseparably linked together. Motion is the result of time acting on space, or of *Rajas* acting on *Tamas*. The nature of *Tamas* is determined by *Rajas* as that of *Rajas* is determined by *Tamas*. I shall have no objection if *Tamas* and *Rajas* are interpreted as mass and energy respectively instead of as space and time. Sāṅkhya, however, is nearer to empirical experience, by incorporating the aspect or *Guṇa* of purposiveness in the primeval stuff of the universe. *Sattva* brings about the Evolution, or progressive growth of space-time, according to its own intrinsic motivation.

Here we may part company with Sāṅkhya, and regard the *Sattva* principle as equivalent to what the idealists speak of—as the spiritual principle of the universe. I think it may be reasonably maintained that the principle of purposiveness is also a conscious principle. It is, however, enough for our purpose if we

assume, on the basis of direct experience, a principle of adaptation or purposiveness. Purpose, however, presupposes value. Purposiveness may be described as an urge towards the realization of values. Values, in a way, form the contents of this principle slowly manifesting themselves as the space-time assumes higher and more complex forms. All forms do not embody value to an equal extent. Their value-quantity may be said to depend upon the extent of their participation in the spiritual or purposive principle of the universe.

I shall finish now. The experience of value leads us on to a teleological interpretation of reality. Purposiveness or spirituality does not come on the scene at a later stage of evolution.

It is there at all times and at all points of existence. From this point of view reality is neither space-time or matter, nor pure spirit. Nor should we regard spirit and matter as two antagonistic and mutually exclusive reals. Values point to the presence of spirit; limitation and mechanism, to that of matter; and both of them are the two inseparable, indissolubly united aspects of the ultimate reality. Pure spirit and pure matter are mere abstractions, useful no doubt but only if used intelligently. I agree with what a certain writer says in one of the recent issues of *Hibbert Journal* "Both (spirit and matter) are present in every experience just as infinity and zero are present in every finite number. If I am asked that if such and such a thing is material or spiritual, I answer neither absolutely, but each in turn relatively or more concisely. Neither but both."

I think this conception of reality, while it does justice to the diverse aspects of experience, is immune from most of the pitfalls and difficulties which beset idealism, whether modern or ancient.

THE LESSON OF INVERSION

(A new aspect of the Law of Contradiction.)

By

PROF. SURENDRA LALL KUNDU

Sec. 1. The Difficulty of Inversion.

Take an universal affirmative proposition like "All A is B." If now, beginning with observation, we go on applying alternately the processes of Obversion and Conversion, we shall at last come to the conclusion "Some not-A is not B;" this is called the partial inverse of the A proposition. If we compare the invertend (All A is B) with the partial inverse (Some not-A is not B), it will be found that the predicate term B has been distributed in the inverse while it was not distributed in the invertend; but this goes against what is looked upon as a fundamental law of deductive inference, *viz.*, that no term should be distributed in the conclusion which was not distributed in the premise. This is evidently a genuine difficulty: for here a conclusion, reached through a series of steps regarded as valid, contradicts a law which again is regarded as fundamental. How is this difficulty to be solved?

Sec. 2. Two Possible Forms of the Solution.

One point seems to be clear: since the conclusion (the partial inverse) contradicts the law of distribution, both of them cannot be admissible; *i.e.*, one of them must be false. The different attempts that have been made to solve this difficulty have, consequently, taken either the one or the other of these two possible forms: on the one hand, it is held by some that the conclusion (the partial inverse) is inadmissible; on the other hand it is contended that what is wrong is not the conclusion but the so-called fundamental Law of distribution itself.

(A) Mr. Roelofs' Solution.

We shall take up the second position first. This is the position taken up by Mr. Roelofs (in *Mind*, No. 143, July 1927). According to him the rule of distribution, as ordinarily stated, is not quite correct ; the distribution of a term, taken by itself, is unmeaning ; "distribution is essentially a relative term ;" "a term is distributed with respect to some other term when it is affirmed or denied, in its entire extension, of that term ;" so the proper statement of the law of distribution is that no term undistributed with respect to some other term in the premise should be distributed with respect to that very term in the conclusion. If the law of distribution be taken in this sense then the partial inversion of A proposition does not break that law ; for the partial inverse (Some not-A is not B) the term B is indeed distributed but not with respect to the original term A : it is distributed with respect to a new term, not-A.

(B) Dr. P. K. Roy's Solution.

In our own country Dr. P. K. Roy has accepted the other solution (*vide* his "*Text-book of Deductive Logic*," Appendix G). According to him "the conclusion is inadmissible." But the conclusion is obtained from the original premise by the processes of obversion and conversion ; so, if the conclusion is wrong then the steps leading to the partial inverse cannot all of them be correct. Dr. P. K. Roy contends that the step of obversion involved in inversion is invalid ; in his own language "the fallacy lies not in the process of conversion but in that of obversion, which assumes that the term B (in the proposition All A is B) has a contradictory and is, therefore, limited to its sphere, although in the original premise its limitation is not implied and it may cover the whole sphere of thought and existence."

We shall analyse the position of Dr. Roy a little further : according to him the partial inverse goes against the law of distribution (as ordinarily stated) and as that law is one of the fundamental laws of Deductive inference, the partial inverse is wrong. But the explanation that Dr. Roy gives of this error in the partial inverse, really makes that error independent of that law, *i.e.*, even if we modify the law of distribution after the manner of Mr. Roelofs so that the partial inverse does not break that law, even then the partial inverse will remain inadmissible on Dr. Roy's view ; for even then the partial inverse will continue to involve the assumption that the predicate term B has a contradictory and is therefore limited in its sphere, while there is no such assumption implied in the original premise : obviously if the original premise contain no such implication, the partial inverse, being based on that unwarranted implication, is inadmissible. But whence comes this assumption in the inverse if it is not already involved in the invertend ? Dr. Roy explains that it is the step of obversion that implies the assumption that the predicate term has a contradictory, *i.e.*, it does not cover the whole sphere of thought and existence. In other words, according to Dr. Roy if the term B (in the proposition All A is B) has no contradictory, then the proposition cannot be obverted at all. We shall presently examine this position of Dr. Roy in detail.

(C) Dr. Keynes' Position.

Dr. Keynes seems to hold a position similar to that of Dr. Roy ; but he is not very clear ; he does not openly declare the partial inverse to be wrong, nor does he reject the fundamental law of distribution. "If the universal validity of obversion and conversion be granted," writes Dr. Keynes, "it is impossible to detect any flaw in the argument by which the conclusion is reached" (*Formal Logic*, Part 2, Chap. 4, p. 104). But Dr. Keynes nowhere teaches us to look upon obversion or conversion

as wrong ; so, the conclusion—the partial inverse—he seems to accept as right ; this, however, would involve that the law of distribution which is contradicted by that conclusion is wrong. But this, again, does not seem to be the position of Dr. Keynes. How then does he explain the anomaly that a valid conclusion breaks a fundamental law ? In his own language, “ It is in the assumption of the existence of the contradictory of the original predicate that an explanation of the apparent anomaly may be found ; ” but the questions that arise here are : (1) first, is that assumption itself true ? (2) secondly, where does that assumption come in ? Dr. Keynes gives no explicit answer ; we have seen above Dr. P. K. Roy's answer to these very questions : according to him, it is in obversion that the assumption is involved, and the assumption itself is unwarranted inasmuch as it is not involved in the original premise.

Sec. 3. Examination of Dr. P. K. Roy's Position.

On Dr. Roy's showing, inversion is wrong because obversion is wrong. But I do not understand how the obverse can be declared to be invalid ; for if the obverse, No A is not-B, be wrong then the contradictory of that, Some A is not-B, is correct ; so both All A is B and Some A is not-B, are correct at the same time, which is impossible. Hence the obverse is not wrong ; and that means that obversion involves no unwarranted assumption and if there is any assumption that can be said to be involved at all in obversion, it is already involved in the original premise. Dr. Roy denies this : according to him—obversion assumes that the predicate term B has a contradictory, while as given in the original premise that predicate may cover the whole sphere of thought and existence. But is this really the case ? Is it necessary for the validity of obversion that we must assume the existence of the contradictory of the

predicate? This does not seem to be the case, so far at least as the obversion of A proposition is concerned; for its obverse, No A is not-B, does not require the existence of not-B; it would be equally true if not-B is non-existent; for this obverse simply denies that any A is not-B, and the possibility of this denial is not barred out if not-B is non-existent. What the obverse does require is that not-B must be a possible predicate; but this does not mean that not-B must be existent.

*Sec. 4. A General Postulate of all Propositions.
a New Law of Thought.*

Our admission that not-B must be a possible predicate, of course, implies that B must be believed to be an all-inclusive predicate. Dr. Roy seems to think otherwise; he holds that "It may cover the whole sphere of thought and existence." This, we venture to say, is not a possibility. It is necessary, however, not to misunderstand the import of our denial; we are not raising here any metaphysical question; our point here is not whether any idea can be all-inclusive (*i.e.*, cover the whole sphere of thought and existence), but only whether any predicate in a proposition can be believed to be thus all-inclusive; and the difference is vital. Our contention is that a proposition loses all its meaning if we already believe its predicate to be true of all possible subjects; for what meaning can we attach to the assertion that a particular predicate B is true of any subject, all A, if we already believe that B is true of all possible subjects, *i.e.*, of All A as well as All not-A? Any proposition, therefore (like All A is B), has a significance if only we believe, with or without ground, that B is not an all-inclusive predicate. It is therefore a postulate of all propositions that All A and All not-A cannot come under the same predicate B.

This is indeed another aspect of the law of contradiction; the ordinary law of contradiction is a law of contradictories as predicate; that law states that contradictories as predicates are

exclusive, *i.e.*, that both of them cannot be true (or. false) of the same subjects. Our present position represents another aspect of contradiction ; it is a law of contradictories as subjects ; it states that contradictories as subjects cannot exhaustively be covered by the same predicate, *i.e.*, All A is B and All not-A is B, both cannot be true. Inversion is directly based on this law.

THE VALUES OF ORGANIC WHOLE

By

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR.

In modern times, the philosophical centre of gravity, as Urban observes, has been gradually shifted from the problem of knowledge to the problem of values. No department of enquiry, however, has been so much affected by this change of emphasis as ethics where the problem of duty or obligation has gradually given place to the concept of worth or value as expressing goodness.¹ I propose to examine in this paper one particular ethical construction based upon this conception.

The starting-point for all modern systems of ethics is the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values. Dr. Moore has made great use of this distinction in his several ethical writings. All those who believe in the intrinsic value of things agree that "intrinsic" is the opposite of "subjective" value. But when Moore tells us that a predicate of intrinsic value (*e.g.*, beauty) is one which depends solely upon the intrinsic nature of the object, and thus distinguishes it from "objective" value on the one hand, and from an "intrinsic property" (*e.g.*, yellow) on the other, and when further a difference of intrinsic value, said to hold between two things numerically different and "not exactly alike," is yet to be distinguished from a qualitative difference,² it is clear that until we can determine the "intrinsic natures" of objects, it would be futile

¹ *Vide*, for a general discussion of value as the concept of ethics, papers entitled "The Theory of Moral Goods," and "Some Suggestions toward a New Ethic," read before the First and the Fourth Session respectively of the Indian Philosophical Congress and published in its *Proceedings*.

² "The Conception of Intrinsic Value" in *Philosophical Studies*.

to attempt to decide their intrinsic values, for the one hangs upon the other. And what remains of an object, when it is stripped of all these aspects, it is impossible to determine.

Further, Moore takes pains to tell us that the intrinsic values of objects are beyond all determination by empirical generalisation or even by causal necessity so that we could say unconditionally that whatever possesses intrinsic value in a certain degree, or anything exactly like it, would so possess it universally irrespective of causal laws. Predicates of intrinsic value thus agree with those expressing intrinsic properties like yellow or red, and differ from subjective predicates of feeling like desire or pleasure,¹ for these latter, being causally determined, need not be present in other universes governed perhaps by different causal laws.

Now these are very large assumptions to make. It is very doubtful that an object possessing an intrinsic property like yellow would retain the same property in a universe governed by different causal laws. For aught we know about yellow, the kind of light-vibrations that are necessary in our present universe to stimulate the normal eye may not exist there at all or even if existing, may fail to stimulate the eye in the required way. It is still more doubtful therefore that a value like beauty or goodness belonging to an object will remain unchanged in a universe different in all respects from our present one. If, as Moore admits, an intrinsic value is not the same as an intrinsic property, it must to a certain extent at least be mind-dependent; it may not be *equivalent* to a mere subjective feeling,² and yet it must be related to it, so that an object similar to A which possesses intrinsic value in a certain degree here and now *might* exist in a different universe in which I did not exist at all, or even existing, could not be affected in the particular way required for the perception of beauty and goodness.

¹ "The Nature of Moral Philosophy" in *Philosophical Studies*, p. 337.

² *Ibid.*

In *Principia Ethica*, some further light is thrown upon the nature of intrinsic value. An object is said to have intrinsic value when it is something which is worth having for its own sake, when it would possess that value even if it existed quite alone, and even if nothing further were to come of it. On the other hand, when something is merely a means for the existence of that which has value in itself, it is said to possess only instrumental value. The method then, which must be employed to determine whether anything possesses intrinsic value and in what degree, is what Moore calls "the method of isolation"—to isolate an object as completely as possible from all possible relations and consequences and accompaniments, and then to ask whether the existence of the object even in such a state would still be considered "good" or "better" than its non-existence.

It seems to me that the method of isolation by itself is not competent enough to decide the question of intrinsic values. For even when one attempts to isolate a given object as much as possible and consider it by itself, there is always the unconscious, unacknowledged undercurrent of suggestion of its possible relation to, and effects upon, the considering mind in the half-light of which our judgment of its intrinsic value is liable to be coloured. Secondly, such isolation, necessarily involving abstraction of the object from its proper contexts and relations, may conceivably destroy or lessen its intrinsic value, for an object is what it is largely by virtue of its relation and context. Thirdly, it is sometimes not possible at all to apply this method without danger to the intrinsic nature of the object to be isolated. In order to determine whether pleasure, for instance, has intrinsic value, Moore thinks² that we must not only isolate pleasure from particular concrete states of consciousness which are pleasurable (*e.g.*, pleasurable contemplation of beauty), but even from every vestige of consciousness itself. But it is clear that in order to

¹ *Principia Ethica*, pp. 83-96, 187-189.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 87-90.

feel a sensation as pleasant requires that we should be conscious of it—otherwise it is neither pleasant nor unpleasant but a mere irritation of sensibility—and conscious too in relation to a given object of contemplation or enjoyment either of the outer or of the inner world. How then can we attempt to determine the intrinsic value of pleasure without destroying pleasure itself in the attempt? What *could* be said to have value is the whole state—a pleasurable contemplation or enjoyment or consciousness of an object. This is the real meaning of Sidgwick's Hedonism. Relation to consciousness is as much essential in the case of pleasure as in that of truth or beauty; only what Sidgwick maintains is that even so, consciousness of beauty or of truth is not in itself valuable apart from its effects upon "the happiness of sentient beings."¹

This discloses what may be called "the method of opposite effects"²—another, possibly better, method to be employed in discovering the intrinsic values of objects. Since instrumental value, according to Moore, depends upon causal necessity, we should, in order to determine the intrinsic value of an object, ask the question whether, irrespective of the kind of effects it may produce, we would consider an object good in itself. Taking Moore's own organic goods like human affections and æsthetic enjoyments—for he believes that nothing else in the world is intrinsically valuable except such states of consciousness—can we declare that friendship between two persons, for instance, to be intrinsically good *if* friendship, instead of bringing happiness and peace to the parties concerned, always and inevitably brought in its train sorrow and misery and unhappiness? Is contemplation of beauty in itself good *if* such contemplation always and necessarily resulted in riotous revelry or excruciating pain? Would the possession of scientific knowledge be deemed to be good *if* such possession were always

¹ *Methods of Ethics*, III, XIV, Sections 4-5.

² Vide "The Theory of Moral Goods" in the "*Proceedings of the First Indian Philosophical Congress*," p. 488.

to be accompanied by evil and anarchy in social and international life? Nay, should we commend moral goodness itself if either the good will or the good act always ended in making the agent or the patient worse than he was before? Why do we sometimes regard pain itself as good? Is it not on account of its ultimate but beneficial effects upon a person's mind or character? Truth, beauty, goodness—we consider such things valuable because they generally tend to produce the kind of effects they do; the moment they appeared to be causally connected with opposite or different effects, they would cease to be considered good or valuable. That is, the value judgment is a causal or empiric judgment and not a synthetic judgment *a priori* or a dictate of reason. As such it no longer denotes something intrinsic and unanalysable.

Applying the method of opposite effects then, we should find that nothing in the world, so far as we can see, does seem to possess value in and for itself apart from the kind of effects it produces on our life and consciousness. Everything is relatively means and end to everything else, and everything is therefore relatively of intrinsic and instrumental value. Even Moore's method of isolation, when applied to a case like the existence of beauty in a world in which no human being "ever has lived, or ever, by any possibility, can live."¹ would bear out our contention that such existences, apart from their effects, are neither good nor bad, valuable or otherwise.

The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values is thus found to be not ultimate or fundamental, and to conceive therefore the task of ethics to lie in the determination of what things possess intrinsic value is to misconceive its nature and function. Mackenzie believes that there are six main aspects of intrinsic value—Truth, Reality, Benevolence, Power, Beauty, and Joy, and yet with regard to every one of them he tries to show that it may be regarded as much instrumental as intrinsic, while values ordinarily regarded instrumental are "so

¹ *Principia Ethica*, p. 81.

directly involved in that achievement (i.e., of an end) that they can hardly be separated from it and may therefore be described as intrinsic." ¹

In view of the above conclusion, Moore's doctrine of organic wholes and his system of ethics based upon this doctrine appear to be structures built upon sand. And the doctrine itself is full of assumptions and self-contradictions. The dogma which Moore enunciates in regard to the whole-part conception is that "the value of the whole bears no regular proportion to the sum of the values of its parts." Accordingly one good thing may combine with another good thing in such wise that the value of the whole thus formed is immensely greater than the sum of the values of the parts. A good thing and an indifferent thing may combine to produce a whole of immensely greater value than what that good thing itself possesses. And indifferent things may also be the sole constituents of a whole which has greater value either positive or negative. Likewise in the case of bad things. And it is also possible that the addition of a bad thing to a good whole, or of a bad thing to another bad, may produce a whole having positive value.² There is absolutely not a scintillation of proof advanced for any of these remarkable assumptions. In order to understand Moore's doctrine, we must remember that according to him the whole-part relation holds only where the part—unlike the means in relation to the end—is a necessary part of the good thing, for whose existence it is a necessary condition. The human body, e.g., is not an organic whole for Moore, for only a causal relation holds between the several members of the body. My contention on the other hand is that the whole may be organic notwithstanding that causal relations hold between its parts. In the consciousness of a beautiful object, e.g.,—an organic whole according to Moore—the value of the whole, being itself only instrumental for the production of joy (according to Mackenzie),

¹ *Fundamental Problems of Life*, pp. 72-80.

² *Principia Ethica*, p. 28.

mainly consists of the value of consciousness in producing a state of joy on the one hand, and the value of the object in contributing to such a state on the other, together perhaps with the value of such other things (the surroundings, the previous mood of the person, etc.—in so far as they are instrumental to the production of such a state) which we generally do not reckon but which do make a difference between wholes otherwise consisting of the same parts. Such an analysis recognises that every element in a whole is both a part in Moore's sense and a means at the same time. This is the uniqueness of organic wholes, and so Moore's criticism against the conception of means and end—that the means is no necessary part of the end, illustrated in the relation of knife to cutting, *e.g.*,—does not hold in their cases, notwithstanding that they contain such a relation. How can it be maintained, *e.g.*, that the eye or the ear is no necessary part of the end, the value of the human body as a whole? It must be pointed out as against Moore that a part *can* be a cause of itself—it is a cause of itself as in its new state in the whole. In the consciousness of a beautiful object, *e.g.*, the beautiful object, a part is certainly a cause of itself in its new state as a contemplated beauty in consciousness.

The parts of a whole, therefore, despite that they are means, must necessarily themselves possess value, instrumental of course. One cannot agree with Moore when he says that a valuable whole can spring out of parts which may themselves be completely valueless. Doubtless in entering into an organic union, the parts may undergo some modification of their original values and it may so happen that the causal value of an element will be different—either more or less—according as it combines with different elements. A pin-prick on one's finger-tip has a different value from that on a so-called pain-spot. This serves to explain the difference that may sometimes be observed to exist between the value of the whole and the mere sum of the values of the parts, and also to vindicate the view that one and the same thing may have different (instrumental) values under different circumstances.

Since causality is thus not incompatible with organic union, it is altogether unnecessary to make the preposterous deductions which Moore draws from his so-called law of organic wholes. Further, if part and whole have no causal relation how is it that "the part of a valuable whole retains exactly the same value *when it is, as when it is not, a part of that whole?*"¹ This, as we have seen above, is not necessarily true of the parts of an organic whole, even as causally interpreted. But if this statement be true, how does Moore explain the incommensurability of values between the parts and the whole which he has set forth in a number of deductions from his general law? If out of two parts which *may* be both valueless in themselves, a very valuable whole can arise (this is Moore's main argument against Hedonism), how are we to account for this emergence of value in the whole? *Ex nihilo nihil*. The value of the whole, either enhanced or emergent, can only be accounted for by assuming either that the parts themselves must necessarily possess sufficient value, or that they, in becoming parts of an organic whole, enter into an internal relation which essentially determines the nature of the whole and transforms the values of the parts themselves in the process, or both. Yet neither possibility is admitted by Moore. He admits that the part is thinkable and predicable by itself and has its own meaning,² and yet "to have value merely as part is equivalent to having no value at all."³ Flagrant inconsistencies of this kind invalidate many of his criticisms against Sidgwick's Hedonism as well as much of the constructive side of his argument in the last chapter of the *Principia*.

Moreover, in so far as a system of ethics based upon the conception of organic wholes, requires measurement and calculation of values, requires an ethical unit, so to say, to determine "greater" or "less" value—and nobody has yet succeeded in giving us such an ethical unit—judgments of intrinsic value are

¹ *Principia Ethica*, p. 30.

² *Ibid*, p. 34.

³ *Ibid*, p. 35.

as difficult to establish as, if not more so than, causal judgments in ethics.

In view of these difficulties, I have to conclude that it is not the business of ethics to concern itself with discovering intrinsic values. Intrinsic value belongs only to the soul and ethics must therefore find its completion, as well as lay its foundation, in rational religion or metaphysics. You may succeed in establishing a General Science of Value whose business it will be to determine the instrumental values of various things in the world—and many thinkers have of late accepted the possibility of such a science—but ethics assuredly is not such a General Science of Value.

HOW DO WE KNOW MINDS OTHER THAN OUR OWN ?

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In this paper we shall discuss the views as to how we reach the belief in the existence of minds other than our own. Do we reach this belief mediately by inference based on the analogical correspondence of bodily expressions and certain mental acts with which we are already familiar about ourselves? I behave in a particular way in a particular mental situation. I see similar bodily expression in similar bodies as mine, and infer that behind those bodies reside minds as my own. Or, is it reached by direct perception or some sort of immediate acquaintance? Before we proceed to discuss these questions we shall first state what we mean by 'mind.' We shall be going far afield if we tried to formulate at length the theory as regards the nature of mind. Only we shall state the view that is most acceptable by the idealists as well as most of the English realists, and which is acceptable by common sense also.

Not to talk of the idealists, even the English realists—G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and S. Alexander—unanimously hold that experience can be analysed into an act of awareness and an object or a concept of which it is aware. The act of awareness is the peculiarly mental or conscious factor in the cognitive situation. This is taken as quite self-evident on self-observation. To Alexander the mind becomes aware of itself as knowing other objects. This self-awareness is called the enjoying activity of the mind. The mind enjoys itself. It cannot contemplate itself as a presented 'this' as it contemplates a physical object as a

given 'this' in perception. So according to Alexander mind is a unique quality which can be aware of itself in being aware of external objects. Bertrand Russell explicitly recognises the knowing capacity of mind as distinguished from the absence of it in the non-mental objects, "The faculty of being acquainted with things other than itself is the main characteristic of mind." (*External World, Lecture III.*) So the *differentium* that distinguishes a mind from other objects is that mind has the faculty of knowing objects. It also becomes aware of itself in the act of knowing. The non-mental do neither of these things. They are presented in perception. Mind cannot be presented as an external object. The mind cannot know itself nor other minds as a presented 'this' in perception. Then how does one mind know another mind at all? If one mind cannot have a direct access to other minds, as in perception, is there any sufficient reason for holding that there are minds other than my own? If not, is the belief merely based on instinct as a sort of assurance which cannot stand the analysis of logical criticism? These are some of the questions we shall try to answer in the following pages.

Below, we give the possible and most plausible alternative views as to reaching the belief in the existence of other minds :

1 (a) The mind knows itself only. It has no access to any thing non-mental. This is the extreme 'privacy' view of mind's capacity to know. The mind is confined within itself, it cannot even know the material objects given in perception, much less the minds behind the external living bodies. There is no logical ground for the mind to pass from its knowledge to the knowledge of other foreign objects. This is the Cartesian breach between the mental and the non-mental.

(b) Then there is the modified privacy-view. According to it the mind has an access to non-mental objects given in perception. However one mind cannot know another directly as an entity given in perception, nor does it know the other

directly as it knows its own acts. The belief in the existence of other minds is reached only by inference based on analogy. I know physical expressions of my mental states. I see other bodies with similar behaviour. I connect this behaviour with a mind behind them as I am already conscious of such a correspondence in my person.

(c) Then there is the third way of reaching the belief. It says that we never know other minds as we know our own. "My toothache is my toothache, it cannot be yours." But then it does not countenance the modified privacy-view, and does not say that we reach the belief by inference. It says that we are already assured of other minds on an instinctive faith created by a social intercourse. We never know ourselves before we find ourselves among others. We know others in so far as we co-operate with them in concrete situations wherein we express ourselves and fulfil our emotions. We are already assured of their existence, we never want to be assured of them by any conscious process of inference. We never do it. Sympathetic interpretation and imagination may help us in reading the details of others' minds, but not in affirming their existence.

Now out of these alternatives which we have enumerated as possible, we shall see which is the most acceptable in consonance with the view of mind that we have presented before.

1 (a) The extreme privacy-view is unacceptable, for it leaves no room for bridging the gulf between the mental and the non-mental, and hence there is no chance of reaching the mental behind a non-mental physical body on that view. No philosopher accepts it as a plausible view.

1 (b) The modified privacy-view, finds favour with many and it is the most commonly accepted view, *viz.*, that we do not directly know other minds as we know our own. Neither do we know them directly in perception, but we know only on inference based on the analogical correspondence of mental states and bodily behaviour familiar to us in our person.

We never see mind as a given entity in perception, nor do we share others' feelings directly. What we see is the bodily expression of the feeling or the mental state. So we cannot be said to have a direct access to the states themselves. Now only the third alternative remains, *viz.*, that we reach it as an assurance or an instinctive faith in our intersubjective intercourse. What we are said to be sharing, *e.g.*, the 'anger' is nothing more than a sympathetic reading of our own experience into others. This is sharing by sympathy, and not sharing by direct perception. The minds or mental states are not given in perception. They are not to be inferred also on this view. We are already assured of their existence ; and analogical interpretation helps us in reading the states in detail, and not in reaching the very belief in them.

So we have eliminated other alternatives and have reduced them to only two :

(1) Inferential view, and (2) Assurance view. We have to evaluate their merits.

The contention of the *privacy-theory* or the inferential view is that only material bodies are perceptible by our senses; while minds from their very nature are imperceptible. This, even we who want to uphold the *social theory* (Assurance view) would admit. But, if the privacy view claims that we get at this belief by a conscious inference, we have the following considerations to press against it.

1. The theory which holds that we reach the belief by an analogical inference, takes for granted that the knowledge of one's self is directly reached in isolation and without any reference to other selves. It takes for granted that every one knows the invariable concomitance between particular psychical states and certain bodily behaviour, as in anger, fear, etc. But these are assumptions unwarranted by experience. " We do not see ourselves as others see us." Our self-acquaintance is much mediated by our perception of others. We do not know how we

look when we are in anger or in other emotional states ; we directly know others in them. We are first familiar with the corresponding looks and gestures of others. Our acquaintance with our looks and gestures is very limited. We do not always look into a mirror and mark how we look in the state of anger, etc. Moreover we never stop to infer consciously in concrete situations. Let us take the example of a child. The child is not conscious of the correspondence of the anger and the expression of anger on its own face. But it can directly read anger, behind the expression of it on the parents' face. Here the belief in the angry mind is not reached by inference. The reading of the mental state may be much helped by the analogical correspondence no doubt in later years. But it is irrelevant as regards reaching the belief in the existence of a foreign mind for the first time. We do not mean to say that the analogical interpretation is of no use. What we mean to press is that this inferential account is quite irrelevant to our purpose, to our genetic explanation of the belief in question.

The whole point at issue is that the distinguishing of my mind from your mind grows *pari passu*. Both are ideal constructions. In short the inferential theory or privacy-theory holds that the individual, nay a child, already knows the correspondence of the mental states and the relevant bodily behaviour we have to press against it, that we come to know ourselves only with reference to other selves in a social intercourse. We do admit with the privacy-view that mental states of others are not experienceable as we experience our own, and that they are neither given in perception. But which is the way open for us except of inference then ?

We never say that we directly share other minds, nor do we want to say that we know them inferentially. We want to say that we know the existence of them in an instinctive belief or assurance of other minds. We have certain emotions, says Alexander, appropriate to our kind and in experiencing them we are assured of others. A conscious person responds to our

feelings, actions and co-operates with us in a concrete situation. We feel ourselves more tender toward a warm child than to a cold child. It is not because under similar circumstances we see that foreign bodies behave similar to ourselves, that we know inferentially that they possess minds similar to our own. It is because we take part in a common situation, that we are assured of their existence. As we hate or love a person, as we experience an emotion towards a living body, we are already assured of its having a mind.

If it be objected that the position of this theory is weak because this belief is tantamount to a faith, an instinct, we can as well question the validity and strength of the inference. For this inference is not of a scientific nature. Ordinarily we contemplate two physical events together, and then by experimentation we reach the necessary connection between the two, and on that we base our inference. But in this case, only one of the terms is given in perception, and the other, the mind, is given in an immediate way. So this connection is on a different level altogether.

Then we come to this :—

1. There are no cognitive situations in which a mind is present as a factor given in perception. Nor do we know them to be by inference for the above reasons.

2. We have only one way open, and that is to say that we are somehow directly aware of them or assured of them in our inter-subjective intercourse. This belief is borne out and corroborated by analogical interpretation. Genetically this belief has nothing to do with inference.

But what is the logical status of this belief ? We shall join here C. D. Broad, and say that if we believe in the existence and reality of physical objects, this belief is corroborated by the process of inference. I see that my own body and its certain movements are real. In the same way I can see other bodies and their overt movements to be real. I know that my body is animated

by a mind, so also I can infer and interpret the corresponding mental acts in those bodies. But the belief or assurance can stand without this corroboration. And in that sense it is on the same level as that in the perceived objects. Our belief in the reality of perceived objects is not reached by inference. We are assured of them in perception. We are so assured of mind in a sort of intuition. We can show that our belief in the reality or existence of material objects also is corroborated a good deal by the belief in the existence of other minds. For example, if I want to be assured that the table in my room is a stable reality independent of me, I should be much helped by people who would say that they saw it there when I was absent from the room. Just as the consensus of the reports about the material objects corroborates the belief in their reality, so also, the belief in the perceived reality leads us to corroborate our belief in other minds by analogical inference based on the reality of bodily behaviour.

So the belief in the reality of physical objects is also open to doubt, as also the belief in the existence of other minds. Both are corroborated in turn by each other.

Both the beliefs are directly reached but in different ways. None of them is known by inference.

SOME SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A THEORY OF SENSE-PERCEPTION.

By

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(1)

Problems in general, and philosophical problems in particular arise out of reflection upon common sense. This reflection, however, does not seem to be always spontaneous. It is generally necessitated by actual facts of experience, which can hardly be neglected. Now for an understanding of the nature of the real problem of sense-knowledge what seems to be necessary in the first place is to notice the common-sense view of knowledge. Secondly, it is necessary to take into account the empirical facts which lead to reflection upon such view. When these are done, we shall be in a position to see what the real problem concerning sense-knowledge is, and what it is not.

(2)

Realism or the Commonsense View of Sense-knowledge.

In point of fact there is no such thing as a well-defined and definitely conceived opinion about any matter which can be called the common-sense view about it. But if it is enquired of an ordinary individual as to how he views a particular matter the common-sense view about that matter may be elicited through his reply to the enquiry. Now so far as sense-knowledge is

concerned, if an ordinary individual who is, for example, seeing a table, be asked to give his own impression about the situation he is in at the moment, he will probably say that he is seeing the table which is over there, *i.e.*, at a distance from him. This statement obviously means that his seeing the table involves a sort of relation which links, as it were, the distant table with himself. If he is made to go deeper into the present matter, he can easily realise that even if he remains exactly where he is, and the table also remains in the same situation in which it is, when he sees it, the phenomenon called sense-knowledge will not be there, provided the relation involved in seeing be not allowed to take place through closure of the eyes or any other device. It must be noticed in this connection that the relation involved in sense-knowledge presupposes a variety of conditions, positive and negative. The opening of the eye-lids, the direction of the eyes towards the table, etc., are, for example, positive conditions in the present case, while conditions like the absence of a screen or dense fog between the eye and the table are of a negative character. Now if these conditions be allowed to be fulfilled and not to be fulfilled alternately, and consequently the relation involved in seeing is itself allowed to take place and not to take place alternately and further, if this process of alternation be repeated a number of times the truth will insistently come to the mind of the ordinary individual that when the relation in question is there, the percipient goes out of himself, as it were, and grasps the table at the place where it is, and the table reveals itself to him but when the relation is absent, the transcendence of the individual mind from itself to the table out there is checked and the table is prevented from revealing itself. So according to common sense the percipient mind and the external object that is perceived, are compresent in sense-knowledge. This knowledge, therefore, involves a peculiar relation by virtue of which one term of this relation, namely the subject, transcends itself and passes over to the other, namely the object.

An attempt may next be made to point out the important implications of the common sense view of sense-knowledge and indicate its limitations.

(3)

The Implications of the Commonsense View of Sense-knowledge.

The relation of compresence, held to be involved in sense-knowledge by common sense implies transcendence as already observed, on the part of the subject and self-revelation on the part of the object. Now self-transcendence on the part of the subject implies not only the existence of the subject which transcends but also the independent existence of the object to which the subject is transcendent. Transcendence loses all significance, if nothing *really* exists other than that which transcends, *i.e.*, if the object in relation to which the subject transcends does not have an independent existence. The independent existence of the external object is, therefore, an essential implication of the relation of compresence.

Self-revelation on the part of the object again means that the object reveals its self—reveals what it is in itself, *i.e.*, its own real nature. It itself is present in the revelation. In the language of current epistemological literature the meaning is that *sense-knowledge is direct*—nothing intervenes between the subject to which the object is presented, and the object which is presented.

The independent existence of the external object, and the directness of sense-knowledge are, therefore, the two essential implications of the commonsense view of sense-knowledge.

(4)

The Limitations of the Commonsense View of Sense-knowledge.

The limitation of the common sense view of sense-knowledge may be said to consist in its avoidance of certain questions.

Limitations as such are not defects. In so far as the limitation of the commonsense view consists in the avoidance of certain questions which are irrelevant to the fact of knowledge, it becomes a source of its strength rather than of weakness. But in so far as its limitation consists in neglecting to provide an answer to certain other questions which are quite relevant to the fact of knowledge and can, therefore, legitimately demand an answer, it becomes a real source of weakness. The limitations of the commonsense view of sense-knowledge may, therefore, be explained with reference to the two kinds of questions it avoids.

(a) Questions Irrelevant to the Fact of Knowledge.

The first kind of questions which the commonsense view of sense-knowledge avoids, namely, the questions which are irrelevant to the fact of knowledge, may be brought under two distinct heads, namely, (1) those which demand an explanation of the fact of knowledge itself, and (2) those which are obviously metaphysical in character. "How is knowledge possible?" "How does the subject know the object?" etc., are the usual forms in which the former class of questions are generally put. Some thinkers are of opinion that this class of questions, far from having any metaphysical implications, are rather prior to all metaphysical questions. But it can be easily shown that some metaphysical view which is opposed to the possibility of knowledge, is presupposed by all such questions. So they too may be said to be *ultimately* metaphysical in character. However, what is *obvious* about these questions is that they represent a demand for the explanation of the fact of knowledge. Is such a demand legitimate? The explanation of a phenomenon generally means its reference to or subsumption under something else. For explaining anything we must go beyond it. So if knowledge is to be explained, we are to explain it by going beyond it. But how can it be possible to

go beyond knowledge? Knowledge is the ultimate starting-point of all enquiry and all explanation. So it does not admit of explanation. It follows, therefore, that those questions which demand an explanation of knowledge are not only irrelevant to the fact of knowledge but are logically absurd.

So far as the obviously metaphysical questions are concerned, they are not necessarily absurd. They are *merely* irrelevant to the fact of knowledge. The most important metaphysical questions under consideration are: "What is the ultimate nature of mind or the subject that knows?" "What is the ultimate nature of the object of matter?" "How are we to conceive of the relation between subject and object?" These questions are regarded as irrelevant to the fact of knowledge, because the answer to them does not seem to make any difference to it. Whether mind be viewed to be ultimately spiritual or material, the fact of knowledge does not seem to be affected in the least, since these enquiries themselves presuppose the fact of knowledge. Similarly the answer to the other metaphysical questions is of no consequence to the fact of knowledge.

We see, therefore, that the commonsense view of knowledge according to which knowledge is an inexplicable phenomenon, is justified in avoiding those questions which involve a demand for the explanation of knowledge as not only irrelevant but absurd, and those which are of an obviously metaphysical character and the answer to which has no bearing upon the fact of knowledge as merely irrelevant.

(b) *Questions neglected by the Commonsense View of Knowledge.*

We may next consider questions of quite a different nature. It cannot be said that common sense deliberately neglects such questions. Nor is it true that they are such that they cannot be answered consistently with common sense. It can be shown that it is not only that these questions can be answered from the

point of view of common sense, but also that their successful solution necessarily presupposes this view. The negligence of these questions on the part of common sense can be easily explained with reference to what we have already observed with regard to its nature. The commonsense view is not, as previously pointed out, a definitely formed opinion, consciously maintained by any one. It is what the thinker can elicit from the ordinary individual by questionings. Now if certain questions are found out the answers to which have not been provided for by the view which has been so far elicited, it is not the view itself that is to blame, but the thinker who has not gone far enough to complete his theoretical task. In order that the commonsense view of knowledge may be a complete theory, it must be supplemented by a solution of these neglected questions; their solution should be a necessary sequel to the commonsense view of knowledge. The commonsense view alone cannot be called a theory of knowledge.

The questions under consideration arise in connection with certain undeniable facts of experience. Two kinds of such facts may be distinguished. In the first place it may be pointed out that it is a fact of common experience that one and the same object may appear differently to one and the same individual under different circumstances, and also to different individuals under the same circumstances. A round object may, for example, appear to one individual as round and to another as oval due to differences of perspective from which it is viewed. What is noticeable about facts of this type is that though our experience in these cases is affected by relativity, it cannot be said to be necessarily erroneous. Seeing a round object as oval or seeing a man as smaller, when looked at from a distance, than what he really is, is not ordinarily regarded as a case of erroneous experience. Secondly, we may distinguish facts of a different nature, *e. g.*, dreams, illusions, hallucinations, etc. Objects which do not really exist may appear in our dreams. In case of illusory experience objects are experi-

enced to be other than what they really are. A piece of rope, for example, may be mistaken for a snake. Our experience in the cases of dreams, illusions, etc., seems to differ from our experience in the cases in which relativity alone operates, in this that in the latter the object experienced not only really exists, but the difference between the object present to consciousness and the object which exists outside consciousness is not such that their identity becomes undetectable, while in the former the object as experienced may not at all exist in the external world, or if there exists any external object, conditioning the object as experienced, the difference between them is generally found to be as much as there is between two distinct objects. It is for this reason that our experience in the one case may be right in spite of its being affected by relativity, while our experience in the other is undoubtedly erroneous.

It is not possible for us to make a detailed enquiry into these phenomena in this connection. Our object in mentioning them here is only to point out that they seem to contradict the principal theses of the commonsense view of knowledge. So unless the advocate of common sense takes care to show that these phenomena are explicable from this point of view, his view is sure to remain unsatisfactory, and there is every reason for its being rejected. It has already been observed that, according to common sense, the subject in knowing transcends itself and directly apprehends an independently existing object, *i.e.*, an object as it is in itself. Now so far as our experience affected by relativity is concerned, how can we be justified in holding that in the cases in which relativity operates, the object as apprehended is the independently existing object? If it is a fact that one and the same object one may apprehend as red under certain circumstances, and as grey under certain others, one cannot be said to have apprehended the independent object in either of these cases, since the object cannot be both red and grey. The difficulty seems to be much greater in the case of dream, etc. In these cases the object apprehended may not at all have an

independent existence. But some object is all the same *present to consciousness*. So the suspicion may naturally arise in the mind of the thinker that there may be some cases of experience to which the commonsense view that in sense-knowledge what is apprehended is the independently existing object, may not apply. Who knows whereto this suspicion may lead the thinking mind? The importance of the question, arising in the connection of these phenomena to any view of sense-knowledge cannot, therefore, be overestimated.

(5)

*The Background of Traditional Epistemological Theories
concerning Sense-knowledge.*

After the above general consideration of the commonsense view of sense-knowledge should come a consideration of the empirical facts, leading to reflection upon it. Now so far as these facts are concerned, we need not separately treat them here inasmuch as reference has already been made to them in connection with our consideration of the limitations of the commonsense view. It has been already mentioned that facts of relativity, dream, etc., tend to throw doubt upon the fundamental theses of the commonsense view—namely the *directness of sense-knowledge*, and the *independent existence of its object*. Now if facts of relativity alone are taken into account, it appears at first sight that what is difficult to maintain is the directness of sense-knowledge and not the independent existence of the object. The latter rather seems to be the presupposition of the former. If there be nothing existing independently, the relativity of its appearances cannot be possible. When, for example, I perceive an object as red at one time and as grey at another what I am naturally led to doubt is not that there exists some object in the external world but that what I perceive is the object itself.

There may arise, that is to say, the suspicion that what is present to consciousness is probably something other than the real object, though this something is not wholly unrelated to the latter. The implication of this suspicion seems to be that it is not necessary that in every case of sense-knowledge what is present to consciousness should necessarily be an independently existing object. This suspicion against the validity of the commonsense view may not only gain some confirmation but may actually grow stronger and invade the other thesis of this view when facts of error, etc., are taken into consideration. It has been already observed that in the case of error, etc., what is present to consciousness may not at all exist in the external world. So the second thesis of the commonsense view, namely, that the object of sense-knowledge exists independently, is also in danger of being rejected. It may be further pointed out that doubt about the second thesis may gather added strength from the consideration of certain experiences, *e.g.*, pleasure, pain, desire, etc., which we have no reason to suspect as necessarily erroneous.

The above consideration, being of too general a character, cannot be said to constitute any definite theory of knowledge supplanting the commonsense view, but the materials which they supply have actually been developed into definitely-formed epistemological theories.

(6)

*The Theory of Truth and Error or the New Theory
concerning Sense-knowledge.*

We have considered above the commonsense view of sense-knowledge, and indicated which questions the right theory of sense-knowledge is called upon to answer, and which not. It has been pointed out that questions regarding the possibility of sense-knowledge, and metaphysical questions, concerning the ultimate nature of the subject, the object and the relation between

them have no legitimate place in a theory of sense-knowledge.. But questions concerning phenomena of relativity and erroneous experiences can legitimately demand a solution. Traditional epistemological theories do indeed involve a consideration of the latter kind of questions, but they do not seem to be aware of the illegitimacy of the former. The consideration of the facts of the relativity of experience, dream, etc., leads most of them to doubt, as already observed, the one or the other of the principal theses of the commonsense view and consequently to raise questions which ought not to be raised, namely, those concerning the possibility of knowledge, etc. It is to be emphasised in this connection, that the acceptance of the fact of knowledge as inexplicable and consequently the avoidance of questions concerning the possibility of knowledge, seems to be more essential to the right theory of knowledge than the solution of questions, concerning relativity, error, etc., inasmuch as the latter presupposes the former. So it need hardly be pointed out that any theory of sense-knowledge which is led to doubt the fact of knowledge or the principal theses of Realism in explaining error, etc., can hardly be called satisfactory. That alone can be a satisfactory theory of sense-knowledge which seeks to explain facts of error, etc., on the basis of Realism. Now Realism is no theory of sense-knowledge since it seeks to solve no problem concerning knowledge. But it constitutes the basis of the right theory of sense-knowledge in so far as the solution of the problem of truth and error, the only problem that legitimately arises in connection with sense-knowledge, necessarily presupposes the realistic theses.

It is clear, therefore, that according to the standpoint of this paper, the fact of knowledge as such does not give rise to any problem. But it is not denied that some problem necessarily arises in connection with knowledge. In so far as we *know* or there is knowledge, there seems to arise no problem. But a problem certainly arises in so far as we *seem* to know though in reality we *do not know*. It is, therefore, in connection

with the phenomena of dream, illusion, etc., that the real problem arises. It has been rightly observed that "in a world in which there was no such thing as error, this theory of knowledge relation¹ would remain unchallenged; but with the discovery of error and illusion comes perplexity."²

The legitimate theory of sense-knowledge should, therefore, be a logical theory of truth and error. It should be noticed, however, that the whole problem of truth and error is far wider than what the theory of sense-knowledge is in a position to deal with. The question of truth and error is co-extensive with the whole field of knowledge. Now sense-knowledge being only of the several types of knowledge, the limitation of the logical theory concerning sense-knowledge is obvious.

If it is realised that the only legitimate problem, arising in connection with sense-knowledge, is what arises in so far as we *do not know* and not in so far as we *do know*, it becomes easy to see that the primary object of the theory of sense-knowledge is positive or constructive, and consists in solving the question of truth and error, so far as it relates to sense-knowledge alone. But since this truth is not generally realised and most of the traditional epistemological theories are led to dispute the very fact of knowledge, the constructive work of the legitimate theory of sense-knowledge should be preceded by some destructive criticism, having the object to show that the so-called epistemological problem originates due to a false perspective in which the fact of knowledge is viewed, and is, therefore, absurd. It can be easily anticipated that the ultimate result of such destructive criticism is the discovery of the simple truth that knowledge is an inexplicable phenomenon. But, however, simple may this truth be, and however arduous may be the destructive criticism which leads to its discovery, the latter must be undertaken in view of the fact

¹ i.e., the commonsense theory of knowledge relation

² *The New Realism*, pp. 2-3.

that in no branch of knowledge the realisation of simple facts or truths is so necessary and in no branch of knowledge they are so easily lost sight of as in philosophy.

We see, therefore, that the primary object of a satisfactory theory of sense-knowledge is to solve the problem of truth and error in so far as sense-knowledge alone is concerned. But since it is not easily realised that this problem is the only genuine problem, it should undertake a criticism of current theories of sense-perception in order to show that the problem which they seek to solve is absurd.

THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWING AND ITS OBJECT

By

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The problem of the relation between knowing and its object is a subject of keen controversy in recent times. Division of opinion on this question is rather acute, the idealists maintaining that the relation between knowing and its object is internal and the realists maintaining that it is external. While the arguments of each school are sufficiently effective in annihilating the position of the opposite school, the arguments of neither have led to any constructive solution to the problem of knowledge. Further, instead of discussing the nature of the cognitive relation on its own merits and defining it clearly so as to throw light on the immediate problems of epistemology, they raise the discussion to a metaphysical level. The solution to the question: "What is the nature of the cognitive relation?" is made to rest upon the solution to the question "What ultimately is the nature of relation?" It is no doubt true that the nature of what any particular relation is, depends upon what relations as such are, but the nature of any particular relation cannot be deduced from the nature of relations as such. It is inevitable that one's view of what any particular relation is, is bound to be influenced by his metaphysical views about the nature of relation as such,—whether one is conscious that one's views are metaphysical or not. But it is not in the interests of epistemology to allow one's metaphysical views to ride rough-shod

over strictly epistemological considerations. It is my object in this paper after revealing these weaknesses which have vitiated the discussion of idealists and realists alike on the question of the nature of the cognitive relation, to suggest a possible view in regard to the cognitive relation and consider briefly its bearings on epistemological problems.

I

In the history of idealistic thought, three lines of arguments have been advanced to prove that the relation between knowing and its object is internal. They are: firstly, the Berkeleyan argument that we know an object only as related to a consciousness and that therefore it is dependent upon consciousness; secondly, the Hegelian argument that the real is the rational and therefore spiritual and therefore dependent on mind; and thirdly, the Bradleyan argument that all relations are internal and therefore the cognitive relation also.

(i) The Berkeleyan argument only proves that in order to be known an object must enter into relation with a consciousness, it does not prove that it must always be in that relation. The Berkeleyan argument is made much of by the realists, but it is not employed by any contemporary idealist to prove the mind-dependent character of reality. The argument which is more seriously advanced in support of the mind-dependent character of reality is the Hegelian argument which we shall now consider.

When the idealists maintain that the object is mind-dependent, they do not mean that it is dependent upon my consciousness or your consciousness, but that it is ultimately dependent upon a consciousness that is absolutely rational. They argue that in so far as the real is the rational and the rational is of the nature of mind, reality is mind-dependent. The argument of Hegel derives a great deal of its plausibility from the ambiguity lurking under the word "rational." "Rational" could be understood in two senses. We may speak of man as being rational and

we may also speak of an argument as being rational, but the argument is not rational in the same sense as man is. "Rational" used in respect of man means, "capable of reasoning," but used in respect of an argument it means "intelligible." Reasoning is not the same as being intelligible. To be able to reason we certainly want a mind, but for a thing to be intelligible it is not necessary that it should have a mind. Reality may be admitted to be rational only in the sense that it is intelligible but to be intelligible is not to be dependent upon mind. Reality must present a scheme of relations to a thinking consciousness in order to be known, but it need not reason. That which does not reason has no mind.

Hegel tries to prove that the cognitive relation is internal by showing that reality is ultimately spiritual. But Bradley does not adopt this line of proof; he tries to prove that the cognitive relation is internal because reality is one. He argues that the relation between knowing and its object is internal because all relations are internal. What he means by internal is expressed by the following propositions. "A relation is internal in so far as it modifies or qualifies or *makes a difference* to the terms it relates." "To stand in relation and not to be relative, to support it and yet not to be *infected and undermined* by it is out of question." "Every relation *essentially penetrates the being of its terms* and is in this sense, intrinsic."

From these propositions we gather that a relation is internal if it makes a difference to the terms which it relates or is essential to them.

We shall see how the argument proceeds when 'internal' is taken in these two senses. A relation is internal if it makes a difference to the terms which it relates. "Makes a difference" could be understood in two different senses. A certain thing may be said to make a difference to a certain other thing, if the former *adds in some way* to the latter. Again a certain thing may be said to make a difference to a certain other thing if the former *causes a change* in the latter. That whenever a term

enters into a relation, we may in a sense admit that it gains in something. The relation of knowing may be said to make a difference to the object in so far as the object gets the property of being known. Terms, by entering into a relation, acquire a rational property which otherwise they would not have and in so far the relation makes a difference to them. In this sense, it is no doubt true that all relations are internal but this is not the sense in which idealists understand the term internal as applied to all relations. Even realists like G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell are prepared to admit that in this sense all relations are internal. "Making a difference" in the sense of "causing a change in" seems to be implied in the last of the quotations from Bradley. But understood in this sense it is false to say that all relations are internal. We cannot say that every relation causes a change in the terms which it relates. Surely, we cannot say that by knowing anything we cause a change in it. Saying so would be as absurd as saying that we cause heat in the sun by merely looking at him. Again, take the second meaning of internal, *i.e.*, internal in the sense essential or organic to the terms that it relates. If, for instance, we substitute organic in place of internal, Bradley's proposition reads thus: "All relations are organic." This would amount to saying that there is only one kind of relation and that one is the organic relation,—a position which would contradict Bradley's own original proposition that all relations are internal. He assumes, to begin with, that there is more than one relation but ends by abolishing all relations but one—a highly debatable metaphysical assumption which at any rate ought not to be taken as the standpoint and basis of an epistemology.

II

Now, let us consider the realist's view of the cognitive relation. The cognitive relation is, for him, essentially external. Two arguments are adduced in support of his position, one nega-

tive and the other positive. (1) The negative argument is that the idealists have not proved that the cognitive relation is internal and that therefore the cognitive relation is external. (2) The positive argument is that all relations are external and hence the cognitive relation also. It is argued that all relations are external in so far as every relation falls outside the being and nature of the terms that they relate. There are terms and there are relations and the terms exist outside and apart from the relations. In other words the content of a thing is in no case made up of anything beyond itself. Relations are things that *lie outside the terms and therefore fall nowhere within the terms that they relate.*

Let us now examine these two arguments :

1. *Criticism of the Negative Argument.*—The idealists may have failed to prove their case, but that does not mean that the realists have proved theirs. If of two contraries, one is proved to be false or doubtful, we cannot infer anything as to the truth or falsity or doubtfulness of the other.

2. *Criticism of the Positive Argument.*—The idealists have tried to prove that all relations are internal and then deduce from it the particular proposition that the cognitive relation is internal. The procedure of the realists is the same, and in this respect the realists are no better than the idealists. They attempt to prove that all relations are external and then deduce from it that the cognitive relation is external. If the epistemological arguments of the idealist are vitiated by a monistic bias, the epistemological arguments of the realist are vitiated by a pluralistic bias.

Overlooking for the present this defect, we shall consider their argument on its own merits and see if, as they say, all relations are external. In the first instance all relations are not external in the sense that they fall outside the being and nature of the terms that they relate. Relations of "cause and effect,"

“ground and consequence” do certainly fall within the being and nature of the terms that they relate. They may be said to penetrate their terms and affect them vitally. This in itself is enough to disprove the realist’s position that all relations are external. But a less extreme position is possible. It may be maintained that some relations are external and that the cognitive relation is one such. In order to meet this possible position, we shall go even further and maintain that no relation—and hence also the cognitive relation—is external in the sense in which the realist maintains that a relation is external. If a relation has nothing to do with the nature of a term that it relates, it is inconceivable how a term could enter into a relation or why a term should enter into a relation. A relation may not affect the being of the terms or cause a change in them, but still in order to be able to relate them it must only fall within the nature of the terms related. Take for example even so external a relation as “on” in the proposition: “The book is on the table.” It is possible for the book to be without being on the table and similarly, it is possible for the table to be without having anything to do with the book. But the book can enter into relations with the table only if it possesses a definite nature. Similarly, the table can enter into relations with the book only if it possesses a certain nature. It is because both are spatial properties that they can enter into the spatial relation “on.” If it were true that a relation falls outside the nature of an object and has nothing to do with its nature, it should be followed that any term could enter into any relation. But this is not really the case. Only certain terms could enter into certain relations and certain relations can obtain between certain terms and not others and this shows that relations are neither extrinsic to the terms nor fall outside of them. Take, for example, the relation “on ;” it can only exist between two material objects ; it cannot obtain between two actions. We cannot speak of an act of thinking being an act of willing. In so far as what relations certain terms enter into

depends upon what nature they possess, no relation is external in the sense that it falls outside the nature of the terms.

Further, just as the theory that all relations are internal leads to the position that there is only one relation and that one an internal or organic relation; even so, the theory that all relations are external leads to the position that there is only one relation and that one an external relation. Just as the theory of internality of relations argues monism rather than idealism, even so the theory of externality argues pluralism rather than realism. The whole discussion of the cognitive relation is vitiated by an excessive metaphysical bias and the question is not discussed on the merits of the immediate facts of the case. To put it in other words the epistemological problem of the relation between knowing and its object is not discussed epistemologically, but rather metaphysically.

III

We shall now try to carry on the discussion in regard to the problem of the cognitive relation on an empirical plane and see if we may not get along with our problems in a more satisfactory manner.

In the course of our discussion of the realistic theory of relations it has been pointed out that it is not indifferent to a relation, whether it relates one set of terms rather than another set. As a matter of fact, certain relations are appropriate only to certain terms and can obtain between them only. This shows that the relations are not extrinsic to the nature of terms. But merely because a relation is not extrinsic to the terms it relates, it does not follow that it is intrinsic in the sense that the terms it relates must depend upon it for its being. There are terms which do enter into certain relations, but which still could as well be without entering into those relations. There are persons who have not entered into relations with many a great personage but still they exist. For example there are millions of men who

are perfectly innocent of Shakespeare, but still they are existing. They may be all the worse for not reading Shakespeare, but nevertheless they are. Similarly, there are elements in nature which have not entered into any relations with us and of which we are unaware, but still we do manage to exist and do not owe our existence to them. Yet when we do enter into relations with those objects, these relations are expressive of our nature as well as that of the objects. All things depend upon relations for the expression of their nature but it is possible for things not to express themselves at least in certain ways. Relations are therefore different ways in which things express themselves. Into what things relations can enter depends upon what kinds of expression their nature permits. Whether relations are essential to the terms or not depends upon whether the expressions which those relations help, are necessary to the being of the terms or not. What is important in considering any particular relation is not whether it is internal or external, but how it helps the expression of the terms which it relates and what light it throws on the expression of things. The importance of relations is phenomenological rather than metaphysical. This is how in different sciences, for example, the relation of causality, ground and consequence, etc., are considered and such a procedure has been productive of good results. May it not be that if a similar procedure is adopted in epistemology also, it may lead to fruitful results.

With this methodological principle in view, we shall now take up the consideration of the relation of knowing to its object. Owing to considerations of space, I shall merely set down my position in the form of a proposition without attempting in any way to explain them.

I. The relation between knowing and its object is not irrelevant or accidental to the terms it relates, but expressive of both of them. II. As expressive of both, it creates a content that is allied in character to the act of knowing, on the one hand,

and object known, on the other. III. This, content, or idea, as it is usually called, exercises a double function accordingly as it glances at the subject, or object. When it glances at the subject it manifests the property of illumination, when it glances at the object it manifests the property of truth. IV. The selective and constructive function which the cognitive relation performs, is not exclusive of or transcendent to the object, but constitutive of it. The object persists and exercises its urge in and through all the selection and construction which the cognitive relation initiates. However creative it may be in its function, its chief goal and terminus is the objective which it seeks to discover. V. In order to bring out this aspect of the cognitive relation we may designate the cognitive relation as the relation of objectivity.

The advantages of this characterization of the cognitive relation are obvious. I. It avoids the fallacies of subjectivism and objectivism alike. The content of knowing is identified neither with the act of knowing nor the object of knowledge. II. Yet, the content is expressive of both and owes its properties of truth and falsity to this circumstance. III. It offers no peculiar difficulty in respect of the problem of error. IV. It implies no preference for any particular metaphysical position—monism or pluralism, spiritualism or materialism.

“ PROPOSITION ”

By

ADHAR CITANDRA DAS, M.A., P.R.S.

“ A proposition,” says Hegel, “ though possessing a subject and a predicate in the grammatical sense is not for that reason a judgment.....For example, ‘Aristotle died in the 73rd year of his age, in the 4th year of the 115th Olympiad,’ is a mere proposition, and not a judgment. There would be something of a judgment in it, only if doubt had been thrown on one of the circumstances—the date of the death or the age of the philosopher :”¹ Hegel seems to suggest that a judgment is one degree more complex than a proposition. A judgment is an assertion in answer to a question or an assertion made in order to remove some doubt. But in the case of a proposition there is no attempt to answer a question or to remove some doubt. If this be the case, a proposition is something which falls apart from judgment. But if it be so, by what name are we to characterise the linguistic expression of a judgment? Hegel is here labouring under a confusion between three distinct things: judgment, proposition and assertion. It is artificial to distinguish between Judgment and Proposition, by stating that the former answers to a question or attempts to remove some doubt. It is not quite clear from Hegel’s definition whether a proposition is a mere combination of some words or there is some intellectual operation behind the words. Judgment is essentially an intellectual act which, as we have seen, consists in truth-claim. But judgment does not hang *in vacuo*. It is, after all, embodied in language, uttered or un-uttered. It has some linguistic

¹ Hegel’s *Doctrine of Formal Logic*, Tr. by Henry S. Macran.

expression, which we take as a proposition. If we take judgment as an assertion in answer to a question or out of an attempt, to remove some doubt, we are narrowing down the pre-natal history of judgment. We have varied interests in life and those interests are undoubtedly the guiding principles of the emergence of a judgment or judgments. If we circumscribe the nature of a judgment, in such a way, as Hegel does, we have to invent some other designation for those truth-claiming assertive attitudes which owe their origin neither to question nor to doubt. What Hegel quotes as an instance of proposition, is nothing but an assertion, which is no judgment. Assertion is a mere statement without truth-claim. I read in some treatise on Greek history, or in a biography of Aristotle, for example,—“Aristotle died in the 73rd year of his age, in the 4th year of the 115th Olympiad.” This is a mere assertion, without any claim of truth. I simply apprehend the meaning of the statement, without judging. Judgment emerges as soon as I claim truth for it. But before that I remain simply neutral to the truth or otherwise of the assertion. It does not necessarily mean that in order to judge, we must first assert. Judgment is autonomous in the sense that it has its own ground to stand upon, and does not require the prop of an assertion.

So we distinguish between judgment and proposition and assertion. An assertion is a mere statement which is nothing but the embodiment in language of a suggested content, which turns into that of a judgment, when claim is introduced into it. Judgment is an intellectual act and this act has its linguistic counterpart, which is proposition. So though judgment and proposition are distinct, yet they are closely connected. A proposition is really a crust of language, which hides beneath the stream of an intellectual operation.

Here we shall do well to refer to Mr. W. E. Johnson's view of a proposition. He departs from the path of traditional Logic and tries to develop a unique position. According to Mr. Johnson, a proposition is not the verbal expression of judgment.

"The sentence may be summarily defined as the verbal expression of a judgment or of a proposition."¹ "It would thus be more natural," says he, "to speak of passing judgment upon a proposition proposed in thought than to identify judgment as such with the proposition."² So we find a judgment is distinct from a proposition. But he, at the same time, thinks that the proposition cannot be usefully defined in isolation. The proposition is "but only a factor in a concrete act of judgment." Now let us take the sentence "This bird is blue" and examine it to see how far it represents a judgment or a proposition. According to Mr. Johnson, a sentence is the verbal expression of a proposition or of a judgment, and a proposition is only a factor in the act of a judgment. So the verbal expression of a judgment must include that of a proposition. But Mr. Johnson does not quite clearly bring out how to detect a proposition, as distinguished from a judgment, behind a sentence. The problem is rather—What is meant by a proposition? "I propose," says he, "to take the term *assertum*, as a synonym for proposition." Whatever may be the meaning of the term '*assertum*' this much is sure that it has a distinct reference to the content of assertion, actually made or to be made. But Mr. Johnson, at the same breath, takes a proposition as *par excellence*—"the unit of thought." We come to the last phase of his theory, when he says, "Bradley has represented a proposition as ultimately an objective, characterising Reality and Dr. Bosanquet as an adjective, characterising that fragment of Reality, with which we are in immediate contact." Mr. Bradley and Dr. Bosanquet make a sharp distinction between a judgment and a proposition. Dr. Bosanquet discusses fully, in his *Logic*, the distinction between a judgment and a proposition. He never speaks of a proposition as characterising Reality. So what appears from Mr. Johnson's statement is this that he forgets the distinction between a judgment and a proposition, even in his own sense, and that he is ascribing

¹ W. E. Johnson. *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 1.

² *Ibid*, p. 2.

to proposition—the function with which Mr. Bradley and Dr. Bosanquet credit judgment. Thus Mr. Johnson's theory of proposition is riddled with contradictions. He began by distinguishing between a judgment and a proposition. But he ends by abolishing the distinction. What is present in Mr. Johnson's mind when he speaks of a proposition as "the unit of thought" and as "a factor in the act of judgment"—is the act of apprehension of meaning. Apprehension is a mere phase in our judging attitude. Wherever judgment is, apprehension there must be. But the converse is not true. There may be apprehension despite the fact that no judgment exists. The linguistic expression of this mode of apprehension of meaning I term as assertion which consists in mere statement, without any claim or belief. In order that there may be a distinction between a sentence, not expressing a judgment and one, expressing a judgment, I take the term "proposition" to designate the linguistic counterpart of a judgment.

CONTINUANTS, OCCURRENTS AND EVENTS IN JOHNSONS' LOGIC

By

D. G. VINOD, AMALNER.

The Continuant and the Occurrent are correlative terms. The realm of particular existents or substantives proper is made up of these two. Occurrents and continuants do not differ from each other as substantives and adjectives. Occurrents as well as continuants are substantives and both are qualified by adjectives. Feeling of headache is an occurrent and a mind is a continuant. Feeling of headache inheres in mind but it is not an adjective which characterises it. Feeling of headache may be qualified by an adjective like hot-ness and the mind may be qualified by an adjective like uneasiness. Feeling of headache is not an adjective of the substantive mind.

Mr. Johnson gives two typical examples of continuants : the material particle and the individual mind. His occurrent and continuant correspond to change and permanence. But this does not mean that there must be a certain determinate value of a certain determinable manifested in all the successive phases of a given continuant or even that a continuant must have a certain permanent property throughout the whole history of its existence. Mind is a continuant and one of its habits is a property. This property of habit may change but the mind never changes. Continuant is the persistent something behind the possibly changing properties. By "Properties" Johnson means a definite group of manifestations not as actual but as "Potential." Any continuant has many modes of manifestations ; each of these modes is a determinable. Its category is

determined by these fundamental determinables. A continuant is manifested by some determinate value of each of these determinables. It is not necessary that continuant shall last for an indefinitely long time or will have no beginning or end. One distinction which Johnson makes between occurrent and continuant is that occurrent occurs and continuant does not. But if continuant may not last indefinitely, as we have just stated, they will have definite end and beginning and they also will *occur*.

And if we can show that occurrents can also last for any indefinite duration just as continuants do there will be hardly any difference left between the two. If continuants can have a beginning and occurrents can have an indefinite duration they shall have forsaken their distinctive character ; and in this connection it will be necessary to consider what must be Johnson's distinction between an occurrent and an event. An occurrent is a manifestation of a single determinate value of a single determinable throughout the whole of a certain temporal or a spatio-temporal region. Let us take colour as a determinable. An occurrent is the pervasion of a certain whole area for a certain complete moment of time by a determinate shade of red. The same area may be pervaded by a definite temperature for the same moment which will be another occurrent. And both these occurrents together might make up an event since they both inhere in the same continuant. If they inhere in two different continuants they will be different events. The necessity of this reference to continuants becomes more obvious in the case of mental occurrents where we have only temporal extension. It is possible that two people may have precisely similar feelings of headache for the whole identical moment of time. In this case the two occurrents cannot be distinguished spatially, temporally or qualitatively. Yet they can never be taken as one and the reason is that they inhere in different continuants.

If events differ in their spatial or temporal boundaries or in both they are different events even when they belong to the

same continuant and manifest the same determinate value of the same determinables. Thus there will be events which are parts of an event as well as of the occurrents which are constituents of the event. The occurrents which are constituents of an event will all have exactly the same spatio-temporal boundaries as the event itself and will differ only in being manifestations of different determinables. The events which are parts of an event will have space-time boundaries which are wholly contained in the event, but they will not be identical with those of the events, though they may all be manifestations of precisely the same determinate values of the same determinables. A question may be asked whether occurrents can have parts ; and it appears that they will have. An event with one constituent cannot be distinguished from its occurrent for that occurrent alone is its constituent ; and then if an event has parts an occurrent can also have the same. The difference between occurrents and events would be that only events can have constituents and occurrents cannot, since they will themselves be constituents. Both events and occurrents shall have parts. An occurrent which constitutes part of an event will be part of the whole occurrent which constitutes the whole event.

The difficulty about these distinctions is as to what constitutes one event or one occurrent ; Johnson does not mean his events to be literally momentary, nor can he mean his occurrents to be so. Every occurrent then shall have some temporal or spatio-temporal extension. If this is so, then the mere fact that it is composed of spatio-temporal or temporal parts will not prevent a manifestation of a certain determinable from being taken as one. What is enough for constituting a single occurrent is that a single determinate value of a certain determinable shall be manifested throughout the whole of a certain temporal or spatio-temporal region and that the whole of this manifestation shall be referred to a single continuant. If these conditions are fulfilled we can say that there is both a single occurrent and plurality of sub-occurrents which together

compose it. There seems to be no reason why an occurrent should not last for any length of time or occupy any amount of space. And if this is so, the distinction between an occurrent and a continuant appears to lose its force.

A similar difficulty may be raised with regard to the problem of events. Johnson tells us that a number of different occurrents are constituents of a single event if they all pervade the whole of a single temporal or time-space region and all refer to the same continuant. Now Mr. Johnson takes an event as composed of a number of different occurrents. If such occurrents between them fill up a certain temporal or spatio-temporal region we can take the contents of that region as forming a single event inspite of the fact that none of the occurrents occupies the *whole* of this region. Mr. C. D. Broad in his criticism of Johnson's *Logic* has given in this connection the instance of a tune. A tune may be counted as one event occupying, say, five minutes. But it consists of a series of *different* sound-occurrents; together they fill up the five minutes, but none of them lasts for the whole of the time. And the event is the tune which it is just because its various constituent occurrents do not all overlap in tune but succeed each other in a certain order. In this case all the occurrents are manifestations of a single determinable. The notion of a single event does require that the same determinables shall be manifested in some determinate form or other throughout the whole of the period which the event is supposed to occupy. But it does not seem necessary that they shall be manifested in a single determinate value throughout the whole period as the example of the tune plainly shows. Also there seems to be no necessity for the determinate manifestations of each determinable at a given moment to cover the whole spatial extension of the event at that moment, provided that between them they leave no part of this extension unpervaded by some determinate manifestation of some of the determinables.

Whitehead's distinction between "Uniform" and "Non-uniform" objects may be referred to in this connection.

Whitehead argues that there are some characteristics which can be manifested throughout any spatio-temporal region however small and that there are others which need a certain minimum of space or of time or of both for their manifestation. In discussing occurrents Johnson has confined himself to "Uniform" characteristics. A definition including also the "Non-uniform" characteristics would be proper. There can be a single occurrent—provided either (a) that we are dealing with a uniform determinable and that is manifested in a single determinate value throughout the whole of a spatio-temporal region or (b) that we are dealing with a non-uniform determinable and that this is manifested in a single determinate value in every part of a certain spatio-temporal region which is large enough to allow its being manifested at all.

Mr. Johnson might have dealt with this question also in some such way as to make all occurrents to be manifestations of uniform determinables and to count all manifestations of non-uniform determinables as events and not occurrents. A tune is an instance of a non-uniform characteristic, while a note may be supposed for the present purpose as an instance of an uniform characteristic. And it may be said that the characteristic of being such and such a tune can belong only to an event whose constituents are a series of occurrents, each of which is characterised as such and such a note.

Mr. Johnson has not said enough about the beginning and end of continuants. He leaves it undecided whether even simple continuants may begin or not. He thinks that scientists will decide it "on empirical grounds." Now if simple continuants have a beginning and an end, we have an altogether new kind of change and a very peculiar instance of causation which falls outside Johnson's *Logic*. Secondly, scientists do not ascribe unending duration to material particle on empirical grounds but on *a priori* grounds. It is obviously an impossible feat to ascribe endless duration to anything on empirical grounds. Scientists ascribe unending duration to the ultimate physical continuants

on a *a priori* ground that beginning or ending of simple ultimates involves a kind of change and causation which is inconceivable. Lastly, the expression "material particle" is ambiguous. In Dynamics it stands for a fiction—a mass-*point*, which seems to be the sense in which Johnson has often used it. But scientists who are said to believe it on empirical grounds must take it as a material continuant of finite spatial dimensions.

To pass on to psychical continuants. Mr. Johnson takes mind as the only example of psychical continuants. Minds are not sub-continuant of larger psychical continuants. "Psychical reality remains essentially pluralistic and cannot be formulated monistically." Bodies not only have sub-continuant of which they are composed but also they are sub-continuant of larger material systems. This distinction between bodies and minds rests on two grounds: (1) The spatial relation *between* two bodies is of precisely the same kind as that within a single body and between its parts. (2) Bodies which are separated in space are linked by transcendent causality and the parts of a single body are also related by the same kind of causality. We may accept Johnson's distinction and the reasons for it. But there will be a difficulty as regards the sub-continuant of a mind. Mind itself may not be a sub-continuant in any larger physical continuant but yet it is possible that mind may have sub-continuant. Johnson himself admits elsewhere that there is something very much like a transcendent causality between various mental processes belonging to a single mind. A process of deliberation and a process of sensation might go on simultaneously and without any interference in the same mind for some time and then one might bring out a modification in the other. In such cases the two processes may be taken as sub-continuant and the mind as a compound continuant of which they are the constituent parts.

In conclusion Johnson's distinctions between continuants, occurrents and events have not much significance and his discussion of the physical and the psychical continuants appears to

be imperfect in many respects. Continuants and occurrents have not been definitely distinguished; parts of occurrents and parts of events are not fully discussed and related and treatment of mind and the material particle suffers from serious imperfections.

REALITY, KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

By

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A Study in Epistemology.

The problem of knowledge is a distinct one and, though related to the problems of both psychology and metaphysics, ought not to be confused with either of them. This, however, does not mean that in both stating and solving the problem of knowledge we have no need of either psychology or metaphysics. On the contrary, a knowledge of both these sciences will be found to be indispensable to the appreciation of the distinctive nature of the Epistemological problem and solution. Many arbitrary statements and dogmatic assertions can be avoided by paying due heed to the lessons of these two sciences. Anyway, as we said, the problem of knowledge must first be stated in as clear and unmistakable terms as possible. Well, then, what is the problem?

Descartes brought about the Copernican revolution in philosophy by insisting on the subjective starting-point in all philosophical speculations. The
Problem stated. The ancients unquestioningly acquiesced in an external world regarded as real and independent, waiting to be contemplated by the mind of man. To the extent that they did not realise the importance of the subjective starting-point in all philosophy they may be said to have not appreciated fully the epistemological problem. We must start with the thinking mind and its content if we are at all to successfully face and solve the problem. As Descartes himself maintained, nowhere in the whole world do

we get a certain basis for further construction, short of the thinking mind or consciousness. The alternative to this is to take for granted that there is reality independent of the mind, with such and such a nature, and the problem of knowledge will then be in thinking it as such, or using such powers of the mind as will enable us to see reality as such and such, unity or plurality, material or spiritual, etc. We protest against the attitudes not because we disbelieve in an independent reality nor even because we doubt its priority as an existent, but because the nature of such reality (not its existence), ought to come as a result of the investigation conducted into the mind, its contents and powers. So what we insist on is the starting with the subjective standpoint as the proper procedure in any epistemological enquiry. Let us, therefore, as Descartes did provisionally, set aside all our implicit belief, in the existence of an independent reality of such and such a kind over against the mind, as, as yet, unverified belief, though we may be led to posit all these later on as a result of successive stages of reasoning. In other words, let us refuse to believe in anything till we have seen the intellectual necessity for it. The man in the street may easily acquiesce in so obvious a position as an independent reality, but we can give our consent to it only if reason demands it.

It must be noticed, at this point, that though we insist on the subjective starting-point our position is not that of the solipsist. For the solipsist says positively and dogmatically that we can know only the mind and its content and nothing more. But we say that the mind and its contents are the certain foundation for any edifice or superstructure that we might raise in philosophy. Thus the mind and its contents are only the starting-point for us, and from there, where we shall go and what we shall posit will depend on the results of our further enquiry. Starting from the mind we might, for example, say that there is an outside world spread out in space ; or that it is material or spiritual ; or one or many and so on. Or we might with

the solipsists end by saying that there is nothing more than the mind and its contents to be known (this, of course, is not going to be our conclusion). Now starting from the mind—because it is the one of which we have almost intuitive certainty,—how shall we state the problem of epistemology?

When the mind and its contents are said to be certain, they are certain only as subjective entities to begin with. But if we stop there we have not so much as faced the problem. So, to say that my mind and its contents are certain, is to be no better than the solipsist. The problem is fully stated only when we ask, how can the mental stream of ideas, nevertheless, be objective? In other words, the problem does not arise till we claim objectivity to our subjective ideas. Knowledge, of course, must be subjectively appropriated, otherwise it is not knowledge, but what is thus subjectively appropriated is not and need not be subjective also. We must show that the mind and its contents though subjective, contain for us something objective. Shall we say that the mind must refer to something beyond its subjectivity? The whole question, therefore, revolves round that word 'objective.' Knowledge is said to be objective; if so, in what sense?

At this stage a possible difficulty in the way of accepting the preliminary contention that knowledge should be objective, or knowledge should be of something objective, must be obviated. The reference is to the sophists who said that knowledge is not objective. Protagoras said that "man is the measure of all things," meaning thereby that what I believe to be true at this moment is true for me and what you believe to be true is true to you and there is no such thing as objective truth common to us both. His disciple Gorgias went further and exposed unwittingly the utter hollowness of the position by saying that what is true to me this moment need not be true to me the next moment and *vice versa*. Truth to them is a matter of opinion. Subjective truth is thus a contradiction in terms; it is in short no truth. Truth, if ever, must of necessity be objective.

There can be no such thing as subjective truth. The sophists provide their own *argumentum ad absurdum*, and, thus, we substantiate the validity of our position that knowledge to be true, though subjective, as residing in the mind of some one or another, ought to *claim* objectivity. Our enquiry into knowledge as given in all the sciences will be to find out the truth-value contained in them. Knowledge and its truth-value cannot be separated, though they can be distinguished. This truth-value of knowledge, pertains to the objectivity that knowledge as such claims. What then is the objective ?

In deciding the meaning of the objective, we must take note of some presupposition involved in the case. Let us fully realise that whatever meaning of the objective we are eventually going to accept, it must be explained in mental categories. For example, even if we speak of the world or reality as material we have no other way of referring to it or affirming it than through our ideas of it. The subjective idealist Berkeley and the phenomenalist Hume were right to this extent that they showed the utter futility of referring to anything except in mental terms. However, there is an essential distinction between the inability to refer to reality in anything other than mental terms and the statement that, therefore, reality thus referred to is mental or psychic in its nature. It is this distinction that they missed. We may perfectly rightly say that we have nothing to work with except our ideas of things whenever we speak about reality. When we see the sun it is the idea or sensation of the sun that we have in the mind rather than the sun itself. It will be shallow criticism to parody this and say that when you eat an orange it is not an orange that you eat but the idea of an orange. What we eat may be an orange conceived as a material non-psychical reality, but if we are at all to know about the eating of orange it must be in terms of the ideas in such a connection—ideas such as the idea of the orange, the idea of eating, etc. Hence without being suspected of being subjective idealists we may concede the perfectly

legitimate position that reality, for knowledge, will be such as could be reduced to mental terms. But with the aid of mental terms we may confidently refer to a reality that is not mental and in a sense independent. Berkeley said, '*esse is percipi*,' i.e., the essence of things lies in their being perceived, but we consider that a very wrong way of stating the truth. Things, if ever, cannot be taken to depend on the mind for their existence and function. The most that we can say is that if things exist and function they can be known to exist and function only through mental interpretation about them. This then is the first presupposition that we can know reality only to the extent that we construct it in the mind through the interpretative, constructive work of the mind. In the second place the reality thus known need not be in its essence psychic. It may have an existence of its own all independent of the knowing mind.

Further in the matter of referring to reality through the mind, we are also said to be shut up, each one in his own mind. The mind of each man is an individual thing, separated from other minds and things. Bosanquet tells us that for the purpose of explaining objectivity in knowledge we must imagine each one of us as being shut up within an encircling panorama with a variety of objects and tints in it. But being shut within it neither we could get out of it nor could anybody else step into it. It is in a real sense subjective, known to me the knower only. This position if pressed too far may land us in the windowless monads of Leibnitz and the pre-established harmony. If we are to escape the uncomfortable conclusions from that awkward position, we must think of each mind as a monad with windows. While each mind is a unique individual existence it is not shut out from the rest as Bosanquet wants us to believe. At the least it is in contact with other minds. We shall also soon find reasons to believe that it is in contact with a real environment of persons and things. Now, if we believe with the idealists that each mind is shut within its own

ideas and the most it could do is to arrange and re-arrange the tints that are magically appearing on its canvas, according to the laws of its own construction, then objectivity can be explained only as a case of coherence or consistency among the ideas. Those ideas or judgments that fit in with the system that we are constructing, will alone be true and the rest false. This implies that reality could be constructed in the mind in one way and no other. Ultimately it is the system that is said to be the basis of all inference and truth. But have we not had instances of a single fact upsetting a system that we regarded as the basis of all further construction and truth? What is the lesson from this? While consistency and coherence may be fairly good indications of truth, when it exists, they are not such as would constitute truth. The coherence theory of truth only shows that the mind in getting truth about reality must be actively interpreting and constructing according to certain laws of thought. The mind is not as Locke said, a *tabula rasa* or a blank sheet of paper or passive pliable clay on which experience begins to write and produce knowledge. The mind's contribution in the acquisition of truth and knowledge is well brought out by the Idealists. The other contribution that they make is the statement that truth-value belongs to judgments, to knowledge. Apart from knowledge there is no point in speaking about truth and falsity. Further truth and falsity must be, theoretically at least, possibilities within knowledge if they are to be intelligibly applied to it. As Bosanquet points out, it is judgment alone that can be true or false. For, he says, it is judgment that can, being subjective, nevertheless claim to be objectively true and may either fulfil or not fulfil that claim. If it fulfils, it is true, but if it does not, it is false. Though truth may pertain to judgment, knowledge, it pertains to it in its connection with reality. Judgment itself is defined as the mental interpretation of reality and knowledge is knowledge of reality. Therefore, truth itself cannot be explained purely in terms of coherence or consistency within the mind,

While this is the position of the Idealists the Realists try to speak of truth as correspondence. The naïve common-sense theories, with which are allied the Realistic theories, start with two worlds, one inside, which is ideal and the other outside, which is real. The real outside is to be copied by the mind inside in feebler material. This is the 'copy' theory of knowledge; truth in this case will depend upon the correspondence between the original real outside and its faithful copy inside. Between the copy and the original there may be differences but, as copy and original they are bound to have some point-to-point resemblance also. If the correspondence that we look for is not there in any one case we put it down as false. It is this that is variously expressed by a representative-perception-theorist like Locke or direct-perception-theorist like Reid or '*Nco-Realists*' like Russell and Alexander or "*critical realists*" like Sellars, Pratt, Stout, Strong, and others. The chief defect in all such theories appears to me, to lie in starting with two worlds (the outer one being a ready-made one waiting to be copied by the mind), which is an assumption we are not warranted in making at the beginning of the epistemological enquiry. In view of the fact that all explanations must start from the subjective standpoint, and in view nevertheless, of the fact that individual minds have windows, we are not justified in starting with the assumption of two independent worlds. Let us for the time being forget that there is an outside independent ready-made reality and start from the mind and its contents only and look for evidences within it for a reality beyond itself.

It is here that Psychology should come to our rescue. There is nothing in the mind, except the emotions, which was not previously in the senses. This, which is an acceptable statement, shows that in knowledge there is something that is given and something that is the interpretation. Just as in telegraphy the receiver only hears dots and dashes but interprets them in accordance with a common code as such and such

ideas as found in the mind of the operator on the other side, even so in knowledge from the sense-data and interpretation we can read off the reality beyond them. The receiving man may not hear the man operating utter those ideas or may not peep into his mind to read them, but with all that may, through a common medium and common code, know exactly what the operator may have wanted to communicate to him. Even so we may not know whether reality is, or is not, there. But we have the nervous excitation and the mental interpretation of those. With these it is not hard to grant that the reality we interpret the nervous excitation to be, is there as interpreted by us. The evidence for reality existing as an independent entity, psychologically, is the way in which sensations and perceptions are obtained and, logically, is the content of the interpreted ideas themselves. The ideas confidently refer us to a world of objects independent of the perceiving mind. Thus we come to have the perceiver and the perceived thing, the knower and the thing known. This much of dualism is absolutely essential for any theory of knowledge. Correspondence between knowledge and the thing known is, like coherence among the ideas, only a partial statement about truth.

As against these a better way of expressing the nature of truth is this. The better way to be outlined below will take advantage of the valuable elements in both idealism and realism and synthesise them in a new way. Jevons gives four stages in the discovery of scientific truth. They are—(1) observation of facts, (2) formulation of the hypothesis, (3) deductive inferences from the hypothesis taken as true, (4) verification of those inferences with actual facts. A casual look over these steps will convince one of the fact that truth is neither pure mental construction nor merely something existing independent of the mind. A fact is not known, and is much less true till it is scientifically *explained*, and the mental explanation in terms of hypothesis is not complete till it is verified with facts. The interaction between mind and facts of nature

is very clearly brought out here. It is in the interplay between the two that truth can be discovered. Bosanquet rightly says that that is true which we are obliged to assert. But what does that being obliged to assert depend upon? His answer is that "because we are all obliged to think assertorily according to the same method, the results of our thinking form a corresponding system." In answer to the other question whether this agreement of our knowledge depends on the agreement of the physical stimuli supplied to us by nature as well as on the homogeneity of our intelligence, Bosanquet says that physical stimuli have no priority in knowledge and, therefore, the objectivity of knowledge must be explained only in terms of mental construction. We fail to see the point of this argument. Physical stimuli, as physical stimuli, have priority in knowledge. Perhaps what Bosanquet means is that physical stimuli are known only after they have been mentally interpreted. But the fact that mental interpretation is not of nothing but of something given by nature, shows that the interpretation must not be separated from the stimulus. They must be taken as inseparable though distinguishable parts of an ideal unity. If so the idea of giving priority to the one or the other of these parts is not proper. In the act of knowing we must take both the mental interpretation and the stimulus as factors of equal importance in deciding the nature of truth contained in knowledge. The defect of the idealist seems to be in making everything of mental construction and nothing of the stimuli. The defect of realists lies in presupposing not only the existence of the physical stimuli, which he is entitled to, but also its nature as an extended something. This latter is got only in and through interpretation. The nature of the stimuli as material or as spiritual must come after interpretation. But its existence as affecting the mind through the senses must be assumed. If this is what is meant by the sensum or sense data of the realist it may be granted.

Hence truth must be explained in terms of mental construction and stimuli, where the existence of the stimuli is to be presupposed, though the nature thereof is to be determined in and through mental interpretation. We agree with the idealists in determining the starting-point and main procedure and the realist in insisting on the need for something more than coherence between ideas to establish truth. According to the theory indicated above we pass from mind to reality, combining the good elements in the theories of both, idealists and realists, instead of from reality to mind.

THE PRIMARY NEGATIVE JUDGMENT

By

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The question that we shall try to answer in this short paper is : How is the negative judgment first obtained ? To make the problem clear and precise with the help of a concrete illustration : On looking at a tree I pass the affirmative judgments—" There is a flower on this tree," " The flower is red ;" these judgments are said to be derived from perception and are called perceptual judgments. But when on looking at the tree we pass the negative judgments—" There is no flower on this tree," " The leaves of this tree are not green ;" can we say similarly that these negative judgments also are derived from perception and that they also can be called perceptual judgments?

The answer that will be ordinarily given will be in the affirmative. It is commonly believed that like an affirmative judgment, a negative judgment also is derived from perception and can be said to be perceptual. But when we deeply think about the matter, the clearness and validity of this ordinary reply is found to disappear into a series of doubts and difficulties.

The very first doubt that presents itself is : The judgment " There is a flower " or " The flower is red " can be said to be perceptual *because* it can be said to be based on the perception of the flower or the red colour (as the case may be). But if the judgment " There is no flower " or " The leaves are not green " is similarly to be called a perceptual judgment, we have to say on the perception of *what* this negative judgment is based. We cannot say that the judgment " There is no flower in the tree ".

is derived from the perception of the tree or that the judgment "The leaves are not green" is derived from the perception of the brown colour of the leaves. For what can be directly derived from these perceptions alone are the judgments, "There is a tree there" and "The leaves are brown," respectively.

It may be urged however that these negative judgments are based on the perception of the non-existence of a flower and of the non-existence of green colour respectively. But this reply would only bring the difficulty to a head. For the question would then arise—"How is non-existence perceived?" Though in common parlance we may glibly talk of the perception of the non-existence of a thing, as much as that of its existence, a closer scrutiny reveals a serious difficulty. For it is found that non-existence cannot possibly affect our senses as an existent object can and that consequently it cannot be understood how it can become the object of a sense-perception. To be an object of perception, in the *same sense* as an existing thing is, non-existence has to become a positive entity and has, therefore, to cease to be non-existence.

An attempt may be made, however, to avoid this objection by saying that though non-existence may not be perceived by itself as an independent entity it may be perceived as the adjective or quality of a positive (or sensible) entity. Using the above illustrations, it may be said that when the tree is perceived it is perceived as being characterised by the non-existence of a flower and similarly that the leaves are perceived as being characterised by the absence of green colour. But this reply is soon found out to be only concealing the difficulty by temporarily putting it off. For when it is further asked how non-existence even as a quality can become the object of perception the old difficulty reappears only in a new form.

It is found, therefore, that it is difficult to understand how non-existence can be *perceived* either as a substantive or as an adjective. The *locus* of non-existence can of course be perceived as being a perceptible entity. But the perception of the locus

does not *by itself* amount to the perception of non-existence, for, in that case we would judge the non-existence of the flower on the tree, even when there is flower on the tree, because we have even then the perception of the locus, the tree.

An attempt may be made, however, to defend, in a modified way, the view that the perception of the locus amounts to the knowledge of non-existence. It may be said that it is only the perception of a *bare* locus that yields the knowledge of the non-existence of an object in it. Let us see if this defence can help us out of the difficulty. What is meant by a bare locus? Does it mean a locus that is bare of all contents? No, it cannot, for in that case we could not know the absence of James from a place where there is John. Does it mean, then, bare of the particular object, the absence of which is known? No, for, then the defence would bring us back to the old difficulty. For it would mean that the non-existence of A is known in X when the non-existence of A is *perceived* in X. Generally speaking a bare locus means nothing more than a locus in which there is absence of something. Now if in the perception of the bare locus, this element of bareness (or absence of something) is not known, this perception would be useless for the judgment of non-existence. But if the bareness or non-existence is known the old difficulty arises as to how non-existence can be known, through perception. It is found, therefore, that all attempts to derive the knowledge of non-existence or the negative judgment, from perception end in failures. What then is the source of the primary negative judgment? In order to arrive at a solution of this baffled enquiry let us examine closely the psychological process underlying a primary negative judgment and compare it with that of a primary affirmative judgment.

In the case of a primary affirmative judgment, say, 'This is a flower' or 'This is green,' something ('this') is presented to sense and we apply a concept to it or rather we bring it under a concept ('flower,' 'green') and we obtain as a result the judgment. But the primary negative judgment, say 'This is not

a flower, ' or ' This is not green ' differs from the affirmative one in two important respects. *First*, though the negative judgment also requires as its basis the presentation of a positive character (say ' a fruit ' or ' a brown colour ' in the above instances) and though some concept also is applied to the presented something, the *application* of this concept is determined not so much by the presented (as in the case of the affirmative judgment) but by the *will* of the judging mind. Generally speaking, in the case of affirmation, the concept is suggested by the *presented*, but in the case of negation it is the *mind* that suggests the concept. In a word the negative judgment is more *subjective* than the affirmative one. *Secondly*, in the case of the affirmative judgment the application of the concept to the presented is successful, but in the case of the negative judgment the concept suggested by the mind is repelled by the presented ; there is a feeling of opposition, and the attempt to apply the concept fails. This failure is the very vein of the negative judgment ; it is its distinguishing feature.

From the above comparison it appears, that though both the affirmative and the negative primary judgments have some presentative basis in common, the underlying processes leading to the two judgments are so different in important respects, that it cannot be said that they are both derived in the same way. But if we are to observe this important distinction, the two processes underlying the two judgments should receive two different names and the names are to be found. Now the distinguishing feature of the process underlying the primary affirmative judgment, is the successful application of the concept to the presented, whereas that of the process underlying the negative judgment is unsuccessful application or rather non-application. If the former process is called perception the latter may be called non-perception. The use of these two names would clearly recall to us the opposite nature of the two processes.

If the above is granted, we are in a position to answer the question with which we started. The primary negative judgment

is derived from *non-perception*. It will be found that this reply, though obtained through a complicated process of arguments, is in harmony with commonsense as well. When a man says—"There is a tree here," if he is asked "How do you know?" the reply that comes instinctively is "Because I perceive it." But when he says—"There is no tiger here," if he is asked "How do you know?" he would at once reply—"Because I do *not perceive* it." It is evident from this, therefore, that he considers non-perception to be the basis of his negative judgment just as he thinks perception to be the basis of the affirmative judgment. It stands both to reason and commonsense, therefore, to say that a primary negative judgment is derived from non-perception.

Though the grounds already set forth may make the above conclusion irresistible there may be two important objections that may make its acceptance difficult. We have to consider these objections, therefore, one by one.

The first objection may arise thus: Non-perception is want of perception and therefore a kind of absence of knowledge, i.e., it is a form of ignorance. To say, therefore, that non-perception yields a judgment is to hold that ignorance yields knowledge, and this is paradoxical if not positively absurd. This difficulty is apparently very great. But it ceases to be so when it is remembered that by non-perception is not meant here a mere *vacant* state of the mind but a *baﬄed* process of the mind, so that it cannot be likened to a non-entity that is incapable of producing any effect. The difficulty loses its force further, if we consider the fact that ignorance can and does actually yield a judgment, however paradoxical it might at first sight appear to be. For, the psychological judgment 'I do not know X' is based on nothing but the ignorance of X. The judgment 'There is no X' is the logical counterpart of that psychological judgment, just as the judgment 'There is a table here' is the counterpart of the judgment 'I see a table here.'

The *second objection* is much more important. It can be stated thus: can non-perception by itself alone yield the negative

judgment? If so, why should *not* the non-perception of a table in a dark room yield the judgment "There is no table here?" We are to think, therefore, that non-perception *alone* does not yield the negative judgment, that some other auxiliary factor is necessary for the purpose. A little consideration shows that the reason why the non-perception of the table in the dark does not yield the judgment about its non-existence is the knowledge of the fact that even if the table existed there it would not be perceived under those circumstances. This again leads us to think that the judgment about non-existence follows non-perception only when we are sure of the fact that the object, if it existed there, would have been perceived under those circumstances. But if that be true, we have to conclude that the judgment about non-existence, *i.e.*, the negative judgment in question, is not *derived from non-perception but from an inference based on the two premises*, one expressing the fact of non-perception and the other the knowledge that if the object existed it would have been perceived under the circumstances. The form of this inference is:—If the table existed here it would have been perceived. It is not perceived here. Therefore, it does not exist here.

Serious as this objection is, it is not unanswerable. There are at least two ways, one direct and the other indirect, in which it can be removed.

The indirect reply would be:—If the negative judgment in question be the conclusion derived from a syllogistic inference, one of the premises of that syllogism must be negative. Wherefrom is that negative judgment obtained? If that again be derived from an inference, the process would lead to an infinite regress. But if that is not derived from an inference it must be known immediately. It has to be granted, therefore, that some negative judgments are obtained through an immediate source. And those judgments, not being derived inferentially, are nothing but primary negative judgments obtained through an immediate source of knowledge. And we have already shown

that that immediate source cannot be called perception, but may be called non-perception.

But the direct reply to the objection would be—It is true that the non-perception of a thing does not always yield the non-existence of the thing. But this should not lead us to suspect that when it does, it does it with the help of some other knowledge. On the contrary, it may be thought that non-perception does *by itself* yield the knowledge of non-existence normally, but it does not do so when there is a positive hindrance to it, such as a cause for doubt or disbelief. The reasonableness of this defence would be more evident when we compare the case of non-perception with that of perception. The perception of an object also does not always yield the knowledge of its existence. The perception of a table in mirror, however clear it may be, does not lead to the judgment of the existence of the table in the mirror. But does this justify us to hold that when on the perception of the table on the floor we judge its existence there, there is *some other* premise which along with that expressing the perception constitutes an inference regarding the existence of the table? If not, is it not also reasonable to think that the non-perception of a thing yields the judgment about the non-existence of the thing, except when there is a positive hindrance such as some cause for doubt or disbelief. The case of non-perception, is, therefore, on a par with that of perception, in this respect, and if the objection does not apply against perception, it cannot apply against non-perception, as well. We are to recognise however, that the objection, though untenable contains a valuable truth.

Whenever from the non-perception of a thing we pass the judgment about its non-existence, there is, of course, the negative guarantee that if the object existed it would have been perceived. But this guarantee may be looked upon as a canon of non-perception. It is not ordinarily present in our consciousness and hence cannot be counted as a factor responsible for the belief in the judgment. But when the occasion arises for testing or strengthening the belief it may be used for the removal of obstacles. In the case

of perception also the necessity for such testing or corroboration may be felt and hence in this respect, also, non-perception is on a par with perception.

If these replies are deemed satisfactory then it can be concluded that the primary negative judgment is derived from an immediate source of knowledge that is different from perception and can be called non-perception.

DHARMA AS A SUBSTANCE IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY.

By

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The word, *Dharma*, is ordinarily understood to mean a moral act or a system of moral practices. Occasionally in the orthodox system of Indian Philosophy, attempts are made to invest the word with a super-ethical significance. In such cases, *Dharma* seems to mean 'the nature,' 'the essence' or 'the attribute' of a substance. In Buddhist system too, *Dharma* has the usual ethical sense; but in many places, it stands for a cosmic law, e.g., 'the law of progressive causality' or 'the law of Impermanence.' The conception, however, of *Dharma* as a non-psychical world-substance is peculiar to Jaina philosophy.

In the Jaina system, *Dharma* has a peculiar sense in addition to its ordinary ethical significance. It is said to be a real non-psychical substance. Like the Principle of mutation, the Principle of Rest and Space, it is formless (*Amūrta*). It pervades the whole of the *Īśākāśa* or 'filled space' and has 'innumerable' (*Asaṃkhyēya*) *Pradēśas* or parts; hence it is one of the five *Astikāyas* or 'embodied substances.' It is certainly 'immaterial' and 'eternal' and as a substance-in-itself, strictly 'inactive.' It does not exist in the *Ālōka*.

Dharma is described as the '*Gati-kāraṇam*,' i.e., the cause of motion. This definition, however, does not mean that it moves the things. *Dharma* is clearly stated to be a '*Niṣkriya*' or inactive substance. How then, can it be said to be the cause of motion? It is the *Vahiraṅga-Hētu* or the *Udāsīna-Hētu* of the Motion of a thing, inasmuch as it only *helps* the motion of a thing. A material substance or soul moves of itself;

Dharma does not actually and actively move it; what it does is simply to assist or make possible the motion. The author of *Dravya-Saṅgraha* says :—" *Dharma* helps the movement of the moving Matter or Soul just as water, that of a moving fish; it does not move the non-moving." The example of water and the moving fish is resorted to also by *Kundakundāchāryya* and other Jaina writers. " Know that *Dharma* helps the movement of *Jīva* and *Pudgala* just as water does that of a moving fish."—92, *Pañchāstikāya-Samayāsāra*. The author of *Tattvārthasāra* also has said, " *Dharma* is what helps the movement of things which are moving of, and by themselves. Souls and Material substances resort to *Dharma* when they are to move, just as fish take the help of water when they move." *Brahma-dēva* illustrates the indirect and non-active causality of *Dharma* in effecting the movements of things in the following way. A *Siddha* is a perfectly emancipated soul having no connection with the world of ours. He does neither help nor is helped by any being on earth. He does not lead a man to Liberation. Yet when a man contemplates on the nature of a *Siddha* in a reverential attitude and thinks that he too is like the *Siddha* in his essential nature, possessed as he is of Infinite Faith, Knowledge, etc.,—well, the man gradually moves towards the attainment of *Siddha*-hood. In this case, the man moves towards Liberation, of and by himself; yet, the *Siddha* is in a real sense the cause of his Liberation. In the same way, *Dharma*, although it does not actually and actively push or move things, is a real cause or condition of their motion.

The Principle of *Dharma* does not extend beyond the *Lōkākāśa*. This is the reason why the Emancipated Soul, although it has the inherent capacity to rise upwards stops at the *Siddhasīlā*, the top of the universe and cannot move in the *Alōka* or the infinite Void Space beyond. The existence of *dharma* within the confines of the *Lōkākāśa* is one of the marks which distinguish the *Lōka* from the *Alōka*. In order that substances can exist in a world and there be order and system

in it, there must be motion in it. It is thus *Dharma* that makes the *Lōka* possible. At the same time it should never be forgotten that *Dharma* is nothing more than the assisting cause of Motion. It is because substances move and stop by themselves and *Dharma* cannot move them when they are to stop that things do not continuously fly in Space. *Dharma* is thus only one of the conditions of the order or system in the world.

Dr. Seal seems to think that *Dharma* is more than "the accompanying cause of movement." He says,—“.....it is something more,—it is the cause (or condition) of the system of movements the fact of an order in the movements, of *Jīva* and *Pudgala*.” He makes *Dharma* somewhat like the Pre-established Harmony of Leibnitz and bases his theory on the utterances of *Prabhāchandra*—“*Sakrid-gati yugapad-bhavi-gati*.” It is doubtful, however, if *Prabhāchandra* really meant *Dharma* to be such a cause of the order or system in the movements of things. *Dharma* is, no doubt, one of the causes of such an order; but, for the purposes of the order or the system in the movement of things, other principles in addition to *Dharma*, are necessary. You cannot say that water alone is the cause of the well-ordered movement of a number of fish in a tank; for the purpose of the well-ordered movement of the fish, the nature of the fish themselves is as much responsible as the existence of water in the tank. In *Pramāṇyakamala-Mārtanda*, *Prabhāchandra* says :

“*Virāḍapapanna Sakala-jīva-pudgalāśrayaḥ Sakrid-gatayaḥ Sādhāraṇa-rāhya-nimittāpekṣhā, Yugapad-bhavi-gatitcāḍēkasaraḥ-sulilāśrayānēka-matsya-gati-rat, Tatha Sakala-Jīvapudgala-sthitayaḥ Sādhāraṇa-rāhya-nimittāpekṣha, Yugapadbhāvi-sthiti-trāḍeka-kunḍāśrayānēka-budaradisthitirāt. Yattu Sādhāraṇam Nimittam Sa Dharmādharma Ścha Tābhyām Pinā Tad-gati-sthiti-kāryasyā-sambharāt.*”

These passages mean : “The individual movements of all the Souls and the Material substances are dependent upon a

common external condition because of the simultaneity of these movements just like the movements of a number of fishes which are dependent upon the water of one pond. In the same way, the stoppages of all the Souls and the Material substances are dependent upon a common external condition, because of the simultaneity of these stoppages just like the staying of a number of plums, etc., in one pot. These common conditions are respectively *Dharma* and *Adharma*; without these, the above motion and stoppage are impossible."

It would appear from the above passage of Prabhāchandra that the simultaneous motions of a number of things are evidence of the reality and substantiality of *Dharma*. Mere simultaneity of movements, however, is no more order or system than their succession. There may be simultaneity of movements without their being any order in them. A fish for example, may run towards the north in a pond, while a man may swim towards the east, a twig which has fallen into the water may float towards the west and a piece of stone may be going downwards in the water. All these movements may be simultaneous and these movements are possible because of water, the medium of motions in this case. Yet no one would see any order in these movements, although they are simultaneous. It is thus that *Dharma* may account for the simultaneous motions of things without being responsible for the order or system in them. It is conceived as a strictly passive substance. It may be one of the conditions of ordered motions; but it is never an active agent and as such, you cannot fix upon *Dharma* as the sole cause or condition of the order or the system of motions in the universe.

It seems accordingly that Professor Chakravarti's criticism of Dr. Seal's theory of *Dharma* is quite pertinent. Professor Chakravarti however introduces the principle of *Adharma* to explain the order in motions. His position seems to be that *Adharma*, the principle of Rest is logically prior to *Dharma*, so that order or system becomes the result of *Dharma* seeking

to counteract or—rather, to modify the influence of *Adharma*. Here we cannot agree with the learned Professor. It should never be forgotten that both *Dharma* and *Adharma* are passive principles. Their existence may be a help to the growth of order or system in movements but certainly they are utterly incapable of taking an active initiative in this matter in any way.

The truth is that neither *Dharma*, nor *Adharma*, nor *Ākāśa* nor *Kāla*,—none of these passive principles—can be said to bring about the order or system in the movements of substances, either jointly or severally,—although their existence may be a help to it. Rigorous monism here would probably introduce the principle of one ultimate Reality or substance to explain the order in the universe and Theism posits God for this purpose. Jaina philosophy is opposed to extreme monism and to Theism as well. To explain the ordered motions, and for the matter of that, order in the universe, we must fall back upon the essential nature of *Jīva* and *Pudgala*, the two principles which move of, and by themselves. The principle of life is essentially the same in all the *Jīvas*, so that their functionings, activities and movements must be similar and have even a family likeness. If in addition to this we take into account the fact that these *Jīvas* work within the bounds of the same *Kāla*, *Ākāśa*, *Dharma* and *Adharma* and *Pudgala*, we shall see that an order and system is bound to grow among them. As regards the order in the purely material phenomena we think Jainism would have no objection to subscribing to the up-to-date scientific explanation of it. Like the scientists of modern times, the Jainas may say that the order in material phenomena is due to the nature of the material substances, their mass and motion, the law of gravity, the principles of attraction and repulsion inherent in them. Here, again, it may be said that the existence of *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Ākāśa* and *Kāla* is a great help,—nay, a *sine quā non*—to the growth of order in the purely material phenomena. Even the existence of Souls in the universe helps

the growth of order in material phenomena because the matter or Pudgala in the universe is from the beginningless time continually shaping itself or being shaped in accordance with the needs and inclinations of the infinite number of Jivas existing and struggling in the world. Thus it is that order or system in the movements of substances is primarily due to the active nature of the substances themselves and that the growth of this order is helped by the existence not only of Dharma but of Adharma, Ākāśa, etc., etc. The author of the *Tattrārtha-rāja-rārttika* lays emphasis on the initiative taken by the substances in the matter of their moving or stopping and calls Dharma and Adharma simply *Upagrāhaka*. A blind man, he points out, takes the help of a stick, when walking; the stick does not make him move but only helps him in his moving.

If the stick were an active agent, it would have moved even senseless and sleeping men. The stick is thus an *Upagrāhaka* of the blind man's motion. Light, again, helps the power of vision; the Eyes have the power of vision and Light does not generate it. If light were an active agent, it would have made even senseless and sleeping men see. Light is thus an *Upagrāhaka* of the power of vision. "In the same way," he says, "Souls and Material substances move or stop, of and by themselves. Dharma and Adharma are only *Upagrāhaka* of the passive conditions of their motion and stoppage. They are not the *Kartā* or active generators of motion and rest. If they were *Kartā* or active agents, motion and stoppage would have been impossible." He shows how *Dharma* and *Adharma*, if conceived as active principles, would make motion and rest impossible. *Dharma* and *Adharma* are cosmic principles, pervading the whole of the world through and through. Now, if *Dharma* were to move a thing *Adharma* would have at once stopped it,—thus making motion absolutely impossible in this world. In the same way, if *Adharma* were to stop a thing, *Dharma* would have at once moved it thus making stoppage absolutely impossible in this world. Akalaṅka-Deva accordingly argues that if

Dharma and *Adharma* were more than passive principles, motion and rest would have been impossible in this world. Motion and Rest are due to the functioning of Souls and Material substances. *Dharma* and *Adharma* only help them and in a sense make them possible. May we not go further and say that *ordered* motion and *ordered* rest also are due to the functioning of Souls and Material substances and not to *Dharma* and *Adharma* either jointly or severally, although these help them and as we have said before, make them possible?

The Jaina Philosophers contend that it is not reasonable to hold that *Dharma* and *Adharma* are not real substances on the ground that their reality is not a matter of perception (*Pratyakṣa*). We are bound to and as a matter of fact, we do admit the reality of many things which we do not actually perceive. The moving and stopping things must have some substances which help their motions and stoppages; this mode of reasoning leads us to admit the reality of *Dharma* and *Adharma*. Some contend that *Ākāśa* may be supposed to be the condition of Motion and that we need not consequently posit *Dharma* as a real substance over and above *Ākāśa*. The Jaina philosophers point out that *Ākāśa* is what gives space to substances. This function of giving space is obviously different from assisting the motion of a moving thing. Essentially different functions prove the existence of essentially different substances and hence *Dharma* must be supposed to be an independent substance. Besides, if *Ākāśa* were the medium of motion, things would have gone into the *Alōka* and actually moved there just as they do in the *Lōka* or the world of ours. The fact that the *Alōka* which is a part of *Ākāśa* is absolutely devoid of all substances (even the Siddhas cannot enter it!) shows that *Dharma* is a real substance which is absent in the *Alōka* and which pervades the *Lōka* and thereby makes the distinction between the *Lōka* and the *Alōka* possible and real. There is another class of thinkers who urge that it is *Adṛṣṭa* which causes the motion of a substance and that we need not admit the reality

of *Dharma*. *Adṛṣṭa*, however, means the effect of good or bad deeds done by a conscious being. Admitting for the sake of argument that *Adṛṣṭa* is competent to effect the movements of a conscious Being how are we to account for the notion of a purely Material Substance which has nothing to do with ethical acts and thereby with *Adṛṣṭa*? Here it should be recalled once more that *Dharma*, as the Jainas conceive it, is not a substance that moves things but only helps their motion. The conception of such a medium of Motion is a logical necessity. The doctrine of *Adṛṣṭa*, thus cannot bar out the possibility of *Dharma* as a real non-psychical substance.

In conclusion, we feel inclined to examine the attempt to trace a connection between the metaphysical and the ethical significances of the words, *Dharma* and *Adharma* in the Jaina philosophy. *Dharma* is the principle of Motion and *Adharma*, of Rest. In Indian ethics, the word *Dharma* signifies Merit; i.e., a good act and *Adharma*, Demerit or a vicious act. There is a tendency to think that the metaphysical sense of *Dharma* is its old and original significance which has determined its ethical sense later on. It is pointed out that the *Jīva* or the Soul is "*Uddha-goi*," i.e., has a natural tendency to rise upwards and *Dharma* as the principle of Motion is what helps the Soul in this its motion towards the blissful *upper* regions. But a Soul is enabled to go upwards only by doing good pious deeds. Thus the word, *Dharma* which originally meant the principle that helps the Soul in its motion upwards came to signify a good or meritorious act. In the same way, it is said, *Adharma* which is a principle helping the stoppage of a Soul in this universe came to be identified with *Pāpa* or sinful acts which cause the continuance of the Soul in the *Samsāra*. We confess, we are unable to accept these theories. To us it appears that the above-alleged connection between the metaphysical and the ethical senses of *Dharma* or *Adharma* could neither be logical nor chronological. There can be no justification for our thinking that *Dharma* as the principle of Motion, is what helps the Soul

in its natural tendency to rise upwards. In Jaina metaphysics, *Dharma* is simply the principle of Motion. It helps not only the *Jīva* but the *Pudgala* in its motion. And then, why should we suppose that *Dharma* as the principle of Motion assists the Soul in its tendency to move *upwards* only! When a Soul goes down to any of the seven infernal regions, I think it is *Dharma* which helps it in its motion downwards. *Dharma* as a metaphysical principle thus assists the downward motion of the Soul as well and as effectively as it does its upwards motion, and it is consequently impossible to trace any connection between *Dharma* in its sense of a good act and *Dharma* as the metaphysical principle of motion. In the case of *Adharma*, too, it may be said that it is the principle which assists the Soul in its stay or stoppage in the blissful upper region,—just as well as it helps it in its stay in this unhappy earth or miserable hell. It is thus impossible to connect *Adharma*, the principle of Rest with *Adharma*, the ethically bad deed. Nor can it be said that as virtue consists in activity, the ethical sense of the word, *Dharma*, is in some way connected with its metaphysical sense. Supreme virtue or merit in Jaina ethics,—in fact, in all the systems of Indian ethics,—does not always consist in a state of activity. A calm state of Rest is always extolled and insisted on, and as such, virtue may be said to be more in *Adharma* than in *Dharma*.

The fact is that the conceptions of *Dharma* and *Adharma* as non-psychical principle of Motion and Rest are peculiar to Jaina philosophy and it is futile to attempt to find out a connection between their ethical and metaphysical senses.

MĀYĀ

By

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The Śrutis are generally accepted and quoted in Indian philosophy as authoritative and final because of their most rational methods. Those methods themselves, being perfectly rational, are not based upon any previous authorities. Hence their supreme importance in our systems of thought. Several heroes of thought mentioned in the different Upaniṣads like Janaka, Sanatkumāra, Yājñavalkya, etc., do not quote authorities, nor do they simply dogmatise, but by taking the totality of our actual experience construct an all-comprehensive and rational system. Where even reason fails to explain certain actual experiences, they finally appeal to our intuition which comes to be the final limit of thought.

Thus the method pursued by Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka* to establish Reality takes at first the form of an appeal to our ordinary experience and then of a judgment on the nature of that Reality which is present to our experience, or consciousness, in one phrase, our sense-of-the-present or the waking. Judged in that way, we can distinguish the Real from what is given and taken to be real in our individual experience. Beyond the conceptual level, transcending the merely perceptual and sensational levels of experience, there are the ethical, aesthetic, the religious and the speculative levels of experience. All these modes of construction adopted and followed by the scientists and the Western philosophers have reference only to our waking mood, or state which is only one aspect of the Reality in Yājñavalkya's system, the other two aspects being the

Dream and the state of dreamless sleep. That we have a memory or consciousness of these three states could never be doubted. But a consciousness of three states appearing as three and identifying itself with them is itself "Māyā" which appears to be but really is not. For we do not find these three states either as successive in one time-series or co-ordinate in space. Therefore, they are not true to the real or intuitional level of experience. Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad is wholly devoted to an examination of the Reality in its apparent dynamic aspect known as three states, which is only a garb worn by the Reality as it were.

Experience becoming compounded with the whole of Reality, we come to find degrees of Reality and levels of experience of which one and all belong to the field of MĀYĀ—a word pregnant with meaning. Transcending both the ego and the non-ego as our very consciousness, yet underlying both as pure consciousness, is MĀYĀ, the entire possibility of experience known as the Universe. It is Gentile's Mind as pure Act, which he considers as the ultimate Reality but is in Yājñavalkya's system, called Brahman by courtesy. Bradley asserts that existence is not the Reality but Reality must exist, *i.e.*, existence is only a form of appearance of the real. This view brings the Reality down to the conceptual level of experience, because existence implies time. But time being an appearance only, the Reality Absolute must necessarily be beyond our ideas of existence (*sat*) or non-existence (*asat*). Hegel's conception is the best that we can possibly have, although his Absolute Idea does not really transcend the subject-object relativity though he asserts it does. A few lines from Bosanquet are to the point: "Thought always qualifies a Real, though not always rightly. The spatio-temporal existence of the nature of a succession of events *ad infinitum*, is the common ground. Thought furnishes us with an idea of self-realisation, of completeness and perfection. But nothing perfect can appear in that series at best only a quasi-perfection by a compromise..... For us the Real does not move from its nature though it reveals it." Such statements are

rather of the nature of dogmatic assertion when their methods have failed to substantiate or guarantee the truth of their conclusions. We too have our Sāṅkhya system which is equal to these scientific speculations of the West. Both begin with a rational system but end in unproved conclusions.

The whole of experience or existence could be viewed as the dynamic or the functional mode of Reality. Consciousness arising from an antithesis between a subject and an object, is the entire empirical Reality. If a complete comprehension is possible of the actual Reality we have in our experience, that alone must be the ultimate Reality. At best it is only a speculative ideal, for consciousness is not capable of a complete comprehension of itself. What consciousness does is different from what it means. It is able to explain everything else but not itself. In itself it means mere "Knowingness" in the ultimate Reality of God because complete knowledge is the ideal of all thought. What constitutes "Knowingness" is consciousness, the material of which knowledge is made. When both become indistinguishable, it is identical with Reality. Hegel says : "The otherness or error as cancelled is itself a necessary moment of truth, which is only in so far as it makes itself its own result." This aspect of Reality is termed the empirical consciousness or MĀYĀ. As such it is not unreal to and in itself, only it is not the Real. MĀYĀ thus is (*sat*) and is not (*asat*). As an empirical fact it is because we see the extraordinary power of the Universe as a whole persisting in and as our consciousness, which does not desert us even in our dreams. It really is *not* because it is nowhere in the perfect knowledge which is identical with the Ultimate Reality. The Upaniṣads point out such a Reality which every one can experience in deep sleep. An actual experience of absolute non-duality in our so-called sleep is the speculative ideal in the conscious states, waking and dream where the apparent duality is trying to abolish itself. As Śaṅkara beautifully puts it, consciousness is itself MĀYĀ in its limited scope and in its fullest or true nature Brahman.

God or the Reality in Yājñavalkya's system is the entire possibility of consciousness or to put it figuratively the totality of the real plus the unreal. It is Reality because it retains its true or unchanging nature in all of its supposed manifestations. Even if we were to grant Bergson's Eternal Change as the highest Reality, the Eternal Changingness does not itself change and the Changelessness of the Eternal Change must be granted. Hence Bergson's Eternal Change is only a partial view of the Changeless Reality. The world is the content of consciousness but all that is possible in consciousness is only a partial or limited view of it. It is consciousness because it is limited and the limitation is its own because of its nature of partial view only. Consciousness therefore does not get rid of or transcend its own forms of space, time and causation, the limiting factors. A point of view implies a self-limitation with its necessary adjunct of an individualisation. Individuality as the central point is thus an illusion arising no doubt out of the basic Reality underlying all consciousness yet retaining its original principle of pure self-consciousness, for ever in all its manifestation. This is the active or will aspect of consciousness which is best realised in the individuality.

Reality by itself must be consciousness in its true nature, *i.e.*, in its entirety. We have such a Reality in the state of dreamless sleep. It is Reality by Itself Alone without an individual consciousness persisting in it. Because of its own self-limitation consciousness or mind can have only a partial view of Reality. This self-limitation is the very nature of consciousness in its partial aspect only which splits itself as the individual and as the world but hiding at the same time the fictitious nature of this division. Dream-consciousness is a fine example of the enveloping nature of consciousness which by itself acts as the covering sheath or *Āvaraṇa* to what it seems to do.

Reality, on the other hand, is of the nature of complete consciousness. Otherwise individual consciousness is neither possible nor explicable. This pure self-conscious principle

spreads itself, as it were, into different but artificial or illusory centres of consciousness just like the one sun being scattered manifold on the waves of the ocean. But the original feature of Reality as complete consciousness remains unaffected although reflected in these centres as their saving factor, so to speak. The phenomenon of manifestation cannot and does not affect the Reality as a whole, for manifestation is the feature of consciousness in its limited aspect only. Hence God as the individual is not a fall, for the error or ignorance is with the individual who is completely enveloped as it were by a displaying but all the same deceptive consciousness. God knows himself by His complete consciousness of Himself and individuality or the partial aspect of consciousness is a reflection of that principle only.

Knowledge means completest individual satisfaction. Perfection is thus the implicit ideal of all consciousness because perfection is its very nature; and a complete knowledge means this perfection. Light is neither a virtue nor an error in the sun whose very nature implies an eternal illumination of the universe. So also Knowledge is neither a virtue nor a blemish in the Reality whose very nature being the ultimate ideal of Knowledge implies All-Knowingness. The essence of All-Knowingness is consciousness only. But mere consciousness viewed as distinct from its true or complete form, namely, Knowledge, has neither knowing nor not-knowing. Consciousness as it is or in fact, has two such possibilities, ignorance and knowledge. Ignorance of Reality is due to the assurance of Reality present in consciousness—the reason why consciousness is always faithful to itself. Dream-world is taken to be real as long as the consciousness of that state remains. Being true to itself is not a defect on that account. This aspect of consciousness is known as *Avidyā* or primæval ignorance as per empirical standard.

Knowledge is the true nature of the Reality and as it completely absorbs within itself consciousness, individuality is

completely absent in it. In the empirical state we find consciousness as a process whose aim is complete knowledge or perfect satisfaction and only in this partial view, we have a possibility of both knowledge and ignorance in it. One thinks he is an individual, born and living as one among many in a world of manifold variety, and he will ultimately cease to be. As long one is conscious of these, these factors will continue in consciousness, for consciousness is extremely powerful as a will-to-be. If man is conscious of a world and of his imperfections, all these, as impressions, will appear as permanent realities since consciousness is always powerful enough to affirm itself. As a consequence such an individuality with such a partial view of himself must continue in time or duration which is only the form of consciousness in its limited aspect. Thus said Yājñavalkya to the bewildered Maitreyī, "Individuality being destroyed after death, no consciousness remains. Thus, O! Maitreyī, I hold." (5 Brah. 4 ch. 13 ver.) Time is only eternity, the characteristic of Reality reflected as a continuous flow or succession in consciousness. Life is duration and life or consciousness can be distinguished only when there is individuality. When life is merged into consciousness and consciousness into life, both become indistinguishable, *i.e.*, there is no consciousness or mind as a separate individuality. Consciousness and the individual both mean the same thing, being the partial aspect of the Reality characterized by the term knowledge. The individual is *not* there as the individual but God is there. The individual's memory of "I slept" is based upon intuition only and is evidence enough of the fact of God's eternal purity and permanent knowing. Sleep only shows the absence of self-consciousness as an individual, but does not prove the absence of God's knowing. "There is no loss of knowing to the Real Knower." (Brhad., 3-4-30).

In the empirical state with its inexorable laws of Time, Space and Causation, "knowingness" involves two aspects, one appearing to precede the other. Consciousness or mind acts

as the cause and knowledge is its ultimate result. Knowledge is thus the ideal and also the 'urge' of all consciousness. It could be easily discerned how the effect is the cause of the cause. The conception of time, the necessary form which all conceptions take, creates this artificial division into cause and effect. In truth both are identical. There is neither cause nor effect, since complete knowingness is the very nature of Reality and as such includes consciousness and overflows it. The sense of time-space-causation exists, *c.g.*, only in two states, the Waking and the Dream and is entirely absent or lost in the Dreamless sleep (*Bṛhad.*, 3-4-21, 22).

As there is no time in the Reality there are no intermediate stages in knowing. The sun does not attain its brilliancy, every day, by a gradual ascent, degree by degree nor loses it by its descent, degree by degree. Knowing is not even an act from the point of view of Reality. God's consciousness as an individual is one such artificial intermediate stage in that act of knowing which comes to be the empirical consciousness, with all its distinguishable features as will, intellect, space, time and causation. In God, all these are indistinguishable as there is only one complete knowingness. Mere consciousness which is involved in that knowingness is not a power as against and for God, although in itself it is powerful enough to create not only the egos but also the non-ego.

There is one curious fact which claims our attention here. There is only one eternal non-ego as the Universe while there are a number of egos all playing their parts in it. Though change is the eternal law of the Universe, yet as the only one Universe appearing in Consciousness it does not change. There is plurality of egos but no plurality of the whole Universes. The Universe as the central object in consciousness is one whole. Mere consciousness, though it means nothing in that complete knowing, is a power in itself and it includes both the ego and the non-ego, for both are its manifestations. If only one is the fact, all plurality must be an illusion. The plurality of egos

only shows and emphasises this fact. The permanent character of one Universe shows the permanent character of consciousness as a power which retains its true nature of purity and non-duality, in spite of the fictitious centres of consciousness which seem to come and go. These fictitious individuals in order to be, must be born out of it and live cognising the same Universe and again get absorbed into it without causing an addition by their presence or a loss by their absence. The light of the sun is neither increased nor diminished by the reflection being continuously formed and lost on the waves of the ocean. The whole of the Universe exists in fact as a concrete content of that power known as consciousness. The individual self-consciousness completes the process called the Universe. Self-consciousness is the end in view of the experience known as the Universe.

Thus we see that knowingness is the very nature of God or the Ultimate Reality. Consciousness is the essence of that knowing and the Universe is the content of that consciousness. The animate is the active aspect and the inanimate is the necessary but passive aspect of that consciousness. Without these two consciousness will cease to be a power, for power demands two forces, one to react to, or co-operate with, the other. Consciousness in its limited aspect must imply a subject and an object and thus involves a simple act. This supreme power or *Māyā-Sakti* inherent in the mere consciousness—in God it is a perfect knowingness or *Jñāna-Sakti*—create the whole of the non-self or we may say, the whole Universe for view.

We have seen that consciousness is only an intermediate stage in the complete knowledge from the empirical standpoint. It is only at this level that Reality, as a power, creates artificial grades or degrees of reality ranging from the mere substance to a self-consciousness. If knowledge is an accomplished fact, the intermediate stages are unreal. Even in the partial view with its resultant division, one does not stop with mere

consciousness. Consciousness must reach the stage of full knowledge. In Hegel's words "Reality is already an accomplished fact to and for itself and does not require to wait for us. That it does so wait is the illusion in which we live and which is the sole active principle upon which interest in the world rests." There is in fact no such distinction between the stage of mere consciousness and the stage of complete knowledge in the Reality. All these must be unreal there and *Māyā* is the term used to denote it.


Empirical consciousness is a power in and by itself but is meaningless in the ultimate Reality. *It is Māyā from the point of view of the Reality, i.e.,* unreal in its true aspect but power enough in its display to itself. It is not merely consciousness, as we know it but includes life as an organic whole. That is why consciousness is a power. It is a power that creates life and becomes conscious of it through the very life. An individual is life plus mind and this supreme power called *Māyā* is both the universe and a consciousness of it, including the plurality of the egos and the oneness of the universe that creates them. The many-ness of the egos is the eternal recognition of its oneness. God's knowingness is never lost even in the minutest aspect of the manifestation of the essence of His knowingness. As a manifestation, *Māyā* or consciousness (existence or life) is a power and a supreme force but meaningless in the ultimate Reality whose other names are Knowledge and Truth.

When we begin to analyse that knowledge, the symbol of all perfection, we get the universe and a consciousness of it in the individual. About the content of that knowledge who can know if there is a content at all? To know Reality, as it is, would require another Reality to comprehend it, *ad infinitum*, which is absurd. The fact that we cannot grasp it shows that there is no other reality and that the plurality of egos and the content of their consciousness are both *unreal*. That is *Māyā* which as mere consciousness—really an indistinguishable factor

in the Reality—is in itself powerful enough to assume a reality and appear itself as a universe to the centres of consciousness which it creates in itself—all these of course not affecting the integrity either of itself or of its real basis.

In that ultimate Reality or complete knowledge there cannot be any possibility of any such division or analysis. Even when we take this mere consciousness and follow it up in all its processes as the so-called developments, we end only where we begin, as the divided aspect of the universe collapses into an unity in self-consciousness. And when consciousness is purged of all its illusions of plurality,—time, space and causation,—what we have is only pure consciousness which is a harmless and insignificant fact in the Reality or God, but in itself appearing to be a big power creating a whole universe and becoming conscious of it. The whole affair is called *Māyā* which is thus real only in itself but unreal in the ultimate Reality. As time is only an intellectual form, *Māyā* cannot be even a fact belonging to Reality, for Reality can have no stages or degrees of itself and consequently knows no imperfection nor any need for development. Development and process demand time. And *Māyā* alone can supply such unreal things, because an unreal demand in consciousness by consciousness is supplied by the all-powerful consciousness. Nothing is removed from the actual or supposed existence simply by being called *Māyā*. This vast universe of sentient and non-sentient factors, though really nothing in the Reality, is nevertheless an undying eternal universe. Whatever is, must be supposed to persist. Existence or persistence could only be in and for consciousness. Existence and continuity are only the inherent nature of consciousness. It is powerful in itself to appear to be a divisible factor in the Reality but is lost beyond recognition in the Absolute Reality. In the dreamless sleep for, *e.g.* it is Reality as it is, a reality transcending both subject and object. (Bṛhad., 4-3-21, 22). As individuality is absent in such an experience we are able to remember it (*i.e.*, *Suṣupti* or the dreamless

sleep) only as a past state of non-distinction with the help of intuition which includes memory and overflows it. The true Consciousness of the three states as the Witness of the three states must necessarily transcend them, and in its true nature is the ultimate Reality itself, as everybody's experience in dreamless sleep shows, though very few are conscious of that fact. If all change and manifestation is *Māyā*, the Reality which is intuited by our remembrance of deep sleep, is changeless for it will cease to be a reality if it is not true to itself. Certainly it could not be Unconscious type of Hartmann's. If so, how could have consciousness arisen out of the Unconsciousness? For even an illusion must have a Real Basis without which it could not have arisen.



VEDANTIC EXPLANATION OF ILLUSION

By

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The object of this paper is to see whether an explanation of an illusion can be given, and whether the theory of illusion of the Vedantin is consistent with his view of reality.

Illusion is not realised as illusion at the time of illusion. We commonly say that we had an illusion, only when the illusion is no more. For instance, when we have the illusion of a snake in the place of a rope, we really feel that we are perceiving a snake, the perception of the snake there is not at all questioned then, and hence it is not an illusion at that moment. Similarly, a dream is not a dream for us when we are actually in the dreaming state. We say, we had a dream only when we are awake. The experience of the snake and that of the dream are both illusory owing to the knowledge of the real rope and the waking life. The snake and the dream are not illusory in themselves and at the time of the perception. The question we have to ask is, why are not the knowledge of the rope and the waking state illusory? They are not illusory because they do not contradict our general experience. They are believed to be trustworthy with certitude and definiteness. The Vedantin condemns the whole of the waking life as illusory. But the notion of his reality on the strength of which he does so, ought to be indubitable and certain. That is to say, the waking life should not stand in opposition, as a hostile antagonist, to his notion of reality. Rather it should be harmoniously included in it. A satisfactory notion of truth cannot afford

simply to ignore the discordant element, but on the contrary it ought to be resolved in its harmonious and richer fullness. A sound metaphysical theory should be able to strip error of its hostility to truth, and be capable of giving a genuine solution of apparent discords and imperfection in experience, in the light of its completeness.

Now to condemn the particular piece of knowledge as utterly false in the face of truth is one thing while to fail to explain it is another thing. This failure to explain is called ANIRVACANĪYATVA (अनिर्वचनीयत्व) by the Vedantin. He can in no way relate his notion of reality to the world, and hence calls the world MITHYĀ (मिथ्या). But if his notion of reality cannot satisfactorily explain our experience and if he is required to effect an utter severance between his reality and experience, there is a strong possibility of his notion of reality being totally mistaken.

Either, Illusory-snake, rope-snake (रज्जुसर्प) or shell-silver (शक्तिरजत) is the stock example of the Vedantin while he tries to prove the falsity of the world. It is our common illusory experience. If we carefully examine and analyse this particular experience we find it very difficult to see, how it helps the Vedantin in condemning the world as unreal. We have to see from this point of view, whether the Vedantic explanation is correct.

The first attempt to explain the illusion is to say that non-apprehension of the rope or shell is the cause of the illusion. We do not see the rope and hence the illusion arises. The Vedantin, following the traditional analysis and explanation of error holds that the appearance of the illusion is to be referred to the non-apprehension of the basic entity (अधिष्ठान) and that the ignorance of ADHIṢṬHĀNA is the cause from which the illusion as effect follows.

But can we say that ignorance or the non-apprehension of the rope causes the illusion? We cannot say that, because we are confronted with many difficulties if we hold this view.

The first difficulty is that if we understand the appearance of the illusory-snake itself to be an ignorance, it is unnecessary to imagine another ignorance for its cause. If we do it we shall have to grant that we take ignorance in two different senses; that is to say, the ignorance of the rope is not an ignorance in the same sense in which the appearance of the illusory snake is ignorance. Moreover, if the ignorance or non-apprehension of the rope be the real cause of the appearance of the illusory-snake, that is to say, the non-apprehension of the rope really explains the appearance of the snake, then we have no right to say that appearance of the snake is illusory. Why should we call an appearance of a particular phenomenon illusory when we can find out a real cause for it?

The second difficulty is this : — Can we seriously say that the non-apprehension of the rope which we understand to be the cause of the appearance of the illusory-snake, is really presented to us at the time of the illusion? Do we really experience such a thing as the non-apprehension of the rope, when the illusory-snake is presented to us? We don't; and in fact, it is unnecessary; for had we had the experience of the non-apprehension of the rope when we were actually perceiving the illusory-snake, the illusion itself would have been impossible.

Can we say that this ignorance is un-experienced? We cannot; because thereby the fundamental thesis of the Vedantin is contradicted. The Vedantin does not grant an un-experienced reality. Moreover, the phrase, "Un-experienced ignorance" is utterly meaningless. Ignorance can be only of some thing and to some-body. Ignorance which is of nothing and to no-body is inconceivable. We can conceive of the unknowability or "un-experiencedness" (अज्ञातत्व) as regards things other than knowledge or ignorance, and that is our common belief also. We can grant unknown reality to things other than knowledge or ignorance. The table may exist in my room without being perceived by me or by somebody else. Things may enjoy unknown reality, they may exist without being known by any body.

But can there be an ignorance of theory if it is not of somebody? Hence we cannot say that there is such a thing as ignorance or non-apprehension of the rope prior to the appearance of the illusory-snake. We have no experience of this sort.

Though the ignorance or the non-apprehension of the rope or the substratum, cannot thus be said to be the cause of the appearance of the illusory snake or of the origin of the illusion we have yet to see whether the non-apprehension of the absence of snake can be taken to be the cause. We misapprehend silver for the shell. We falsely perceive the snake in the place of the rope. This given silver is illusory because, we perceive it, though it is not in fact there. The given appearance of the silver is cancelled when we realise the being of the shell instead of the silver there. That is to say, our ignorance of the absence (अभाव) of silver is the cause of the appearance of the illusory silver. The given appearance of the silver is cancelled only when absence of the real silver is known. The cancelling of the given illusory-silver is the proof of the true absence of the real silver. Then can we say that our ignorance of the absence of the real silver gives rise to the appearance of the illusory silver?

The tendency of the above explanation arises owing to a misunderstanding of the nature of the annulment of the given illusory-silver and the negative judgment "this is not silver" ("न इदम् रजतम्"). The annulment of the given illusory silver as well as the negation and the knowledge of the absence of the silver, are not quite distinct and separate things. The negation implies the knowledge of the absence of the silver and the absence of the silver is not any external situation except the truth of the negative judgment "This is not silver" (न इदम् रजतम्). Moreover it is not necessary to presuppose such a thing as an absence of silver prior to the negation, for its truth. Hence if there be no such thing as absence of silver, what ground have we to say that we had an ignorance or non-apprehension of this absence? How can the non-apprehension of the absence which is the significance of the later negative judgment and which is only realised by the

judgment, be the cause of the previously given **रजत** which is annulled by the judgment? If we say that we shall have to say that the negation or the cancelling of the silver itself is the cause of its appearance, or knowledge is the cause of ignorance.

Again, though we grant that, there is a real absence of silver, and accordingly the non-apprehension of it is a cause of the illusory-silver, prior to its appearance, we do not make our situation easier, rather we are confronted with a more serious difficulty. If the truth of the negative judgment is determined by the external absence of the silver we shall have to grant that our criterion of truth is external. We thereby imply correspondence as the criterion of truth. This correspondence presupposes duality as essential. Moreover the correspondence notion of truth has many defects of its own. The Vedantin particularly can never admit correspondence as his criterion of truth inasmuch as, in his opinion, knowledge itself is the ultimate reality. Hence to say that the truth or falsity of our knowledge is determined by external situation is to condemn one's own fundamental thesis, in the case of the Vedantin.

In this way, though the ignorance of the shell cannot be taken to be the cause of the illusion, there may be a sense in which shell and the absence of silver can still be the cause of it. We say that, the apprehension of the shell or that of the absence of the silver cancel or annul the illusion; the illusory-silver appears only because this knowledge is not present or was not present. Had there been this knowledge from the first, the illusion would not have been there at all. So can we say that they are the cause of the illusion in this sense? We cannot, because we do not understand causation to be of this nature. If this be real causation, then we shall have to say that in every piece of knowledge the ignorance of the object is the cause of the knowledge of the object, which we happen to know. Moreover, though we grant that the knowledge of the shell or that of the absence cancel the illusion, we are not entitled merely on this ground to say that their ignorance is the cause of the illusion, or that

ignorance causes the illusion. Another thing to be noted is that the very nature of knowledge is such that it cannot be said to be the cause of the cancelling of the illusion. In the presence of knowledge there is the absence of ignorance, and so if the ignorance be absent how can knowledge abolish it at all?

The above considerations may appear artificial if we look over the meaning of the Vedantin's apparent technicalities as regards *ajñāna*.

The coming into being of the world is due to the original ignorance (*Mūla-ajñāna*) while I see the objects owing to my individual ignorance. That is to say, that which we call ordinary knowledge is from this point of view ignorance, the object also of which it is a knowledge is effect (*Kārya*) of the (*Mūla-ajñāna*). I do not create the world. I do not create the table which I perceive. The being of the object and the knowing of it both are in this sense nothing but ignorance. Truly speaking the technical distinction between *Ajñāna* and *Mūla-ajñāna* or *Acidyā* and *Ajñāna*, or the two powers of the Cosmic illusion, *Āvaraṇaśakti* and *Vikṣepaśakti*, etc., indicate one and the same thing, and if all these views are followed to their logical consequence they take the form of the *Dṛṣṭisrṣṭivāda*, and hence we can safely say that the analogy of the illusory-snake or "shell-silver," is the best representation of the notion of *Ajñāna* according to the *Dṛṣṭisrṣṭivādin*. The origin of the notion of *Mūla-ajñāna* may be in the expectation as regards previous existence of the object prior to its being apprehended. Or it may be that hypothesis of *Acidyā* or *Māyā* is by way of answer to the possible doubt as regards determination of objects by knowledge, namely, that if object is thoroughly determined by knowledge, how is it that we cannot see one object in the place of another if we so wish it? Whatever that may be, if we want to hold the view that the object is totally unreal, we are not only required to deprive it of its unknown reality, that is, its reality when it is un-perceived but also the given reality simultaneous with its being perceived. That is to say, the object

cannot be distinct from its perception and hence knowledge of distinction itself is through ignorance. But the reality of the Vedantin is without the three-fold distinction (त्रिविधभेद). So we see that we cannot even hope to proceed to explain illusion unless we presuppose the distinction between knowing and that which is known.

So we see that, we cannot give any explanation of illusion. We cannot say that the non-apprehension of the substratum or *Adhiṣṭhāna* is the cause of illusion. For, we in fact have no experience of that sort. We cannot say that this non-apprehension of the substratum can be un-experienced. For thereby the fundamental thesis of the Vedantin is contradicted. Nor can we say that the non-apprehension of the absence of snake can be the cause of illusion. Because, in the first place, there is no such thing as "absence of snake" prior to the negative judgment (नेदम् रजतम्) and secondly, the explanation implies correspondence theory of truth which is fatal to any sort of monism. So also we cannot find out any third cause for the illusion. Even the annulment of the illusion cannot be said to be owing to the knowledge of the substratum. Because the very nature of knowledge is such that it simply cannot be a cause for the cancelling of the ignorance. The technical distinction about ignorance does not help us in any way because the "Reality" of the Vedantin cannot suffer the presence of any distinction whatsoever; while the explanation of illusion does necessarily presuppose knowledge of distinction.

In short, the very effort to try to explain illusion is through ignorance of the nature of illusion. Illusion is an ultimate fact and we can in no way relate it to reality. It is thus "ignorance that pretends for the time being, to be indubitable knowledge, that form of false thinking which unhesitatingly claims to be true and in so claiming substantiates and completes its falsity."

ŚAMKARA'S CRITERION OF TRUTH

By

D. G. LONDHE

Amalner.

What is the criterion of truth in Śamkara? This is the question that is discussed in this paper. To ask what is truth is the same as asking 'what is reality?' for Śamkara does not seem to have made any distinction between truth and reality. Śamkara would not have supported the view that truth is what is logical and the reality is what is ontological, the former being concerned with ideas or representations of the existent and the latter being the existent. The reason perhaps would be that he was opposed to the dualism implied in such a distinction. Another thing that might be mentioned here, by way of clearing the ground, is the doubt concerning the legitimacy of the question of the criterion of truth in the system of Śamkara. The objector will point out that the truth, as Śamkara understands it, does not admit of any criterion since it is transcendent in character, goes beyond the ken of the logical categories of criterion and the proof and the proved. The '*pramāṇa-prameya vyavahāra*' itself belongs to the sphere of the phenomenal falls within *Avidyā*. In fact, with Śamkara Truth is extra-philosophical. Philosophy ever deals with the fictitious, the creation of the *Avidyā*; philosophy, in other words, is "the philosophy of the 'as if';" of the Truth there can be no philosophy. In a sense we may admit the force of such an extremist view, but it is irrelevant to philosophy, inasmuch as in philosophy we are dealing with the philosophical and not with the extra-philosophical, if there be any such thing at all. Moreover, is it not by

philosophising activity alone that we have understood what is extra-philosophical? Sāṃkara seems to have clearly borne in mind the rules of the game we are playing in philosophy, supposing for a moment that he believed in the extra-philosophical character of Truth. We, therefore, say that the question we raise is a legitimate question.

Coming to the problem proper, Common sense takes experience as ordinarily understood, *i.e.*, sense perception, as adequate to give us truth. It would in effect have us believe that truth is not a matter of laborious intellectual search we have simply to open our eyes to see truth laid out before and around us in the manifold of name and form. Perception merely acquaints one with a datum about the truth, or otherwise, of which there is no question on the perceptual level. To the unsophisticated mind, the content of every perception is true as it is not awakened to the sense of the inner contradictions lurking therein. Sāṃkara finds himself faced with the task of correcting this naïve belief. A philosopher in the modern sense of the term, when undertaking a similar task would have proceeded to expose the contradictions of experience and would have concluded by arriving at the non-contradictory which, to him would be truth. Sāṃkara, unlike his modern successors, starts by stating the distinction between truth and falsehood, that is, the one between Self and not-Self. It is with this topic of the utter distinction, for which there is no parallel in the domain of thought and existence—inasmuch as of the two terms distinguished the only one, *viz.*, *is* and the other *is not*, metaphysically speaking—that he opens his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*. His method may be characterised as deductive, rather than inductive. He enunciates the proposition to be proved, gives the reasoning afterwards, with a 'Q.E.D.' perhaps at the end.

Why does Sāṃkara say that the Self and the not-Self are so thoroughly distinct? The reply to this question, as we try to make it clear to ourselves, may give us valuable help in determining Sāṃkara's criterion of truth. One consideration that is

suggested by the comparison of the distinction in question with that between light and darkness is that the Self or the Subject is self-evident, self-luminous, *Ṣvayamprakāśa*. The Self is self-revealed, known by itself. The not-Self, or the Object depends upon another for its knowledge, and going a little further, one may even say the object depends upon the subject for its existence, as the essence of the existence of the object is its objectivity which depends upon the subject that is derived from its relation to the subject. The object, then, looks up to the subject for its revelation while the subject or the self is self-revealed. The self-revealed, or better self-revealing character of the subject is thus an important mark of its reality. Contrariwise the object lacks this character and has, accordingly, to be relegated to the realm of the unreal. It is essentially owing to this self-revealing character that the subject possesses a certitude that is unique to itself. There can be no actual or even possible doubt as regards the subject itself. One's own existence is indubitable. All experience their own existence ; no one feels ' I am not ' (*Brahma Sūtra*, Bh. 1. 1. 1). Śamkara, almost in the manner of Descartes, takes the absolute, unimpeachable certitude of the self as a criterion of its truth. But Śamkara would not go with Descartes when he proved the existence of the ' I ' from ' my thinking ' ; He would not say, ' I think, therefore, I am ' but would rather state that ' I am, therefore, I think ' ; what is primary and fundamental is ' my being,' my thinking is secondary and derived. This absolute certitude, this impossibility of doubting or thinking away one's own existence (*Bt. S. B. 2. 1. 3*) is the criterion of the truth of the self.

Is there any certitude of this absolute type about the object that is presented? Obviously not. Whatever is presented is liable to some doubt or other in the last resort. In fact one may say that to be presented is to be haunted by a ghostly possibility of doubt or error of some sort. This liability to error arises in the first place from the inherent imperfection of the senses. In the second, it arises from the possible parallax of

judgment. But apart from these considerations, sense-perception cannot guarantee the truth of its datum, because it is so much bound up with its content that by the very nature of the case it does not possess that detachment which is absolutely essential for epistemological introspection, or rather, retrospection into past experience. To take the stock example in the perceptual experience of a snake appearing on a rope, the mental state and its content were inseparably bound together; it was a reality at the time, it is only in the light of further experience that its content is rejected and that which was taken as perception is judged to be illusory appearance. Psychologically speaking, every experience as experience, that is as a state in the mental history of an individual is true; in fact, truth is not a psychological category at all, it is an epistemological, or strictly speaking, a metaphysical category. Some go to the length of denying knowledge-value to the perception of the 'rope-snake' and choose to call it 'belief' rather than 'knowledge.' But that is an extreme view. We think that at the time of illusion, the experience is real and if it were to remain uncontradicted in further experience, it may continue to be real.

This brings us to the inherent inadequacy of sense-perception as a criterion of truth, as recognised by Sāṃkhya. Dream-experiences are negated or contradicted by waking experiences, and some (illusory) waking experiences are negated by other waking experiences. But what about the majority of waking experiences which are never negated? (The word 'never' is relatively that is never in the *vyāvahārika* stage.) Pressed thus, Sāṃkhya appeals to *Śruti*, that is, Scripture or revelation as a source of knowledge and a criterion of truth higher than perception. It is to be noted here that whereas a modern thinker rejects the authority of perception in favour of reason, or, in other words, commonsense is corrected by scientific knowledge, Sāṃkhya rejects *Pratyakṣa* in favour of *Śruti*. Consequently it is emphasised that the provinces of *Pratyakṣa*

and *Śruti* are altogether separate. In ordinary matters sense-perception is all in all and the reference to *Śruti* is both unnecessary and unavailing, while in matters metaphysical, that is, when ultimate issues are raised *Pratyakṣa* is powerless and the only authority here is *Śruti* (*Gītā* Bh. 18. 66-*Sūtra* Bh. 3-2-21).

The acceptance on Śamkara's part, of the authority of *Śruti*, revelation as a source of knowledge and criterion of truth higher than perception, has led critics to suppose that Śamkara's system is a theology rather than philosophy, dogmatism rather than criticism. It is necessary to remember, however, in this connection that he appeals to *Śruti* not as one who appeals to *ipse dixit* to be blindly believed in, but as one who does not wish and afford to ignore the valuable guidance, in matters spiritual, of the thinkers and seers of the past. His idea throughout is that knowledge realised by some only assures us that it is realisable, provided all the conditions necessary for realisation are fulfilled. It is in principle similar to the procedure in science where a scientist has to take for granted the results experimentally arrived at by other workers in the field. Śamkara's system would have been dogmatic, had he debarred reason, logic or *Tarka* altogether. As a matter of fact he gives to reason ample scope in enquiry into ultimate reality. He warns us, however, against the possible danger of reason dwindling into reverie or subjective fancy. Wild logicising, rank ratiocination, if there be such a thing, has, in his opinion, to be safeguarded against. According to Śamkara, *Tarka* is vicarious, ungrounded (*apratigṛhīta* Br. S. Bh. 2. 1. 2) and therefore it should not cut itself loose from the *terra firma* of *Śruti*. Practically he would put no limit to the re-thinking of problems, to the advancing of fresh arguments and disclosing new aspects of questions, provided all this substantiates, and does not supersede main teaching of the unity inculcated by *Śruti*.

The uniqueness of Śamkara's position consists in the fact that he rejects the testimony of perception (*Pratyakṣa*), at once in favour of revelation ; it is only secondarily that he brings in

reason to substantiate revelation. This, however, saves his system from the alleged air of theology or dogmatism.

There is another important point to be considered in connection with the transcendence of perception. This introduces us to the essence of the logic of Vedānta. According to the native belief, concomitant with the first, unreflecting acquaintance with the world, an object is given in sense-perception; hence its perceptibility is regarded as an unmistakable indication of its reality. The object is taken as real because it is perceptible. Sāṃkhya completely subverts this notion; he takes perceptibility as the conclusive and irrefutable reason of the *unreality* of the object, and not of the *reality* of the object. According to Sāṃkhya, the object is unreal for no other reason but that it is capable of being perceived. To be perceived is to be unreal, he would have said in effect. He would not admit that the object exists independently of knowledge, or the Self whose essence is knowledge. "It cannot be said that there exists an object but it cannot be known; it is like saying that a visible object is seen but there is no eye. When there is no knowledge there is no knowable" (Com. Pr. Up. 6. 2). The object has no being (*sattā*) apart from the object, the self. This amounts to saying that only the self is truth and the object is a mere appearance. This concept was elaborated with great acuteness by his followers. We find, for instance, that Madhusūdana in his *Advaitasiddhi* advances 'dṛśyatva' as the principal reason of the unreality of the world, and maintains it with a subtlety of thinking that is unsurpassable. With him, whatever is a content of a cognitive state must be for that very reason something short of the ultimate reality, the absolute truth; that which is an object of a *vyākhyā* is but Brahman associated with *upādhi*, the 'pure Brahman' is only suggested by '*lakṣaṇā*' hinted at indirectly. If we clearly bear in mind this concept of perceptibility as a negative criterion of truth, or rather the criterion of untruth, we shall have no difficulty in comprehending that Sāṃkhya would never have accepted the correspondence

theory of truth. Correspondence as a criterion of truth implies that the object exists apart from and independently of the subject, knowledge is a copy of the object and his knowledge is true when the copy or the representation is faithful to the original. Here knowledge is made to conform to the object. Now we have seen that Śaṃkara regards knowledge as central and object as wholly depending on knowledge, nay only the knowledge is real and the object an appearance, (appearance being understood as 'nothing' other than the knowledge, and not as ghostly something still confronting knowledge and thus destroying its non-duality). So practically from the Śaṃkarite standpoint, the question of correspondence does not arise at all. Had there been any two *real* entities one needs somehow correspond to the other, when only one is there, correspondence is out of the question. To follow Śaṃkara faithfully it is not sufficient to say simply that the relation between the Subject and the Object is 'asymmetrical' but that there is no real relation between the two, the relation is only fictitious (*adhyāsika*). Nor would the coherence, or even the pragmatic theory of truth, have found favour with Śaṃkara—the former because of the still lingering dualism between the ideas, on the one hand, with which alone truth is conceived as being concerned and the objective existences on the other, the latter being left in an unadjusted state to take care of themselves and the latter because it just jokes with truth, inasmuch as to-day's truth being thought of as possibly turning out falsehood. This is travesty of truth in Śaṃkara's view. He believes that Truth is unchangingly eternal (*kūḥastha nitya*); it is free from any change or contradiction happening to it. "Truth is that which, when once determined to be of some essence or character, suffers no alteration in it" ('Tait. Up. Bh. gadrūpeṇa yamniścitam tanna vyabhicaratīti sat). Change ranging from alterations in a speck of dust to the forming and dissolution of worlds, according to him, is due to the *avidyā*, absence of knowledge of 'Truth, just as perhaps illusory silver

comes into being and passes on the *really* unmodified character of a shell.

Thus we come to consider the knowledge of Truth compared to which our so-called knowledge is but ignorance, that is, in other words, we ask What is *Anubhava*? In what sense is it the highest criterion of truth? Let us take for careful reading some passages important in this connection. For instance, we are told in one place that philosophic search of truth (*Brahma jijñāsā*) differs from the theological inquiry (*Dharma jijñāsā*) in that, in the former *Anubhava*, etc., over and above *Śruti*, etc., are the *Pramāṇa*, authoritative evidence (Br. S. Bh. 1. 2). It would not be correct to interpret this as signifying simply that *Anubhava* is just co-ordinate with or on a par with *Śruti*, as Śaṅkara hastens to add that *Anubhava* is the culmination, end (*arasāna*) of *Brahma-Jijñāsa*, the culmination here means not only the last stage in a chronological sense, but also in a logical sense inasmuch as the *Anubhava* in it contracts the knowledge of earlier stages but itself is not contradicted by any other experience. A corroboration as the ultimate criterion of *Anubhava* we get in another statement, *viz.* 'Tarka, reason, only when duly supported by *Śruti*, revelation, is here resorted to, as being subordinate to *Anubhava* (BR. S. BH. 2. 1. 6). We find here a hierarchy of authority, in Śaṅkara's opinion; *Anubhava* is supreme, *Śruti* comes next, and reason the last as it is nothing unless 'patronised' (*anugrhitā*) by *Śruti*.

Apart from the relation of *Anubhava* to other *Pramāṇas*, what is *Anubhava* in itself? Is it a cognitive act or an intuition? Psychologically speaking, it is a mistake to understand *Anubhava* as one cognition among others, with this speciality perhaps that its object is 'internal,' but essentially similar to others so far as the character of the act is concerned. For a cognitive act, as we know it, presupposes that its object is an 'other' to it, even if it is internal; Śaṅkara, however, as also his followers would not admit otherness in *Anubhava*, it being

the realisation of what the self is in its true nature. What the self was not, but was mistakenly supposed to be, may be removed by the last cognitive state (*caramā vṛtti*). In realisation the Self is what it ever was, without a ripple of *vṛtti* arising any longer. Hence it is characterised as '*Sarā-rūpānubhūti*.' It will be clear from this that it would not be correct to christen *Anubhava* as intuition. Intuition has got a very vague connotation; the term is useful in its negation of the intellectual knowledge, but what is the non-intellectual experience it never unequivocally describes. What is sure, is that *Anubhava* is not a mystic intuition. It is philosophic intuition if there be any such thing. *Anubhava* is not transcendent to experience in the sense of being discontinuous with it. Hence Śaṅkara cannot be justly charged with having an unbridged gulf between what he calls *aparā vidyā* and *parā vidyā*. He has emphatically stated that what is realised in *Brahma vidyā*, as contrasted with *Karma*, is not something reached, accomplished, manufactured (*āpya, sādhyā, saṃskāryya*) but it is experiencing what always had and ever will have accomplished facthood (*siddha*). The accomplished facthood of the *Ātman*, however, differs from the accomplished facthood of finite, material things; as with the latter, it is a limitation, bondage in the forms of space and time, whereas with the former, the accomplished facthood does not preclude the possibility of still accomplishing itself, in the sense of experiencing, realising the accomplished facthood. Realisation, *Anubhava*, may be best described as 'the point where the knowledge about the Absolute and the Absolute itself are one and the same.' *Anubhava* is an experience in which the criterion of Truth and Truth itself are one. This is the highest criterion, for there is nothing that contradicts this experience.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ĪSVARAKṚṢṆA AS EMBODIED IN THE SĀMKNHYA KĀRIKĀS

BY

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1. The object of this paper is to show that the *Kārikās* contain a philosophy fundamentally different from what Vācaspati and a host of other writers on the subject have propounded it to be. They have gone on an absolutely wrong track and have imported into the interpretation of the *Kārikās* quite an amount of myth and superstition to the entire detriment of their great philosophical significance. It may be argued that I have no right to question the validity of Vācaspati's interpretation since it has the sanction of tradition behind it. To this it may be replied that there is a clear gap of several centuries between Īsvarakṛṣṇa and Vācaspati and it is not improbable that he had to depend on his own ingenuity for restoring to light a half-forgotten philosophy. Be that as it may, my only right to question the truth of his interpretation is based on the *Kārikās* themselves.

2. The subject is vast, difficult and highly controversial and no justice can be done to it within the prescribed limit. I shall only attempt to give a general outline of the new interpretation which, I think, is the true meaning of the *Kārikās*. I am hoping to write it out fully in the form of a book. My only object now is to ascertain the views of those who have distinguished themselves in the domain of Indian Philosophy.

3. The first point on which I would lay great emphasis is the determination of the point of view adopted by the author of the *Kārikās*. The point of view is the most important thing in philosophy. There is no more efficient means of making

confusion worse confounded than by refusing to think out clearly the right point of view. The main points of view are three, naturalistic, theological and humanistic. Dualism is a form of Naturalism and Philosophical Mysticism and Rationalism are two of the forms of Humanism. The point of view of the *Kārikās* I would characterise as rationalistic Humanism. It treats Man as the emblem of Reality and Man is considered as essentially a rational creature, *i.e.*, one who *knows*. It ultimately takes the form of the theory that Knowledge and Reality are identical. The Mystic also accepts that Reality is *Jñānastarupa* but he means by knowledge a distinctionless, partless, aspectless unity and attributes all distinction to error and illusion. But Sāṃkhya has got a different view of knowledge.

4. The Sāṃkhya Philosophy is generally considered as advocating a naturalistic or commonsense dualism. Some would understand by it a theistic doctrine. I beg to contend that the Sāṃkhya Philosophy is neither dualistic nor theistic but Rationalistic in a much deeper sense than Macdonell has conceived though he has acclaimed it as the first rationalistic philosophy of the world. The view that the Sāṃkhya preaches a rank materialism does not deserve the ink with, and the paper on which it is written.

5. The *Kārikās* contain a theory of knowledge which may be best characterised as the development of meaning. The Meaner with the Meaning and the irreducible Meant form a transcendental unity. They are distinguishable aspects of a unity which by its nature is transcendental, *i.e.*, non-spatial, non-temporal and non-causal. *Puruṣha* is inconceivable without *Artha*. The whole *Vyakta* world simply symbolises what the *Puruṣha* means. Creation has been referred to as *Pratyaya Sarga*, *i.e.*, intellectual or better logical construction. It is the development of meaning through symbols. Thus it has two aspects the *Liṅgākhyā*—the symbolic and the *Bhāvākhyā*, the aspect of meaning. The term *Liṅga* in the Sāṃkhya Philoso-

phy is very important. It means throughout Symbol. The Symbol is pregnant with meaning, "*Bhavairadhibāsitam Liṅgam.*" The *Liṅga Puruṣa* is the Symbolic Man, the empirical Man. The transcendental man is the *Puruṣa*. No *Liṅga* without *Bhāva* and there is no realisation of *Bhāra* or meaning without *Liṅga* or Symbol. All these have been explicitly stated in the different *Kārikās*, only their real meaning has not been properly understood—thanks to the unphilosophic writers of philosophic commentaries. The *Bhāras* or meaning have been called *Sāmsiddhikāḥ*, i.e., as one translator has by chance rightly translated it, transcendental. Dr. Jha has shown his ingenuity by criticising it. He considers that this interpretation is guilty of meaning by it exactly what it does not mean. Dr. Ganganath Jha's translation is replete with instances of uncommon ingenuity which show clearly what an unphilosophic writer on a philosophical subject can readily accomplish.

6. I propose now to turn to the texts that have led me to the view I have attributed to the *Kārikās*. I am only sorry that space will not permit me to discuss any problem fully. I shall however give the fullest consideration to the definition of the point of view of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy.

7. In the second *Kārikā* the author has characterised the Sāṃkhya Philosophy as *Vyaktāryaktaijñāvijñāna*. The word *Vijñāna* distinguishes it at once from *Prajñāna* or Mysticism of the Philosophical and not of the Theological type. For this latter there is no place in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy. The Sāṃkhya has been debarred by its point of view from being theistic. The *Seṣvara-Sāṃkhya* illustrates the acme of misapprehension. The Sāṃkhya *Vijñāna* is the rationalistic knowledge of what knowledge or reality is.

8. The term *Vyaktāryaktaijñā* is usually taken to be a case of simple *Dvandva samāsa*. The grammarian here gets the better of the philosopher and he finds in it the unmistakable evidence of commonsense dualism. The *Vykta* and *Aryakta* are taken to mean two forms of Matter or Nature, and

Jñā is taken to mean spirit or *Puruṣa*. It betrays a hopeless ignorance of the true meaning of *jñā*, to know. *Vyaktā-vyaktajñā* is a case of *Samāhar Dvandva*. It means a unity of the knower and the known. *Jñā* is not mere spirit. A mere spirit is hardly distinguishable from a dead atom. It means a spirit who discharges his true function of knowing. *Jñā* is spirit with a function, viz., the function of knowing. To know is to develop meaning. The terms of the compound *Vyaktā-vyaktajñā* do not fall apart and form a duality but are held together by the transcendental tie of knowledge.

9. It sounds rather strange that *Puruṣa* has any function. On the other hand, is it not a fact that *Puruṣa* is *Akartā*, *Sākṣī* and *Draṣṭā*? Yes, but what do they mean? *Akartā*, i.e., not having any *kriyā*. True. But does *kriyā* mean all forms of action? No. It means in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy a particular kind of action. It is called *parispanda* and its *Lakṣaṇa* is *Pariṇāma*. *Kriyā* is the operation of the changing forms. It may be said to be mechanical action as distinguished from the transcendental function of developing meaning. Logical interpretation is an act but it is not *kriyā*. It is realisation of meaning, a unique activity. *Puruṣa* is the *Bhoktā*, i.e., Experiencer (not enjoyer) and interpreter. Everything expresses his meaning. By calling him *Akartā* mechanical action or the interaction of the changing forms has been denied to him. But it does not amount to a denial of all actions or functions. This unique transcendental activity has not been denied.

10. *Sākṣī* and *Draṣṭā* signify the unique activity that belongs to *Puruṣa*. Meaning is understood as it is said in English. Perceiving is understanding meaning. It is for this reason that in the Sāṃkhya theory of perception the transcendental reflection of *Puruṣa* is said to be absolutely necessary. Without this there is no knowledge. The Sāṃkhya theory of perception has the merit of steering clear of the perverse Psychological theory of perception which gives priority to the object. Object has no priority in knowledge. This will be

further seen when my view of *Vyakta* and *Avyakta* has been elaborated. The author has used a different word, viz., *Pratibimba* to signify the transcendental act of *Puruṣa*. May I quote here Nicolaj Iosskij? Perception, he says, is a unique non-causal relation of Epistemological co-ordination. Really *Draṣṭā* does not mean a mere seer. There is nothing like mere seeing. Seeing is seeing. It is a sort of transcendental functioning. The Sāṃkhya Philosopher means by *Puruṣa jñā*, i.e., a spirit with spiritual functions or better a knower with logical functions. Its unique character has been specified by calling it neither *Prakṛti* nor *Vikṛti*. It has no *Prākṛtic* or *Vaikṛtic* activity but of all these *Prākṛtic* and *Vaikṛtic* activities the *hetu* is *Puruṣārtha*. But the mode of operation of *Puruṣārtha* is unique. The *Prakṛti*, the *Prakṛti Vikṛtis* and *Vikṛtis* act simply because *Puruṣārtha Prakāśa* is their inherent function. It is through them that *Puruṣa* realises his meaning or *Artha*.

11. Now I shall turn to *Vyakta* and *Avyakta*. They agree and differ. *Kārikās* 10 and 11 have described the features in which they agree and differ. I need not recount them here. I shall consider only those that are highly significant and of which the significance has been missed.

12. The *Vyakta* is *Anityam*, i.e., mutable or changing. The *Avyakta* is *Nitya*, i.e., unchanging. Yet it has been called *Prasada-dharmi*, i.e., productive. Does it mean that it does not substantially change and all changes are mere changes of form! It can only mean this. Consequently the *Vyakta* means a world of ever-changing forms of symbols. The *Avyakta* is formless. The *Vyakta* is thus identical in content with the *Avyakta* and hence the agreements are but different in form and hence the differences. This agrees with the theory of *Salkāryyārāda* and further throws light on certain terms used to characterise the *Vyakta*. The *Vyakta* is *Liṅga*, i.e., Symbolic and thus it is *Āśrita*, *Paratantra*, *Sāvyaya*, *Aneka*, and *Avyāpi* while the *Avyakta* is neither of these.

13. *Aryakta* has been identified with Aristotle's formless Matter. It is a pity that Aristotle should be considered as a standard philosopher and Indians should glory in the fact of the Sāṃkhya's resemblance with the system of Aristotle. However that be, it is here contended that the Sāṃkhya Philosophy is much superior to that of Aristotle. *Aryakta* is not formless matter. There is no matter in the Sāṃkhya Philosophy. *Aryakta* is the undifferentiated Experience-complex on which has been reared the whole *Vyakta* world of everchanging symbolic forms. It is Experience characterised by objective reference. It is the presentative aspect of the *Puruṣa* and is hence co-eval with *Puruṣa*. It is the stuff of the objective.

14. The *Aryakta* is an uncaused existent. But yet it is not an independent, self-existent entity. For though uncaused, it requires an *Adhiṣṭhāna* and a *Bhoktā*. *Puruṣa* has been called the *Adhiṣṭhāna* of *Mūlā Prakṛti*. *Adhiṣṭhāna* has been distinguished from cause. This point is very important in connection with the Sāṃkhya theory of causation. *Aryakta* is the Experience-complex and *Puruṣa* is the experiencer and *Adhiṣṭhāna* *Puruṣa* is the interpretative aspect, viz., the *Vijñātā* and the *Aryakta* is the presentative aspect (vide Charaka's account). *Aryakta* has been further characterised as *Viśaya*, i.e., objective and hence necessarily correlated with the subject *Puruṣa* or *Jñā*. It is the irreducible datum or the Meant. Is it not really surprising that the Sāṃkhya has been so long considered as a dualistic Philosophy?

15. The Sāṃkhya terminology is wonderfully exact. The *Vyakta* and the *Aryakta* are the two forms of the objective and hence their relation must be different from the relation in which both of them stand to the subject. Consequently while the *Aryakta* has been said to be the cause of the *Vyakta*, *Puruṣa* has been described as *Adhiṣṭhāna* and *Bhoktā*.

16. What is the justification for holding that the *Aryakta* is the undifferentiated Experience-complex and if so how can experience be said to be the ground of the objective. Now,

17. The *guṇas* have been described in terms of experience (not feeling). They are identical with *Prīti*, *Aprīti* and *Viśāda* and their meaning or function is *Prakāśa*, *Pravṛtti* and *Niyama*. They mutually modify and subdue one another, consort together and are co-present in every bit of experience in varying proportions. The last-mentioned characteristic makes them not units but aspects of a unity. *Prakāśa*, *Pravṛtti* and *Niyama* are the exact equivalents of the three aspects of experience as analysed by Modern Psychologists, specially Stout and Ward. *Prakāśa* is cognitive, *Pravṛtti* is conative, and *Niyama* is effective. The description of the *guṇas* so far agrees wonderfully with the description of experience given by modern Psychologists. Further, *Puruṣa* has been called *Bhoktā*. *Ayoktā* is therefore nothing but the undifferentiated Experience-complex.

18. Is Sāṃkhya, then, a form of Subjective Idealism? No. This theory differs from Subjective Idealism in the very same way as Kant differs from Hume, or Bosanquet and Gentile differ from Berkeley. The whole objective *Vyakta* universe has been already stated to be Symbolic. It symbolises the meaning of *Puruṣa* as developed out of the datum of undifferentiated Experience-complex, viz., *Acyakta*. The Sāṃkhya goes beyond Kant by insisting on the necessity of recognising the *Acyakta*.

The *Puruṣa* without its presentative aspect is *Paṅgu* and the presentative aspect without the interpretative aspect is blind. It reminds me of Kant's sense without understanding which is blind and understanding without sense which is empty. It anticipates Bosanquet by the view that experience primarily means the objective. *Kārikās* 13 and 36 are very important from this point of view. In the 13th *Kārikā* we find it stated in connection with the *Vṛtti* of the *guṇas* "*Pradīpavat ca Arthato Vṛtti.*" This has been thoroughly misunderstood by Vācaspati. It does not mean working towards a common end like the lamp which consists of different things and yet works towards a common end. Its plain meaning is that the *guṇas* like the lamp make objects visible, i.e., the *guṇas* are characterised by objective reference. The *guṇas* mean the objective. This rendering is further supported by *Kārikā* 36. *Pradīpa Kalpaḥ Guṇa Viśeṣaḥ Puruṣasya Artham Prakṣya*, etc. The same metaphor has been used here but the meaning is absolutely unambiguous.

I shall close by referring to one very important significance of the interpretation I have ventured to advance. It is that the root of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy goes deep into the Upaniṣads. It rises directly out of the philosophy of *Yājñavalkya*, as we find it in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. The root is not so slender as the incidental mention of the three colours or stray reference, to the technical terms used by the Sāṃkhya Philosophy. It is more far-reaching and will necessitate a thorough revision of the History of Indian Philosophy as written by some eminent Professors who have laid undue emphasis on mysticism as the dominant note of Indian speculation. I am sorry I cannot further develop my thesis within the prescribed limits.

THE MAṆIMĒKHALAI ACCOUNT OF THE SĀMĀKHYA

By

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For sometime past scholars have been endeavouring to fix the date of the Tamil Classic *Maṇimēkhalai* and the period of what is called the Sangam Age, in the light of the account given of the Classical Indian systems of Philosophy, in that work. The treatment of Indian Logic is particularly full and has constituted the battle-ground of rival theorists who claim either that account marks a transition to Dignāga¹ or that it has utilised the teaching of Dignāga.² The question has not yet been settled. Since it seemed to the present writer that the treatment of the other systems of philosophy could not but be of interest and profit, in this connection, he attempted a study of these, and was agreeably surprised to find that the account of the Sāṃkhya was both novel and significant. The doctrine there expounded has very little affinity with the classical Sāṃkhya except in respect of the number of the *tatvas* (twenty-five including Puruṣa). Since the account is comparatively short, it is set out here in English *in extenso*.

The expositor of the Sāṃkhya doctrine spoke dispassionately thus : That which is difficult to know, is of the nature of three constituents,³ is unattainable by the mind (*manam*), is pervasive and common to all, and is the substrate of the evolution of all

¹ Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, *Maṇimēkhalai*, pp. xxii-xxv.

² Prof. Jacobi in the Supplement to his article in the Hultzsch Jubileo Number of the *Zeitschrift für indologie und Iranistik*; tr. in *Maṇimēkhalai*, pp. xxxi-xxxiv.

³ It is worth noting that the text uses the words "mukkuṇamāi : being (or becoming) the three guṇas," and not "possessing the three guṇas." The guṇas were thus constituents, not qualities.

things, that is Mūla-prakṛti. From this *Citta* (a synonym for Prakṛti) arises ether (ākāśa); from that arises air (vāyu); from that arise fire (agni); from that arise water (appu); from that arises the earth (mañ); from the aggregate of these arises the mind (manam);⁴ from the mind is declared (to evolve) the evolute of individuation (āṅgāram); from ether the evolutes called the ear and sound, from air the evolutes called the skin and touch; from fire the evolutes called the eye and light, from water (of the elements still left) the evolutes called the mouth (vāi) and taste, and from the earth the evolutes of the nose and smell are declared (to evolve);⁵ out of these as evolutes of the skin⁶ arise the organ of speech, the hands, the feet, and the organs of excretion and generation. As modifications of the elements here mentioned arise hills, forests, etc., and constitute the world. These return in the same manner as they appeared and are absorbed. Till the universal deluge these will expand continu-

⁴ This provides an interesting analogue to the Vedānta view that mind evolves from the five tanmātras : See *Advaita-Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*.

⁵ The text would seem to support only a parallel evolution of the Indriya and what it senses, not a prior evolution of one or the other. Kanakasabhai's translation (in *The Tamils 1800 Years Ago*) reads "from ether sound is produced through the ear" and so on. There is little warrant for this is the text : "ākūyaṭṭir cōviyoli vikāramam," etc. Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar's translation—"from ākāśa springs sound heard by the ear"—is non-committal.

⁶ The text reads : "ivarrir rokku vikāramāi," etc. The second word 'rokku' changed by sandhi to 'rokku' is used in the sense of skin (tvak) a few lines earlier. There is no reason to hold that it is used in a different sense here. Kanakasabhai translates thus : "from the union of these appear the tongue, etc." This is not a helpful way of understanding the passage. Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar who translates "these find expression by means of the physical organs" seems not to recognise the difficulty. Is there any view which takes the organs of action to be derived from one of the organs of cognition—the skin? An interesting view which bears on the question, though not directly, may be noted here. In commenting on verse 50 of Rhoja-deva's *Tattvaparakāṣikā* (a Śaiva Āgamic work), Aghora Śiva raises the objection that the organs of action would be infinite in number, if for every action, e.g., knitting the eye-brows, a separate organ were needed. The reply he gives is that the organs of action are not localised but pervade the whole body like the skin, and that knitting the eye-brows is a function of the *indriya* known as the hands. A certain fundamental resemblance is here recognised between the skin and *karmendriyas*; whether any greater degree of identity is pre-supposed is not known.

ously throughout space.⁷ Puruṣa is easy to know, devoid of the three constituents incapable of being cognised by the senses (poṛi); he is not the substrate for the evolution of anything, (but) he is the intelligence whereby all those (evolved) things are known; he is the one, all-pervasive eternal intelligence. There are twenty-five entities cognisable by the senses (pulam); earth, water, fire, air and ether; the body, the mouth, the eye, the nose and the ear; taste, sight, touch, sound and smell; the organ of speech, the feet, the hands, the organ of excretion and the organ of generation; mind, intellect, individuation and citta; and the one soul (ātmā) called life (auir).''


The scheme of categories may be clearer from the accompanying table. It will be noticed that there is a considerable divergence from the Sāmkhya as expounded by Īśvarakṛṣṇa and taught (presumably in a continuous line of tradition) up to the time of Vijñāna Bhikṣu, if not up to the present day. A prominent feature is the omission of all reference to the subtle elements (tanmātras) out of which the gross elements evolve, according to the classical Sāmkhya. Another prominent feature is the notion of the one-ness of the Puruṣa. Whether we construe the unity strictly or as but referring to the class of intelligent beings, we have something very different from, if not opposed to, the plurality emphasised in the *Sāmkhya Kārikā*.⁸ The order of evolution is itself worthy of note. Manas and ahaṁkāra figure more as byproduct than as evolvents of the third and fourth degree as they do in the *Kārikā*. The evolution of the elements is that set out in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, II, 1. To a great extent, the account seems to show affinities with the Sāmkhya of the *Mahābhārata*.⁹ The omission of the *tanmātras*

⁷ The sentence in the text is far from clear. I have adopted Kanakasabhai's translation.

⁸ See *Sāmkhya Kārikā*, 18.

⁹ Cf. Keith: *The Sāmkhya System*: "The absence of the five elements, Tanmātras, from the epic results in a different position in the series of evolution for the gross elements. Occasionally these are derived direct from the absolute being, following the doctrine of the

Taittiriya Upaniṣad (ii, 1), or from mind, but their normal source is the principle of individuation. From the gross elements spring their Viśeṣas, distinctions, the term given to the specific qualities which they possess. In the classical Sāṅkhya, the introduction of the Tanmātras reduces the gross elements to an inferior position; the five elements are without distinction, Avīśeṣa, probably because each element consists of its own nature alone, while the gross elements now themselves bear the term Viśeṣas apparently because they each contain portions of the others. This theory of the mixing of the elements is found in the epic, but there is also found the very different theory by which the elements as in the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad*, arise each from the less complex, the lowest, the ether, with one quality, and the highest, the earth with five" (p. 37). On the unity of Puruṣa in the epic Sāṅkhya, see Dallmann, *Die Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, esp. p. 5; "Das klassische Sāṅkhya nimmt eine Vielheit geistiger Substanz an, das epische Sāṅkhya leugnet dies Vielheit und hält an der unbedingten Einzigkeit des absoluten Geistes fest;" also *Mahābhārata*, XII, 311 (where Vaiśiṣṭha says "Prakṛti is one at the time of the deluge and manifold in creation. The controlling Puruṣa is also one at the time of the deluge and manifold in creation)." On the indriyas as evolutes of the mahābhūtas, see *Mahābhārata*, XII, 283 and 288 (where Vyāsa says, for instance, "The organ of hearing is the evolute of ākāśa. The sage who knows what the āśtras lay down knows sound to be characteristic of that ākāśa;" also Ch. 315 (where Yājñavalkya says "Avyakta, mahat abhikāra and the five gross elements are the prakṛtis. The five organs of cognition, the five sense-impressions, and the five organs of action are specifications of the five gross-elements)." This doctrine provides one more affinity with Vedānta; (see *Adaita-Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, Viṣaya Pariccheda); here of course, the evolution is from the tanmātras, not from the gross elements which are themselves derived from the tanmātras. The probability of the doctrine being closer to the Upaniṣads than to the classical Sāṅkhya seems thus to be very great. The references to *Mahābhārata* are to the *Madhava Vilas Book Depot* edition.



is also reminiscent of the Sāmkhya as expounded by Caraka.¹⁰ It would be interesting to know if there is any analogue to the view of the evolution of the organs of action from the skin (or the body as it is termed at a later stage of the account).

Judging from the remarkably precise account given of Indian Logic and the equally correct though, perhaps, jejune account of Buddhism, there is little reason to think that the account of the Sāmkhya, as given in the *Mañimēkhalai* is anything but a faithful version of the doctrine as current at the time of the author, and in his part of the country. It is difficult to believe that such a version would have been current after the date of the *Kārikā*, and one may assert with a good measure of reason that there is no likelihood of its having been current two to three centuries after the date assigned to Īśvarakṛṣṇa. One seems compelled, therefore, to conclude that the composition of the *Mañimēkhalai* could not have been later than the third or at the most the fourth century A.D.¹¹

A consideration of the *pramāṇas* enumerated in Chapter XXVII of the work gives a suggestion which may in some measure re-inforce the above conclusion. Inference which is recognised as a *pramāṇa* is said to be three-fold and the three forms—*pūrrarat*, *śeṣarat* and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*—are explained much in the same way as by Vātsyāyana in the first portion of his commentary on *Nyāya Sūtra*, I, 1, 5. *Śeṣavat*, for instance, is said to be inference from effect to cause, not inference by elimination as suggested by Vātsyāyana in the latter half of his commentary; *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* applies where perception of co-existence between middle and major is absent, not only where it is impossible (being *alīndriya*). The latter view of *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* inference suggested by Vātsyāyana himself seems

¹⁰ See Das-Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, I, 213-222.

¹¹ For the date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, which is generally fixed as the third century A.D. or earlier, see Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, II, 254-255.

to be shared by *Īśvarakṛṣṇa*, as seen from *Kārikā* 6. It seems likely, therefore, that the author of the *Mañimēkhalai* came before *Vātsyāyana* who is believed not to have come later than 400 A.D.¹³ The suggestion in itself is very weak, however, since a particular interpretation might have been chosen in preference to others which were also known. But if taken along with other suggestions which a more detailed study of the Chapters XXVII-XXX of the work is likely to yield, the cumulative result cannot but be positively helpful in a more precise determination of the period to which the work belongs.

¹³ For the date of *Vātsyāyana*, see Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, II, 38.

THE NATURE AND IMPLICATION OF MEMORY

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One of the most baffling problems in Psychology and in Theory of Knowledge is suggested by the phenomenon of Memory. It is one of those obstinate problems on which many have exercised their wits, seldom with any evidence of success. The problem of memory raises a number of distinct questions. It is, in the first place, a chapter in Psychology. We have to discuss there what memory is in itself, whether it is a definite psychical faculty, or a function in which the whole of consciousness participates. Leaving Psychology aside, it also suggests certain Logical and Epistemological issues. Memory is said to give us knowledge, and with knowledge is bound up the question of belief. In discussing the problem of memory we are thus inevitably drawn to the problems of Knowledge and Belief. One of the most tiresome problems of Metaphysics, *viz.*, the question of the interrelations of Soul and Body is also seen to centre upon the subject of Memory. From Metaphysics again we are slowly and steadily led to the lofty heights of Spiritualism and realise how powerfully operative our current conceptions of memories have been in shaping and moulding the New Spiritualistic movements as to the structure of Personality and its survival of bodily death. From whatever side we look at it memory furnishes a problem of supreme interest to every student of philosophic thought.

The psychological questions as to the nature of memory might have been easily skipped over if we could satisfy ourselves with the usual account that memory is an ultimate and

inexplicable faculty that makes for the retention of our past experiences as well as their reproduction on appropriate occasions. But further considerations reveal defects that call for removal. Memory naturally suggests retentiveness, yet more retentiveness is not adequate to the purpose. Moreover the doctrine of retentiveness carries with it certain conceptions about unconscious mental dispositions or cerebral modifications to which it is difficult to give one's assent without convicting himself of a foregone metaphysical bias. Nor is any improvement effected by the supplementary notion of reproduction. Reproduction of the past is illustrated in the bare fact of repetition. But mere repetition is obviously not a case of memory. Where we are concerned simply with repetition or redoing of what was learnt previously, there comes in the phenomenon of habit. We often marvel at the skill and accuracy with which some people are able to reproduce the lines from a poem after one or two readings, and feel tempted to characterise them as gifted with 'phenomenal memories.' In truth however there is no case of memory in this. It falls in the same line with the skill and dexterity of a typist in operating his machine after a month's practice or so. If instances like these be included in the category of memory there would be no line of demarcation left between memory, habit and instinct. The peculiarly psychical implication of memory would be one and it would be an exhibition of that universal characteristic of matter which allows it to persevere in its pre-existing state. Orthodox Psychology is offended at this.

Memory as a psychological problem rises out of our belief in the supremacy of our psychical life. If we grow suspicious about its reality or be ready to degrade it to the level of brute matter, there is no room for orthodox psychology, and the chapter on memory should naturally lapse into a chapter of Physics. The new doctrine of Behaviourism is an attempt in that direction. But as to the advisability of such a course we must not prejudge at present.

From the viewpoint of orthodox Psychology, memory cannot be said to consist in mere reproduction or repetition. The essential feature that characterises memory as a psychical phenomenon is that it involves knowledge of the past. To be more accurate, memory signifies "consciousness of past events as having been in fact experienced in my past." It is the fact of recollection or remembering, and not of reproduction that typifies memory.

To say that memory constitutes knowledge of the past may prove ruinous without a warning. In the first place we have to emphasise the fact that though true memory consists in knowledge of past events, every form of knowledge relating to the past does not come within memory. It is possible for us sometimes to know the past through inference and sometimes through imagination. Obviously such forms of knowledge fall outside the range of memory. The precise points in which memory-knowledge differs from knowledge of the past obtained through inference and imagination will have to be put off a while.

In the next place we have to clear up certain confusions that hover round the nature of memory-knowledge. There are three levels of completeness in our knowledge of the past. At the lower level it comes to us simply in the form of vague feeling of familiarity. At the next stage it develops into definite recognition. But recognition also has different shades of character, sometimes it simply makes us feel the similarity of one object with another. At a further stage we may even become aware of the object having been seen by us before. And although recognition in each case is a mnemonic phenomenon, *i.e.*, an outcome of past experience, it is only in the latter case that we have anything like an approximation to memory.

Memory-knowledge is thus quite a peculiar sort of thing. It resembles in many respects perceptual knowledge, *i.e.* knowledge of the present derived by the senses, but the difference between the two goes deep enough—perceptual knowledge

is confined to the present, while memory-knowledge always refers to the past. The chief trouble that besets the psychologist is to determine the precise form and conditions of memory-knowledge.

The most convenient explanation is that offered by the realist. But it is said to be convenient for the simple reason that it gives up the hopeless attempt to explain the inexplicable. "Memory is possible and that is all we need to know." There is no philosophising as to how the poet is known. The past is apprehended as immediately and directly as we know the present. Any objection as to how there might be an immediate apprehension of the past on the score that the past no longer exists is met by a categorical declaration that knowledge need not require an immediate contact with the thing known, nor are we obliged to assume that existence is necessarily confined to the present.

The position is further strengthened by a negative criticism of the doctrine that a reinstatement of a series of memory-images is necessary to serve as representatives, in the 'specious present,' of the past. If in our attempt to recollect the past it be necessary to invoke a series of images in the present to tell us about their past prototypes the difficulty is only increased. "How can Jones," asks Laird, "know that any memory-images represent the past, unless he can compare the memory-image with the past itself? And does not the possibility of this prove that Jones is directly acquainted with the past?"

Bold as such a statement is it is nevertheless fraught with difficulties. Even if it be conceded that we are gifted with an oracle to give us "really the existing past," why should it go out of its way, and prove illusory at times? Illusions of memory are notoriously frequent and he should be a bold man indeed who trusted his recollections implicitly. The only explanation which the realist can suggest comes in for an admission of the images and yielding to the popular demand that in recollection there is an intrusion of the element of

imagery. Images are not what we recollect, nevertheless at the time of recollection our mind does a little reconstruction, and this embroidery of fancy easily blends with our recollection. But an admission of the reality of images makes it difficult for us to understand how without their help there could be any recollection. It is more intelligible to say that though the present is apprehended in a direct and immediate way, the memory-knowledge of the past is possible only through the intermediary of images.

On the other hand if images be invoked to account for our knowledge of the past we are faced with other troubles. Our belief in past occurrences is not certainly a belief in images. I value my recollection for the simple reason that it reawakens in me my past experiences. To all intents and purposes, I know nothing of the intervening images.

We are faced now with two slightly incompatible situations. On one side we declare that without images there is no possibility of recollection, and on the other it is said that what we recollect does not consist of images. The solution would obviously lie in making memory a rather complex and elaborate affair, resting upon a process of interpretation, the keynote of which is supplied by images.

It follows then that memory cannot be regarded as a direct and immediate apprehension of the past. It is a reconstruction of the past,—built up through a combination of elements, and so must be considered derivative.

Such a decision is bound to affect seriously the trustworthiness of memory. It will no longer be possible to accept the verdict of memory on the score that it comes through recollection. Perceptual knowledge may carry its own authority but memory-knowledge must submit to a foreign standard.

This is an irreconcilable demand. But strangely enough, Russell though advocating the indispensableness of images in memory, declared nevertheless that memory-knowledge must be immediate. He sought to account for this through the agency

of a specific kind of belief-feeling which, as he supposed, conferred upon the image, in an imperceptible way, the status of memory-knowledge. How that could be passes our comprehension.

Once we admit the rôle of images and ideas in the making of memory, there is no escape from the inevitable conclusion that memory is a very complex phenomenon, and involves a high degree and development of thinking. This is the position taken up by Bradley.

It is difficult to bring out the extremely complex considerations that induced Bradley to refuse assent to the doctrine of memory as an immediate presentation of the past. 'Immediate presentation of the past', he says, 'would be a gratuitous miracle.' According to him, memory is an ideal construction of the past from the present. Something in the present acts as a cue to set up through its own identity a process of ideal construction in the lines of already formed association. He illustrates his meaning thus. Let us premise there has been formed a disposition to an ideal series, *c-d-e*. If now we have a present qualified as $\Lambda(b-c)$ then there is through the identity of *c* a transition from Λ to *e* through *b-c-d*.

There are three definite points to which Bradley draws our attention to clear up certain confusions. One of them relates to the apparent incompatibility between the requirements of memory and the order of ideal construction. The order of ideal construction moves onwards, while memory always goes backward. How can this be achieved? The remedy is suggested by showing that while ordinary thinking in its forward movement is relatively independent of the present, the ideal construction, constitutive of memory, must be stirred up by the present, and be both connected with and yet incompatible with the present. The actual order of movement in ideal construction no body can alter. But it is possible for us to ascertain whether it relates to past or to future. If from our present situation Xd , we are led up to an ideal construction Xa through the identity

of X , and if this Xa through associative connection $b-c-d$, leads up to our present Xd , and be prolonged into the future, we have evidently a case of memory. The real test lies in the beginning of the series of ideal construction. It must have affinity with the present and yet be incompatible with it.

The other two points are concerned in showing how the memory construction can be differentiated from the ideal construction of inference on one side and of imagination on the other, even when they deal with the past. Briefly put, the explanation amounts to this. In inference the development of ideal construction is necessitated at every step by the law of identity, whereas in imagination the flow does not abide by the restrictions of identity. In logical thinking no transition is possible from Ab to Ac , unless we are assured of the identity in Ab , bc , cd and de . In imagination on the contrary, the transition is quite possible from Ab to Ac or to anything else without any restriction.

The work of memory lies between these two orders. In memory-construction, unlike imagination, there is an appearance of necessity, yet this necessity is not of the same order as logical necessity. Logical necessity is intrinsic, due to the ideal development by identity of the same subject. Memory-necessity is certainly due to the nature of ideal content, but it is not conditioned throughout by the law of identity. This explains, according to Bradley, why the conclusion of an inference is binding upon us on the strength of logical cogency, but the deliverance of memory acquires its compelling character partly from logic and partly from extraneous considerations; while in respect of imagination we may always assume a free attitude.

This drives us to the most alarming part of Bradley's theory. If it be accepted that the transition to ideal construction, involved in memory, is effected through, and finally rests on a point of, ideal identity, memory also becomes an offshoot of inference. And so we are told, "memory in its essence involves an inference and so is inferential." It is further

suggested that our capacity for inference is not only a presupposition of memory, but precedes it in time as a matter of fact. "I am convinced," Bradley continues, "that while in fact many or most of the lower animals certainly reason, perhaps none of them is able to remember in the proper sense of memory."

It is useless to comment on the above picture of memory drawn by Bradley in his inordinate zeal for dialectic. It embodies a vigorous line of reasoning, but on looking at it one is bound to stagger whether he has a case of memory before him or something that means a complete subversion of memory. How can memory hang on inference, when in fact, inference itself, as a passage from premise to conclusion, must require the aid of memory?

The chief interest that attracts a student of psychology to the problem of memory is its stubborn absolute character. Next to perception there comes memory with its unimpeachable tone. Veracity of memory must be accepted in principle, though it may err in particular cases. Bradleyan memory, on the contrary, falsifies all this. His 'memory' has no inherent infallible character. Its veracity may remain unimpaired in many cases, but that is so not because they are cases of memories, but because they happen to agree to a foreign standard.

Bradleyan treatment of memory leaves a lesson for us. It shows, if it shows anything, how utterly vicious must be any procedure that aims to settle questions of fact by an appeal to logic.

What then is the remedy?

It seems no remedy is worth anything so long as we run with the notion of time as a succession of moments, and think of the past as non-existent, buried behind the present or cut off from the present by a long stretch of distance. If memory has to deal with such a past her work must be made increasingly difficult. Realism rests content with a frank confession, 'memory is possible but we are not required to explain the

inexplicable.' Representationism and idealism move a step forward and seem to be under the impression that they can explain it through the intermediary of images and ideas. So long as the present continues our knowledge has a touch of solidity, but as it begins to recede into the faintly glimmering past, there steps in the indistinct dying echo of recollection. As perception ends memory is said to begin. The two remain sundered from each other. This is the position to which they are committed, and once this position is accepted, there is no way left to make good the stubbornly authoritative character of memory-knowledge. The more we invoke the aid of ideas and images to help us in our recollections the more we deprive memory of her genuineness and immediacy.

To get rid of this *impasse*, it is necessary to carry through a complete change in our conception of time. Time is not a succession of moment. Such a time is imaged in space in a linear order,—a degenerate form of real time which is an essentially spiritual thing. In real time there is no past sundered from the present. The so-called past is for ever there with the present. It is synonymous with the ever-living reality itself, and grows and abides there without break or pause. This is the way Bergson thinks of time. He calls it duration and looks upon it as a master-key to the solution of long-drawn conflicts between idealism and realism and a host of other problems. The problem of memory must be brought in a line with duration if we have to understand it at all. Duration is the ever-living present, continuously growing. The past is never cast off from the present, on the contrary it interpenetrates the present. If the past were split off as a dead, dried up mass from the present, the present would equally lose its inward suppleness of life. To realise this goes a great way towards understanding how memory is formed. If the past is the present, never-cut loose from it, memory must also be viewed as being formed along with the perception of the present, being in fact wholly contemporaneous with perception. Our perceptions and memories are

not two distinct products borne in upon us on two different occasions—one in the present, and the other in the past. To assume such a position is to stand against truth for truly speaking there is no past separated from the present. “Step by step as perception is created, the memory of it is projected beside it as the shadow falls beside the body.” (*Bergson*.) We have both at the same moment, though one differs from the other as the object differs from its image reflected in the mirror.

Our life is predominantly practical in its outlook. It is interested in acting and doing, and has its attention fixed upon those objects that constitute perception. For it is from these alone that it can expect action and reaction. The “attentional tone” of life is the decisive factor that compels us to accept the perception as alone real and to ignore their reduplications which form memory. But with the slackening of “attentional tone” the ignored duplications begin to capture the field of consciousness and figure before us as memory. Perception and memory are thus one and the same thing ; what divides them is the degree of attentional tone.

This fruitful conception accords with, and finds special support from, the fact of ‘*paramnesia*’ or false recognition, when the individual has what is called “memory of the present instead of the normal memory of the past.” This happens when there follows an enfeeblement of the ‘attention to life’ owing to certain sudden derangement of the mechanism which canalises the impulse of life in the direction of practicality. At such a crisis the patient loses the sharp distinction between past and present or even experiences the present as past.

Bergson spared no pains to make his theory stand, and it would be an offence to comment upon it without going into details. The most noteworthy feature in his philosophy centres round the concept of life as the one dominating principle by which everything is explained. Our ordinary waking consciousness is but the outcome of the impulse of life focussed in a point and held in tension. What are called dream-experiences are the

offshoot of the same life-impulse with the strings of tension let off. But what makes possible the appearance of the contents of dream-experiences is the phenomenon of memory. It is always with us ; in fact, it is the central animating principle of consciousness. Yet we are obliged to ignore it, forget it and relegate it to the " domain of the unconscious," owing to the straining forward attitude which pins it on to the future. Consciousness, Unconsciousness, Perception and Memory are all one and the same.

Bergson's concept of life, with all its fascination, proves faulty for manifold considerations, the most striking of which is that it is sterile. Left to itself it would not proceed beyond the stage of simple automatism. To let it work Bergson had to lean upon another category, *viz.*, attention. It is the variation in attentional tone that accounts for the birth of consciousness, unconsciousness, perception and memory. Attention however is a derivative phenomenon, an offshoot of will. It seems clear then that our explanation of memory along with consciousness should rest upon will.

With the concept of will behind we proceed to state how memory is formed. One thing must be premised in agreement with Bergson. It is that memory is contemporaneous with perception. There is identity between the two. This is why vivid recollections by themselves serve to carry conviction in the absence of perception. Whether we should call it perception or memory rests upon the prevailing interest of the moment. What under one grade of interest we feel like remembrance may pass over into perception if the interest should shift its centre. Interest itself springs out of will.

Yet deeper considerations force us to incline in favour of will as the basal condition of memory. Memory and perceptions have been declared to be identical, which means that they are held together in the same pulse of consciousness by an underlying bond of unity. This unity is a very important condition, but its precise nature is very hard to grasp.

The question is whether the required unity exists there by itself as a matter of fact, or is only a possible notion whose actualisation depends upon an endeavour of the will. Matter of fact unity is only a misnomer. In the real sense it is no unity, for there remains the possibility of distinction and separation of parts. Nobody knows how in a brute matter of fact manner these parts should be resolved in the whole. Genuine unity knows of no externality of connection between part and whole. It is essentially spiritual in its make-up. A spiritual unity is a thing for realisation. It has to be organised and felt as one through an endeavour of the will. Where the will is lacking bare consciousness speedily disintegrates into a succession of discrete states. It hardly rises to the level of self-conscious unity. A truly self-conscious spirit alone knows the art of bringing the varied experiences into a focal point. This is what renders the past to live in the present.

It is the endeavour of the will that makes for the growth of self-conscious personality. Such a type of unity is the only privileged order of existence that can be said to have anything like true memory.

Such a doctrine of memory stands as a corrective to the modern spiritualistic movements. Much has been made of certain phenomena of a pseudo-scientific character to console the tenderminded with the belief that their psychic life as it unrolls in time here on earth goes on accumulating in the form of memories, the varied experiences of love and hate, knowledge and wisdom. And when owing to the dissolution of the associated physical frame, life on earth comes to an end it does not cease for good. The psychic personality with its structure of memories continues to play the game even beyond the grave. It is soothing enough to listen to the stories of psychic survival. But it ignores the cardinal point that psychic personality is not a matter-of-fact existence. It has to be reared up by steady and strenuous effort of the will. Where no determined effort is made to co-ordinate and organise the moving experiences of the

passing hour into a single unified system there we have no evidence of psychic personality with any memories. It is idle to say that such a crude type of being continues, of right, to survive the dissolution of the body. Even birds and fishes, insects and worms have a right to survival.

SVABHĀVA-VĀDA OR INDIAN NATURALISM

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[*Not read before the Congress.*]

In Sanskrit philosophical works, we sometimes find mentioned a world-view which is designated *Svabhāva-vāda*, a term which we may without implying exact equivalence, render by the English word 'naturalism.'¹ It is a very old doctrine going as far back as the Upaniṣads² and representing a current of thought opposed to belief in the supernatural or *Adṛṣṭa-vāda*,³ advocated generally by the priests. We know that the reaction against the Vedic religion was very old. Buddhistic and Jain works refer to numerous philosophical schools,⁴ many of them heretical as having existed when Gotama and Mahāvīra taught. It is difficult to believe that all of them took their rise only in that generation and some at least of them must be much older. Hindu tradition also refers to the courts of ancient kings like Janaka teeming with teachers expounding separate doctrines including heretical ones.⁵ The *Svabhāva-vāda* should have been an important offshoot of this reaction. Though the origin of the doctrine can be traced only vaguely, its influence is transparent in more than one sphere of Indian thought as we now know it. In the later scholastic philosophy, it is represented, however

¹ Compare, e.g., the references to it in Śaṅkara on *Br. Sū* : I : 1. 2 and Sureśvara's *Br. Up. Vārtika*, I, iv, 1487. Anandajñāna in explaining these references uses the term *Svabhāva-vāda*. See also *Śaṅkṣepa-sūtraka*, i, 528; *Kuṣmāṇjali*, p. 16 (Benares Edn.), 1912.

² See *Svet. Up.*, 2, vi 1.

³ Nilakanṭha, in commenting on Mahābhārata, XII, 213, 11, makes this contrast.

⁴ See 'Cambridge History of India,' Vol. I, pp. 160 & 302.

⁵ See, e.g., *Mbh.*, XII, 218, 4-5.

inadequately, by the Lokāyata system, and is seen to have contributed important elements to the growth of other systems like the Sāṃkhya. The doctrine represents in fact an ancient and distinctive current of Indian thought—parallel to the orthodox creed through the greater part of its history. It should once have been quite prominent for we find sage Ajagara, an advocate of the doctrine⁶ speaking of it as 'widely mentioned' (*Bahurakhita*).⁷ Notwithstanding its secular or non-priestly origin, it counts among its teachers Brahmins⁸ along with Kṣatriyas and others. Though it represents so important a school of thought, no detailed exposition of it is to be found anywhere in Sanskrit literature. It no doubt appears either as an established view⁹ (*siddhānta*) or as one to be rebutted,¹⁰ (*pūrva-pakṣa*) in the Mahābhārata which like the Atharva-veda is a great storehouse of popular and non-priestly beliefs. But its tenets there, owing to this revision which the Epic has undergone at the hands of its later editors, appear largely modified by those of other schools. It has also in this process of revision come under the review of unsympathetic thinkers as is clear for example from its being traced often to such objectionable sources as demons (*asuras*).¹¹ Though modified, the Mahābhārata account¹² is the only considerable one from which we have to draw our information about the doctrine in the early stages of its history. We propose to state here, chiefly on the basis of this account, its broad features; but, owing to the uncertainties of our source and the uncritical character of the editions of the Epic so far published, the statement should, for the most part, be regarded as tentative.

⁶ See *Mbh.*, XII, 179, 11. The term *animitataḥ* occurring in the previous stanza should, in the light of what is stated in this one, be taken as meaning 'without any external cause.'

⁷ *Mbh.*, XII, 179, 35.

⁸ Sage Ajagara for instance, referred to above is a Brahmin.

⁹ Cf. XII, 179, 222, 224, 248.

¹⁰ Cf. XII, 186, 187, 218, 275.

¹¹ E.g., Arāhṛāḍa and Bali who expounded this doctrine in XII, 222 and 224 of the Epic.

¹² Sometimes the Purāṇas contain allusions to this doctrine though not on such a large scale. Buddhistic and Jain works also are of use in this connection.

It is necessary to distinguish this doctrine first from another which is also very old and may be mistaken for it, viz., 'accidentalism' described as *Yadṛcchā-vāda* or *Animitta-vāda*. Both the *Yadṛcchā-vāda* and *Svabhāva-vāda* are found separately mentioned in the *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad*.¹³ While the one believed that the world was a chaos and ascribed whatever order is seen in it to chance, the other recognised that 'things are as their nature makes them.'¹⁴ The word *svabhāva* means one's uniqueness—the power or property restricted to one object or one class of objects.¹⁵ Hence according to the *Svabhāva-vāda*, it is not a lawless world in which we live but a world which only has no external, especially a transcendental, principle governing it. It is self-determined—neither undetermined, nor determined, by a supernatural agency. The nature of a thing entirely determines its history and it is because we are blind to this fact that we imagine that it obeys no law or that its course may be altered by the intervention of human or divine will. Both these views, however, were at one in rejecting the idea that Nature reveals any divine power working behind it or indeed any transcendental being which controls it or is implicated in it. Nor did either doctrine seek for its views any supernatural sanction. In the former of these, we have to look for the source of the sensualist school of Cārvāka thought, which also ascribes the events of life to mere accident.¹⁶ It is the latter that is of real philosophic importance.

(i) Theoretical Teaching.

The first point that needs to be noted about this doctrine is its positivistic character which is implied by its contrast with

¹³ The *Animitta-vāda* is refuted in *Nyāya-sūtra*, IV, i, 22-4.

¹⁴ *Mbh.*, XII, 222, 27. See also stanzas 15 ff.

¹⁵ Cf. Vardhamāna's definition in his Com. on the *Kusumāñjali* passage referred to in Note 1 (*ekaniyato dharmah*).

¹⁶ Indian Materialism as set forth in works like the *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha* is a curious mixture of *Svabhāva* and *Yadṛcchā-vādas*. Here probably we find the basis for the distinction which Jayanta makes between the 'cultured' (*su-śikṣita*) and the vulgar (*dhūrta*) Cārvāka. See *Cārvāka Nyāyamañjari*, pp. 64 and 467.

with *Adṛṣṭa-vāda* already referred to. The *Mahābhārata* in one of its sections¹⁷ ascribes to this school belief only in Perception and Inference, based upon it; and describes it as not accepting anything, that is the result of more speculation. Later in the same chapter¹⁸ *agama* is compared to the *mahut* that entraps elephants and explicitly condemns it as decoying the unwary. In this strict limitation of the sources of knowledge consists the contrast of *Svabhāva-vāda* with the supernaturalism of the Mantras and Brāhmanas on the one hand, and, on the other, with the metaphysical view of the Upaniṣads. In it also consists its general resemblance to modern thought. In fact it is this doctrine and other Indian systems, so far as they involve it, that may appear to deserve the name of 'philosophy' in the modern sense of the term. It refuses absolutely to shelter itself behind any dogma and rejects every form of mysticism. This positivistic character of the teaching—its 'mundane metaphysics'—seems to have been the original significance of the term *lokāyata*¹⁹ ('restricted to the *experienced* world') more generally applied to it in later literature. Its refusal to believe in a Hereafter, is what is meant by the term *nāstika*²⁰ sometimes used by the orthodox in speaking of its followers.

If we understand *svabhāva* to mean, as we have said, the unique power or property of an object or a group of objects, the doctrine implies, unless we regard everything to be distinct from everything else, the classifiability of the things in the world according to the resemblance which they bear to one another. But the classification, we must assume, is such as will leave diversity in the end as the characteristic of the universe. If the view were monistic, there would be no point in describing

¹⁷ XII, 218, 23 and 27. *Kṛtānta* in the latter stanza, according to the commentator, Nilakaṇṭha, stands for Inference. It seems to be the same as *dṛṣṭānta* and suggests Inference in its older form of analogical reasoning and not the later syllogistic one.

¹⁸ Sk. 45.

¹⁹ Max Müller suggests 'prevalent in the world' or 'world-wide' as the meaning. See 'Six Systems,' pp. 98-9.

²⁰ See, e.g., *Mbh.*, XII, 216, 28.

the nature of a thing as *svabhāva* where the term *sva*, with its meaning of 'one's own,' implies contrast with 'the other.'²¹ The necessary presupposition of *Svabhāva-vāda* is thus dualism, if not pluralism, and to find this conclusion supported by old references to the doctrine. The *Svabhāva-vāda* is sometimes ascribed to *bhūta-cintakas*²² or 'such as believe in the ultimacy of the elements.' It means that the *Srābhava-vādin* stopped in his analysis of the world at the 'elements.' As regards the number of the 'elements' he postulated, nothing can be definitely stated. The evidence of the later Lokāyata system points to four; that of the Mahābhārata to five.²³ But, on account of the modifications which both these accounts have undoubtedly undergone, they cannot be taken to give us the exact truth about the earliest stage of *Srābhava-vāda* in this respect. We know²⁴ that in the history of ancient Indian thought three stages of growth are noticeable in regard to this point; first, when only one element was known; then, three; and last, five. It looks probable that the *Srābhava-vāda*, which is very old, originally believed in only three elements mentioned, for instance, in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VII. ii) earth, water and fire which are directly experienced unlike the remaining two. Since the course of thought in this early period is not clearly known, it is difficult to say which of these is indebted in this matter. In the absence of any clear evidence to the contrary, we must presume the Upaniṣadic account²⁵ to have been the original.

²¹ Compare Vardhamāna's statement referred to in note 15.

²² *Mbh.*, XII, 232, 19. The *Śvet. Up.* however distinguishes between the two (i, 2).

²³ See XII, 234, 17; 275, 4-14; 288, 36.

²⁴ Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 190 ff.

²⁵ There is one circumstance, however, in the Upaniṣadic account which suggests the contrary view. There the original source of the universe, *viz.*, *Sat* first differentiates itself into the three elements which re-combine according to what is described as *tri-ṣṭi-karana*. The need for such combination is not clear since, as derived from *Sat*, they all must be essentially the same in their constituents, and repeat the complex character of their source, *viz.*, *Sat*, however much they may differ in the proportion of the various elements in them. This shows that the doctrine of the *bhūtas*, conceived as *distinct* entities, may be alien to the Upaniṣad and that its intercalation necessitated this apparently artificial explanation.

The *Svabhāva-vāda* denied the existence of a transmigrating soul and may therefore be contrasted with what is described as *Adhyātma-vāda* which took for granted an immortal soul. 'When experience clearly shows that all that constitutes a living being perishes, it is hard to believe in anything beyond, on the basis merely of traditional teaching.'²⁶ In fact that denial of such transcendental entities, is, as we have seen, the very aim of this doctrine. According to the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*²⁷ it is this controversy of a surviving soul that sets Naciketas seriously thinking. But there appears to have been no disinclination on the part of the *svabhāva-vādin*²⁸ to admit 'personality' lasting as long as life does, understanding by 'personality' a certain unity of the differences characterising a person. This is a very important admission inasmuch as the unity admitted enables the school to explain satisfactorily psychical phenomena like memory and to find scope for self-discipline according to an ideal.²⁹ This personality, however, was not there previously to birth; nor was it believed to endure after death. It was something that emerged when a certain stage of complexity was reached in the concatenation of the elements constituting the animal body. Here we see a complete departure from both animism which believes the soul to be a mysterious something which enters the physical body at birth and quits it at death; and from the refined philosophical systems which replace it by a sublimated or superphenomenal self.

(ii) *Practical Teaching.*

Freedom of thought, in the case of *Svabhāva-vāda* does not mean license in conduct; and the chief characteristic of its

²⁶ *Mbh.*, XII, 218, 23.

²⁷ I, 20.

²⁸ See *Mbh.*, XII, 224, 7. There is an allusion to a view like this in Vedānta-Deśika's *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 175 (Benares Edn.).

²⁹ Compare, *Kusumāñjali*, I, 15. See also *Nyāya-manjari*, p. 467.

practical teaching is the stoic severity of the discipline it imposes. Its aim is ascetic³⁰ and in this it stands pre-eminent among all the old schools of Indian thought. Asceticism certainly was not unknown to orthodox faiths. But, as Dr. Winternitz has observed,³¹ that ideal is 'only from the point of view of the *āśrama* theory, according to which the Aryan has first to pass the stage of *Brahmacārin*, the student of the Veda and of the householder (*gṛhastha*) who founds a family, offers sacrifices and honours the Brahmins, before he is allowed to retire from this world as an hermit or an ascetic? Quite different is the asceticism of the *svabhāva-vāda* which means renunciation once and for all. 'Detachment is fearlessness and peace; attachment, certain ruin.'³² Though advocating asceticism in this extreme form, the ideal is as far removed from cynicism as it is from hedonism. It may perhaps be described as rational pessimism.³³ The spirit underlying it is very well illustrated by the account of sage Ajagara who realising how the course of events cannot be altered resigns himself entirely to it. Unable to change nature, he submits to it willingly, if not joyfully. Pleasure is not shunned by him, nor pain courted. He takes either as it comes, without being elated by the one or upset by the other. What is condemned in unmistakable terms is all *craving* for the attainment of pleasure and for the avoidance of pain.³⁴ Pain and pleasure are regarded as incidental to life which the wise man will regard with indifference. Thus the doctrine, though it is essentially different from the orthodox creeds, yields to none of them in its insistence upon purity of character. But character by itself will not suffice and needs to be supplemented by *jñāna*, i. e., wisdom or

³⁰ See, e. g., *Mbh.*, XII, 179, 32 ; 222, 8.

³¹ Cf. 'Ascetic Literature in Ancient India.' *Calcutta Review*, Oct., 1923, p. 8.

³² *Mbh.*, XII, 288, 13,

³³ *Mbh.*, XII, 179.

³⁴ See, e. g., *Mbh.*, 179, 28, 288, 6.

enlightenment³⁵ such as can dispel the "general delusion (*moha*) that there is permanent a soul and that in its interests we can modify the nature of things."³⁶ It is this *moha* that is the source of all selfish desire (*tṛṣṇā*). What is recommended here is an adjustment of the mind to its circumstances and not the reverse process of changing them to suit our needs—an attempt which, according to the *Svabhāva-vāda*, is bound to end in failure sooner or later. If such wisdom is combined with ascetic discipline, man can rise above the troubles of life and attain the goal of peace.³⁷ But the *Svabhāva-vādin* did not believe that he could *wholly* escape from evil and never strove for either permanent or unmixed happiness. Whatever evil there must be, will be ; but he that has had the necessary training will be able to endure it with fortitude.

A necessary corollary to this positivistic teaching is the ideal of *jīvan-mukti* or freedom while one is still alive. The conception of Mokṣa as a condition to be attained after death is incompatible with this doctrine and whatever the ideal be, it has necessarily to be achieved here on this side of death.³⁸ *Videha-mukti* which represents the orthodox ideal, as its name signifies, is supposed to occur after dissociation from the physical body takes place. But this doctrine, which did not look forward to a life hereafter, naturally tried to put the present life to the best use and advocated the perfection of character within its limits. It is true that some orthodox system, like the *Advaita* of Saṅkara and the *Sāṅkhya*, recognise *jīvan-mukti*, but yet it looks as if the conception originated in *Svabhāva-vāda* or some similar school of thought with whose view-point it so well agrees.³⁹ The summary way in which for instance

³⁵ Compare *Mbh.*, XII, 222, 35.

³⁶ See *Mbh.*, XII, 224, 8-11.

³⁷ See *Mbh.*, XII, 222, 25, 224, 11.

³⁸ This is the significance of *mokṣa* being described as a condition predominantly of *antya* and not as one transcending it also. See *Mbh.*, XII, 224, 10-12; 228, 25.

³⁹ This ideal is as old as the Upaniṣads (see, e. g., *Kaṭha.* : Up., V (1) VI (14), but we know that the *Svabhāva-vāda* is equally old.

Āpastamba, a recognised exponent of orthodox tradition, dismisses it, suggests its heterodox origin.⁴⁰ Here then is another important point in which the doctrine breaks away completely from the supernatural teaching of the Veda, and the *svabhāva-vādin*, like Socrates, it may be said, brought philosophy down from heaven to dwell among men. In a series of verses in the Dialogue between Sagara and Ariṣṭanemi ending with the burden 'He indeed is free,' (*mukta eva saḥ*) the *Mahābhārata*⁴¹ proclaims an attitude of passionless serenity, attainable in this life, as itself *mokṣa*. The transference of the ideal to the sphere of this life does not minimise its importance; rather it emphasises it since the ideal thereby becomes something verifiable under empirical conditions.

⁴⁰ *Dharma-Sūtra*, II. XXI, 14-16.

⁴¹ *Mbh.*, XII, 288.

A NOTE ON THE CONCEPT OF INSTINCT

BY

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The concept of instinct has been a topic of great interest to psychologists during the last few years. On one side it has been viewed as a psycho-physical function of an exceedingly complex character. It has been invested with a varied array of psychic correlates such as perceptions, emotions, meanings, intelligence and impulses—to say nothing of certain other accompaniments of uncertain filiation such as ‘urges’ and ‘drives.’ It has been assumed to transform itself from an overt physical act into a sublimated sentiment or idea ; it has been supposed to play its part in the nether region of the unconscious as well as in the field of consciousness. Instinct, in short has appeared as an agency of indefinite potentiality and as a concept of uncertain connotation in the recent view of mental life. On the other side, many have asked whether it is necessary to retain notion of instinct as a distinctive psycho-physical function or as a significant concept. The analysis and discussions have not yet reached a stage when any agreement or conciliation of the discordant ideas seems possible.

The need of a more precise determination of the significance of the term, however, is felt by all students of Psychology. The lines of enquiry pursued at the present time fall into six different groups. (1) In the first place, there is an attempt to describe what may be called the phenomenology of instinct. We have the description of instincts as activities common to all members of the species, as unlearned and relatively invariable modes of re-actions, as ‘all or none’ responses, as distinguishable into ‘preparatory’ and ‘consummatory,’ ‘overt’ and ‘inci-

piet ' phases. The traditional description of naturalists, some of the behaviourist analysis and the studies of Rivers may be subsumed under this class. (2) Secondly, there is an effort to classify instincts either on the basis of the consummation reached by each mode of activity or in terms of phenomenal characteristics. The contributions of MacDougall and Marshall as also some of the studies of Mental Pathologists may be included in this category. (3) The third type of research is directed towards defining the relation of instincts to mental life in general. Such views as those of Psycho-analysts or of those who maintain a more general form of the Hormic theory of mental phenomena belong to this class. (4) The fourth line of enquiry is concerned with the definition of the character of stimulation in the case of instinctive activity. The behaviourists attempt to encompass all psycho-physical functions under the stimulus-Response pattern, the Gestaltic analysis of stimuli as patterns as also the views of those who claim a psychic or central antecedent of some sort, like perception, all illustrate this standpoint. (5) The fifth class of studies of which there are unfortunately very few are concerned with the determination of the neural correlates of instinctive acts. Many of the older studies of decerebrated animals like those of Goltz and Foster as also some of Sherrington's studies, the analysis of responses of decerebrated frogs are directed to this end. The theory of Rivers about the thalamic centre, on the basis of which he proposes to call instincts " protopathic responses " is also an instance in point. (6) The sixth question which psychologists have been trying to solve is that of the factor which integrates the complex movements and intraorganic adjustments into a unitary whole to which the name ' instinct ' is usually given. Stout's conception of meaning as an antecedent to instinct, the Gestalt view of impulse and Bergson's *élan vital* as also the *entelechy* of Neo-vitalism supply the psychic principle of integration. The heredity and facilitation of neural paths through practice are some of the ways of physical explanation.

of integration. A conception of instinct in order that it may prove fruitful in Psychology must base itself upon the various orders of facts brought home to us through these channels of investigation.

The idea of instinct which I propose to suggest in this paper is that instinct is a series of responses, synchronous and successive, invariably conditioned by a hypertrophic condition of the internal organs, visceral, digestive, reproductive, etc.

I begin with MacDougall's view of instinct. He maintains that emotion is the only component of instinct which does not change ; both perception with which instinctive movements vary according to circumstances. Emotions, however, we may concede whether we accept the James-Lange theory or not, are accompanied by an over-functioning of the internal organs. Whether the complex psychic phenomena which MacDougall attributes to instincts, may exist in all cases of instinctive activity is a matter of considerable doubt if we consider the sub-human scales of life. It may not, however, be difficult to believe in relatively intensive activity of the internal organs as correlates of instinctive movements.

The cases of anxiety nemosis are marked by intensive organic sensations and therefore by a hypertrophic condition of the internal organs. Since these pathologic conditions are said to be induced by certain persistent instinctive tendencies, the organic condition may be regarded as the accompaniment of the instinct. In other types of mental disorders, too, in which the causative factor is said to be a persistent instinctive urge, there is a marked persistence of organic hypertrophy.

Again, certain instinctive responses are easily aroused when some of the internal organs are in a state of hypertrophy due to disease. Aggressive behaviour, for instance the tendency to hit others, among children is said to be more frequent when they suffer from digestive troubles. Some kind of digestive trouble in adults is said to induce a frequent sexual propensity.

Fourthly, instincts and emotions have been regarded as being in some way equivalent. James regarded the two as phases of the same complex process. Instinct, he said, is a way of acting on a situation as emotion is a way of feeling it. It is a matter of common observation that no hard and fast line of demarcation can be drawn between, say, fear and flight or between "tender emotions" (in MacDougall's sense) and the act of coddling. Applying the principle of our first argument we may say that organic sensations being correlates of emotions must be conceived as bearing a definite relation to instincts. This hypothesis is further borne out by certain cases of mental disorders in which an instinctive tendency may manifest itself as an overt action, as an emotional experience or as a disturbed function of some of the internal organs.

Lastly, in normal cases, the activities which are agreed by all to be instinctive such as aggression, sex-proclivities and flight are accompanied by increased functioning of a number of internal organs.

It is reasonable then to conclude that hypertrophic state of the internal organs, of the digestive, reproductive, respiratory and other systems, is an accompaniment of the motor-processes known as instinctive. We shall next pass on to consider how this hypertrophic function can be said to be a condition of the motor processes called instinctive activities. I suggest that the afferent impulses set up by the stimulation of these organs distribute themselves along the appropriate spinal centres; by incindiation, by following a common path and by the inhibition phenomena exhibited in the case of reflexes, a series of motor processes is maintained as long as the hypertrophic condition persists. If the normal motor outlet is inhibited, the impulses follow a more circuitous route through the higher centres and consciousness appears. This is what, I suggest, happens in the case of the phenomena related to the inhibition of instinctive activities. Emotion and experiences, then, would appear when a new motor-channel has to be opened up or the old ones blocked.

Gradually, the conscious states would disappear, as paths are established or restored leaving the internal organs to supply the afferent impulses. Again, Parsons suggests that when a large number of impulses afferent and efferent have to be co-ordinated, consciousness of various orders appears as the synthetising factor. We may at least admit that consciousness appears in such cases whether we accept its synthetic function or not. This would account for the fact that the conflict of instinctive acts is attended with emotional experiences and ideational processes of considerable complexity. Their function seems to be to initiate a large variety of incipient motor states so that a number of channels might be found for the final outlet of impulses.

We may then say that when the internal organs function together and in excess of their normal tenor of activity, they serve to open up a series of motor channels. The activities that ensue result from the synchronous, alternating or successive working of these channels as long as the afferent conditions persist. The internal organs keep one another in a stimulated condition. Hence the motor process runs a definite temporal course. When the afferent impulses take the longer route through the centres, the same situation prevails.

This conception of instinctive activity is not new. It has been maintained in more or less elaborate form by many. There are certain special advantages of the hypothesis.

(1) In the first place, it enables us to explain the instinctive acts of sub-human organisms without attributing emotions or perceptions. The working of the organs determines the movements. So long as the internal organs and muscular system are similar, the reactions would be similar.

(2) Secondly, it enables us to account for the responses of decerebrated organisms. Even spinal frogs exhibit the phenomenon of sexual clash. This can happen because the internal organs are left to work.

(3) Thirdly, it enables us to explain some of the symptoms in anxiety neurosis and hysteria. These organic functions may

appear purely as physical symptoms such as digestive troubles, arrhythmia of the heart, etc. This would be so, if we were to conceive a direct relation between the motor processes and organic functions without the mediation of consciousness.

(4) Finally, the question of integration of the movements may not appear so difficult. For, we know that a number of internal organs function together especially when they are stimulated to a high degree of intensity. They also persist in a stimulated condition. Hence, a durable flow of afferent impulses is ensured which in turn sustain the motor states.

The conditions for the stimulation of the internal organs may be varied in character. They may originate from psychic sources, they may arise from the chemical changes or they may arise from previous excitation. They may also be due to the character of the make-up of the body. There is no need for assuming a particular source of stimulation. This view would be in keeping with the fact that some instinctive activities are present in delusional states when no external stimulus can be discovered. Heredity, training, disease, as well as external stimuli may all be ranged as conditions of organic functions.

PROF. STOUT'S THEORY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

BY

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In this paper I propose to examine critically Prof. Stout's theory of the nature and status of *sensa* and of their relation to physical objects. By *sensa* we shall understand such things as colours, sounds, smells, shapes, sizes, etc., which we perceive in sensations proper in our waking life. Along with other realists Stout rejects the view that they are mental. "In the antithesis of matter and mind they fall on the side of matter and not of mind" (Prof. Alexander's *Theory of Sense-Perception*, *Mind*, Oct., 1922). They are objects presented to our consciousness and are not similar to affective states, desires, volitions, etc. Starting with this fundamental premise he then proceeds to determine more precisely the nature of *sensa* and their relation to physical objects.

Ordinarily we believe that the sensory qualities which we perceive by means of our senses are the actual features or characteristics of physical objects which are supposed to endure, change and inter-act independently of any relation to sentient beings. We believe that the *sensa* which we directly experience are integral parts of these physical objects and share their unperceived existence. Common sense assumes that we know the existence of such objects and know them to be independent for their existence of any processes that take place in our minds or organisms. Stout sides with common sense in this respect. He, however, rejects the common-sense view that *sensa* are existentially identical with these physical objects. There are

certain facts of our experience which go to show that *sensa* have an existence and history separate from the existence and history of physical objects. The *sensa* are material and thus homogeneous in nature with such objects but are not simply identical with them.

First, there is the familiar fact of what is known as the relativity of *sensa*. We find that the sensory qualities of what we consider to be the same object vary concomitantly with variations in the interrelations between percipients and those objects and in the processes occurring in the organisms of percipients. *Sensa* vary only when there are corresponding variations in the relevant bodily conditions. Processes which take place outside the organism of a percipient do not make any difference to *sensa* unless and so far as they affect his sense-organs and his nervous system. The diminishing size of a plate from which an observer is gradually receding corresponds directly to the diminishing size of the retinal image and changes may take place in the plate without affecting the percipient's organism in any way and without therefore making any difference to the *sensa* which are perceived. It would be simply impossible for *sensa* to vary in the manner in which they are found to vary if they were identical with the same portion of the independent physical object to which they are referred and which is perceived by an observer under different conditions. Secondly, we may take into account what may be called the spatio-temporal dislocation of physical objects or events and the sensory contents which are ascribed to them. When we hear the report of a gun several seconds after seeing the flash it is sensibly brought home to us that the sound heard and the event to which it is referred exist at two separate instants, that the former is present when the latter is no longer in existence and that consequently these two, *viz.*, the firing of the gun and the sound actually heard have no element of identity between them. Similarly, when we press one of our eye-balls we see the duplicated image of an object in a different place and this

image cannot be existentially identical with the object itself. Finally, *sensa* which appear in sensations proper are found to be qualitatively similar to the contents which appear in dreams, hallucinations, etc., and which cannot be regarded as identical with physical objects. So the *sensa* which appear in sensations proper may very well resemble them in this respect also.

Stout contends that the only implication of such facts is that *sensa* are different from physical objects. But these very facts can be construed, as they have actually been construed by Alexander and other thinkers in an altogether different way. It has been held that all the varying appearances of an object are identical with it and independent of the act of perception. It is admitted that *sensa* vary along with variations in the processes occurring inside the percipient's organism but it is contended that the function of such processes is the selection of certain features of the actual physical world and not the generation of *sensa* different from physical things. If, however, all the varying *sensa* which are ascribed to the same object were identical with it, it has to be shown how they can be housed in the object at one and the same time. It has to be shown, for example, that the elliptical shape of a plate which appears to us under certain conditions is as much a real characteristic of the plate in question as the circular shape which appears under a different set of conditions, or that the bent shape of a stick half immersed in water can be identified with a real feature of some independently existing physical object or a combination of such objects.

Stout is of opinion that this cannot be done. He subjects Alexander's theory of perception to a critical examination and seeks to show that Alexander has failed to make good his case for a selective theory. When we look at a circular plate obliquely it looks elliptical. This elliptical shape, however, cannot be identified with any particular portion of the circular shape which is supposed to approximate more or less to the real shape of the

plate. All the parts which appear in the circular sensum appear also in the elliptical sensum but in different forms. It will not be correct to say, in other words, that some parts of the surface of the plate have vanished while others remain. Similarly, the appearance of a bent line presented by a stick half immersed in water cannot be identified with any part of an object which is bent independently of the perceiving eye, that is to say, which appears bent not only to the eye but to touch also and therefore it cannot be simply selected by the percipient.

The sensible appearances of objects often contain an element of distortion which cannot be explained away by identifying those appearances with portions of objects to which they are referred. Sensa cannot be reinstated in the physical objects exactly in the forms in which they are presented to us. Stout is therefore of opinion that the nature of the relation between sensa and physical objects can be understood only if we recognise the existence of a distorting medium in the percipient's nervous system. The characteristics and relations of the varying sensa point to the single conclusion that their nature and existence directly depend upon certain organic processes whatever factors may be concerned in producing them and that they have no existence in the absence of sentient organism. They cannot be actual portions or features of independent physical objects.

But if sensa are different from physical objects, how can we know the existence of such objects at all? To this question Stout replies that though it is only the sensa of which we have immediate experience yet our immediate knowledge is not confined to them. We immediately know more than what we immediately experience. It is wrong to assume that in sense-knowledge all that we know primarily and immediately is what from time to time we immediately experience as a sensum. Sensa are apprehended as essentially incomplete and they inevitably lead us to a consciousness of what is required to complete them. This fragmentariness of sensa points to entities which are different from them and yet necessary to complete them.

The *sensa* are apprehended as "continued into a whole which transcends them" (*ibid*, p. 394) and yet which is not directly experienced. Inasmuch as the world of physical objects is immediately known as a continuation of the world of *sensa* it must be apprehended as homogeneous with the latter in respect of certain general features without which such continuity is impossible. Thus the physical objects to which *sensa* are referred, though different from *sensa*, have certain general characteristics common with them and this is what is meant by saying that they are both material in nature.

How are we to estimate such a theory as this? Has Stout given us a satisfactory account of the nature and status of *sensa* and their relation to physical objects? The first question that we may consider in this connection is whether he has correctly read the true significance of immediate experience. According to his analysis, when we immediately experience a red patch we are also immediately aware of an object homogeneous with the red patch in respect of certain features. The experience of the red patch by itself would be incomplete and fragmentary and would require to be supplemented by the knowledge of the object. Now, we may grant the fragmentary character of the red *sensum* but it does not necessarily follow that the something else which is required to supplement it is apprehended as an existent which is different from all *sensa* and which never does nor can enter our sense-experience. It is quite possible that this 'something else' may be another *sensum*. As a matter of fact we find that the object to which a *sensum* is referred is always apprehended in terms of other *sensa*. The visual *sensum* corresponding to the surface of a coin is apprehended as being of a piece with a solid object, *viz.*, the coin, but the coin is not known as different in nature from the *sensum* itself. The surface is known to have another side similar to it and also as one of many sections similar in nature and placed one after another. Whatever other reasons there may be for maintaining that a *sensum* points to existence of an object different from it and giving rise to it we

cannot maintain that we are aware of such an object in immediate experience. What we are aware of are other *sensa* essentially similar to the one which is immediately presented to us.

Granting that we are immediately aware of the existence of physical objects as different from the *sensa* which are given to us in immediate experience the next question arises as to whether it is possible to determine definitely and positively the nature of the external objects as distinguished from that of the *sensa* which depend for their existence on certain processes in our organisms. Stout answers the question in the affirmative. According to him "we determine the independent nature of objects external to the sense-organs, not directly by their relation to our sense-experience but by certain relations which they have to each other, relations of such a kind that they do not vary with the bodily conditions of perception" (*ibid*, p. 397). It is possible to rule out of account such variations in the objects of perception which are directly dependent on variations in our physiological conditions and to determine independently of them, say, the real size or shape of an object or real variations in the physical world.

An examination of the examples cited by Stout, however, goes to indicate that he has not been able to show how this can be done. Causal processes, he says, take place independently of the bodily conditions of perception. If I turn on the tap in the bath-room, water flows and the bath begins to fill. The flowing of water is apprehended as being causally determined by the turning of the tap and therefore the sequence of these two events is apprehended as a fact which is not dependent on bodily conditions. The relation between such successive events is a relation not merely between *sensa* but between physical objects as such. Variations in the external world which depend on such causal processes are therefore variations in the physical objects themselves and we can know them to be such. But it has to be noticed that *ex hypothesi* the tap

as observed is a collection of *sensa* and the flow of water a stream or succession of *sensa*, all of which depend for their existence on certain processes occurring in my body. The question is whether the physical events corresponding to these sensory events are related exactly in the same manner in which the latter are related. We can give no definite answer to this question in the absence of the possibility of directly comparing such relations with each other. Granting the initial assumption all that we are justified in asserting is that there are certain relations between physical facts which give rise to certain changes in the world of *sensa* independently of any special physiological processes in the percipient's organism but not that these relations exactly resemble the relations between *sensa* of which we have direct experience. An object which is receding from me diminishes in size. There is a change in the object no doubt but it differs essentially in nature from the change in the *sensum*. Similarly, there may be certain variations in the physical world corresponding to the causal succession of *sensa* but there is no positive ground for maintaining that these two variations are exactly the same.

It is also difficult to see how we can positively fix the extensive magnitude of external objects with the help of measurement by superposition as suggested by Stout. It is true that when the palm of one of my hands rests on a portion of the table I get a positive and definite idea of the magnitude of that portion as independent of the vicissitudes of my sense-experience and its bodily conditions. Other *sensa* may come and go, processes in my body may change one after another but the magnitude of that portion of the table as known in terms of the magnitude of my hand remains constant. But can I thus really determine the magnitudes of two physical objects in relation to each other? The part of the table and the hand, the magnitudes of which I am comparing, are nothing but sensible appearances. As revealed to touch the table is a mass of cutaneous *sensa* and the hand a mass of organic *sensa*. As

revealed to sight the hand and the part of the table covered are visual *sensa* only the boundary lines of which are visible. Thus in this case also all that we are justified in asserting is that the magnitude revealed is that of a *sensum* which is indeed independent of special bodily conditions but not that it exactly coincides with the magnitude of a physical object.

If *sensa* are described as material and at the same time existentially different from physical objects and if they are regarded as directly dependent on certain physiological processes this can only mean that they have to be looked upon as the terminal factors of a chain of material causes and effects whose succession is determined by physical laws. We have to conceive of colours, smells, sounds, etc., as mechanically generated out of processes or events which are wholly devoid of such sensory qualities. There may not be anything inherently impossible in such emergence of qualities as there is nothing inherently impossible in abiogenesis but a theory which avoids such a hypothesis is certainly to be preferred to one which is committed to it provided that other advantages of the theories are equal.

If, again, we strip an object of all *sensa* with which we clothe it, what seems to remain is empty space and we cannot conceive how empty space can act on our organisms and produce the *sensa* by its action. We have already seen that no characteristic of *sensa* can be predicated of physical objects not even motion or extensive magnitude. A generative theory is thus required to prove the possibility of the generation of *sensa*.

Any theory which separates the physical world from the world of *sensa* and regard the latter as mechanically generated out of the action of physical objects on sentient beings will meet the same fate as the older representationist theories. This cannot be avoided by describing *sensa* as material in character. The old problems which proved insoluble for representationists are bound to arise again and prove to be as insoluble as ever.

MIND IN EMERGENT EVOLUTION

BY

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The influence of the concept of Evolution on modern thought since Darwin cannot be overrated and has been controlling it almost with a magical charm for the simple reason that the last two generations of mankind are claiming to be more versed in 'Science' than in 'Philosophy.' Professor Dewey's monograph on 'The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy' (1910) among other things, laid the foundations of the naturalistic theory of man, reducing all human activities to be responses to stimuli. Experience being defined as just certain modes of the interaction of natural objects, of which the physical body is one, states of consciousness being replaced by sensori-motor co-ordinations of functions and habits, of adjustments and re-adjustments between the human animal and its environment.¹ But it is interesting to note that the immediate effect of Darwinism on Philosophy, and its subsequent development into behaviourism in Psychology, Instrumentalism, Naturalism and Realism in Philosophy² only tended to make philosophical outlook more naturalistic than evolutionary. "The conceptual apparatus of Darwin's theory of Evolution—accidental variations, struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, etc.,—has now been dropped, nor have post-Darwinian developments in biology, *e.g.*, the theories of Mendel and Weismann with all the detailed researches

¹ English and American Philosophy, p. 396.

² Philosophy To-day, pp. 1-2.

to which they have led or the rise of Neo-Lamarckianism exercised any marked influence on our evolutionary naturalists in Philosophy." ¹ Again the biological concepts of evolution being confined to the phenomena of life alone, the need of a more generalised formula was felt and found its response in the wider Cosmic Evolution of Spencer who showed that biological evolution was only one chapter in the whole story. Darwin was a biologist whereas Spencer was a philosopher and evolutionary philosophy owes much more to Spencer than to Darwin. And the combined effort of both Darwin and Spencer has been to transfigure the old Atomic materialism into what we now call Modern Materialism or Naturalism whose aim is to construe everything and every phenomenon physical or mental, in terms of natural laws. But the present-day evolutionists, however, loathe to accept the grandiosely futile formula of Spencer which involves many a lacuna or gap in its application to the Cosmic System as a whole and have hit upon the concepts, of 'Emergence' and 'Emergent Evolution' ² which exercise almost a magical charm with them. They are now thinking that Emergent Evolution gives us the most thorough-going history of the sequence of stages through which what Lloyd Morgan calls the "increasing richness in stuff and substance" of the universe has been attained; but so many thinkers of different schools are now converging towards the one common movement of modern thought of which 'Emergence' is the watchword, that it is not easy to give a simple statement of Emergent Evolution. It counts within its camp neo-realists, critical realists, biologists and even organicists; and no two of its exponents agree in respect of very fundamental points. Lloyd Morgan's scheme, for instance, seems to give *finished* pyramid of matter-life-mind, while Alexander provides ample scope for progression from space-time to Deity and perhaps beyond Deity, or his universe is still evolving, and

¹ Philosophy To-day, p. 2.

² Contemporary British Philosophy (First Series), p. 297.

the present is ever big with prospective novelties about to emerge. Sellars's interest seems to lie in his attempt to establish a thorough-going naturalistic theory of mind, though however he never comes to close quarters with the alleged processes of emergence of life and mind. Again Professor Strong's version differs from Lloyd Morgan's in that while the latter postulates that the physical which is real, has psychical correlate, the former starts with an assumption that the real nature of the physical is psychical. And Noble makes a noble venture to equate organic with inorganic causation, reducing teleology to be merely an abstract aspect of mechanistic results of greater stability, and thus unconsciously rehabilitates Spencerian scheme over which the doctrine of Emergent Evolution in any form claims superiority. And as Lloyd Morgan postulates Divine purpose as the guiding principle of evolution, so Noble postulates his mutilated teleology throughout nature, and curiously enough, he ignores more completely than Lloyd Morgan, the grades of experience which would have convinced anybody else of what teleology proper implies. Wheeler with his biological predilections make emergence to consist in "*a novelty of behaviour*" arising from the specific integration or organization of a number of elements, whether inorganic, organic or mental, which thereby constitute a whole, as distinguished from their mere sum or resultant.'

Without further detailing the emergent formulae of minor importance we may fairly be said to be in a position to evaluate the theory of Emergent Evolution as a cosmological hypothesis. The whole history of the theory shows that there has been going on a regular tug-of-war between the opposing tendencies of contemporary thought—the one scientific or naturalistic and the other metaphysical or philosophical; Professor Sellars may be said to have taken hold of the naturalistic end of the rope, the philosophical being gripped by Lloyd Morgan. And of all the accounts of Emergent Evolution, that of Lloyd Morgan, purged of its inconsistencies (and inconsistencies there are in all the

accounts) is admittedly the most acceptable, elaborate and authoritative, as it originates with one who combines in himself the qualities of a Scientist, a psychologist and a philosopher. We would therefore propose to concentrate upon the account of Emergent Evolution as given by Morgan, not of course in all its implications, but only in so far as it relates to mind. As it functions in the history of the cosmic process, it evolves its workings and determines the subsequent go of the process when it has once emerged and would supplement our estimate of the problem of mind in Emergent Evolution by reference to the cognate views of the contemporary evolutionists.

"In the old sense," says Lloyd Morgan, "evolution meant the unfolding of what is already in being, but enfolded. In that sense emergence is the coming into view of that which has hitherto been submerged—virtually there but hidden; latent and not as yet patent. Nowadays the word 'evolution' has supplanted the older word 'epigenesis' and means the coming into existence of something in some sense new; and this something new, in a specialised sense, is what Lewes labelled 'emergent,' as contrasted with 'resultant.' The emergent, he claimed, is unpredictable before its *defacto* epigenesis; the resultant is calculable before the event, on lines analogous to the so-called 'Parallelogram of forces.' On these terms emergent evolution is on the one hand through and through naturalistic; but on the other hand, it embodies a protest against a mechanical, or so called mechanistic, interpretation!" Elsewhere he lays down, "Emergent Evolution urges that the 'more' of any given stage, even the highest, involves the 'less' of the stages which are precedent to it and continue to exist with it. It does not interpret the higher in terms of the lower only, for that would imply denial of the emergence of those new modes of natural relatedness which characterise the higher and make it what it is." And it is too well known to repeat here the three-fold assumption or 'acknowledgment' he makes with what Alexander calls 'natural piety' as the necessary

postulate of his philosophy of Evolution, for according to him all constructive philosophy must have its acknowledgments or postulates to start with.

Morgan's story begins with a reality which is one, indivisibly one—a psychophysical whole from top to bottom—a matter—life—mind. While passing from matter to life and life to mind, we cross no gulf, but pass from one kind of acquaintance with this reality to the other. According to him there are no physical events, there are no integral systems of physical events, that are not also psychical events and integral psychical system. "There is one evolution in both attributes—distinguishable but nowise separable." And the whole process is guided by a relating and directive activity which manifests itself in evolution "under the conditions of space and time." It is needless here to point out that with Alexander mind emerges at a certain stage of purely physical complexity out of the originally evolving stuff of space-time, without anything of the psychical correlation postulated by Morgan. Now beginning from Morgan's starting-point of evolution one can see that there has been evolution by emergence in the physical realm which had some indefinite physical forerunner of matter distributed in systems of very simple organisation. The systems became more and more complex, protons and electrons combined themselves in varied systems to give rise to the various chemical elements like oxygen, hydrogen, sulphur, etc., and their resulting 'qualities' and 'properties' are emergents. Oxygen and hydrogen combined in certain proportions have rendered actual the potentialities of oxygen and hydrogen with the result that water has emerged exhibiting qualities and properties different from hydrogen and oxygen in their pure state. The *new kind of relatedness* is intrinsic to the system; the emergence of the new qualities and properties is independent of any new extrinsic relation. Similarly for the emergence of all other chemical compounds. When further we come up to the level of life we find that life emerged when some system of atoms chiefly,

C, H, O, N, perhaps with P and S, attained a new degree of complexity ; and the complex qualities—properties of assimilation, metabolism, growth, generation, regeneration, and the rest also attended it. And finally the new complications of living system rendered the emergence of sentience or forerunner of mind possible ; and with the further complications of sentience cognition emerged and we have what is called mind for the first time appearing on the scene. Then when those systems in which Mind has emerged, acquired greater and greater complexities, they exhibited higher forms of intellectual and moral qualities, and according to Alexander, the pre-eminent amongst these intellectual and moral systems will be the Deity who is yet to emerge.

The above in brief is the general story of the evolutionary process under the emergent scheme. The next question that naturally suggests itself is—what is that condition, what is that 'critical' turning-point in the advancing course of events that evokes emergence of new qualities and properties? Morgan's answer is that it is "the increasing complexity of stuff and richness in substance." He writes elsewhere, "Progressive advance in evolution is my theme." Now the whole question of emergent evolution hinges on what Morgan means by "Increasing complexity of stuff and richness in substance ?" What does he mean by "Progressive advance ?" Does it consist in greater complexity or increased efficiency? Apparently he means by it great complexity. Now 'greater complexity' or experience of new relatedness or increase in stuff and substance or whatever term he might have used, it can at least stand for that idea of epigenesis, which emergent evolution is out to dispel.

Further if "greater complexity" be the criterion of evolution it does not apply to the changes in the physical and chemical world. Given pressure, temperature and the rest of the collocation of conditions there seems to be no good reason to suppose that mere cooling and condensation of the earth's crust could have given us the complexity in the physical and chemi-

cal realm that we now have. Again the term greater complexity is a misnomer as applied to physical or inorganic evolution. If we accept the findings of the best of physicists of the present day, *e.g.*, Sir J. H. Jeans, we cannot but be convinced that the whole trend of the cosmic process is towards dissipation, annihilation and devolution and not towards evolution, or at least it is a change, but mere change is not evolution. Or, to put otherwise, the physical world thus illustrates immergence rather than emergence.

True evolution, then consists in the progressive organisation in respect of complexity and efficiency, complexity being subordinated to efficiency. And mere increase of complexity of organization, not accompanied by increase of efficiency, is mere monstrosity, devolution rather than evolution. And the main point of difference between organic evolution and physico-chemical change is that while the former is a process of cumulative change, each organic type having evolutionary history of its own which determines the increase in the structural complexity as the result of memory, the latter is without 'memory' and therefore cannot be called evolution, the term memory being used in the widest possible sense to mean a stability of organisation which enables it to survive change and to incorporate effects of change within itself—a stability which is utterly wanting in the physical nature.

But the problem with which we are most directly concerned is the emergence of mind, and the first step in that process is the emergence of *sentience*. Now we are told that sentience is purely anoetic, it is something in between matter and mind, without causal efficiency and therefore without any effect upon the chemical events of the brain from which it is alleged to have emerged. If so, then this emergence of Sentience contradicts the very principle of emergence which consists, we have seen, in the causal efficiency determining the subsequent go of the process, and as such simply rehabilitates Epiphenomenalism which it is the aim of emergent evolution to overcome. Again, the emer-

gence of Sentience the supposed first effulgence of mind, has never been tackled in close quarters either by the neo-realists of the school of Alexander, or by the critical realists of the school of Lloyd Morgan. Even granting the emergence of Sentience, we are, however, still far from the emergence of mind which must furnish an account of the three aspects of cognition, feeling and conation.

We next proceed therefore to estimate the accounts given by the emergentists of these three aspects of the mind. Cognition implies an objective reference. Now with regard to reference Morgan has given two alternative accounts in two works. In his "Emergent Evolution" Morgan tells us that the first inkling of mind is a passive Sentience in which there is no effective relatedness of causal efficiency but which is accompanied by a vague enjoyment, but later on with the complication of Sentience by revivals of formerly experienced sense-qualities, reference or cognition emerges and conscious guidance of behaviour begins and repetition makes it more and more conscious. In his later work "Life, Mind and Spirit" he however modifies his view of the emergence of reference and says that what emerges is not 'reference' as such, which is correlate with the physical, but a special kind of reference, called by him "Prospective reference" that introduces the conscious guidance of behaviour. But the crux of the question is what makes the reference prospective? What makes the emergence of the appreciation of temporal relations involved in prospective reference? To this we do not get any satisfactory answer from Morgan. This attempt on the part of Morgan to account for the genesis of cognition by the conjunction of sense-qualities is the rehabilitation of the old associationist view of perception modified by the principle of emergence or creative synthesis. The fact of the matter is that "if we are not quite gratuitously to place an impassable gap between the earlier and the later stages of mental development we must assume that reference or cognition cannot be legitimately regarded as evolved or as emergent out of some events or some functions that have

from beginning nothing of the nature of cognition." Further all intelligent perception involves appreciation not only of spatial and temporal relations but also of causal relations. But even here in his explanation of the causal relations he repeats the old story and says that it is the complication of sentience by alleged revival of sense-qualities that constitutes the essence of the process.

When we turn to Morgan's disposal of the problem of *conation* or of *impulse* we receive no better explanation than that it is purely a physical process, without reference whatsoever to what is called a *hormic* factor. But curiously enough he has nevertheless smuggled "planful activity" or "inner urge" into the process. What we expected from him is the account of the emergence of conation at a level of animal evolution, posterior to or higher than that of the emergence of reference, for reference is involved in conation. Without prior reference there is no impulse or conation and without conation or impulse no prospective reference, either spatial or temporal. The fact of the matter is that Morgan's account is mechanistic, and no hormic or teleological event can emerge from any combination of mechanistic events, just as no positive quantity can emerge from the summation of negative ones.

Not only the element of conation but also that of feeling, of which pleasure and pain are but the simple forms, receives no adequate explanation at his hands for their emergence. In "Creation by Evolution" he writes: "Enjoyment is concomitant with life, even so simple an animal as amoeba has something, however, rudimentary of the nature of enjoyment," and adds that with "the emergence of prospective reference there emerges also a fore-taste in enjoyment." But, as already intimated, we miss here any plausible explanation of the emergence of enjoyment, or differentiation of pleasure and pain from rudimentary enjoyment, except a hedonistic account of behaviour that all our activities are influenced by pleasure and pain.

We cannot conclude our consideration of the mind in relation to emergent evolution without referring to the rôle of mind in the evolutionary process. What we have gathered so far is that emergent scheme as applied to the physical realm, renders an account which amounts to devolution, annihilation or immergence, and as applied to the mental realm it has revealed that instead of explaining the evolution of mental capacities by way of the emergence of new relatedness, causal or otherwise, it has indirectly corroborated the supposition that mind everywhere at all levels is fundamentally teleological, cognitive, conative and affective, but differentiates its latent powers according to fundamental laws of its own that are teleological, and that there has been no emergence of the teleological from a mechanistic physical realm. Our next important query will, therefore, be, as it was with Morgan: "What makes emergents emerge?"—and this, it need hardly be told, is the fundamental question of the philosophy of Evolution.

To this question at least these different answers could be given, and I have chosen three distinct types of thinkers as representing the three lines of approach. I mean Sellars, Alexander, and Lloyd Morgan. Sellars in his "Evolutionary Naturalism" has given the straight and consistent answer that the whole process is through and through physical, the so-called psychical events being only the highly complicated physical events. Or to put it more definitely the psychical is an evolution from a purely physical and mechanical world that has nothing of the nature of mind, and the psychical, when it reaches the human level with the high complexity of human brain processes, it plays its part as conscious thinking and conation in the total complex of psycho-physical events. His scheme is conspicuous by the absence of the handling of many important problems like memory, heredity, etc., nor does it really come to close quarters with the alleged processes of emergence of life and mind. Alexander's scheme, it is needless to repeat, begins with space-time as the matrix of all, passes through life and mind,

which later is bound to develop into Deity. In it mind appears at a particular level but thenceforward instead of affecting causally the subsequent go of events remains as a mere onlooker compresent with the physical series. And the whole cosmogony of Alexander ignores the problem of the relation between teleology and mechanism which is the central problem for any scheme of emergent evolution that undertakes to account for the emergence of mind from the physical realm. But both Sellars and Alexander may be asked the question: Does not the logic underlying the principle of evolution urge us to seek for something antecedent to where their schemes start? Some teleological principle of the nature of mind which has not only given start to the process in that line in which it continues, but also immanently works through it. It is perhaps because of this logical necessity that Morgan has been led to think that the reality is one integral whole of the psychical and the physical combined, and that the go of events is directed throughout by the transcendent activity of God. But at the same time we wonder how he could not shake off altogether his ultra-scientific bias when he is found not prepared to allow any extra-natural element in the evolutionary process. The main source of trouble both with philosophers and scientists seems to be that they begin by treating mind as a mere spectator of events, and having done so, it becomes difficult for them to give it the more important position it deserves.

**SECTION OF ETHICS
AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.**

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

By

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FRIENDS AND FELLOW-DELEGATES,

My first duty before I occupy the Chair is to thank you for the honour you have done me by electing me the President of this section. A conference of this kind has its obvious advantages. It enables those who have adopted the vocation of teachers who are scattered all over the country and carry on their work under widely different conditions to meet together once every year and to compare notes in respect of some of the conclusions which they have reached as the result of mature and continued reflection. If there be substantial agreement—if we happen to discover that the same or a similar position has been reached by my fellow-teachers, by trains of reasoning or modes of experience not exactly identical in all cases, such consensus of opinion gives us a greater measure of encouragement and increased confidence in the fruitfulness of philosophical speculation. If, on the other hand, our conclusions prove divergent, this would only lead us to revise our premises, to subject our deduction or generalisation, as the case may be, to further scrutiny, so that by a more careful and impersonal examination we may detect the errors which might have unconsciously crept into and vitiated our conclusions. A conflict of opinions is always welcome to the disinterested searcher after truth. If

as Heraclitus says, strife is the father of all things, it is certainly the father of truth. The history of speculation has abundantly proved that truth, like the good, lies midway between opposite views. In order to discover and locate this midway position, the essential prerequisite is the formulation and accentuation of the two opposed and extreme views. As Aristotle says, you cannot straighten a bent stick, except by bending it in the opposite direction. Hence the sharper the conflict of views, the greater is the stimulus to fresh inquiry. A too ready acquiescence of views is fatal to the spirit of inquiry.

Besides the purely academic, such an assembly of teachers has a social and human side. If distance lends enchantment to the view, distance is also responsible for many crude and erroneous notions which can be dispelled only by personal contact. Behind the surface show of different languages and costumes, of different forms of culture and religion, it enables us to discover, recognise, and welcome our fellow brethren, inheritors of one universal culture achieved by the best spirits of the entire human race, and alike animated by common desire to add to the universal store of knowledge.

Our section is the Ethics and Sociology section. I would not attempt the rather dangerous task of forming an estimate of the relative importance of the different academic disciplines and of vindicating for Ethics and Sociology the highest place among them. Comparison is always odious. But it may be safely asserted that the inquiry into the principles of human action—the causes from which they spring and the ends towards which they tend—has a central place in any scheme of knowledge. There are various departments of theoretical inquiry, as also various departments of practical activity or avocation. But in every one of these, we are engaged in some sort of action—even philosophical reflection and meditation is a sort of action. To *live* is to *act* and the question inevitably arose—and it arose long before there was any systematic inquiry called Ethics—as to how to regulate the actions of the individuals of

a community so that they may not be frittered and dissipated in aimless, useless pursuits, or what is more serious, that they may not cancel and destroy each other. To impart some kind of uniformity and consistency to these aimless and irresponsible actions was the problem which confronted the primitive community, the problem which was essential to its very existence. And primitive society solved the problem by the creation of customs which imparted uniformity to the actions of the individuals, just as the creation of Language and Religion standardised in a rough way their ideas and sentiments. Later on, when the power of introspection was sufficiently developed, reflection upon these three, upon Custom, Language and Religion, gave rise to the three Sciences, *viz.*, Ethics, Grammar and Philology and Theology. Thus Ethics cannot be charged with having created Custom but systematic reflection upon Custom has created Ethics.

The three fundamental conceptions of Ethics are the Good, Duty and Virtue. Life has to be lived under certain objective conditions—the conditions or data supplied by our environment, physical and social. This objective factor is not the sole criterion of the end of action. That is the error of empirical—evolutionistic Ethics. There is also an inner factor, *viz.*, the potentialities of our nature—of our peculiar and essential *human* nature. These two factors, outer and inner, jointly determine the end or good of human life. This is the truth of teleological ethics—the truth which is not recognised by intuitional ethics, which by ignoring the objective ends of action, and by emphasising, in an abstract one-sided manner, the authority of the deliverances of a faculty called the Conscience, would, as Hegel rightly points out, disintegrate society into an aggregate of psychical atoms. If every individual be allowed to judge of the morality of an action according to the dictates of his own conscience, if every individual be conceded the right of private judgment, then any concerted action would be impossible, and the cohesion and stability of the community would be gone. The

organic structure would give way to the atomic, life would give way to death.

Hence the need of a teleological view of action. The several ends of action must be clearly formulated and these ends must be harmonised by arranging them into a hierarchy, leading to a supreme ultimate end, *i.e.*, to the conception of the Good. To realise the Good, successfully and skilfully to pursue this supreme principle of all actions, it is necessary to enact and enforce certain rules for the objective guidance of conduct—and these rules underlie the conception of Duty. But in order that duties might be performed, there must be within us an appropriate psychical apparatus or mechanism responding more or less faithfully and uniformly to the external call of Duty. These inner tendencies and dispositions of the mind—the moral habitudes—are styled the Virtues, mostly natural endowments, but capable of expansion, education and development. These three,—the Good, Duty and Virtue—sum up the whole Philosophy of action. And whether you treat these actions from the standpoint of the individual as Ethics does, or whether with Sociology we treat them collectively from the standpoint of the Community, there can be no question as to the importance of the place occupied by Ethics and Sociology among the sciences.

The conception of the Good is the very kernel of Ethical speculation. I should like therefore to dwell upon it for a moment. Speaking broadly it has been conceived as Perfection, as Preservation, as Pleasure. Pleasure is a most ambiguous term and may mean anything from animal gratification to the highest kind of spiritual satisfaction. But without some kind of pleasure action is impossible. Pleasure is the motive-force or steam which moves the machinery. Even actions from instinctive impulses, which are called the primary springs which originally move us to action and give us for the first time a taste of what is called pleasure—even these instinctive actions proceed from a vague sense of dissatisfaction and mechanically impel us towards certain ends which remove this painful feeling of want

and dissatisfaction. Even Kant admits that the performance of duty is the outcome of a feeling or sentiment, *viz.*, the feeling of reverence for the Moral Law. Nothing is good without qualification except a good will. But even a good will involves feeling as a constituent—in other words, a good will is necessarily qualified with a feeling. If you conceive Will as something separate from Feeling, you are confronted by the Kantian dualism of Duty and Inclination. This anti-thesis of Will and Feeling, of Duty and Inclination, is the result of an abstract and false psychology. Inclination is not invariably and necessarily opposed to Duty. The facts of life show the untenability of this assumption. Indeed the end of all education and training is to cultivate a set of habits which will readily incline the mind to Duty—to bring about an inclination *to* Duty. I do not wish to indulge in verbal quibbles. But it is a fact of moral experience, that when we act against inclination, we still act *from* inclination—we are only subordinating a *lower* inclination to a *higher* one. The psychological condition of all action is that you cannot perform an action unless you are already inclined to it. The proposition is so true that it almost amounts to a truism. The disinclined mind can no more give rise to an action than the perpendicular stick can cast forth a shadow when the sun is directly overhead. In the psychological world, Pleasure is the prime-mover which sets in motion the psychical apparatus which we call mind or the empirical consciousness. This is the element of truth in Hedonistic Ethics. But the recognition of this truth does not make one a Hedonist in practice. The value of Pleasure is fully recognised in non-Hedonistic systems of Ethics. Its importance was admitted by Aristotle, the author of the first systematic treatise on Ethics. Its value is also admitted in Idealistic and Evolutionistic Ethics—by Green and Spencer, by Paulsen and Wundt. In Evolutionistic Ethics, Pleasure and Preservation coincide ; in Idealistic Ethics, Pleasure is the index or concomitant of Perfection. Thus, however differently we might interpret the ultimate end or goal of action, there is no

serious dispute as to Pleasure being the efficient cause which impels us towards the goal. The martyr is most pleased or feels the highest pleasure—or shall we say, the deepest satisfaction—in sacrificing his life for truth. The ascetic is similarly pleased to renounce all pleasure. The gay Lothario is also pleased with life of pleasure. How can we solve this puzzle? Only by careful nomenclature and definition. Does Pleasure really mean enjoyment of immediate gratification? Epicurus, the real father of Hedonistic philosophy, answers the question with an emphatic negative. To *get* pleasure we must *forget* it. His own philosophy was not active pursuit of pleasure, but rather an absolute abandonment of this pursuit, so that the sage might enjoy the deep satisfaction and tranquillity of an unruffled, undisturbed mind. An undisturbed mind is like the calm surface of a lake which truly and faithfully reflects the images of the surrounding objects. Extremes often meet, and how does the Epicurean ideal ultimately differ from the ideal of contemplation of the stoic philosopher?

It is a pity that the connotation of Pleasure is narrowed down by popular usage to satisfaction of sense. This narrow, and wholly unjustifiable use of the term accounts for the repugnance which all high-souled men feel to the Hedonistic theory. John Stuart Mill tried to remove this repugnance by giving a higher conception of Pleasure. But he did not quite succeed in that he sought to erect Pleasure exclusively upon the foundation of sense—although the senses which counted with him were the higher senses. The pleasures of sense, even those of the higher senses are only pseudo-pleasures, counterfeits and imitations of the real genuine article. They do not please or satisfy human nature, for human nature is not exclusively sentient. Human nature is the life of Reason which has its roots deep down in the soil of sense. The soil is of undoubted importance, and unquestionably it has its rights. The sap of spiritual life is most certainly drawn from this soil. Deny its rights, and the spiritual plant with its fair blossoms and fruits withers away.

The Founder of Christianity fully recognised this truth, and gave His ungrudging sanction to the legitimate demands of the life of sense. The soil then is to be carefully watered and tended—which means that it is to be denuded of all weeds which draw away the nourishment, the whole of which should go to sustain the life of Reason for which it is intended. When the life of Sense has been effectively subordinated to the life of Reason, when the soul has been finally freed from the contradiction and strife within its own life which dissipates and corrodes away its energies, it is then free to devote itself without distraction to the development of its spiritual potentialities. And the consciousness of this activity of spiritual development or realisation without any observation from the underlying life of sense is what constitutes *real* pleasure—or if the word ‘pleasure’ offends you, call it ‘abiding satisfaction.’ Pleasure is, as Aristotle tells us, the consciousness of the unimpeded exercise of the powers of the Soul. Even the Hedonist has to admit that Reason has to control the life of Sense. The only difference between the Hedonistic and the Idealistic position is that according to the former, Sense is the master and Reason the servant who ministers to the wants of the Master, while according to the latter the relation is just the reverse. But surely human nature is not exclusively sentient. It is a travesty of human nature to describe Man as only a more developed animal. The discord between our animal and spiritual nature is a fact—a tremendous fact of our spiritual experience. This fact refuses to be brushed aside by the exigencies of a monistic philosophy. This discord is not a sort of tug-of-war between two forces of co-equal status. The controlling influence of Reason has to be recognised by the Hedonistic philosopher even though Reason controls as a slave. The discord is rather a struggle between a higher force which would ascend and a lower force which would pull it down—a struggle in which the higher force has already achieved success, and is bound to triumph eventually. A life of sense even when assisted by Reason,

would lead us nowhere—it would result in either chaos and confusion. The most consistent form of Hedonism is the philosophy of Nietzsche, just as the logical outcome of empiricism is the Skepticism of Hume. Other Hedonistic systems have been able to keep up appearances and to save disasters at the expense of self-consistency—by unconsciously and unwarrantably borrowing elements from non-Hedonistic systems. “Man does not live by bread alone.” The Soul—whether it is a hard self-identical spiritual atom as the old doctrine of substantiality explains it or whether it is an individual sum of actual psychical activities as the modern theory of actuality interprets it—the Soul is the distinctive feature of human existence. And we refuse to barter its rights for a life of animal enjoyment. “What shall it profit a man if he gains the whole world and loseth his own soul? What shall a man give in exchange for his soul?” The above is my conception of Good which is, as I have already told you, the very pith and marrow of all Ethical theory and of all Ethical practice.

Before I conclude I should beg your indulgence to allow me to refer to a thing which most intimately concerns us as teachers of the subject. We cannot exactly teach Philosophy, much less Ethical Philosophy, as we can teach other subjects. We can deliver lectures and dictate notes, and explain text-books, but this sort of theoretical teaching by itself would not have much influence on the moral development of our pupils. What really counts is the force of personal example. The life lived by Socrates has proved a more effective moral text-book than his ethical discourses. The Sermon on the Mount is of enduring ethical value. But what appeals most powerfully to the heart of humanity is the account of Christ's Temptation in the desert and of His Passion on the cross. The life of Jesus is a perfect poem, an artistic whole of exquisite beauty which has its *finale* in those words of His expressive of deep spiritual satisfaction and spiritual triumph—“It is finished.” Spinoza claims our homage not merely by his Philosophy which heralds the spirit of

Modern Europe but also, and much more, by the beauty and purity of his life. The same is true of Berkeley and Fichte. Our influence on our pupils is determined by what we really *are*, and not by what we profess to *teach*. The teacher may present flawless exterior to his pupils, but should there be any discrepancy between his public and his private life, his pupils are sure to discover it. Our neighbours have some gift of mysterious intuition which enables them to tear off the mask, and expose to view the hypocrisy and hollowness which lies concealed behind it. Although we may not know it, our actions are constantly observed, scrutinised, criticised, and in some cases, are, I fear, absolutely condemned by our pupils. This criticism and condemnation result in most cases from immaturity of youthful judgments. But where the condemnation is really deserved, there is created a breach, a loss of confidence, between the teacher and his pupils, and this breach may go on widening till the teacher loses all influence by which to mould the character of his pupils. The responsibility for living a pure and clean life, outer and inner, dominated by moral energy and enthusiasm, attaches in a special manner to those who have taken up the teaching of this subject. This responsibility has become all the greater now that a new kind of consciousness has dawned upon the student community all over India. They have become conscious of what is due to them, and have been organising themselves with a view to demanding what they think is their due. This movement is certainly to be welcomed if it means a development on their part of a fuller personality, and of an increased sense of personal dignity and responsibility. We cannot hope to influence them any longer by the mere exercise of traditional pedagogical authority. If we want faithfully to discharge the task voluntarily undertaken by us—the task of shaping and moulding the character of the youths entrusted to our care, it cannot be achieved solely by our success and popularity as teachers or by our reputation as scholars. These may extort from them a certain amount of confidence in our

skill as teachers, but nothing more. We should not be content till we have succeeded by our life and character in evoking in them the sentiment of genuine reverence, without which the *Guru* is a mere high-sounding name and not a real living force.

THE EXPEDIENT AND THE MORAL OUGHT

By

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Every moral action is the exponent of a stabilised character; it is the result of careful deliberation and rational choice; it is the free and responsible act of an intelligent individual who consciously pursues certain ends which are worthwhile in themselves; and in performing it the agent feels he is under an obligation; and this sense of obligation or duty may be taken to be the nerve-centre of the moral life.

Duty always means a constraint, a sort of forceful authority which impels one to a certain action; it is binding upon individual men and women; it is not a thing to be renounced or delegated to experts. Moral worth refers to conduct; and conduct requires knowledge and choice on the part of the agent; deliberation is really the attempt to justify to ourselves a given line of action; a man who can choose in this way is morally responsible. Now that which is morally right and that which a man ought to do are one and the same thing. So all moral judgments express an "ought;" and an 'ought' implies a norm which in the last resort reduces itself to the form of an End which all acts accounted as right seek to attain.

Thus a right action is that which is according to a code or standard. Man is by nature a bundle of wayward desires and chaotic impulses which tend to take the line of least resistance. Our mental life consists in part of desires more or less in conflict, needing organisation according to a principle of unity; these impulses and desires cannot be driven out;

but they may all be assigned to their legitimate places and harmoniously integrated so as to form a well-established character; and morality is the disciplining of human nature by which man is made genuinely social, rationally free and personally interested in realising worthy ends. So the ordering of our desires with a view to drawing out the best in us and the performance of those actions which directly conduce to the common good without interfering with the freedom and dignity of other persons become the chief functions of morality; and these right actions are pointed out to us by what are called the moral laws. These are not made out of nothing; they are simply the recognised customs, group-habits and revered conventions which in course of time become codified and hold sway over man's conduct.

But practical difficulties arise in actual life owing to a strict adherence to these moral laws. Laws conflict with laws; the practice of one virtue comes in collision with another. It is wrong to lie; but it is possible to imagine cases in which to tell the truth may seem to amount to treachery, nay almost to murder. It is right to obey the parents, to submit to the law of the land; but there are times when parents must be disobeyed and the law defied. Moral heroes have done all these things; and in doing them acquired undying fame. Duty to mother conflicts with duty to wife. Which duty is to be done? Now it is in such situations of moral perplexity that an attempt is made to draw a distinction between the right and the expedient. It is maintained that expediency is the only guide in practical life and that one ought to prefer the expedient to the right.

The mental attitude which gives rise to such a perplexity is not to be slighted; it only shows that there are worthy grounds of disobeying the moral law, *i.e.*, neglecting what is held to be right and preferring the expedient. As Browning says "when the fight begins within himself, a man is worth something." The man is really at war with himself; he is a

house divided in itself ; there is clash between his obedience to the established laws and his reverence to the system of values with which he has identified himself.

But let us look more deeply into the matter. What is the full implication of this attitude which causes the perplexity, viz., the feeling that it is more worthy to prefer the expedient to the right? In plain language it signifies that it is right to prefer the expedient to the right ; that is to say, the expedient is right and the right is not a right. But this *reductio ad absurdum* is really due to the confusion about the meaning of the term 'right.' There is clash between what is ordinarily considered to be duty and what is always genuinely duty ; and the question is, is it not our duty to break what are commonly recognised as moral laws? It is possible that life abounds in cases for which the generally recognised moral standards do not legislate, i.e., cases which cannot be settled by reference to the moral code. In such circumstances it is pointed out to us that we should follow the expedient. But in this line of thought there is gross misapprehension ; and the man who holds that he ought to prefer the expedient to the right is guilty of a logical absurdity. For if the expedient is what one ought to prefer, then the expedient is the right. But let us see what he means by the right and the expedient. Evidently he means by the 'right' something different from what it seems to him that he ought to prefer. Such a man probably understands that the 'right' is obedience to supposed moral laws. Though under such circumstances, the doubt in him is justified, yet we must realise that it is an unhappy and misleading angle from which to approach the subject.

Of course we do admit that in these cases of genuine perplexity there is sincere moral earnestness ; and in order to reach the heart of the moral situation, let us examine a concrete case. We have no doubt that the law of truthfulness is universally obligatory ; but what does its formulation—thou

shalt not lie or thou shalt tell the truth—mean ? Are they universally binding ? Is it possible for any one to adhere to the letter of these maxims ? Now duty or right is a term which strictly applies only to an action in its fulness. You cannot properly judge the rightness or the wrongness of a particular action apart from the aim or the intention which organically binds it together with the rest of a man's proposed procedure into a purposeful unity. If this is accepted, then just as the administration of a poisonous drug, although in itself injurious, may sometimes form a necessary part of the most healthful way of treating a disease—so lying, *i.e.*, deception, although injurious in its immediate object and hurtful in its tendency, may sometimes prove a necessary part of the right and obligatory way of meeting a situation. Occasionally in cases of unusual circumstances a course of action which involves as part of itself an effort to mislead by a direct lie may express a loyalty to the rights of personality which could not be expressed by any action free from deception. If so, is not that deception, regarded in its place as an organic part of the totality of the intended course of action, a right and dutiful way of behaving ?

Here we must strike a note of warning. It is not maintained that in certain circumstances a great right can outweigh a little wrong or the end will justify the means. Such courses of action are purely Machiavellian and savour of opportunism. Means and ends between them exhaust the act ; and the act is inconceivable apart from the character of the person and the position he occupies in society. The moral quality of an action requires that the means be good as well as the end which together form a single whole. A choice always demands a continuous selection of methods, times and means to the end decided upon, until the deed is accomplished. This selection reveals the character as much as the selection of ends. To choose means known to be evil so that a moral good may be accomplished is a contradiction ; for the deed is a living unity

of means and end and cannot be partly good and partly bad without destroying the moral worth of the act as a whole. The moral coupling of means with their end implies that the two form a single series; and it is plain that the very attempt to achieve an end by the employment of appropriate means should be judged according to the whole plan of it by any rational creature. It is not the end which justifies the means; the whole series must be justified.

Thus duty, *i.e.*, the morally right comes to us always in the concrete out of a complex situation. But usually there are many different roads to a desired result; and the sanction of freedom and deliberation is that by which we mentally weigh all the possibilities and select *that one* course of action which alone will be the genuinely right. Thus, strictly speaking, it is a mistake to use the term "duties" in the plural. For any person at any moment there is never more than one duty. What is obligatory at a certain moment under a certain situation is that concrete action which exhibits the inner loyalty of the man to his self-chosen Ideal. So there is no such thing as a real conflict of duties. Under every group of circumstances which constitutes the field of action there is but one act which is the good or the right. Thus the right or duty becomes purely individual and personal; it is such a living act that it can never be covered by any set of rules. In the performance of duty there is really no conflict at all; the conflict is only between rules, not duties.

This brings us to the real crux of the problem. Duty or the right always demands more than mere truth-speaking; and on rare occasions, it may also forbid truth-speaking. What is the explanation for this? The truth is that what is morally right or good can never be prescribed by any law or set of laws, because laws are abstractions and can never infallibly or adequately express the duty of man. Duty is such a living, growing thing that it is impossible to foresee all the different cases of action which may conceivably occur and provide in advance the exact rules for each case. As Bosanquet says, "though general advice

may help to put the elements of the situation before you, no mind but your own can strike the decisive balance of values and resources and appropriateness to your scheme of life. "

Thus no rigid standard as the Ten Commandments or the Codes of Manu can provide a measure for conduct. For conduct is action and its unit is a concrete act ; and the concrete is always unique and therefore incapable of being measured by any fixed code. Law implies repetition. But there can be no repetition in the moral sphere, for the subject is modified by his own act ; others feel its effects ; a duty done creates a new duty, and nothing is just the same after, as it was before the action. Personally we each feel that no one could have had just the crises to face that each of us had to meet. Individuality implies uniqueness. How then can there be a rule of action that more than one should follow ? Hence the anxious conformity to prescribed codes, besides magnifying the letter of the law at the expense of the spirit, tends to rob duty of its freedom and spontaneity, and puts the centre of moral gravity outside the concrete process of living.

Once we have grasped this, it becomes quite easy to get rid of the moral perplexity. Let us therefore reconstruct the meaning of the terms right and expedient. The right is always individual, unique and personal. It is a whole-hearted effort at expressing our loyalty to all that we count good ; and in this sense it includes expediency which we may define as the way in which we can most efficiently work for certain given ends ; *i. e.*, the expedient is any course of action which will under the circumstances best promote the ends we are seeking, whether they be worthy or not ; and the right is that course of action which will under the circumstances best promote the ends *we ought to seek*. Therefore, it is clear that the expedient need not be right ; but the right must be truly expedient.

But we are not still out of the wood. What, then, is to become of the established moral codes, and what ought to be our attitude to them ? Laws, social conventions and rules of manners are still with us and constitute the morality of

many of us most of the time and all of us for a good deal of the time. Without them the individual would be practically helpless in determining the right course of action in the various situations in which he finds himself. But we must realise their limited validity. Although morality has grown up amid custom, code and tradition, the moral life tends to become distinctive by calling them in question. In a sense the individual becomes confessedly moral by putting his conduct in relation to every custom to see if the social habit meets with rational approval. Of course they are all of them sources of instruction regarding conduct ; but we are bound to exercise discriminating intelligence, criticise and catch their spirit before they are accepted. But at the same time we must remember that moral action is a matter of reflection, fore-thought and settled preference for the right. Reflection is necessitated because of the incompatibility of alternatives and conflict of laws and customs, whereas the application of a ready-made law to an action or adherence to a custom does not need any reflection. At best the various maxims can only supply different points of view from which to judge and decide the right action. What we really need in morals is not *rules* which are dead, mechanical and inadequate but *light*. It is the illuminating principle and not the multitude of fixed codes and peremptory injunctions that is the informing spirit of all that is truly moral in human life. We must search for the principle which will express the spirit implicit in all moral codes. The function of the moral principle is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in particular situations. No genuine moral principle ever prescribes a specific course of action ; it only guides him in his deliberative process by suggesting to him the important considerations for which he should be on the look-out and warns him against taking a narrow or partial view of the act. Thus a moral principle is *not* a set of injunctions and prohibitions commanding him to act or refrain from acting in a given way, but a

tool for analysing a special situation and supplies a sound foundation for an effective, all-round and objective survey of desires, values and deeds.

Now where can we find such a comprehensive, objective and dynamic moral principle which will be the perpetual inspiration and guiding star of our moral life? To my mind the Kantian formula of the Kingdom of Ends seems to be just the sort of light needed to illuminate the path of moral doing without at the same time unduly interfering with the free volition and reflective criticism of the moral agent. The realisation of the Kingdom of Ends or social unity of persons is the secret of moral duty. It is a group or community of persons—not things—who desire, purpose and evaluate. The Ends-in-themselves possess not only value but dignity ; and this is virtue of Reason. Reason which makes us men, reveals the principles of uniformity in experience. By itself it is not productive, for all richness comes out of our original stock of instincts and emotions ; yet without reason all is blindness. It reveals to us meanings in this great jumble which we call experience, and it does this by pointing out to us the underlying principle ; and reason is able to indicate the path of duty, for it grasps the total meaning of my character in its present human environment ; and it can do this because it is able to take into account the value and claims of the personalities concerned ; that is, reason which makes each man an end-in-himself recognises all rational beings as Ends-in-themselves and bids us treat them as such. *What* is my duty must necessarily change from time to time just as the circumstances and other aspects change ; but the spirit, the inspiring principle is the same.

In an acute moral situation we must ask ourselves—is this proposed action worthy of me as a member of the Kingdom of Ends ? Do I in this action treat other people as Ends-in-themselves and not as a means ? Can I will that the maxim of my action should become a universal law ? If the answer is negative the action is not moral and it must be rejected. Thus the moral

attitude is just in consonance with the general economy of Nature. Nature has given us reason, and the moral attitude is at least one for which reason is required. Again the practice of morality is vitally connected with concrete social values. Duty is not an abstract personal quality, but an indispensable factor that fits and binds men together in harmonious relations. The moral springs not only directly out of the social, but it functions to bring about a new and higher type of social order. Thus we need to know what the social situation is in which we find ourselves required to act, so that we may know what it is right to do. Kant makes an acute piece of psychological observation when he says that when we do wrong, we do not will that our actions should become universal. Thus the essence of wrong doing is its anti-social tendency, and selfishness sums up immorality. Though a certain subjection is associated with duty, a great dignity also is inherent in it, since the imperative to which he subjects himself is the law he himself gives ; and it is only as self-given, does he subject himself to it.

Life is activity, and the man is committed to action. The 'ought' is on hand as soon as there is a person to act. Life is motor, and self-conscious life is a succession of conscious adjustments to changing circumstances ; and in every one of these adjustments the person is face to face with the 'ought.' But it should not be understood that the 'ought' is a stern tyrant ever holding the self and society up to duty. It is the creative ought ; it consists in giving my best, in the joy of doing, involving my integrity as a person. It is the conviction that I as a moral agent am free to take steps toward what I hold to be right ; it is the principle of conduct acknowledged to be unconditioned and universally valid. The feeling of 'ought' is a binding to something which has a worth of its own. It is essentially productive not inhibitory ; it leads to the fullness of life, since membership of the Kingdom of Ends carries with it the fulfilment of life's mission and the perfection of the individual life.

Though this interpretation of the Kantian criterion of duty may seem to be at some variance with his own formulation, yet it is hoped that no great violence has been done to the spirit of his teaching. As thus understood, we find that Kant has vindicated the social basis of the moral 'ought'; its spontaneity, universality and its rational, dynamic nature; and in his formulation of the Kingdom of Ends we have the eternal inspiration of determining our duty and fulfilling our destiny. If this discussion has shown anything, it is that morality is life and not something ready-made and complete once for all, and that the practice of morality demands eternal vigilance as it involves ceaseless struggle and internecine warfare which ultimately yields to the alchemising influence of the categorical imperative of Duty.

THE VALIDITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

By

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The validity of moral judgments is closely connected with their objectivity. In fact there can be no determination of validity without some reference to objectivity. If a judgment is valid, it is so because the character of the thing judged is in accordance with the assertion made in the judgment. It can never be the case that a judgment is valid because the person judging wishes it to be so or because he entertains a particular feeling towards it. 'I wish this' is a judgment whose validity no doubt depends on my actually having the wish: but the wish here in question forms part of the judgment itself and to make it valid no further wish directed upon it is neither necessary nor sufficient. Our mental life is so complex that in its concrete functioning no element in it can be absolutely separated from all the rest. So an element of feeling may be present whenever we make a valid judgment or know a judgment to be so. But the element of feeling itself can never be the sole or essential ground on which the validity of the judgment may be said to depend. What determines the validity of a judgment is the nature of the thing judged, and if this fails, then, however strongly we may desire that the judgment should be valid and however sincerely we may feel that it is so, our desire and feeling will never make the judgment really valid.

Prof. Moore has conclusively proved that "To predicate of an action that it is right or wrong is to predicate of it something quite different from the mere fact that any man or set of men have any particular feeling towards or opinion about it" (Ethics,

p. 244). To say of an action that it is right is not the same thing as to say that some one is pleased with it. This seems to follow from the very form of the judgment. The judgment that an action is right has got a different subject and a different predicate from the judgment that some one is pleased with the action. When their difference is so pronounced, they cannot in any sense be identical in meaning. The fact that some one is pleased whenever an action is right is not and need not be denied ; but the fact that a person is pleased is not the same thing as the fact that the action is right. Thus when we find that there is no subjective reference in our moral judgments it appears safe to conclude that they are essentially objective.

But the sense in which the moral judgments have, here, been found to be objective appears to be a sense in which all judgments are objective. In this sense the judgment that I am pleased is objective, because it refers to the presence of pleasure in me which is an objective fact. If the pleasure is there in me—in which event alone the judgment will be true—I cannot by any means alter the fact. When a person under the influence of a strong passion ascribes to a particular object, some character which it does not possess, his judgment too is objective, inasmuch as in his judgment there is no reference to any feelings of his mind.

What is clear beyond doubt from Prof. Moore's discussions of moral judgments is that such judgments do assert some objective trait or character—that they are not merely the expressions of personal thoughts and feelings. But even when we recognise the objectivity of moral judgments in this sense, we may not yet be convinced that they are objectively valid, because what is asserted to be there may not really be there. Mere assertion of a thing is no proof of its real existence. Its non-identity with our thoughts or feelings does not itself show that it must necessarily be something in fact. So although a moral judgment may assert something which is not identical with any of our mental facts, it does not thereby make itself valid. If the asserted thing

does not exist—and there is no proof in the judgment itself that the thing must exist—the judgment will be as false as any judgment made under the influence of an illusion. It is easy to understand that a moral judgment asserts something as objective. But it is more difficult to establish that the thing in question is really objective. People have raised serious doubts about the real objectivity of moral attributes. We shall consider here some of the arguments which deny real objectivity to moral attributes and, therefore to all moral judgments.

What is objective, it may be said, is not private to any individual ; it is equally recognised by all intelligent beings. But it is notorious that people in the world widely differ from one another in their moral judgments. If rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, were some real characteristic of things, they should be recognised by different people in the same place. One of Prof. Moore's arguments against the subjectivity of moral judgments is that if they were subjective then different moral judgments could be made without contradiction about one and the same action. But the fact that contradictory judgments are really passed upon one and the same action seems to show that these judgments are subjective.

Now, what is objective is, no doubt, under ordinary circumstances, generally perceived in the same way by different people ; but there are cases in which what is admittedly objective is still seen differently by different persons. A round penny appears elliptical to a person who looks at it from a particular angle of vision and if two persons judge differently that it is round and that it is elliptical that does not show that their judgments are subjective. It shows that even objective characteristics are not perceived in the same way by different persons. No body can contend that the shape of a physical thing is not an objective property. The fact that two persons differ in their judgments about one and the same thing does not show that their judgments are equally true or equally false. It only shows that both of them cannot be true; and when the judgments are

contradictory, it further shows that one of them must be true, and in the case of two contradictory moral judgments, whichever is true will unquestionably establish the objectivity of moral attributes. The fact that different moral judgments are made about one and the same action does not show that there is really no contradiction between them nor that the persons who make the judgments do not feel themselves to be contradicted by one another. If the words used in the judgments are significant, the contradiction between them cannot be denied. The point in Prof. Moore's argument is not that contradictory judgments are not passed upon one and the same action but that they should never be recognised as contradictory if they were subjective. The fact that they are recognised as contradictory and are felt to be so shows that they are not subjective.

It may be argued that since we are unable to know for certain which of the judgments is true, it is better to treat them both as equally true. And this is possible only when we consider them as subjective.

Now to treat them as subjective in order to get out of the difficulty presented by their apparent contradiction may be very convenient, but this can scarcely be considered the right way of dealing with the matter. When we are presented with two contradictory judgments we may be unable to decide which of them is true and the best that we can do is to withhold our judgment upon them. But we can never be justified in thinking that both of them are true or that they are subjective especially when the persons making the judgments do not feel like making only statements about their personal likes and dislikes.

The meaning and intent of our moral judgments are never subjective in any sense. When for instance we say that to murder an innocent child is wrong, we never mean simply that we are displeased with the act. Our displeasure at the act, if committed, may be there but over and above this—and principally, we mean that the act itself is wrong and its wrongness cannot absolutely be translated in terms of our or anybody

else's feelings towards or thoughts about the action. To say that moral judgments are subjective is to say that they are all false. If an action itself is neither right nor wrong then to say that it is right or wrong, is certainly to make a false statement. We have seen above that we cannot conclude to the falsity of all moral judgments from the fact that there are contradictory moral judgments about one and the same action. But even if we suppose for a moment,—although the supposition would not be right—that we get nothing but falsity whenever there is contradiction, we shall not be obliged to believe that moral judgments as such are false. For when two contradictory moral judgments are made, the contradiction lies in the particular predicates used and not in their nature as moral judgments, since it is agreed that both of them are moral judgments. When about one and the same action there are, for instance, two contradictory judgments of the forms 'This is right' and 'This is wrong,' we may as well say in each case 'This has got a moral property.' And when we do so the alleged ground of falsity being no longer present, the substituted judgment will have to be granted as true.

The falsity of moral judgments is sometimes sought to be deduced from the fact that the primitive man never made any such judgments, that our moral experience is the product of our social life. But the fact that the primitive man never made any moral judgments only proves that he lacked the knowledge of what is right and what is wrong. From his lack of knowledge we cannot infer the non-existence of all moral properties. We can never argue that because mankind in its infancy failed to be conscious of the moral properties of things, therefore these properties were not and are not there, even though it perceives them clearly in its present developed state. The validity of our advanced knowledge is never affected by the consideration that we were devoid of such knowledge when we were children. Our social life may have quickened our moral perception; it has also contributed towards the development of

our intelligence. But because our intelligence and moral sense have been things of social growth, it does not follow that our knowledge acquired through them is false. It has rightly been pointed out that even science has developed under the pressure of our social life, but merely on this account no body ever questions the findings of science.

We see, therefore, that we have so far found no conclusive reason or think that our moral judgments are false. But let us suppose that for some reason or other one is persuaded to think that they are really false. To say that all our judgments are false is to say that the moral experience of mankind is the product of an all-pervasive illusion. Can such an opinion be justified? We have seen that we cannot be led by any arguments, so far considered, to the conclusion that our moral judgments are false. Let us now consider whether the opinion that moral experience is all illusion can at all be consistently maintained. It sometimes so happens that although there are no positive arguments to prove a particular conclusion, there are also no arguments to prove it to be false. We have found no conclusive arguments which can prove that all moral judgments are false. We shall now attempt to show that there are arguments which make such a conclusion untenable.

No body ever maintains that all moral judgments that any one may pass on any thing on earth must be true. What is sought to be maintained as beyond all question is that there are some moral judgments which are absolutely true. The proposition "Some moral judgments are true" can be held to be false only when its contradictory proposition "No moral judgments are true" is held to be true. And it can be maintained only when one believes that our moral experience is all illusion. If there is a single instance in which a thing can be truly taken as right or wrong, good or bad, then it will not be true that no moral judgments are true. In order that it may be true that no moral judgments are true, there should not be any thing in the world which is really right or wrong, good or bad. In

moral experience we take things to be right or wrong, good or bad. If therefore it is a fact that no moral judgments are true, then in moral experience we have got a type of experience in which things are taken to be what they are not. In other words moral experience turns out to be a mere illusion. This, however, is a position which, we shall presently see, cannot consistently be maintained.

There is a general consideration against moral experience being all illusion. All illusions that we know of in life are for particular individuals and last only for a time. We do not know of an illusion which lasts for the whole life of a man and affects the life of whole mankind. This consideration tenders the possibility of moral experience being all illusion very doubtful. Moreover an illusion is not known as illusion so long as one is still under the illusion. So if a person were justified in thinking of moral experience as illusion, he should be free from the illusion ; that is, he should be devoid of all moral consciousness. Such a person however is very difficult to find out in the world.

In illusion one always takes a thing for what it is not, that is, for some thing other than what it really is. Now the thing for which a particular thing is mistaken in illusion must have already entered into the experience of the person before he has the illusion. When a person mistakes a piece of rope for a snake, it must be conceded that he knows what a snake is. If he had no previous knowledge of a snake, it would be impossible for him to have the illusion of a snake. When he is absolutely ignorant of what a snake is and when no snake is actually present before him, nothing would succeed in producing in him an illusory perception of a snake.

It may be contended that although some knowledge of the illusory object is necessary before one has the illusion, that knowledge may also be of the illusory kind. But if the previous knowledge necessary for the present illusion were itself an illusion, that illusion would require for its explanation some antecedent knowledge which must not be illu-

sory, otherwise it would give rise to an infinite process. So it seems beyond doubt that in all illusions some real knowledge of the illusory object is always presupposed. We find, therefore, that some genuine moral experience is absolutely necessary in order that there may be the illusion of moral experience. The very possibility of illusion demands that all should not be illusion. If all moral experience were illusion, there would be no illusion of moral experience, since the genuine moral experience which is necessary for the illusion is supposed to be absent. The inherent self-discrepancy of the position lays bare the absurdity of the hypothesis that all moral experience is illusion.

SECTION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

FIFTH INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS,
LAHORE

SECTION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Presidential Remarks

By

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I have to apologise at the start for not preparing or presenting an elaborate Presidential address. I may assure my audience that the failure to do so is not due either to indifference or neglect but to the very high regard in which I hold that audience for which nothing seemed in my opinion to be good enough ; for, though coming from a part of the country which had produced the greatest of Indian philosophers, I could not forget that the seal of greatness seemed to be set on them only in Kashmir, so close to the venue of the present Congress. If I still have the temerity to make some sort of address, it is because I feel a compelling need to give expression to a few ideas which have been haunting my mind.

The first point I desire to draw your attention to and deprecate is the passion for historicity. Much of the work done of recent years in Indian Philosophy has been historical and some of it no doubt has been valuable. But there can be no doubt either that a great amount of time and effort are mis-spent in the historical aspect of research. Much remains uncertain and will remain uncertain for a long time in respect of the exact development

of the philosophical systems or of the various interpretations within each system. *A priori* reconstruction of historical development is highly deplorable ; but the known facts are few and the extent of the unknown is itself indeterminate. Any theory sing is, in the circumstances, bound to be extremely tentative and of value only to a very secondary extent, in what is really the philosopher's task, the interpretation and evaluation of the respective systems he studies. I speak not as a hyper-critic, but as one who has himself been a victim of the lure of historical research, who after nearly three years of work on Śrīkaṇṭha could conclude only that nothing definite could be said about the relative chronology of Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha. It is not my purpose to decry the historian's task ; but I do wish to distinguish it from that of the philosopher and to stress the importance of the latter from the point of view of the student of philosophy. It is far more important for the latter to know what Buddhism meant and means, than whether the Buddha meant to teach any *-ism* other than Brahmanism.

The place of Indian Philosophy in our studies is a point of great importance, which has been already discussed in one of the symposia at this session of the Congress. It was ably made out by Professor A. R. Wadia that Indian Philosophy should no longer be treated as a subject among other subjects, but should be linked up to every subject of study in the philosophy course, so that the student of Logic or Psychology or Ethics necessarily and as a matter of course knows the Indian view-point too in respect of these sciences. The suggestion is very valuable, but in my opinion does not go far enough. Very much depends on the starting-point and orientation of the student ; and the Indian student should be made to start with Indian Philosophy, learning to know of other views and view-points, in the course of his study from that basis. 'Time was when the East was considered mainly spiritual and the West mainly material, a free exchange of culture being necessary for the welfare of either. The fiction has long been exploded, but the idea of barter still persists ; it is thought

that each lacks something which may well be supplied by the other. The truth, however, seems to me to be that the two cultures differ not in the possession or lack of this or that value, but in the stress on this or that value. Neither culture lacks respect for the material world ; neither of them at its best seeks to decry the spirit. But the ways in which they set about their tasks are different. As I have said elsewhere, they may be compared to two persons who start to circumnavigate the globe, one proceeding East and the other West. The final achievement of the one will be identical with that of the other ; at a relatively early stage, the individual experiences of the one will be very different from those of the other. Even should they meet on the other side of the globe, they may exchange experiences, but the experiences retailed by one will not be identical with, or capable of taking the place of, the experiences to be undergone by the other. The process of comparing notes may awaken a lively sense of interest and contribute to the richness of the experience when it comes. This is all the supplementation that is possible. There can be no other synthesis of East and West, any more than our circumnavigator can proceed partly east and partly west. For himself, his course must always be eastward or westward according to the original direction he took. An interference with this orientation will lead but to confusion and arrest of progress. This is what has happened in the case of our philosophical studies. India is no longer the home of philosophic thought, because the traditional mode of studying philosophy is neglected and ignored, while the current coin of western philosophy has no living significance for us. We are able to juggle with it or use it in a mechanical fashion, reproducing western thought in a not altogether discreditable fashion. But we have not made any notable contribution to thought ; nor has our philosophy had any effect on life in the country, for the two are as far removed as English education from the masses. If Philosophy is to be a live proposition in India to-day, the student has to get primarily and in the first instance the mental outlook of the Indian

Philosophers of old ; he has to acquire the Pandit culture, while eschewing the Pandit mentality. To this end have to be directed all our efforts at reforming philosophical studies.

The Presidential address of the Rev. Dr. Urquhart drew pointed attention to the need for philosophy and the philosopher in public affairs. If philosophy to-day has receded to the background, it is in no small measure due to the failure of the philosopher to apply his synoptic vision to affairs which, though mundane, yet agitate the hearts of myriads of his fellows. The modern philosopher may not affect a tub like Diogenes ; but his home is none the less a padded cell, and if is little consolation to know that no one has immured him there but himself. There is not a single political, social or economic measure that does not proceed on large assumptions as to the rights of the individual persons. The notions involved as to personality and individuality are often highly questionable and yet the philosopher, especially in India, has not come forward to evaluate them, praise where praise is due, condemn where condemnation is called for. To take one small instance, the Child Marriage Restraint Act popularly known as the Sarda Act : it is not my purpose either to praise it or to decry it. But it is a fact that those who have expressed themselves vociferously on either side are either religious fanatics or persons brought up on western notions of the social fabric and devoid either of the patience or the ability to weigh the applicability of those notions to a society which has been otherwise organised and has apparently stood the test of time for twenty centuries or more. There is not one Indian supporter of the Act, Hindu, Mussalman, or Christian, who at times of stress and trial would not seek solace in the notion of *karma*, in the belief that our sufferings now are the inevitable consequence of our previous acts, that in so far as we suffer, we wipe out an old score against us of our own creation. If this notion has any degree of truth, will not the conception of personality and the rights of the individual person vary ? The social reformer who believes in *karma*, will he not so seek to *minimise*

suffering rather than *avoid* it, whether for himself or for others ? From such a view-point, will not measures of social reform take a different direction though for the moment they may be largely indistinguishable from measures advocated by our Occidentalists ? These are pertinent questions which ought to have been raised and answered by the philosopher in India. Lost though he be in the contemplation of Brahman, the empirical world has a right to call to him for guidance as long as he is embodied, and the measure in which he gives true guidance will also be the measure of the truth of his vision.

THE CONDITION OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH IN THE *ṚGVEDA*

BY

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According to the orthodox Hindu view, the whole of the Hindu civilization is a homogeneous unit—the Vedas comprehending the *Saṃhitās*, the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Upaniṣads*, and the later *Dharmaśāstras* and the *Purāṇas*, all representing the same fundamental doctrines. But according to the modern *scientific* view, Hinduism is a conglomeration of various conflicting doctrines, heterogeneous in nature and propounded at different times in the history of Hindu civilization. According to this modern view, the conflict is not merely between the Vedic and the later Purāṇic civilizations, but also between the various strata within what is called the Vedic civilization. The Vedic civilization consists of two distinct periods, one following on the other, and each as distinct from the other as the North Pole is from the South Pole. The *Saṃhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas* together represent the earlier period of priestly domination and the *Upaniṣads* form the second period dominated by the independent and rationalistic philosophy of the Kṣatriyas. Even in the *Upaniṣads*, it is only the beginnings of philosophy. It is only at a much later period in the history of India that real philosophy appeared, when Saṃkara propounded his Monism, which is essentially rationalistic, paying homage to the theocracy of the Vedas only as a matter of diplomacy. There was a regular evolution of thought in India, from the ritualism and

nature-worship of the *Samhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas* (with a Pantheistic colouring at the latest stages of the Ṛgvedic Samhitās) to the beginnings of rationalistic thought (this being only the stage of groping in the darkness of Philosophy) in the *Upaniṣads* and later on through the rationalism of the Buddhists to the real philosophy of Saṅkara. The *Upaniṣads*, not merely the literature but also the thoughts contained in the literature, show a development from the thought of the *Samhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas*, and hence must be later. Many of the thoughts contained in the *Upaniṣads* are new ones, unknown to the literature of the *Samhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas*. Special emphasis is laid on the introduction of the conception of the transmigration of the soul, which saw its first dawn in Indian thoughts in the *Upaniṣads*.

I must here give a warning as regards the application of the doctrine of Evolution to the realm of thought. In the Vedic literature, we have Polytheism, Pantheism and Monism, in the early and the later parts of the *Samhitās* and in the *Upaniṣads* respectively. So there must be a corresponding sequence in time also. This is the main tendency of modern interpretation of the religion and philosophy of the Vedas. If we can transfer ourselves in our imagination to a period, say, three thousand years hence and look at the history of Indian philosophy at the period bordering on 1000 A.D., we can have a parallel. Here we have three outstanding figures in the field of Vedānta—Saṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva. Suppose we have no historical material to work upon for deciding the chronology, and if the Theory of Evolution will hold the field even then, I am sure that we will arrive at the conclusion that Mādhwā was the earliest, Rāmānuja followed him and last came Saṅkara. We will also refuse to accept many of the *Ślotras*, now attributed to Saṅkara, as the work of Saṅkara. In determining the relative chronology of the various Vedic Mantras and also of the *Upaniṣads*, we must have this warning before us. The mere fact that in the *Upaniṣads* there is the conception of the transmigration of the soul, and also the doctrine of the One Reality,

and that the *R̥gveda* reveals a religion of Polytheism in the main with only a touch of occasional Pantheism, does not in itself warrant the conclusion that those portions of the *R̥gveda* where there is Polytheism must be the earliest and the portions with the touch of Pantheism are later and that the *Upaniṣads* must be still later. Further, the conclusions drawn regarding this relative chronology based upon the Evolution of Thought, upon Evolution of Language, upon Evolution of Metre and upon the relation of repeated passages are not uniform. Further it is only in thought and language that an evolution is accepted, but in the matter of repetitions, due to imitation, there is degeneration. Here the Doctrine of Continuous Evolution is thrown away.

I am concerned in this paper only with the question whether the theory of the transmigration of the soul is a new invention of the Indian mind during the *Upaniṣadic* period, or if the doctrine existed even in the *R̥gvedic* period. I accept that the *Upaniṣadic* texts are later than the *R̥gvedic* texts. But I cannot so easily accept that the *Upaniṣadic* thoughts are later than the *R̥gvedic* thoughts.

The *R̥gveda* is not a work on Philosophy. So we have no right to expect any direct discussion in it of the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul, as we may expect in the *Upaniṣads*. This is also accepted by all. Is it possible to explain certain *R̥gvedic* conceptions without accepting the doctrine of transmigration? This is the question. The general opinion is that there is no hint of an acquaintance with such a doctrine in the whole of the *R̥gveda*, in any works prior to the *Upaniṣads*: also that in the portion where in the *Upaniṣads* we first come across a reference to the doctrine, there is clear evidence of a development of this thought through the various stages. In considering this problem, the following points have to be taken into account.

The *R̥gveda* is essentially a work connected with ritualism, Karma. The result of Karma is Svarga, and Mukti or liberation is the result of Jñāna. This is a fundamental doctrine in the *Upaniṣads*. Do we find this doctrine in the *R̥gveda*?

There is the life in this world. After death, the soul experiences a life in another world, from which after some time the soul returns to this world. After a series of such cycles, the soul reaches a world from which there is no return to this world. Thus there are three worlds in which the soul lives. Is there any such conception in the *Ṛgveda*?

Man consists of an eternal element and a non-eternal element. Even the non-eternal element consists of a gross element and a subtle element. Does this doctrine of the gross body, the subtle body and the soul find a place in the philosophy of the *Ṛgveda*?

It is by considering the philosophy of the *Ṛgveda* along these lines that we can get at the truth of the religion and philosophy of the Vedas.

Everyone accepts that in the *Ṛgveda* there is mention of three worlds, namely, the *Prthivīloka*, the *Antarikṣaloka* and the *Svarloka*, or better *Dyuloka*. There are two barriers spoken of in the *Ṛgveda*, the *Vṛtra* and the *Vala*. The two words are derived from the root *Vṛ* to envelop, to shroud. Indra, pleased with the drink of Soma kills *Vṛtra* and "water" flows down the seven rivers. *Brhaspati* is the chief figure in the killing of *Vala*, and what is recovered after the removal of this barrier is "light." Indra is the chief figure in the *Yajña*, in *Karma*, and *Brhaspati* is chiefly associated with knowledge, with prayer. "Water" is the characteristic feature of the *Antarikṣaloka* and "Light" is the characteristic feature of the *Dyuloka*.

In *Ṛgveda* IX. 113. 6. 11, there is a beautiful description of the higher worlds. They deserve to be reproduced here.

yatra brahmā pavamāna chandasyām vācam vadan
grāvṇā some mahiyate somenānandaṁ janayan—indrīyendo, etc.

Where *Brahmā*, O *Pavamāna*, reciting melodious prayers, as the Soma flows from the pressing stone, reigns supreme, giving joy to the gods with the Soma,

yatra jyotir aśasram yasmin loke savar hitam
tasmin mān dhehi pavamānāmṛte loka akṣite—indrīyendo.

Where there is eternal light, where the *svarloka* is placed, there, O Pavamāna, support me, in that region eternal, undecaying.

yatra rājā vaivasvato yatravarodhanam divaḥ
yatrāmūr yahvīr āpas tatra mām amṛtaṃ kṛdhi—indrāyendo.

Where the king is Vaivasvata, where is the innermost sanctum of heaven, where are these young waters, there make me immortal.

yatrānukāmam caranam triṇāke tridive divaḥ
lokā yatra jyotiṣmantas tatra mām amṛtaṃ kṛdhi—indrāyendo.

Where movement of light is unimpeded, in the third world, in the third heaven, where the worlds are radiant with light, there make me immortal.

yatra kāmā nikāmās ca yatra bradhnasya viṣṭapam
svadhā ca yatra tṛptiś ca tatra mām amṛtaṃ kṛdhi—indrāyendo.

Where there are all desires and wants fulfilled, where is the seat of the sun, where there is *Stadhā* and enjoyment, there make me immortal.

yatrānandās ca modās mudah pramuda āsate
kāmasya yatrāptāḥ kāmās tatra mām amṛtaṃ kṛdhi—indrāyendo.

Where there are blessings and delights, enjoyments and pleasures, where even desires get their desires fulfilled, there make me immortal.

Generally it is believed that in the *Ṛgveda* we do not see that pessimism so characteristic of the Upaniṣads, that dissatisfaction with the limitations inherent in this world and that eagerness for a change for a better condition of things. But if the ideas contained in the above passages do not suggest such a dissatisfaction with the conditions of the world and that hungering for a better state of affairs in a different place, I do not know what can make the suggestion more clear. They are not primitive people who sang this song; they are civilised people. If they knew that the natural goal of man is the higher world after

death, if they were not afraid of time limits for their life in these worlds after death, how can we explain such prayers ? In the above passages there is a description of the two worlds above, the world of " Waters " and the world of " Light." The two ideas are not confused, but kept separate. They are not blended in the same stanza. In both the places, it is uninterrupted bliss.

Here I anticipate a question. Do the passages indicate any belief in a termination to life in the higher world ? Cannot the expression :

" tatra mām amṛtaṁ kṛdhi "

(make me immortal there) mean " deliver us from this world so that we can go there where happiness is immortal ? " This would mean that life in the higher world is eternal and the prayer is to enable them to go there. Immortality is not what is prayed for, but only the position in that world. The meaning is legitimate except for the fact that it comes into conflict with the general tone of Vedic religion. If the expression is interpreted in this way, it will be reading a pure and simple pessimism into the religion of the Vedas.

There is a kind of pessimism in the Vedic religion. But it is of an entirely different kind from pessimism as it is understood in modern philosophy. In the Vedic religion, as also in later Indian religion and philosophy of the Purāṇas and the " philosophical systems," there is no belief that the world is an unmixed evil and the way for escape is to get rid of the world. The pessimism of Hinduism, both Vedic and later, consists in the belief in a state of life transcending all evil, beyond this life. It is only in relation to this higher life that life in this world is misery, but not absolutely. Further, life in the present world is not something one can push away and thus escape from ; one must come back to it, until *in due course* one gets to the state of immortality in the higher world. One has to pull on in this world through one's allotted span. That this was the belief in the Vedic times

also, is clear from the fact that there is no indication of an eagerness to get rid of this life. The Vedic poets knew that a certain span of life was allotted to man, and man has to live through it. So we constantly come across prayers for health, happiness, wealth and children during this necessary span and when they go to the higher world after death, after the allotted period of life in this world, we find prayers for immortality in that world. We have passages like :

paśyema śaradaḥ śatam—R. V. VII. 66. 16.

May we see a hundred years

vyāśema devahitam yaś āyuh—R. V. I. 89. 8.

May we live the span of life allotted to us by the gods

tokūya tanayāya jīvase—R. V. III. 53. 18.

For son, grand-son and long life

suvīrāḥ drāghīya ayuh pratarantīdadhānaḥ—R. V. I. 53. 11.

Living through long life with heroic sons.

We see absolutely no pessimism here. Still we see that eagerness for immortality in another world. The only way to reconcile these two ideas is by assuming that the Vedic Aryans were praying for happiness in this world and also *immortality* in the other world after, not for an escape from this world and admission to the other world. And such a prayer for immortality can have a meaning only if they believed in a termination to the life *there*, i. e., a return to life *here*.

This desire for long life in the higher worlds is seen in other places of the *R̥gveda* also. Take the funeral hymn in the 10th *Maṇḍala* :

Sa no deveṣv ā yamad dīrgham āyuh pra jīvase.

—May he take us to the gods that we may live a long life !—This desire for long life, not only here but in the other world also, can have no meaning, unless they were conscious of a possibility of a termination for such life. Everybody accepts that the *R̥gvedic* *Ṛ̥ṣis* had the notion of a soul that survived the body, a soul that is eternal. Where else can that soul go at the termination of the

life in the higher world, unless it comes back to the world or goes to hell ? No one has suggested the idea that the *R̥gvedic* *R̥ṣis* believed in eternal perdition.

There is frequent reference to Yama having found the Path. What is this Path ? Take the expressions like :

bahubhyaḥ panthām anupaspaśānam—R. V. X. 14. 1.

Who has spied out the path for the many.

yamo no gātum prathamam viveda—R. V. X. 14. 2.

Yama has first found out the Path for us.

Yama and the *Aṅgīrasa'* *R̥ṣis* are closely related to each other. They are spoken of together in many places.

Yama aṅgirobhiḥ—R. V. X. 14. 3.

idaṁ yama prestaram ū hi sīdāṅgirobhiḥ—R. V. X. 14. 4.

aṅgirobhir ā gahi yajñīyebhir yama—R. V. X. 14. 5.

Closely related to this finding out of the Path by Yama is the conception of the finding out and recovery of the " Light " by the *Aṅgīrasa'*. *Brhaspati* is also spoken of as having found out and recovered the " Light."

aṅgīraso gā avindan—R. V. I. 62. 2.

aṅgīraso raveṇa cakrur divo br̥hato gātum asme adaḥ svar
vividuḥ ketum usrāḥ—R. V. I. 72. 2.

vipram padam aṅgīraso dadhānā yajñasya dhāma prathamam
mananta.—R. V. X. 67. 2.

br̥haspatir usriyā havyasūdaḥ kanikradad vāvaśatir ud ājat—
R. V. IV. 50. 5.

ud gā ājad abhinad brahmaṇā valam agūbat tamo vy acakṣayat
svaḥ—R. V. II. 24. 3.

Here in the last example contrast the killing of Vala by *Brhaspati* with songs, with the killing of *Vṛtra* by *Indra* with the *Soma*.

Now what is the Path that Yama has found out ? What are the " Cows " regained by Aṅgiras's and Bṛhaspati ? What is the Path that the Aṅgiras's made in the Heaven ? Even from the quotations given, it is plain that the Path is to the third world, the Dyuloka. The Cows are the " Light " in that Loka. That Path was found out after killing Vala by Songs or Knowledge. About this Path, it is said :

Yamo no gātum prathamam viveda naiṣā gavyūtir apabhartavāu.

Yatrā naḥ pūrve pitarāḥ pareyuḥ enā jajñānāḥ pathyā anu svāḥ—
R. V. X. 14. 2.

Yama then first discovered the Path for us. This Path is not to be fallen away from. There our ancient Fathers (Aṅgiras's and others) have gone according to their Paths, knowing these. If one goes through this Path, he does not drop away from it. If a man goes only to the Antarikṣaloka after the performance of Yāga, he has to drop away from that *loka* and be born again ; but that is not the case with the Path which Yama has discovered. There is again another passage :

saṁ gacchasva pitṛbhiḥ sam yamaneṣṭāpūrtena parama vyoman
hitvāyāvadyam punar astam ehi saṁ gacchasva tanvā suvarcāḥ—
R. V. X. 14. 8.

I translate this : Go along with the Fathers, with Yama, with the fruits of the Yāgas and good deeds, to the highest heaven. Then devoid of defects, come here again to this abode, be endowed with a body, full of vigour. Here the word " *chi* " is the combination of *ā* and *ihi*, which can mean nothing else than " come here." *Punaḥ* means " again." *Astam* means the " home." The meaning is that the man is dead, and as a result of his Yāga and good deeds (*iṣṭāpūrta*) he goes to the highest world, to the company of the Fathers and Yama. When he has finished the reward of his Yāga and his good deeds, he has to come back to his home, this world, endowed with a body. Then the prayer is that when he comes back, let him have no defects,

avadya, and let his body be strong. I am not able to read any other meaning into this stanza.

Further, there are the three words, *svasti*, *svadhā* and *srāhā*. is what man enjoys in this world, *Svadhā* is what the Fathers enjoy in the next world, and *Srāhā* is what the gods enjoy in the highest world. The consistent way in which these three words are used in the *R̥gveda* shows that the state of life of the Fathers after death is entirely different from the state of the life of the gods.

In the stanza

matali kavyasir yamo āngirobbhir
br̥haspatir̥ ṛkvaḥhir vāṇṛdhānāḥ
yāmś ca devā vāṇṛdhur yo ca devān
svāhā anye svadhayānye madanti.—R. V. X. 14. 3.

the difference between the gods and the Fathers is clearly brought out. Matali with Kavyas, Yama with Āngiras's, Br̥haspati with Ṛkvas, having grown strong, whom the gods make strong and who make the gods strong, some enjoy Svadhā and the others Svāhā. Here Matali, Yama and Br̥haspati are gods and Kavyas, Āngirasa' and Ṛkvas are Fathers. The gods make the Fathers strong and the Fathers make the gods strong. The Fathers enjoy Svadhā and gods enjoy Svāhā. This shows that the world beyond to which the Fathers go after death is not the final world, and that there is a still further world. The Path that Yama has found out for the Fathers is this Path, i.e., the Path to the realm of gods where there is absolute immortality. The Āngirasa' were able to recover the light in this world, what is designated by the term *gāvaḥ*. Now what is more interesting is not that Āngirasa' were able to obtain this light, but that it is a light that had been kept away by Vala or by Paṇis, as is said in other places. So this Light of the highest heaven is not something entirely new to the mortals. It belonged to them, but was kept away from them and they recovered it afterwards. This is also an Upaniṣadic idea, the attainment of Light is not a positive factor

but only a negative thing in so far as it consists only in the removal of the barrier.

Again the word *gāvaḥ* met with so often as the name of the Light that was recovered after the killing of *Vala* or from the *Paṇis*, means really horses and not cows. Some ancient commentators of the Veda explain the word *gāvaḥ* as horses mostly, and so Kesava says :

dvayos tv aśve tathā hy āba skandasvāmy ṛkṣu bhṛīśaḥ.

Nānarthārṇavasaṅkṣepa.—T. S. S., p. 8.

The word (*gauḥ*) may be both masculine and feminine and it means horses. So does Skandasvāmin explain the word in most of the places. These horses have to be compared with the horse, a white horse, which the *Aśvins* gave to *Pedu*, with the help of whom he attained victory (over sins?). Then there is the horse-god *Dadhikrāvan*, who is worshipped for sweet mouth (songs : knowledge), by which one can cross over to the other side of lives :

surabhi no mukhā karat pra pā āyūṃṣi tāriṣat.

And what is more significant is that immediately after this *Ṛk* comes the famous *Ṛk* :

haṃsaḥ śuciṣad vasur antarikṣasad

dhotā vediṣad atithir duroṇasat

nṛṣad varasad ṛtusad vyomasad

abjū gojū ṛtajū adrijū ṛtam.—R. V. IV. 50.5.

This *Ṛk* has no meaning in this position unless it is meant as describing what *Dadhikrāvan* really is. The word *cāja* in the name *Vājasaneyi Samhitā* is also significant. The name *Aśvins* (having horses) is also very significant. It is with a horse's head that the *Ṛṣi* *Dadhyaṇ* gave the *Madhuvidyā* to the *Aśvins* :

ātharvapasyāśvinā dadhīce

'śvyam śiraḥ praty airayetām

sa vām madhu pra vocat.—R. V. I. 117.22.

O Asvins, you two gave Dadhyañ the son of Atharvan, a horse's head, and he gave you the Madhuvidyā. This intimate relation of Āśva or the horse to the Light of the highest heaven, recovered by Aṅgīrasa' and to the part played by Brhaspati in the recovery of the Light after killing Vala, with the help of prayer (brahman or knowledge) also shows that even in the Ṛgveda, the Mukti is the result of Jñāna and by Karma only Svarga is attained. The gods most prominent in Yāga are Maruts, Vāyu and Indra and they are fond of Soma and they are invoked for drinking the Soma. The lesser gods of the Ṛgveda, from the point of view of number of hymns, are Viṣṇu, Brhaspati, Savitar, and others. They are not so intimately connected with Soma. They are propitiated by prayer (brahman). Indra, Vāyu and Maruts belong to the Antarikṣaloka and Viṣṇu and Savitar belong to the Dyuloka. Here also we find a close relation between the Yāga and the Antarikṣaloka and between knowledge and the Dyuloka.

To sum up : men perform yāgas, Indra is propitiated ; he kills Vṛtra and Waters flow. Indra belongs to the Antarikṣaloka.

Brhaspati with Brahman kills Vala and Horses are released. Angīrasa' also recover the horses. The name Āśvin means having horses. Āśvins gave a horse to Pedu. Dadhyañ, son of Atharvān, gave the Madhuvidyā through the head of a horse. Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā, more related to Jñāna than the Taittirīya Saṃhitā (which is *the book* for Karma), is associated with the horse. The horse Dadhikrāvan gives sweetness to the mouths of the devotees (*i.e.*, gives them Madhuvidyā or highest knowledge) and this horse is in the next stanza identified with the Highest Truth.

Yama saw first the Path, from which there is no falling away. The ancient Fathers (a term which signifies essentially the Aṅgīrasa') have gone through that Path, not all the Fathers who have departed from this world. The Departed Father is invited to come back to this world with a strong body after he has enjoyed the rewards of his Yāga and good deeds.

The impermanent nature of the life of the soul in these other worlds after death is also indicated in the story of Maruts and Ṛbhus. Both the Maruts and the Ṛbhus were mortals and they became immortals. What is the difference between the immortality of the Maruts and of the Ṛbhus and also of the soul after death ? The only difference can be in this that the soul, though immortal, has to return to this world after some time, whereas the Maruts and the Ṛbhus have gone beyond that need to return to this world.


The importance of Indra in the Ṛgveda above Viṣṇu is also an indication of the close relation of Yāga and Svarga. The Ṛgveda deals with Yāga and not with Jñāna. Viṣṇu belongs to the Highest world, which can be attained only through Jñāna and so Indra is important in the Ṛgveda, being the God of Antarikṣaloka, which is the reward of Yāga.

Thus the relation of Yāga to the Antarikṣaloka (Svarga) and of Jñāna to the Dyuloka (Mukti) is plain in the Ṛgveda. Certain stanzas, read in the light of this, can give no other meaning than a statement of the doctrine of transmigration. The very brilliant account of the higher worlds, and the prayer for getting immortality there shows that they were conscious of a termination to life in the higher regions, and after the termination, the soul has to come back to the world, there is no other place to go.

I have only attempted to give a bare outline of the fundamental unity between the philosophy of the Upaniṣhads and the philosophy of the Ṛgveda. Although the Upaniṣads are later than the Ṛgveda, the philosophy of the Upaniṣads is not later than the Ṛgveda, and is not much different from it.

Postscript :

I have developed this horse-symbolism in the Vedic literature, and it will appear separately. I simply announce here my thesis that in the Veda, Karma is symbolised by the Bull and Jñāna by the Horse. This symbolism is very significant, and also very clear in the religion and philosophy of the Vedas.



THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY

By

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The purpose of this paper is to make a brief statement about the social philosophy of John Dewey and to briefly discuss the methods he employs in carrying out that philosophy. The miracles of the modern age : the radio, the aeroplane, the automobile, the machine are more than steel and iron—they are the mighty forces which have disorganised our old habits, disturbed our customs; and while they have thrown us into the realization that our world is a mere speck among millions of other worlds, they have at the same time proved the majesty of man and his ability to subdue and master the physical environment. The suddenness with which ideas and ideals have come in such close contact have left all peoples, everywhere, in a daze. There is a general seething unrest from the shock of collision. The cry for a new philosophy is heard from every side : a philosophy which shall bring about a proper readjustment and reorganization of habits, one that shall not deprive society of those values, traditions and memories which are essential to its own enrichment and growth, and at the same time regard the values that arise out of the new contacts; a philosophy completely dedicated to the task of “ illumination of human purposes and the co-ordination of human values.”

Above the confusion and turmoil of this bewildering age we catch the clear note of John Dewey's voice. Grasping the full significance of the problems, he says :—

“ What serious-minded men not engaged in the professional business of philosophy most want to know is what modifications and aban-

donments of intellectual inheritance are required by the newer industrial, political, and scientific movements.....The task of future philosophy is to clarify men's ideas to the social and moral strifes of their own day. Its aim is to become, so far as humanly possible an organ for dealing with these conflicts.....A catholic and far-sighted theory of the adjustment of the conflicting factors of life is philosophy." ¹

Or again,

"Unless philosophies are to be Edens of compensatory refuge, reached through an exercise of dialectic ingenuity, they must face the situation which is there. It is their business to bring intellectual order out of the confusion of beliefs.....due to lack of adjustment between ideas and ideals inherited from an older culture and the dominating interests and movements of present civilization, while not itself philosophical in origin is both a datum and an opportunity for philosophy... Any philosophy which does not accept important facts is in that degree a philosophy of escape." ²

He neither shrouds himself nor his philosophy in the mysteries of metaphysics, nor seeks refuge in the theories of epistemology, nor gropes in the doctrines and hopes of theologies. Himself an earth-child, he roots and grounds his philosophy on earth. There is no suggestion of any supernatural causation in his naturalistic philosophy. He believes with Dr. Haydon that Life with its manifold drives is the product of millions of forces acting and reacting upon a slowly assembled planet ; and the human organism stands at the point where the cosmic material has become intelligent, by constant re-adaptation to the environment. By virtue of this intelligent and continuous readaptation man becomes capable of controlling the direction of its future life. Control to re-direct and remake is the key-note to this new philosophy, and upon man falls the responsibility of putting purpose into the future development of human history, and for using his intelligence for the advancement of experience.

¹ Dewey's statement quoted from Will Durant's *Story of Philosophy*, pp. 574-75.

² Dewey's article on Philosophy in Baird's *Whither Mankind*, 320-28.

This warm-hearted American professor is no mere "visionary," dreaming of a great democratic community. His own experiences release his big dreams and compel their realization through a dynamic practical program. His childhood and youth were spent in his native state of Vermont, where he absorbed the fresh incoming tides of European thought and philosophies. Then he travelled to the Middle West, found that the philosophy he was trying to formulate was provincial and could not quite meet the tests of the "hard-headed" Westerner. Born with a passion "to serve the present age" he soon formulated a philosophy not only continent-wide, but world-wide. For this philosophy of control of the environment, whose task Dewey insists is "to clarify men's ideas to the social and moral strifes of their own day," he suggests a two-fold program or method: By Education and by Democracy. Or in other words, a suitable Education would of itself bring about Democracy. Let us now turn our attention to a brief study of each of these.

Education, dynamic and living, will give a sane outlook on life. His experimental habits drive him to seek clarification in the great laboratory of the school-house. Science has controlled the physical environment—might not its method be employed to control the larger and deeper problems of society. He urges first and foremost the scientific approach. In other words, we must cultivate a sincere desire for observation, for "detailed analysis," for "specific inquiries," and for "facts," because "What cannot be understood cannot be managed intelligently." Again and again we come across this plea in his writings, *viz.* :

"The first distinguishing characteristic of thinking is facing the facts—inquiry, minute and extensive scrutinizing, observation."¹

And again,

"The first step in dealing with it is to increase our detailed scientific knowledge. We need to know exactly the selective and directive

¹ Dewey, *Reconstruction of Philosophy*, p. 140.

force of each social situation ; exactly how each tendency is promoted and retarded.....Having the knowledge we may set hopefully at work upon a course of social invention and experimental engineering. A study of the educative effect, the influence upon habit, of each definite form of human intercourse, is pre-requisite to effective reform." ¹

The second factor he urges in this great laboratory is the application of the knowledge thus gained and the accumulation of facts thus gathered. Of what use is Mathematics if the architect does not use it when he is putting up a building, or if the engineer does not utilise it when he sets forth to construct a bridge? Thus again our industrial civilization presents philosophy with a double challenge.² Not only must we discover the full significance and meaning of the experimental methods employed in securing the advancement of natural and physical sciences, but we must be willing to revise and even sacrifice any fixed notions we might have with regard to the nature of "mind, thought and truth" in the interest of bringing about our share of social emancipation. Secondly, in the light of the new "tools" placed in our hands by the applications of science we must re-state the ideals and elements contained in our present-day politics, religions, moralities and everything that comes under the head of social affairs.....Life and purpose he breathes into the subjects which make up the school curriculum : reading, writing, mathematics, history, geography, drawing, singing, physics, chemistry, sports, and so on. What, after all, is the purpose of all this ? Let Dewey himself answer us :

"Numbers are not objects of study just because they are numbers already constituting a branch of study called mathematics, but because they represent qualities and relations of the world in which our action goes on, because they are factors upon which the accomplishment of our purposes depends. Translated into details, it means that the act of learning or studying is artificial and ineffective in the degree in which the pupil realizes the place of the numerical truth he is dealing with in

¹ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 147-48.

² Baird, *Whither Mankind*, pp. 826-29.

carrying to fruition activities in which he is concerned. This connection of an object and a topic with the promotion of an activity having a purpose is the first and last word of a genuine theory of interest in education." ¹

The part that the educator and the curriculum play in this scheme is to furnish the environment which calls forth responses and directs the learner's course. Remember that in dealing with the school we are creating an environment only for a very small community. But whatever its strength numerically, or its extent physically the social environment thus created gives meaning to the habits formed. In his book "*The Public and its Problems*" Dewey devotes a great deal of space and attention to the significance, place and nature of habit. I quote him at length :

"The influence of habit is decisive because all distinctively human action has to be learned, and the very heart, blood and sinews of learning is creation of habitudes. Habits bind us to orderly and established ways of action because they generate ease, skill and interest in things to which we have grown used and because they instigate fear to walk in different ways, and because they leave us incapacitated for the trial of them. Habit does not preclude the use of thought, but it determines channels within which it operates. Thinking is secreted in the interstices of habits. The sailor, miner, fisherman and farmer think, but their thoughts fall within the framework of accustomed occupations and relationships..... (and) the *objects* in which men find their love manifested, the objects which they take as constituting their peculiar interests, are set by habits reflecting social customs." ²

Habit, then is basic to all human action. Without it we would be utterly helpless.....it is the greatest steadying force in our life, "the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative influence." Hence the importance of habit-formation in a system of education.

In its last analysis social life demands not only teaching

"and learning for its own prominence, but the very process of living

¹ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 158.

² Dewey, *The Public and its Problems*, pp. 160-61.

together educates. It enlarges and enlightens experience, it stimulates and enriches imagination, it creates responsibility for accuracy and vividness of statement and theology." ¹

The very process of living together is, furthermore, a constant impetus to intelligence to be alert and wide awake to all suggestions of further resources, alert also to all factors that obstruct and retard growth, eager to cherish all values that can enrich and broaden our outlook, keen to grasp what may be involved in a rising situation. Life, Dewey tells us, "is a self-renewing process through action upon the environment. Continuity of life means continual re-adaptation of the environment to the needs of living organisms." ² And "Life" covers everything that lies close to the human heart; its beliefs, institutions, its customs, its victories, its defeats, its hopes and its aspirations, its amusements and joys and pleasures, its recreations and its luxuries, its hobbies and its occupations, its choices and its freedoms. In short, everything to which man responds, and which come within the range of his experience. Intelligence, therefore is busy and has its constant expression in conduct and in action. And what is conduct? "Potentially conduct is one hundred per cent. of our acts. It behoves us therefore, to "so act as to increase the meaning of the present experience." ³ Never is there a stand-still in this business of living. Always there is either an urge forward or a pull backward. Dewey encourages and pleads for the forward look: We play hide-and-seek among the clouds; the stars reveal their secrets to us; the bowels of the earth yield to us; and the waters part at our bidding. We grow in knowledge, why not in wisdom? And so he says:—

"Progress is present reconstruction adding fullness and distinctness of meaning, and retrogression is a present slipping away of significance,

¹ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 7.

² Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 1-4.

³ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 279-281.

determinations, grasps.....Sufficient it is to stimulate us to remedial action, to endeavour in order to convert strife into harmony, monotony into variegated scene, and limitation into expansion. The converting is progress, the only progress conceivable to man." ¹

Or yet again,

"Not perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining, is the aim in living.....The bad man is the man who, no matter how good he has been, is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who, no matter how morally unworthy he has been, is moving to become better." ²

When we try to get the full significances of Dewey's educational schemes, we find how tremendous is the responsibility put upon those who unfold the meaning of living to the young minds. At first sight we would be willing to entrust the expert with this responsibility. But unless there is a revival among the experts themselves, a cleansing, he warns us that "the world has suffered more from leaders and authorities than from the masses"... and this statement does not in the least deny the good that leaders have already done in giving us various means of control both in the natural and physical sciences and in social affairs, but that

"The important consideration is that opportunity be given that the idea to spread and become the possession of the multitude...The essential need...is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate and persuasion. That is the problem of the public."

This brings us to his second method or suggestion. It is so closely bound up with the method of education that it is hardly worth one's while to separate it, except for purposes of discussion. Control of the social environment will be achieved by the practice of democracy. Unfortunately the criticisms about the nature

¹ Dewey, *Reconstruction of Philosophy*, pp. 176-177 (Quoted from "The Story of Philosophy," p. 571).

² Dewey, *The Public and its Problems*, p. 208.

and significance of political democracy, as it has so far been practised, have been so adverse that one is afraid to even utter the word, for fear it will be ridiculed. In fact "the new age of relationships" has no political agencies worthy of it. But for want of a new and suitable word we use democracy with the hope that a fair practice of it will change the existing notions regarding it. Perhaps the salvation lies in a social democracy. The best discussion is found in his two recent books: "*The Public and its Problems*" and "*Democracy and Education.*"

"Democracy is the idea of community life itself...The idea or ideal of a community presents, however, the actual phase of associated life as they are freed from restrictive and disturbing elements and are contemplated as having attained their limit of development. Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is good shared by all, there is so far a community. The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy. Only when we start from a community as a fact, grasp the fact in thought so far as to clarify and enhance its constituent elements, can we reach an idea of democracy which is not Utopian."¹

Vainly the modern age utters the formula of the French Revolution. Fraternity, Liberty, Equality are shallow abstractions apart from community experience. According to Dewey,

"Fraternity is another name for the consciously appreciated goods which accrue from an association in which all share, and which give direction to the conduct of each. Liberty is that secure release and fulfilment of personal potentialities which take place only in rich and manifold association with others: the power to be an individualized self making a distinctive contribution and enjoying in its own way the fruits of association. Equality denotes the unhampered share which each individual member of the community has in the consequences of associated action."²

¹ pp. 147-148.

² Dewey, *The Public and its Problems*, p. 156.

Formulæ and sentiments and thoughts are controlled by symbols and objects, and the new age has "no symbols consonant with its activities." Too often has this philosopher seen energies and loyalties tied up to symbols when their meaning should be translated into the experience of the life of the community. So in poetic language he proclaims,

"Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal. The life of the community in which we live and have our being is the fit symbol of this relationship. The acts in which we express our perception of the ties which bind us to others are its only rites and ceremonies."¹

No symbols need be used, at least not the kind that will make growth of community life difficult.

As a philosopher of the spiritual life and a lover of men Dewey was driven to attempt some practical program of social control. His philosophy is frankly humanistic. He aims to bring about a democratic organization in which the life interests of man will be supreme over machine and material things—an organization, as Dr. Haydon of the University of Chicago suggests, in which the resources of the earth will be turned to the service of life; in which individuals will have equal opportunity for realizing the potentialities of their nature; an organization in which every possible opportunity will be given for the full development of every capacity that lies inherent in man, and one in which the supreme happiness of life will lie in sharing "of the achieved spiritual values of the race in art, literature, music, science and thought; in which gratitude produced by individual service for the common good will be the highest and supreme reward; in which the economic basis of life guaranteed to all will make possible goodwill, mutual understanding and appreciation, and so replace in the new social order the ancient

¹ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 332-33.

drive, intolerance, hatred, fear, suspicion and grief.”¹ This is our task and our challenge, here and now. Says H. G. Wells in his recent book *“The Modern Utopia,*

“ There will be many Utopias. Each generation will have its new version of Utopia, a little more certain and complete and real, with its problems lying closer and closer to the problems of the Thing in Being. Until at last from dreams Utopias will have come to be working drawings, and the whole world will be shaping the final World State, the fair and great and final World State, that will not only be a Utopia because it will be this world.”²

In the midst of writhing pain and confusion John Dewey from the West offers, not a ready, made solution and remedy but a way of life and of hope, a philosophy of social control and guidance.

¹ Dr. Haydon, *University of Chicago : Class Lectures.*

² H. G. Wells, *Modern Utopia*, p. 354.

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING EVIL : ITS ORIGIN

BY

E. AHMED SHAH, LUCKNOW

(a) *The Body : its Place and Function : a Clue to Physical Evil.*

Man combines in his nature two distinct factors, namely, the body and the soul. Each is an essential factor. The body with its minutely constructed organism, an elaborately developed nervous system, and highly organised brain centres, forms a befitting organism for the living presence and co-operation of the soul. The fact of the two coming together does not create a basis for the essential presence of evil, as is considered by some systems. It is true that man is essentially limited in his capacities, is finite; but this finiteness is not an evil in itself. The body is sometimes considered as unnecessary, a prison and fetters, to be freed from which can alone bring happiness to man. It is sometimes considered a condition of bondage for the soul, the source of all the mischief and pain experienced by the self. And the whole endeavour of man is to obtain release from its bondage. Sometimes it is considered an evil in itself, and different thinkers have made it the root of pain and moral evil. Thus the body, in its finite limited nature, has been called an occasion of metaphysical evil.¹

But it cannot be treated as an unnecessary accompaniment to the soul. It is an essential part of man's entity; he is a corporeal as well as a spiritual being. With respect to his body man belongs to the corporeal world and forms

¹ Locke, *Human Understanding*, Book II, xxi. 5.

its completion. It is through its bodily organism that the intelligence of man attains its knowledge of all material objects. It is not only the medium through which it knows all bodily objects beyond itself, it is itself an object primarily known ; it is the only object originally known. The soul has no independent agency, it acts only through and with the body. It can manifest itself only by means of its necessary instrument, the body. The body and the soul are essential and real and neither in itself is an evil, or an unnecessary factor to be got rid of, maltreated, eschewed and neglected.

Looking at the structure of the body we may state that one kind of evil—physical pain—is implied in its constitution. Taking the case of an acquirement of knowledge by experience it is easily pointed out that it can never be wholly agreeable or painless. The perceptive and sensitive nerves must be set to work, there is implied in their activity, exertion and tension. Even if the experience to be gained is acquired without much ado, there is the natural fatigue experienced by the engaged nerves and organs after a certain lapse of time; but if that which we try to gain is thwarted or withheld for a time, there is an application of greater effort, resulting in perhaps greater pain. In all cases of effort, there must be strain, which will give rise to some kind of uneasiness, discomfort or pain. Thus we find that physical pain is a natural outcome of the organs of the body. This fact must not be underestimated, much less overlooked. Physical pain in this form is neither destructive nor mischievous, but on the other hand a means of sustenance and development of the healthy organism. Such pains may stand as examples of evils involved in the very being of our nature, but so involved as to be the condition of higher good.

Besides these physical evils there are others which appear in the constitution of man's organism for which he is not responsible, such as hereditary diseases. The pain, suffering and misery which these entail is untold, but man must bear them. The origin of this evil is to be traced to the race to which man

belongs. The connection of one man with a race, and of one race with another, indicate that human solidarity which binds each individual with another. Whatever physical deformities are inherited by one, and the consequent evil of pain and suffering, take their origin in their immediate ancestors, and those ancestors from their predecessors, till we find that some one by violating a certain law brought on himself and his successors a particular disease and its consequent pain.

(b) *The Soul ; its Apprehension through Consciousness ;
the Will.*

It is not physical evil in its multifarious forms that demands a satisfactory answer as to its nature and origin, but moral evil. The body as a component factor of flesh and blood or of nerves, granules and corpuscles, or a compound of twelve elements, does not and cannot explain it. Let us turn to the nature of the soul, and see if any clue can be found there.

Its nature is revealed through consciousness. This is the only doorway through which we can have access to knowledge regarding the soul. Consciousness is an awareness of the self or soul. It is analysed into three phases, namely, intellection, affection and volition. The real nature of the self—as far as is known to us—is known through the third factor, volition.

This factor must be carefully distinguished from the other two. It is different from intellect, because intellect is knowing power, and will is controlling power. Will holds a relation of superiority to intelligence in respect of control, a relation of dependence in respect of need for knowledge. Affection is inclination towards another object. Will is guidance of our own activity. Again it must be differentiated from desire and emotion. Desire is a craving of what we have not. Will is the use of what belongs to us as a part of our nature. Emotion is excitement of feeling in contemplation of an object.

Will is energy from within, directing us in our relations to external objects.

Its nature is thus described: "We find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end, several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind-ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such and such a particular action. This power which the mind possesses thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it, or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice versa*, in any particular instance, is that which we call will."¹

"Will is an essential and prominent feature of personality. A person is a self-conscious intelligence capable of self-determination. If intelligence is needed to make knowledge of moral law possible, will or power of self-determination is needed to make obedience to that law possible. Power of self-determination is thus essential to the nature of the moral being." Kant says of man that "His will is his proper self."²

"The will is simply the man. Any act of will is the expression of the man as he at that time is. The motive issuing in his act, the object of his will, the idea which for the time being he sets himself to realise, are but the same thing in different words. Each is the reflex of what for the time, as at once feeling, desiring and thinking, the man is. In willing, he carries with him, so to speak, his whole self to the realisation of the given idea."²

From these passages it can safely be inferred that will is the self in action. It implies the capacity of beginning to do or forbearing to do an action, continuing to do or bringing an action to an end if once begun. It implies, in short, a power of choice, freedom of the Will.

(c) *The Freedom of the Will.*

There has been an age-long contention concerning the freedom of the will. I will not go into its details. But as our problem

¹ *Metaphysics of Ethics*, p. 71.

² Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, pp. 158, 159.

demands its exposition I shall express myself as briefly as is practicable.

Spencer maintained that the freedom of the will goes against the universally recognised and acknowledged law of causation. All changes either conform to law or not. If they do, they are determined; if they are not, they are meaningless. And the only law known to us is that of causation. And as all things obey the law of sequence, one after the other, each in its turn being determined by the preceding set of conditions, so are all actions of man determined. He has no power to choose between one motive and another. If all motives were known, we could predict a man's character. He is determined by his dispositions, permanent tendencies of his mind which lie embedded in his sub-consciousness and his fixed character, together with those circumstances, social and religious, with which he is surrounded.

Dr. Ward takes up the challenge and raises the question : " Is the Will's course of action infallibly and inevitably determined at every moment by the circumstances, internal and external ? " ¹ The internal circumstances are chiefly represented by motives, and the external by social and religious influences. Is a man's action determined, at every moment, by the strongest motive acting on him ? The determinist would say that the action is inevitably determined by the motive, meaning by the word 'motive' 'the desire of some preponderating pleasure.' The determinist's theory, then, turns out to be this, that no man resists his strongest present impulse. But examples are not wanting to show that a large class of men do often resist their strongest present impulse. A student preparing for an examination goes out in the damp muggy weather in spite of the desire to sit snugly in his arm-chair by the hearth. Who but a sluggard remains cosily warm in his bed early on a frosty morning ? The fact of self-restraint is sufficient to point out

¹ *Mind*, April, 1879, p. 30.

that even the strongest motive does not in all cases determine a certain course of action. It is not the motive, but a resolve, 'a definite and decisive *spontaneous* impulse of the will or the resultant direction of the will' that turns the balance of the mind in favour of one or the other rival motive. And this resolve, like the movement of thought, *originates* within man, springs up within the mind. A decision is made, and it is *his own* decision. This or that motive is restrained, and the restraint is *self-restraint*.

It is thus shown that the will does exercise a freedom of activity, a choice between the several alternatives that are constantly presenting themselves to it. The will does not come under the law of causation as is commonly expressed. But this does not mean that the law of causation is altogether violated. It is violated if it be taken in the sense of its application to the inorganic physical world. But man's action cannot be likened to the mechanical course of things. We cannot assert that just as when oxygen and hydrogen are combined in certain proportions water results, so when unemployment and want of food and shelter come together a man becomes a thief. The law of causation is not violated when we understand the true nature of causation—the Will as cause. The human mind is so engrossed with the physical world that it only traces causation between sets of visible tangible things. But a little reflection will show that the real cause is the will. What is the cause of the movement of a clock? Certainly not the wheels and the springs. No doubt when once made and finished it works automatically, but the power with which it works has been thought out and implanted by the mind. The whole mechanical construction is the effect whose real cause is the mind. Just as the mind with the material provided for it in the shape of steel, iron, brass, wood, etc., now makes a clock, now an engine, now a flying airship according as it chooses to make things in view of certain inner demands, in the same way the mind from amongst the various impulses, desires and motives, the material presented to

it by its physical organism does choose one course of action out of the various alternatives in the form of motives. Mind is equally a cause in the selection and determination of motives, as it is a cause of the making of any mechanical instrument. The law of causation understood in this sense is not violated. The freedom of the will is no anomaly in the facts of the world ; but on the other hand points to the right source whence the real nature of causation can be understood.

This freedom is not an arbitrary freedom, enjoying the free license of a prodigal. It works under all the limitations of the physical organism within which, and with whose co-operation, it manifests itself. The internal and external factors of the determinists, in the shape of motives and dispositions on one side, and social and religious influences on the other, do constantly influence this freedom of activity, but not to the extent of wholly determining it. It receives the impulses, and shapes them according to itself.

The question may be raised, what then is the soul ? Is it different from its impulses, wishes, desires, thoughts and feelings ? Do these factors put together make a soul ? Or, in other words, is the soul the sum of these ? It is different in the sense that neither is it one taken by itself, nor their sumtotal, nor a product of the sumtotal in the epiphenomenalistic sense. It is not different in the sense that all these are what they are because of its presence.

All the time, while the soul is directing the impulses, it is at the same time building itself. As the artist's eye, when painting a picture in view of several suggestions, combines various hues, paints the picture, and improves it with a touch here and a touch there, is in turn trained and becomes better fitted for further efforts at painting; in the same way the soul, while guiding and directing the impulses, is itself impressed in one way or another, but never to the extent of being altogether swallowed up by them. It retains the prerogative of being a cause.

(d) Parental and Social Influences.

Having gone through the exposition of the nature of the soul as a being with a free will, there is one more essential factor to be kept in mind before we investigate the origin of moral evil, namely, the relation of man to (a) his parents, and (b) to society.

We have seen above that the soul in guiding and controlling the various impulses of the organism is in turn gradually shaping itself. As it manifests itself in the human organism—that being the fittest of all organisms where its activity is possible—the soul acts and is acted upon by it. Both grow together, being interdependent each on the other. The place and function of neither can be minimized. A sound mind and a sound body go together. The body, if it is healthy and clean, enables the soul to play its rôle fully, otherwise the soul is handicapped, and is not able to express itself fully. Therefore the free play of the guiding capacity of the soul depends, to a considerable extent, upon the kind of bodily organism in which it manifests itself. Here is the first parental responsibility in causing an organism to appear in the world. Whatever capacities, tendencies, and impulses the parents have they transmit to the new organism. As this new organism begins to live and grow with all the congenital potentialities, so the soul—no matter how and when it came to be with the organism—from the very beginning begins to work in the organism, but its conscious presence is felt when the growing child feels a sense of lack, a sense of want—not seeing himself what he ought to be—in the face of an ideal no matter how crude it may be. This sense of lack is aroused, and the ideal is presented to him by his parents and other persons with whom he comes in contact.

He was born with natural tendencies to be cultivated and developed, with instincts of self-preservation and self-development ; but as he lives amongst persons he very soon learns that those impulses and tendencies cannot be developed at large. He is only one among many others like himself seeking self-preservation and self-development. His tendencies must be kept in

check, lest they infringe the like rights of others. He must exercise control and restraint. He lives amongst others under certain limitations. While he is growing, his social environment influences him in countless ways. His congenital tendencies begin to be moulded and shaped, according to the ways and manners of other members of family and of society. Here is the second factor which begins to influence the growing man.

Thus we find parental and social influences playing a very important part in providing essential means for the growth of the self. Parental influence is twofold : (1) the implanting in the new organism their own tendencies, (2) the presentation of certain ideals in their lives. Social influences are suggestive of certain ideals by the precept and example of living members of Society.

(c) *Moral Evil.*

Bearing in mind the nature of the soul as a being with a free will, and the relation of man to his parents and society, let us turn to seek the origin of moral evil. The tendencies, impulses and instincts with which a child is born are all natural and non-moral. He seeks to realise them. But very soon he finds that every impulse of his organism cannot be allowed to run its natural course. Some require considerable suppression, some control and others subordination. When he becomes conscious of his relation with other selves, he finds that the natural instincts of self-preservation and self-development cannot be worked out at the expense of others. He thus awakes to a sense of struggle, within himself, amongst his various impulses, and without, in controlling the instincts of self-love and self-seeking. Morality consists in the control and right guidance of these warring natural impulses by the self in the light of reason. Out of our natural, non-moral individuality we have to form a moral personality, which is brought about by the subjection and obedience of the impulses to the rule of reason. As soon as this becomes clear, there develops in the growing man

a sense of moral law in the form of a categorical imperative which demands of him—You *must*, because you *ought to*, because you can control these impulses and instincts in order to develop the self in the proper and right way. If the self obeys the law, he is following the good ; if he swerves from the law, evil springs up. No natural impulse is in itself evil, no instinct is immoral. Evil or immorality arises, when in spite of his consciousness of the moral law, which demands the control and subjugation of these impulses and instincts, they are not controlled ; or in other words, when moral law is set aside. This setting aside of moral law is not due to the impulses and instincts being too strong to be overcome by the self ; if it were so, no evil would be committed, for man would only follow his non-moral instincts and impulses ; it occurs when the soul as a being with a free will, having the power to follow or not to follow the ideal known to him under whatever circumstances he may have been placed, makes the choice of not following it.

Three factors are to be kept in mind very distinctly in tracing the origin of evil, namely, the freedom of the will, heredity, and the social environment. Kant places it exclusively in the freedom of the Will. Evolutionary moralists attribute it to the stock from which a self takes its being. Schleiermacher and his followers place it in the social environment. But no factor in itself is responsible for the appearance of moral evil. At the same time no one of these factors can be ignored, or its influence minimised. The chief factor, no doubt, is the freedom of the will, for without it the very conception of morality is eliminated ; but it is not the will exclusive of the organism within which and by which it alone manifests itself. The organism, with all the natural non-moral tendencies which it receives from the parents, though in itself neutral, yet, as it is vitally necessary for the manifestation of the soul, does provide either healthy normal tendencies which enable the soul to follow more easily the ideal, or else appears with wrongly directed tendencies which present a great obstacle to the soul in its quest. Heredity plays

by no means a negligible part in providing favourable or unfavourable conditions for the normal development of man under the guidance of his will. But when this has been pointed out all has not been said which makes the appearance of moral evil possible. There is the third factor, the social environment, which begins to work on the growing man as soon as he is born, first through the parents and the members of the family, and then through other persons with whom he may come into contact. Slowly and steadily by precept and example one idea after another is presented and his education begins. In this education the self is not simply unfolding its latent tendencies, but, while developing the capacities with which he was born, he assimilates the ideals of others. In this environment he learns that all his natural tendencies, as they appear within his organism, are not to be allowed to run an unrestrained course ; he learns that, when he has adjusted his impulses and instincts, subduing some and controlling others, he is not to seek his own, exclusive development unmindful of other selves like him ; he learns, in view of ideals presented to him by others, a sense of lack or want, and finds he is not by any means all that he ought to be. During this period of development the consciousness of the self or soul with regard to its own nature arises, and it finds within itself a controlling directing agency, the will. The soul receives impressions from the social environment, and while thus being impressed, directs and guides the impulses and tendencies. The social factor thus provides a great influence, not to be neglected, which again either facilitates the following of the ideal or provides a hindrance to such a following. By itself the social factor is not so strong as to overrule the freedom of the will, but it does influence the soul by making its path difficult or smooth as the case may be.

Thus we maintain that the origin of moral evil is to be traced within man in his free will as it is manifested in an organism, and develops and grows in a social environment.

A PLEA FOR A RATIONAL HEDONISM

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Sidgwick's protest, in his discussion with Green, that the arguments advanced against rational hedonism are those that apply only to psychological and not rational hedonism, we might take as our starter in this discussion. Hedonism is the theory of the end as feeling for feeling's sake. Both rational and psychological hedonism agree in this. The difference comes in attaching value to the object. Psychological hedonism uses the object altogether as a means to feeling, whereas rational hedonism attempts to use the object both as an end in itself and as a means as well ; *i.e.*, it seeks to give value to the object and also make it minister to feeling for feeling's sake.

The rational attack against hedonism has been showing signs of wearing down on a number of fronts. Thanks largely to Rashdall's efforts, " pleasure for pleasure's sake " is now allowed as an end of life, though confined to a portion of it only, *viz.*, the holiday part of it. It is not realised, however, what even this partial allowance means. It introduces a duality, a discord into our theory of the end, a setting up of a dyarchy instead of a unitary form of government—one part under the rule of pleasure, another under the rule of, let us say, self-realisation. But we cannot live with a discord and it will have to be transcended and the whole of life unified under one government. What is to be the character of it,—this is our question.

Other signs of the weakening of the rationalistic attack will be briefly noticed. Moral philosophers now allow that the end has to be seized by both reason and feeling—an admission of a more generous position for feeling in the end than has hitherto been allowed. Further, the quantitative criterion has been given a place in the weighing of the good. Quantity and quality thus need no longer be for ever at strife. The commensurability of all values has thus been admitted.

But there are other factors which are waiting to throw their weight in the scale before the final summing up for a verdict in the case. These are the witnesses of the artistic and the religious consciousness.

The artistic consciousness has always stubbornly resisted passing under the yoke of rationalistic morals, and stood for a feeling for feeling's sake as the end. The artistic consciousness is not as such opposed to morals. The artist *quâ* man has to be and is moral, individual aberrations notwithstanding. But it is opposed to the type of moral theory which gives a subordinate place to feeling. The artist is not against instruction, or giving value to the object, but his position is that he writes for pleasure first, and instruction secondly. This consciousness any way seeks to conserve the value of the object while making it a means to feeling and thus furnishes corroborative evidence in favour of rational hedonism. To turn now to the religious consciousness. To quote Milton's devils in *Paradise Lost*, no mean authority on the subject, the life in heaven will consist of doing nothing but singing eternal hallelujahs to God. It will be a life of praise and adoration. It will be going over what great things God has done for the redeemed and getting as much satisfaction of feeling out of it as possible. On earth, it should be noticed, it is the same situation—the devotee loves to sing of his God. The Christian, for example, wants to go over and over again the work of Christ for the sinner. "Tell me the old old story of Jesus and His love"—as a popular hymn has it. Song and dance and ecstasy are essential

accompaniments of religious expression. Ritualism also bears witness to the same principle of feeling for feeling's sake. The religious motive is joy. The Christian end is blessedness. The object here is not sacrificed, but it is used none the less as a minister to feeling also, whatever the term in which we express the end,—pleasure, happiness, joy or blessedness. Joy is one of the fruits of the spirit. But the most striking passage in the Christian Scriptures, for our purposes, is the one where Jesus is spoken of as having "for the joy that was set before him endure the cross." Heb. 12.2. The Shorter Catechism, again, speaks of man being made to enjoy God forever. The witness of other faiths is congruous with the Christian deliverance here. The dance of Shiva is well known in our land. Also creation as "Leela"—the play of God. There are as we know different theories of play. The one which fits in with rational hedonism is that of play as energising—a view which has the sanction of Prof. Starbuck.

Besides the evidence of these two consciousnesses, rather in the light of it, what is needed is a new examination of desire and the part pleasure has in it. We shall find if we carry on such a process, that the distinction drawn by rational moralists between "pleasure in idea" and "idea of pleasure" is not a mutually exclusive one. The two are not necessarily antithetical but can and do go together in moral choice. We have already referred to the evidence of art and religion under this head. Let us take now devotion to other impersonal ends—country and knowledge, for example, and we would find the same principle at work. The patriot who spends himself for his country also gets as much pleasure out of it as possible. He shouts his national anthem, stamps his feet or loses himself in the contemplation of its glories. The student, again, while following the dry light of reason, makes his studies an instrument to his pleasure. "Pleasure in idea" and "idea of pleasure" are always present together in the one whole of our consciousness. But what we can distinguish, perhaps, is that in the earlier stages,

i.e., the stage of pursuit and not possession, in the same whole "pleasure in idea" is prominent, but as pursuit merges in possession the "idea of pleasure" gets the ascendancy. The emphasis changes. Take, for example, Sir J. C. Bose demonstrating the truth of his discoveries. Till he got them accepted by the scientific world, we perhaps could say that he was giving more value to the truth than the pleasure accompanying it. But once his discoveries are acknowledged, in the proclamation of the truth the emphasis shifts. It is now pleasure first, and instruction second. The same is true of character development, when doing shall end in being. This is how Aristotle comes to speak of the contemplative life as that of perfect happiness. Talking of Aristotle I would respectfully submit, though it is a passing reference, that perhaps when we look at his view of art in his poetics and in the light of it at the conflicting views on the place of pleasure in his Nicomachean Ethics, perhaps we shall find that the way to unify it all is in a theory of the end as rational hedonism. I have mentioned Sidgwick in this paper. While acknowledging his services in keeping the place of rational hedonism before our minds, I must say that he has prejudiced the case by his eclecticism, particularly his empiricism in working out his theory. An empirical pleasure calculus need not fill out the bankruptcy of a rational pleasure calculus, as Sidgwick makes out. But my object in this paper has not been so much to work out fully a theory of rational hedonism as advocating the validity of the theory as such and lifting from it the ban of untouchability.

THE ETHICS OF MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL

By

A. MAJID, LAHORE

I wish in this brief essay to state and examine the ethical theory propounded by Mr. Bertrand Russell in his "*An Outline of Philosophy*." Russell abandons the view advocated by Dr. Moore that "Good" is an indefinable notion and that we know *a priori* certain general propositions about the kinds of things that are good on their own account. His latest view is that good and bad are derivative from desire. Men's desires conflict and 'good' is a social concept designed to find an issue from this conflict. The concept of good emerges from reflection on conflict of desires.

Desires conflict, in the individual as well as in society, and the resolving of that conflict requires what is called moral effort. Russell holds morality to be mainly (if not wholly) social, for it is in society that the phenomenon of conflict shows itself in its most difficult and most puzzling forms. There is authority, on the one hand, which cannot tolerate insubordination and rebellion, and there are the disputants, whose desires and interests are incompatible. Virtue from the point of view of authority consists in promoting just those interests and purposes with which it has identified itself. Authority takes care that the individuals do not defy it. It prevents and stamps out all that is unpalatable to it by means of legislation. Its positive method is the creation of *esprit de corps*, public spirit, patriotism, etc. This method has its limitations for its employment by nations labours under the constant danger of self-aggrandisement.

What about the disputants themselves? "It is of course obvious," says Russell, "that there will be a greater total satisfaction when two people's desires harmonise than when they conflict, but this is not an argument that can be used to people who in fact hate each other." Social life involves purposes and cross-purposes, claims and counter-claims. It is generally difficult to convince a disputant as to the folly of his ways. The point of view of the individual is always partial, because he cannot see things but through the coloured glasses of his peculiar interests and purposes which do not necessarily harmonise with other people's interests and purposes.

Russell realises this, and is therefore led to think that the point of view of the disputants cannot be profitably discussed and understood in isolation from the point of view of authority. The attitude of authority according to him is this: Men desire all sorts of things, and in themselves all desires taken singly are on a level—there is no reason to prefer the gratification of one to the satisfaction of the other. But when we consider not a single desire, but a group of desires, there is this difference, sometimes all the desires in a group can be satisfied, whereas in other cases the satisfaction of some desires is incompatible with that of others. So it is with the removing of conflict that we are concerned. Russell says that the supreme moral rule should be to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires. He has two main methods to this end: first to produce social institutions under which the interests of different individuals or groups clash as little as possible; second, to educate individuals in such a way that their desires can be harmonised with each other and with the desires of their neighbours.

Against Russell's view I have to offer the following points in the way of criticism.

(1) Russell holds that good and bad are derivative from desire, and that morality is born of the conflict of desires, and that it is as a matter of fact the means of resolving that conflict. Morality

is not something to be sought on its own account. It has no claim to the allegiance of mankind, in its own right. That is to say, it has no intrinsic worth, its value is only instrumental. Here is a teaching which runs counter to the best moral teachings of all ages. If morality is not an end, but a means, then clearly it must be subservient to desire, should in fact minister to desire. The doctrine that morality has no intrinsic value would fail to furnish life with a principle of organisation. We appraise or condemn man, his life, his institutions, his sayings and his doings according as they are or are not governed by moral principles. There are so many different motives inspiring man's action—economic, political, literary, artistic, etc., which of these is to take precedence of the rest? Art and literature, economic policies and political games, law and custom, when divorced from the moral factor, become perilous guides. Mankind has regarded morality as a touch-stone which can show whether our ideas and our beliefs, our traditions and our institutions do or do not fall short of a certain standard. If there is nothing intrinsic about morality, it is a mere means and nothing else, if it is to minister to ends other than itself, then man, the bundle of instincts and impulses, with his whims and eccentricities would become a measure of all things. If morality is not commendable on its own account, it cannot, it ought not to sit in judgment on civilisations and cultures, but on the other hand civilisations and cultures should pronounce upon its utility or disutility. Art for art's sake, literature on its merits and the economic law of demand and supply should all, unfettered by moral values, guide the conduct of life.

(2) Russell refers to the all-important rôle of authority in social life. The claims of individuals present a phenomenon of conflict and discord. How are different ends to be apportioned and adjusted? Russell says nothing about this. Is authority to be all-in-all? How far it is to accommodate, if at all, the private judgment and initiative of the moral agents, Russell does not tell. The ideal of harmony would

be impossible of achievement without reconciling these two everlasting sources of discord. There is still another point in this connection which Russell does not make clear. Is authority its own law ? Or is it to operate under the guidance of laws and principles more fundamental ? There are two conflicting and irreconcilable lines of thought in Russell's theory. He says that ' God ' is that which happens to be desired by the members of a social whole, and that authority consists of individuals who find it advantageous to enter into a social alliance, both offensive and defensive. That means the good is the good of authority, that good is the good of a social group. That is to say, that is to be desired which the members of a group choose to regard as desirable. This would imply that authority as constituted can do no wrong, it is supreme. Again Russell says that desires are to be encouraged or discouraged according as they do or do not lead to a harmonious life. Suppose there is a community authorising tyranny over other peoples which is according to Russell a potent source of discord and conflict. Are we to say that the community is perfectly within its rights, granting that that community sees no harm in what it does ? Then Russell should admit either that the word of authority or moral question leaves much to be desired; or that harmony of desires does not always mean the thing; either that what authority calls good is not always necessarily so, or that harmony of desires has no objective and universally binding significance.

(3) We are to aim at a harmony of desires. Harmony for the time being or in the long run ? There is harmony in a fool's paradise as well as in a saint's meditations. What is the kind and measure of harmony that Mr. Russell would have us seek ? There is a harmony in letting the sleeping dogs lie, and there is a harmony which is achieved or may never be achieved after sacrifices and struggles, after defying the world, and its order of things. Which of these is to be preferred ? What would be the attitude of Mr. Russell or rather his philosophy towards a Socrates or a Mohammed who can fearlessly criticise and

condemn the abuses of the age, and thus plunge people into the troubled waters of conflict. There seems no place for such men on Russell's view. What would Russell say of Christ who, on his own admission, had come not to bring peace but wage war, not to end conflict but to give it a fresh lease of life.

Russell is a pacifist. He is a pacifist when he says that our desires ought to be harmoniously organised. He is a pacifist when he says that nations ought to live in peace and harmony. There should be no disturbance, no conflict, no tyranny. What is that supreme law of proportion which is to bind our desires, personal and social, which is to direct and control our social and political dealings, which is in short to point the way to a universal harmony.

(4) According to Mr. Russell the term 'Good' comes to apply to things desired by the whole of a social group. Shall we say that slavery was good in the age of Aristotle but is not good to-day when the law and public opinion alike condemn it? Is polygamy good in a Muslim country, but bad in Christian lands? What about the devout Christian who lives in a Muslim country? Mr. Russell seems to think as if morality were a matter wholly external to the moral individual. He seems to overlook the fact of motives. Morality cannot be reduced to external observances, enforced upon the individual from without, by authority. Mr. Russell's view seems to suggest that the good man, the ideal man, the virtuous man is the one who does not violate the criminal law of his country, who gives no cause to the police to suspect him of infidelity to his group. Morality rests upon sanctions not external, but upon sanctions of the moral consciousness. Motives too are not irrelevant to the matter.

Some very strange sort of consequences follow from Mr. Russell's view of Good. A man who is regarded as immoral in England can become the most ideal citizen in Russia, because society there looks upon his views with approbation. Mr. Russell's view teems with subjectivism; it lands us in moral relativity and conflict; it is hardly distinguishable from the views of the

pre-Socratic sceptics. All talk of morals is futile if they are arbitrary, no more than the rule of the rod. They are of no use if there is no way out of the conflict. Mr. Russell's view is unsatisfactory and unsatisfying because in its effort to bring us out of a conflict it takes us into a still greater conflict from which there is no way of escape.

The ethics of the Pacifist ends in sheer conflict. If this conflict is in the nature of things then would not the ideal of harmony be an unbearable strain on a nature which is not made for that ? If our 'ought' is not at the same time a 'canst' then must not the practicability of ideals remain a matter of doubt ? Would not this clash and conflict which lies at the heart of things stand in the way of a universal harmony of desires, should it ever visit the earth in the form of a world-wide democracy and brotherhood ?

AN IDEA OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION

By

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[The writer of this paper is at present engaged in studying the Bhagavad-Gita with a view to ascertaining its value as a text-book for Universal Religion, so far as an idea of it is possible for us under the present conditions of our knowledge. For that purpose he has formulated a tentative conception of Universal Religion. The following is an attempt to state the conception as briefly, if a bit dogmatically, as possible. A detailed and a critical consideration of it is not possible within the limits of this paper.]

Whether any one Universal Religion will ever establish itself in this widely heterogeneous world is a theme that must have vexed many reflective minds. Religious missionaries and enthusiasts, on the other hand, must have always thought to themselves that there could not be any reasonable doubts about the ultimate establishment of their respective religions,—religions represented by them,—throughout the world. But leaving aside for the present the possibility of universal religion, we can at least assume for ourselves that even if universal religion may not be possible quite yet, still *religion* itself seems to be a universal fact of human life. A philosophical analysis of the essential conception of religion as well as the modern factual researches in the fields of anthropology and sociology tend to prove beyond all doubt that religion is an irreducible phenomenon involved in all human life and history. Philosophical theorists of religion now define religion as essentially a reaction of man against the universe in which he finds himself. And this

definition itself positively commits us to the acceptance of at least an ideal concomitance of man and religion,—where man is, religion also is. In fact religion is involved in the human nature itself. It is a relation and a response. And though the modes and forms of this reaction or response may be found to vary in actual fact according to the nature of the specific stimuli, the fact of the reaction itself can hardly be gainsaid. Even Sir John Lubbock's famous 'atheistic tribes' can, if suitably handled, be proved to betray a more or less explicit capacity for religious response, in howsoever nascent or incipient a form it may be. And these statements can be fully supported and substantiated in the light of the extensive researches that have recently appeared in the field of anthropology with special reference to the phenomenology of religion.

But it is not our immediate purpose to enter into that discussion here. That would require us to explore all the anthropological material unearthed by specialists and sift it and interpret it so as to bring out its religious implications,—a task that lies outside our present scope and perhaps beyond our personal capacity. Our specific aim here is a much more restricted and a definite one, and we shall indicate it below.

On observation among the scientists of a general presumption in favour of accepting the fact of the universality of religion, one naturally feels tempted to formulate a conception of universal religion if such were possible under the present conditions of our knowledge. We shall attempt this formulation very briefly in this paper.

Before we take up our task proper, a few words about the method of formulating or determining the main characteristics of universal religion may not be out of place here. One thing seems clear and it is this, that our enunciation of these characteristics will not be a case of mere empirical enumeration of readily found facts, as no one universal religion exists where one can find these simply waiting for our recognition. Here also, as elsewhere, reality is not a fact, but a construct.

And the study of psychology in modern times has shown us that religion is a function of human life. We must, therefore, largely depend upon a theory of human nature to enable us to formulate the said characteristics. Whatever lies embedded in our essential human nature as its native and permanent endowment as distinguished from its temporary and vanishing sophistications must have a significance for us in our formulation of the conception of universal religion. In other words, we suggest that a psychological approach is the only method possible and accessible to us in the formulation of the chief features of universal religion.

For considerations of space, we refrain from enlarging here upon the theory of human nature which we propose to adopt as the basis of our speculations. Our discussion, therefore, in what follows must necessarily appear as somewhat of a summary and dogmatic nature. For our purposes suffice it to say here that our theory will be a theory of the *whole* of human nature, even as and because religion is a reaction of the whole personality of man. In fact it will be our deliberate postulate that *religion to be universal must satisfy the whole of human nature with all that is implied and involved therein.*

(a) Universal religion then must be a monotheistic religion to begin with. Religion is a relation between a human personality and another extrapersonal entity called God. And as human personality with all its aspects and distinctions of faculties and instincts is after all one and irreducible, even so God must in the last resort be one. With the progress of world-civilizations, the unity of all human life and experience must come—as it has been coming—to be increasingly recognized. If men as such are one at heart, so must be the supreme person whom all of them worship. Monotheism unites men; polytheism as such creates barriers between them. Monotheism at its best stands for a brotherhood common to all; polytheism and even undeveloped monotheisms countenance distinctions between the Jews and the Gentiles, the Christians and the Heathens, the

Greeks and the Barbarians, the Aryans and the Dasyus, the Mussalmans and the Kafirs, and so on. In monotheism lies the hope of humanity; persistence of polytheism in some form or other acts as a backward drag in the way of its realisation.

Pantheism, it must be further noted, is the logical culmination of any thoroughgoing monotheistic doctrine. The one living God must be immanent in this world and not merely a transcendent being alone and abstracted. The world is not merely a creation out of nothing or a case of divine procreation, but is a direct, though perhaps a partial, manifestation of His nature. But this manifestation is by no means homogeneous or complete in the world. All things do not display the divine nature and being in them equally or wholly; but there is a graded scale of values in which there is the divine revelation from the nascent or incipient forms of divine being and presence to the highest and transcendent Essence of Godhead in an incarnation. In fact Incarnationism is involved in all true pantheism.

Universal religion must further satisfy the three broad recognized tendencies of the inner cravings of the human spirit :—(1) To Know, (2) To Feel, and (3) To Act. To take these *seriatim*.

(b) Some sort of apprehension of the circumstances is the primordial fact of all conscious life. We *know*, before we feel and act. This fundamental truth of psychology when applied to religious life means that a theory of the Real or the Universe must lie at the basis of a religion that would be universal. In other words, a sound metaphysics must constitute the solid foundations of a world-religion. Mere moralising in the air would be dogmatism and would not do in the long run. The rebellious reason is an irreducible and distinctive factor in man's make-up and perhaps it is this that is responsible for almost all the revolutions and wrecks in the history of the world. Universal religion, therefore, must be no mere faith or make-believe ; it must be a rational conviction. Its foundations must lie deep enough and they must be solid enough to be

beyond all the rude shocks coming from the fresh discoveries and inventions of science and philosophy. Religion must not be a ghost-like apparition living in the gaps of science and suffering amputations with every fresh step in its field and dying a perpetual death with its onward and continuous progress. It must be rather vital and virile enough to be capable of absorbing and assimilating every new conquest of science. It must fatten, rather than famish, in the hands of the scientist and the philosopher. In other words, the universal religion must make friends and must not hate or be indifferent to them.

It is also possible to add a few words about the kind of metaphysical philosophy that would underlie the universal religion. It must in some sense be monistic, though it need not be singularistic. Dualism and other pluralisms are out of question. The object of genuine religious worship must be *supreme* and without any limitations from without. The modern doctrine of a 'Finite God' helping and being helped by human beings is a mockery of genuine religious feeling and is scarcely a fair representation of it. God as such must be *one* and *independent, causa sui*. And having once accepted this, the further consequence in regard to the status of the individual follows, *viz.*, that the individuals are the sparks of the Divine Energy, and therefore draw upon it for their existence and power. The free currents of Divine Life course through and replenish and sustain at bottom these apparent centres of independent being and existence.

(c) But mere intellectual knowledge of God does not make up the whole of religion. After apprehension comes affection ; after knowledge comes love. Universal religion must be a religion of Love and Beauty, and must thus offer satisfaction to the emotional and aesthetic aspects of man's personality. There are moments when man feels lonely and none in this mundane world is then found capable of satisfying the inmost craving of the human heart for intimacy and union except the Ultimate. Experiences of deep personal love point to and culminate in a

love of the Ultimate, of the Highest. God alone then can come to the rescue of man, God to whom man could offer himself in entirety with all his merits and faults. Such an ultimate relation should be capable of eliciting the highest expressions of love and devotion and worship towards the Ultimate or God. But even a mere life of love and devotion does not make up the emotional or affective side of the universal religion. This must also make room for man's ideals of beauty and sublimity suggested by his life of nature and art which also is a manifestation of the affective element in his make-up. As Carlyle has said somewhere, there is music in every soul. And a religion that neglects art or goes against the primary aesthetic intuitions of man is a religion that is not likely to be capable of holding civilized humanity for long. universal religion therefore must keep itself abreast of the aesthetic ideas of humanity and it is only by resorting to art that it can hope to convey its message home to human minds inherently gifted with ideas and ideals of Beauty and Sublimity. For instance we must recognize the genuinely religious feeling-tone or quality in the higher reaches of the beauty of art and the sublimity of nature which finds spontaneous expression in the writings of religious poets or nature-mystics. Universal religion will never be a dead or dry dogma; on the contrary, it will and must recognize and tap the emotional and aesthetic resources of man and divert or sublimate them towards the *Para* or the Highest.

(d) But there remains a third and an important aspect of human nature which must also find scope in our theory of universal religion. This is the volitional aspect. Impulse in some sense lies at the root of this universe. This dynamism is naturally shared by the whole of creation. But in man the unconscious life-force of nature or the *élan vital* is transformed into conscious teleology. Man wants to act and to achieve. And a theory of universal religion must accept this as one of the fundamental facts of human life and must provide for it. For one thing, under universal religion there must not be a call to

the total eradication of the instincts and impulses planted in man by nature. It must allow them some amount of unimpeded scope or sphere for their free play. Life is activity; stillness is stagnation and even death. Religion that deprecates activity and preaches pure inaction and asceticism cannot take root; and if it does, it will either languish before long or else have disastrous moral and material consequences both for its immediate adherents and for the civilization of humanity at large. A Religion of inaction and abstinence is an abstractionist 'idol,' which our modern psychological knowledge of human nature has done much to dispel.

But universal religion cannot rest with a mere negative vindication of impulse and sensibility. It must further provide a positive *end* and *method* for their exercise. Universal religion must define the end of human life and prescribe a *path* for its realization. In other words, it must offer a theory of the *Moral Ideal* and *Moral Life*. We might even go a little further and briefly definitise the general nature of the kind of moral ideal and moral life that is involved in our conception of universal religion. Some sort of *Eudaemonism* (in the Aristotelian sense), will be the moral creed. Happiness of the *complete* personality of man must be the moral ideal in universal religion. One-sided ethics, whether of the Hedonistic or Puristic type, must be given up and a larger and *conserving* synthesis must be adopted. And the same conserving attitude must characterise our conception of moral life. The Ideal (Moral) Path of Life must not seek to sacrifice or suppress worldly life. The realization of the ideal must be open in, and through, and even because, of it. Thus *Optimism* must be an integral element in the moral theory of our universal religion, and this can only be secured by the interpenetration of the worldly and the spiritual (as distinguished from their bifurcation which spells pessimism).

(c) The last, but not the least, is the necessity of recognizing in our theory of Universal Religion, the unique significance and potentialities of human personality with all that is

involved therein. Religion is essentially a relation, and though the nature and meaning of the other term of it (God) is not always very obvious to man, man himself doubtless, constituting as he does the first term of the relation from our side, must be recognized as an integral and basic entity on which the whole superstructure of religious life rests. Human Personality is the one unique thing of central interest in the study of religious life. The wonders and ramifications of the religious experiences of humanity would lose all their significance unless they were referred to the underlying personalities, *viz.*, the experiencers. And whether the personality is ultimately conserved or surrendered in the highest reaches of religious life and experience, it is the personality doubtless that is the point of departure, whatever the culmination.

With this admission of the unique significance of human personality, our theory of universal religion must also accept some minor admissions in regard to this personality, the more important of which may be formulated here. *Every* human personality as human must be the seat of our universal religion. Universal religion admits *all* within its fold,—irrespective of race, and sex and even views. Nothing can preclude anybody with all his peculiarities and idiosyncrasies from its membership. Under it, there will be no man-made distinctions between man and man like the distinctions referred to before. Universal religion stands for a world-unity based on the foundations of the essential unity of all human beings. The attitude in it will be : “at bottom all of us are *one*, citizens of the same *one* Universe and, therefore, the followers of the same world-religion of the One-without-a-second God.”

But if truth is not to be sacrificed, the counter-stroke must also be given. Human diversity is as much a fact as human unity. And if this is so, our universal religion must tolerate peculiarities inherent in the individuals. We are *not* articles manufactured to a type ; we are personalities and as such are bound to be each one of us *unique*. No actual uniformity of

worship therefore must be expected, though worship as such will reach the same ultimate God (of monotheism) behind His diverse symbols. Christ cannot be the only saviour son of the Father ; nor Mahomed the only prophet of Allah ; nor yet again can Moses be the only Law-giver of Jehovah ; nor Krishna the only Avatar of God Vishnu. Not only has everybody the right to choose either or none of these for himself, but every body has also the right of aspiring to be any of them himself. Human personality has infinite potentialities and the universal religion must leave the fullest scope and freedom for their realisation.

With freedom must also be admitted the necessity of positing a sort of 'conservation of values,' an immortality (pre-existence and rebirth). There must be a formal provision for the 'storing' of the good and evil on one's account. There is nothing absolutely new ; there is a sort of continuous *karmic* process in which nothing is lost. Nor are, consequently, the apparent beginnings and ends final. This is the ordinary course of the universe and can be interfered with only by the deliberate acts of Divine Will.

With the retention of freedom and conservation goes also the possibility of man's going wrong. If man is capable of rising to giddy heights, he is as well liable to err and to fall to the infernal depths. But his fall cannot be something irrevocable or final. Under universal religion there must be an opportunity and facility for him to try and rise again. We might even go further and say that under universal religion man may not only ascend, but that he will also be *lifted up* through love. In other words, there must be there a doctrine of Redemption and Forgiveness or Grace.

We have formulated above the main characteristics of universal religion so far as this is possible in the light of our knowledge of human nature and personality. And we trust that our outline can well be used as a test or criterion to examine any religious text with a view to ascertain its value from the point of view of universal religion.

THE RELATION OF MORAL TO SPIRITUAL EXCELLENCE

A Study in Vedanta Philosophy

By

V. B. SHRIKHANDO

The relation of moral to spiritual excellence has suffered from a considerable amount of confusion in the minds of most persons. People speak of spiritual progress as if it were something apart from moral and even intellectual progress. The idea apparently is that while moral goodness consists in behaving in certain ways towards other persons and things, and intellectual advancement consists in acquiring a more adequate knowledge of the world, spiritual uplift means going nearer to God or some other religious ideal which is considered to be different from the first two. It is also believed that these lines of progress are more or less independent of one another, that a man may occupy a high moral level without knowing much about himself or the world around him and that even an uneducated person may hold communion with God. All religions, it is true, insist upon the observance of certain rules of morality as a precondition of the attainment of the spiritual ideal. As the *Kathopanishad* puts it: "None, who has not desisted from evil ways, or whose mind is not at peace, being troubled by passions and desires for worldly things, can hope to find the Self by means of knowledge" (1.2.23). *Vairāgya* or freedom from attachment to worldly objects has always been proclaimed to be a necessary qualification for the aspirant after the spiritual goal. But in the first place, different religions do not make exactly the same moral demands (witness the attitudes of the various religions towards

the killing and eating of animals) and secondly, though moral development may be allowed to be an indispensable means of spiritual development, the two are not held to be the same thing, nor are people agreed upon the degree of Variāgya necessary for spiritual onlightenment. We find so many *gurus* (spiritual teachers) maintaining that their moral feelings do not take away from their spiritual greatness, as the spirit is above all good and evil. They quote texts like “सर्वथा वर्त्तमानोऽपि स योगो मयि वर्त्तते” (“Whatever his ways of behaviour, that *yogi* dwells in me”—Bhagavadgita, Chapter VI, Verse 31). The dangerous nature of this teaching need not be pointed out as every one knows how even educated people, who at least ought to know better, are being misled before our very eyes. The inquiry undertaken here is, therefore, of much practical as well as of theoretical importance.

Let us begin with certain distinctions. We can distinguish easily enough between the body and the mind though they are intimately connected with each other. The body (including the brain and the nervous system) is material and as such, unconscious. It is experienced only through the senses. The mind is directly known without the help of the senses and it appears to be conscious of itself as well as of other things. But when we proceed to draw the distinction between the mental and the spiritual we must be very careful if we would avoid confusion. What is the spirit as distinguished from the mind ?

We know the mind through its functions. It is that which knows, feels, and wills. Both knowing and willing consist in determination of something—the former, of the nature of a thing or events, the latter, of the action to be performed by oneself. “What is this ?” is the question answered by the former ; “What shall I do ?” by the latter. In both cases there are certain alternatives between which we have to decide. The mind as presenting to itself these alternatives and wavering between them is called *मनः* (the function of which is to desire and

doubt.—संशयविकल्पात्मकं मनः) and the same mind as deciding between the alternatives is called बुद्धिः (पञ्चवसायामिका बुद्धिः). The experience of pleasure and pain, like every other experience, is connected with *Manas* or *Buddhi* according as it is vague and doubtful or definite and certain. Does our experience point to the existence of the soul or spirit apart from the mind ? For one thing, I can distinguish myself from the mind just as much as from the body. Though, on many occasions, I think and speak as if I were the same as my body, yet, on reflection, I find that I am conscious of the body as an object of which I am the subject. In the dream state, again, I am not conscious of my body, though I am conscious of myself as the subject of the objects in dreamland. This leads to the conclusion that my real Self or Soul is different from the body. In the same way, it appears that I am conscious of the mind as an object of which I am the subject (as when I think of my desires and decisions). In deep sleep, again, I am not conscious of my mind (doubts and decisions) though I am not without self-consciousness. These experiences show that the self (which is referred to by the pronoun " I ") is different from the mind also. It is the same during the three states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep and is of the nature of pure, unchanging consciousness. Mental processes and their objects come and go ; the subject remains constant.

These are the reasons for distinguishing the self, soul or spirit from the mind. But we must note that they point to an unchanging subject or spirit in contrast to the changing mind or other objects. How, then, can we speak of spiritual progress, meaning thereby progress of the spirit ? For all progress is change—though change in a certain direction. But the spirit as we have conceived it is the changeless witness of all objects—knowledge and ignorance, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, good and evil and hence above them all. The so-called spiritual progress must, therefore, consist in the progressive understanding by the intellect of the true nature

of the unchanging spirit (or the inmost self प्रत्यगात्मा). The conception of the self as having birth and death, finite, impure and bound, gradually give place to the conception of the same self as eternal, infinite, pure and free.

But some people think that there is a great difference between a mere intellectual knowledge of the Spirit and the realisation or direct experience of it. It is argued that the spirit is beyond the intellect (यो बुद्धेः परतस्तु सः) and hence beyond all speech and thought. We may meet this objection by saying that the ignorance of the real self resides in the intellect and therefore the removal of the ignorance must also be an affair of the intellect. As for direct experience of the self, we are always having it (यत् साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म) though it is mixed up with certain illusions and only requires to be freed from these before it is clear and distinct. This was recognised by Descartes when he said "*Cogito, ergo, sum*" for he meant that he always experienced himself as the subject of thinking. The doctrine that the soul is beyond the intellect does not imply that it is not to be known by the latter but that the only way of knowing it is by distinguishing it from the intellect with which it is usually confused. When it is said to be unknowable it is implied that it cannot be known as an object and can only be experienced as the subject. The difference between what is called a mere intellectual understanding and realisation is, in this case, only one of degree and not of kind. The direct experience which is said to be the one means of salvation is here nothing but intellectual knowledge freed from all doubts and illusions (संशयविपर्ययरहितज्ञानम्). This truth is expressed by texts like "It is to be attained by the mind," "It is seen by the subtle intellect" (मनसैवेदमाप्तव्यम्, दृश्यते त्वय्याबुद्ध्या). This blessed vision of the spirit, therefore, is only the crowning achievement of the intellect in its search after truth. It is the last stage of the same mental process which finds expression in the child's wondering questions about the things around him, their relations to one another and to himself. For the whole course of scientific and philosophical thought

shows that the intellect is ever pressing forwards towards the principle which will reduce to unity the bewildering variety of subjects and objects in the universe. This process reaches its completion when the intellect perceives that the spirit is the one universal reality, eternal and all-pervading.

If spiritual uplift is thus nothing but an intellectual realisation of the spirit, our problem may be restated as follows. What is the relation of moral virtues like self-control and benevolence to this intellectual perception of the true nature of the self and the world? Why should any type of behaviour be laid down as a necessary qualification for the pursuit of truth? At first sight it appears that moral and intellectual activities are independent of each other. The perception and recognition of a house as such depends upon sensations and the meaning which they have acquired by association, but it seems to be unaffected by the moral nature of the percipient. A boy who is not morally good may occupy a higher rank at school or college than another boy whose behaviour is morally unobjectionable. The understanding of a geometrical proof has apparently nothing to do with the good or bad moral tendencies of the student. Bacon and Byron stand out in the history of literature as great authors whose moral weaknesses have been a source of regret to many. We may have to admit that the understanding of an abstruse subject requires concentration which is not possible if the mind is distracted by other desires. But, in the first place, these other desires may be good as well as bad and secondly even bad desires need not trouble the student during his studies, being fulfilled at other times. If the pursuit of knowledge becomes an all-consuming passion, then only, it appears that other desires must come into conflict with it and must therefore be controlled.

Perhaps a consideration of the conditions of voluntary action will throw more light on this question. Every voluntary act proceeds from a certain belief, *viz.*, that the proposed act will do good to the agent by helping him to accomplish some valuable end. This statement may appear to be contradicted by facts.

People may be seen to be knowingly acting against their own interests and previous resolutions. But a close observation of such action on our own part reveals the truth that the act takes place only because at the moment it is believed to be in our interest. Remorse may immediately follow upon the execution of the act and we may think that for the time being we were blinded by the overpowering desire but there is no doubt that when the temptation was upon us there was a corresponding belief also—belief inconsistent with that on which the previous resolution was based. So it is really a quarrel between two beliefs and not between belief and action. Hence Socrates wisely said, “Virtue is knowledge,” meaning that right knowledge (knowledge of the good) is sufficient for right action. In the case of those who yield to temptation we can say that their knowledge of the good is not yet free from doubt and hence the remedy prescribed is a further dwelling on the merits of virtuous conduct. When as the result of this process the mind attains full conviction on the point so that no opposite belief can arise, there can be no temptation also. The strength of the false belief consists in the deep impressions which it has made on the mind during the long period of its occupation, and meditation, or the process of dwelling on the merits of virtue serves to strengthen the impressions of the correct belief and through these to wipe out the opposite ones. When this is done we can be said to have arrived at the knowledge of conviction which is bound to manifest itself in corresponding action.

But one might ask, “Granting that every voluntary action involves a certain belief and that all beliefs regarding the merits and demerits of virtue and vice respectively must issue in corresponding acts when the occasions arise, how does this bear on the relation of virtuous or vicious conduct to the right understanding of the real Self ? ” In reply to this question we must go a little deeper into the character of the beliefs underlying vicious conduct. We shall take, for example, intemperance and see what ideas are involved therein. When a man proposes

to drink in excess he thinks that drinking will fulfil his want. The need is here connected with the body. In thinking it to be his own need, therefore, he is obviously identifying himself with the body. Thus a wrong belief regarding the self is at the bottom of the vice of intemperance. The desire to deprive another person, by force or fraud, of what belongs to him by right involves two false ideas—first, that the thing appropriated will be an addition to the self, and secondly, that the person whom one thinks of robbing is a different self. Selfishness generally is seen to involve a narrow idea of one's self due to false identification with the body and mind. The desire to deceive another by telling a lie is also to be traced to the same source inasmuch as it is inconsistent with the belief that the same self runs through all. Sex-attraction also involves the sense of duality and identification with the body. The strength of these evil desires represents the strength of the underlying wrong beliefs.

We now see why the vicious tendencies of a man should resist the entrance into the mind of the true principles regarding the self. The new ideas run counter to those which are already in possession of the field. The force of habit which is so powerful in human life is working in favour of the latter. The impressions produced on the mind by the same thoughts, feelings and acts, repeated times without number during the course of past existence, are so deep and strong that they do not so much as allow the new ideas to be entertained. The Law of Contradiction prevents two opposite beliefs co-existing in the mind. Hence the old occupants are naturally jealous of the new-comers and as they have taken deep root in the mind would afford no chance to the latter. What adds to the difficulty of overcoming the false beliefs is that they commonly lie concealed and express themselves only through their effects (*viz.* desires and acts). The process of bringing them to light requires an effort of analysis which cannot be expected of a man who is completely under their influence. In order to

weaken their hold on the mind to a certain extent, the student is advised first to control their manifestation in action and to regulate his outward behaviour. But this effort cannot continue long unless he proceeds to exercise control over his desires ; for if the same desires continue to arise they must lead to the same acts. As those who try to get rid of a bad habit know after a small period of abstinence there is an outburst of indulgence, all the more violent for the previous abstinence. So the important question is how to control one's desires. Suppression by sheer force of will is, as we have just seen, impossible. The only course open is to convince the mind of the evil consequences of indulging the desires. If we dwell on these till the thought takes a firm hold of the mind (which is called **विवेकसाक्षात्कार**), the objects of sense will lose most of their attraction for us (**वैराग्य**). This is the course recommended in *Manusmṛiti* II, 96, where it is pointed out that the senses which are attached to objects cannot be successfully controlled merely by denying them their objects but by constant thinking of the evil consequences of satisfying them (**न तथैतानिश्च्यन्ते संनियन्तुमशक्यम् । विषयेषु प्रजुष्टानियथाज्ञानेन नित्यम्: ॥**)

When we have thus acquired a certain amount of control over our desires, we are in a position to trace our evil tendencies to their roots in ignorance or false beliefs. The consideration of the consequences of satisfying the desires has thrown doubt on the validity of the ideas which gave rise to them and the new doctrine of the spirit has some chance of getting a hearing. This truth has been beautifully expressed in *Bhagavadgītā* III, 40, where the Divine Teacher, enlarging on the mischievous nature of Desire (**काम**), says that it is seated in the senses (in the form of impulse to action), in the *Manas* (in the form in which we recognise it as Desire) and in the *Buddhi* (in the form of ignorance or false belief), and He goes on to advise his disciple to direct his effort first to the control of the senses and then proceed to slay this enemy of

true knowledge. Wrong action, evil desire and false belief are thus one and the same thing expressing itself in different ways and we now see why the student is called upon to satisfy certain moral requirements before he can qualify for the study of philosophy. The ancient teachers made their disciples go through a period of strict discipline before they introduced them to the study of *Adhyātmavidyā*, the spiritual lore. A true doctrine is rightly expected to carry conviction to every one, but it demands, on the part of the student, openness to facts and a certain provisional faith. Only these can secure to the new doctrine that careful and fair consideration which is an indispensable condition of the perception of its truth.

The fulfilment of the moral requirements is important in another way also. As long as a man continues to be keenly interested in the objects of sense and expects satisfaction from these, he will not be inclined to tread the difficult and tiresome path of philosophy. Reading of philosophical books, listening to lectures and constant meditation are sufficient to exhaust the patience of a man soon if he is not intent on the solution of life's problems as the only means of attaining success in life. The origin of philosophical reflection, as pointed out in the first *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, is to be found in man's uneasiness and dissatisfaction with the usual means of removing it. A change of values is therefore necessary for giving us that keenness of interest in philosophy, which will bear up our spirits during the toilsome journey. In the *Yogabhashya* (on *Yogasūtra* I,12) the mind is compared to a river with two channels leading in opposite directions, one towards the objects of sense and the other towards the soul. It is only when the former channel is stopped that the river of the mind begins to flow through the other which leads it to salvation. As this condition is so difficult of fulfilment, we find only one in a million, if at all, sincerely taking to the path of the spirit.

But if fortunately a man perceives the hollowness of the common objects of pursuit and enters upon the path of true

knowledge, his moral progress continues along the lines of self-control and benevolence. The thought that his real self is distinct from the body and the senses (both external and internal) begins to occupy his mind and gradually becomes effective in modifying his desires and behaviour. He is now less prone than before to seek satisfaction in the things which are pleasing to the senses as he knows that they do not affect the real self. This makes self-control easier. Perfect self-control, of course, comes only with the clearest perception of the truth. As the *Bhagavadgītā* (II, 59) says “विषया विनिवर्तन्ते निराहारस्य देहिनः । रसवर्जं रसोऽप्यस्य पश्यदृष्टवानिवर्तते .” Again the thought that the same self is running through all the apparently different beings in the universe has the effect of gradually making his sympathies wider. He comes to identify himself with an ever-widening circle of beings and this in an increasing degree. Thus he becomes more and more benevolent. Every idea, as we know from modern psychology, tends to pass into action and if it does not actually do so the explanation is to be found in the presence of another and a conflicting idea. The existence of the latter is many times undetected as it is working, not directly, but through its impressions on the mind and we are not conscious of these. An idea can be said to have left the mind only when its impressions also are effaced. Hence in the *Yogasūtra* II, 33, a man who has resolved upon exercising self-control in the matters of sex, money and injury to others, but who finds that his mind is yet troubled by evil desires, is advised to dwell upon the opposite ideas. When the impressions of these latter become stronger than their opponents, then only the difficulty of self-control is overcome.

The last stage of this progress is said to be marked by the enjoyment of unbounded bliss owing to the realisation of the infinite self and the consequent fulfilment of the one supreme desire in man. The hedonists in Europe tried to introduce unity into the world of man's desires by saying that the one ultimate object of human desire was pleasure, other things being desired

only as means. Their attempt was a failure and the confusion underlying their theory has been pointed out by many. But it can be maintained that the self is the only ultimate object of desire, everything else being desired owing to a false identification with it. Every man is, therefore, seeking the enlargement of his self every moment of his life and this process ends only when he comes to know that his self is really infinite. Then he is completely satisfied and free from all desires. He can be said to have conquered all the worlds and to have gained all the desires of man. As the *Chhândoggyopanishad* (8,12,6) puts it “स सर्वांश्च लोकानाप्नोति, सर्वांश्चकामान्यस्तमात्मानमुविश्वविजानाति.” When a man has reached this condition he is said to be a *Jivanmukta*, “freed while yet living,” and there is no further problem for him to solve.

The logical conclusion from this is that he is no longer subject to the rules of behaviour which are binding on other men, and the sense of duty, in so far as it involves a sense of constraint, has disappeared from his mind. For rules are binding only as long as something is to be gained by observing them or lost by not observing them. But the man who has realised the Self and is freed from all desires has nothing to hope for or to fear. Hence we find Indra saying in the *Kaushitakibrahman-upanishad* (III, 1) “No sin, however heinous—be it matricide, patricide, theft or child-murder—can take away from me what I have gained or dim the lustre of my face.” Such passages have led some people to imagine that the man of realisation may behave against the rules of morality and many so-called Sadhus take advantage of this by asking their disciples not to judge their conduct by ordinary standards of morality as they have risen above all rules and criticism. This is the trick by which they make their followers blind to their weaknesses and sins. It is even maintained by some that there is no necessary connection between knowledge and behaviour and that the former cannot, therefore, be inferred from the latter.

But as has already been pointed out, there is an intimate

relation between a man's belief and his action. If action does not follow belief, we must seek an explanation for it and it can only be found in the presence of a conflicting idea. The man of realisation is free from all doubts and errors. Hence, though there will be no feeling of moral compulsion in him, yet, as all the evil (*viz.*, ignorance) in his nature has been eradicated, he will behave morally as a matter of course. As we read in the *Manusmriti* (XII, 118), "He who sees all in himself cannot be inclined towards the evil." Once we are convinced that all evil desires have their origin in ignorance of the real nature of the self and of its relations to other things, we can easily see that these desires must disappear along with their cause. Hence we can safely take a man's conduct as an index to his belief. Only we must not form a hasty judgment. If a close observation of a man's behaviour during a sufficiently long period shows that he has some or all the weaknesses of ordinary men, we can be sure that he has not realised his self. In his *Bhashya* on the first *Brahmasutra*, Shankaracharya has considered the objection that so many who profess to know the all-pervading Spirit, behave just like other men, being subject to the same passions and feelings. He says in reply that, if their behaviour is not modified, we may be sure that they have not realised the Spirit, and appeals to the Law of Causation in support of his conclusion. What people so often forget is that realisation does not consist merely in learning (*Shravana*) certain conclusions from books or persons. Most of those who profess to know the self have only made themselves familiar with certain technical terms by reading and listening. They have not even gone through the next stage of the path of knowledge, *viz.*, *Manana* which consists in justifying to oneself what one has heard by reconciling it with one's own experience and thus clearing it of doubts and objections. It is at this stage that the two conflicting beliefs come face to face and the fight begins. But even if *Manana* is successful and the old beliefs seem to be worsted, the fight is not finished. During the period of our study, the false beliefs may appear to have retired from

the mind, but they return as soon as our study ends and our dealings with other men and things begin. Then they return perhaps with a vengeance and carry everything before them. This is how the inconsistency between a man's professed beliefs and his behaviour arises and in order to remove it we must go through the third stage of the path of knowledge, *viz.*, *Nididhyasana* or constant dwelling on the truth. In the way already explained, this weakens the hold of erroneous beliefs on the mind and finally sets the mind free from them. What is called "realisation" comes only after this most important and difficult stage, *i.e.*, only after the conflict of ideas has altogether ceased. Hence there can be no longer any inconsistency between knowledge and behaviour.

This sweeping statement requires one slight qualification. Even after full conviction has been attained, emotions and actions inconsistent with it may make their appearance by the sheer force of habit. A man who is of a naturally irritable temperament may show signs of anger on his face and in his behaviour but the emotion is only a rapidly passing wave and disappears soon. No continued fit of anger, fear, grief or jealousy is consistent with the knowledge of the Spirit, as has already been seen. As soon as the emotion comes, it is seen to be out of place and may, therefore, be called, in a sense, unreal. Of course, even this cannot arise except from an erroneous belief but the error is perceived at once and cannot play further mischief. Hence it is often compared to a burnt seed which cannot grow into a plant. We must be careful not to overrate the effect of what is called *Prārabdha Karma* on our conduct. The original and the main source of sin is ignorance. When this is removed, in the way and to the extent above indicated, what remains is only the force of habit which has already lost most of its energy. Whether it is the *Prārabdha* that is determining the conduct of a particular man or it is his ignorance can be known by the careful observer after some experience of him in different circumstances.

We now know what Indra meant by saying that the worst sins had no power to injure him. He could not mean that the wise man would ever commit these crimes but only that even if he did commit them, he would remain free from all taint. In other words, Indra is trying to impress upon his disciple the purifying effect of knowledge by taking these extreme cases. We can certainly conceive rare situations in which a wise man may have to kill his parents or children but he would do so only if the imperative call of duty demands it of him.

Morally good behaviour is thus seen to be only another side of intellectual excellence which we have found to be the same as spiritual excellence. A man may be ignorant of spiritual matters in the technical sense but if he is sincerely benevolent we can say that he is blind to the apparent differences which divide men, and keenly alive to the common spiritual element. Moral progress may thus be said to be a necessary condition and also an inevitable expression of spiritual uplift.

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A PSYCHOLOGICAL ENQUIRY INTO RELIGIOUS MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

By

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INTRODUCTION.

For a long time religious phenomena were taken for granted on authority and faith. It was only late in the nineteenth century that thoughtful writers began to apply scientific methods even in the secluded realm of religion. The first attempts were to study religious experience in general, and it was in 1882 that Dr. Stanley Hall published in the *Princeton Review* his article "The Moral and Religious training of Children and Adolescents." Dr. Arthur H. Daniels followed it up with his article on "The New Life—A Study of Regeneration." The author gives a few statistics, not very conclusive, to prove Dr. Hall's statement that conversions are most frequent in the adolescent period. Soon various thinkers entered wholeheartedly into the study of religious experience in all its various phases. Religious biographies and autobiographies were analyzed and studied, question circulars were used in the study—notably by Dr. Starbuck and Dr. Thorndike among others. Experimental methods were applied even in such a subject as the study of "religious values." (One noteworthy example is given in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XII).

Gradually the psychology of religion was looked at purely from the scientific point of view and there was practically no sphere of religion left over that was not experimentally handled,

even from such subjects as "soul" and person to those of religious values and prayer. But mysticism was one of the subjects that was scientifically studied very late. First, the chief data of mysticism were gathered from literary records of one sort or another. But psychology profits directly, however, from records of introspective impressions and valuations. The search for witness to supposed mystical revelations common to all religions brought to light deep contrasts within mysticism itself, and between it and the non-mystical. [*The Quest Series* : Abelson, J., "The Jewish Mysticism;" Nicholson, R.A., "The Mystics of Islam;" and Rhys-Davids, "Buddhist Psychology" place side by side the different kinds of mystical union (Jewish, Christian and Muslim).]

Another profound difference between the types came to light in an attempt to evaluate mysticism for modern life. Alongside of nature-mysticism and contemplative mysticism, both of which tended to make individuality illusory, there stood a personal mysticism. Gradually it was realized that there were violent differences of type in what was called mystical. In view of such a situation, the detailed descriptions of experiences even from the ecclesiastical point of view, either Catholic (Poulain, A., "The Graces of Interior Prayer") or Protestant (Buckham, "Mysticism and Modern Life"), (Dean Inge, "Christian Mysticism") had great value. Underhill in "Mysticism—A study of the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness," has attempted to prove the view that mysticism entered Christianity through neo-Platonism.

Next, on almost all hands, there came to be asserted the continuity of mystical experiences with the common life. Ames in his "Mystical Knowledge" gave functional analysis and found that mysticism arose from the same impulses as science, but that it sought to satisfy them by a short-cut method. Rufus Jones in "Mysticism in Present-day Religion" saw in the experience not a "way" of either knowledge or life but rather a more effective use of ordinary resources.

From the opinion that mysticism is a set of fantastic doctrines, psychology first advanced to the view that it is a set of pathological phenomena. Leuba and others in their writings have brought this out, however, stating that side of the experience is not pathological. To-day we are distinctly beyond this position. Even extreme mystics attain a more stable will, a more firmly organised personality by means of their mystical practices. Hence many religious psychologists have begun to study the psychology of mystic experience from the modern scientific point of view.

Perhaps no term is misunderstood more than that of mysticism. Those who are mystics hold the term to express that which is of value in life, while those who deride mysticism find no value in it. The term is used with reverence and with disgust according to the point of view of the scholar. But there must be some ground upon which a common understanding can be reached or some satisfaction, and yet not too broad an interpretation given to the term. Doubtless in many cases, the controversy is not about the same experience, but with the view of studying the writings of some of the present-day mystics to learn what is the mystical experience which they describe, and to compare this with what has been attacked by some psychologists as mysticism. These men have tapped vital sources of energy and have a reality in their religion which is much in need to-day. If instead of being accused of having an abnormal religion, mystics prove to be receiving their energies from the real source of inspiration, then mysticism can make a much-needed contribution to religion, even in a day when religion must stand in the spotlight of science.

In metaphysics the term 'mysticism' is encountered as opposed to reason. Bertrand Russell¹ states that metaphysics has been developed from the first by the union and conflict of

¹ *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 8.

two very different human impulses, the one urging men toward mysticism and the other toward science. For him mysticism is a little more than a certain intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed about the universe. Russell finds that the philosophers in history have been divided between the camps of mysticism and of logic. Despite the fact that he does not believe reason to be a creative force and that intuition cannot meet the needs of a philosophy, he concludes that scientific philosophy comes nearer to objectivity than any other human pursuit and gives us therefore the closest and most intimate relation with the outer world that it is possible to achieve. But it must be remembered that the work of science and reason can give us but inference to what the outer world is. Men have always sought for some reality, but inference does not give reality, only approximation. Henry Bergson tells us that there are two ways of getting knowledge about an object. By moving around it, by collecting data about it, by considering it in the light of reason, the object may be approached but only relatively. But there is another way of knowing an object, and that is, by entering into it. Bergson's contribution has been his great emphasis upon intuition. By intuition and not by reason may an object be absolutely known. Bergson defines intuition as the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and therefore inexpressible.¹ In epistemology the question thus becomes,—by what means is knowledge derived, and how is the most accurate knowledge derived? In an age when science is the spokesman and final authority, the philosophy of Kant that the thing-in-itself cannot be known is sometimes overlooked, for, a scientific philosophy is looked upon by many as the source of the most accurate knowledge. But there are some philosophers who would call attention to the fact that even science has its limitations and would suggest other approaches to the problems of metaphysics

¹ *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 6.

and epistemology. According to Professor Lyman, the great concepts of personality, prayer, democracy, faith, and God come as intuitions, and as such they may be experienced. This does not imply hostility to the method of logic or even suggest opposition to it, but rather does it imply that there are various roads of travel—towards the goal which are being sought.

The contrast between Russell and Bergson presents the division which underlies the search for truth. If this diversity of approach is found in philosophy and metaphysics, it is not surprising that men would interpret religious experience in different terms and find it in different fields.

The term 'mysticism' has many meanings and is used to express various experiences. Most of the attacks upon the term are due to its historical connotation, and have been caused by the light which psychology has shed upon religion, and the retrenchment which followed. The searchlight of science has been turned upon religion, psychology has caused religion to cling to that which is real and to forsake that which is false and has thus aided religion in its search for a foundation upon which to stand. But can psychology say that the experiences of religion can be explained and reduced to explicable terms? There are some psychologists who would say that man and God do not commune, that man does not experience God. What do the mystics of the present day answer?

The historical meaning of mysticism has been the psychic experience which manifested itself in trances, visions, voices and hysteria, and through which the Divine gave his message to man. Paul on the road to Damascus was suddenly blinded, fell to the earth and a voice spoke unto him, "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?" Paul evidently was not aware of his immediate environment, but was wrapped up in the experience which he was undergoing. That experience was an experience of God for him. It was accompanied by a pronounced psychological and physiological manifestation. As such it would readily fall into that class of experiences which

have historically been called mystical. But to-day that term is being used to describe experiences which do not have these outward and striking phenomena: no voices are heard, no visions are seen, no abnormality is displayed, marked ecstasy is not always found, and yet God is reported as having been experienced. Even these mystics are unwilling to have their experience classed with those of the pronounced and abnormal type, for they claim their experience to be one of everyday and normal expression.

Many more definitions and formulations of the mystical experience and of mysticism might be given.¹ Although an exact common denominator cannot be expected, perhaps some light might be thrown on the problem by considering those elements which are in common. The mystical experience is an individual experience. When mystical states are well developed they are and have the right to be absolutely authoritative over the individual to whom they come, but no authority emanates from them which should make it a duty for those who stand outside to accept these revelations uncritically.² But even if it is acknowledged that these are individual experiences, there may be some aspects which are common enough to be taken as signs and concomitants of the mystical experience.

One of the most common claims, as shown by the definitions given above and by mystics in general, is that their experience gives them *union with reality*, in contrast to the transient sense-experience. Sensations make us aware of objects in our environment; the more numerous and the more intense these sensations, the more prominent becomes the object. That there is another means of knowing outer world than by the sensation is the claim of mysticism. As *William James* states in his chapter on the

¹ Recejac, James, Addison, Delacroix, Von Hugel, Mrs. Herman, Flournoy, Buckham and others.

² James, *Varieties*, p. 424.

"Reality of the Unseen" in the "*Varieties*," it is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call "something there," more deep and more general than any of the special and particular senses by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed. That this reality may vary with the mystical experiences as described is true, but whatever the experience may be, the one thing which it contributes is a "feeling of intimacy with something which is beyond time, something which is real."

This feeling of intimacy is immediate. This is at the heart of mysticism. Nothing is between the individual and the Reality with whom he communes. And as he is certain of this immediacy, he is also certain that there is a response from the Reality. The mystic is ready to admit that he cannot always in fact frequently, cannot tell at all, what the communication is, but he is certain that there is a response. As the doctor feels the pulse of his patient and is certain that there is life in the patient, so can our senses tell us of the life in other people, but not so with the mystic. He is in such immediate contact with the other, that were the same analogy carried out as set forth above, he would be supplied by the pulse of the other—so intimate would be the contact. There is nothing to separate the individual and his source of inspiration.

In a mystical experience *there is a unity of the self.* Although the life may have many selves which are striving for supremacy, there may be a struggle within, there may be conflicting motives, one must win out. The self becomes unified. This unity reaches out, touches and becomes unified with an even greater self. As is often quoted, the mystic then knows that "This is He," the one for whom he has been seeking. He is no longer himself, but becomes one with God. As Paul said, "It is no longer I who live, but Christ who dwells in me." Paul's mysticism was a Christ or a Spirit mysticism, for it was

Christ with whom he became united. He felt that Christ had taken possession of his life, he lived and died with Christ. The union was complete.

In this experience the attractions of the senses are diminished, and in the complete stages time is no more. Though the feeling may be but for a short time, as far as the individual is concerned, time does not exist. As a book may become so fascinating and attractive that one does not hear the clock strike, and pays no notice to the passing hours and is undisturbed by minor attractions, so in a greater degree are all of the attractions of sense eliminated for him who feels himself in touch with God.

As mentioned above, the *experience is often ineffable*. There are human feelings which cannot be adequately expressed. When a loved one has died and a friend extends his sympathy, one may try to express something which cannot be fully expressed. Something remains unsaid. Poets have attempted to record their feelings as they have stood by the Grand Canyon, or watched the sun go down beyond a still lake, or have seen the sun break through the mist which overlhangs Mt. Blanc, or listened to the rush of Niagara Falls, but when anyone experiences one of these for himself, he knows the poet has not expressed all. When the mystic has communed with God, he has even a greater feeling of wonderment and he cannot express to himself even the experience he has passed through.

But he has received an emotional uplift which he cannot forget. He comes back to the common world, after having traversed a strange land. After a vacation or a trip abroad, the old home seems different. It is not the same place. The mystics quoted above find this the driving power which they need for life. Life would be stereotyped and dull, were it not for these times when they see the world from Mount Everest, and then descend to work in the valleys. When turning a problem over in the mind, everyone has had the experience of giving it up and turning to something else, when suddenly a new light will flash

the problem will be solved completely, just as Minerva sprang from the head of Jupiter, and as symphonies came to the great composer, Mozart. The very basis of the belief that Minerva sprang from the head of the gods had insights which brought great results, which gave greater usefulness, which were at the foundations of life and which were other than that of cold reason. Otherwise, why should not Minerva come by the ordinary process of generation, at least in point of time? Insights are at the basis of life.

A VERIFICATION OF MYSTIC EXPERIENCE.

This brings us to the *question of the verification of the mystic experience*. How does he know he is in communion with God, that he is touching reality and his experience is not an illusion, that he is not communing with himself or a projection?

Rufus M. Jones advances three reasons for an answer to this question.¹ These experiences come from beyond the margin of his individual me;² there is something in the content of his experience which transcends anything that normally belongs to him in his finiteness;³ these experiences possess an impelling coercive power, a higher unification of life than he ordinarily knows.⁴ These, of course, do not settle the validity of the experience. The individual experiences which involve faith, and which cannot furnish objectifiable facts can settle the reality of God for none other than the individual. No empirical evidence of any sort can answer the question of the reality of God, and to all time men will be called upon to exercise faith, and "to make their venture in the light of what ought to be true, and in the light of what seems to them to be true, and to live by that faith." If what ought to be true, cannot be true, man is in a

¹ *Studies in Mystical Religion*, XXVII.

² *Inner Life*, p. 189.

³ *F. E. O. L.*, p. 23.

⁴ *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. VI, p. 357

hopeless dilemma, but faith does not leave man in such a precarious position.

But we do not believe these experiences are subjective. "Such experiences minister to life, construct personality, and are conducive to the increased power of the race. Energy to live by actually does come to them from somewhere. The universe backs up experience." (*Studies in Mystical Religion*.) As quoted above the best support for the reality of such experiences is what men will do, will suffer, will undergo because of the experience of God. After all is not this the highest test for any experience?

Our contention is that here is a form of experience which implies one of two things. Either there is a far great complexity to the inmost nature of the personal self-consciousness than we usually take account, that is that we ourselves are bottomless and inwardly exhaustless in range and scope, or the fragmentary thing we call our self is continuous inwardly with a wider spiritual world with which we have some sort of relationship and from which vitalizing energy comes to us. It looks as though God were within reach, and as though at moments we were at home with Him.¹

In testing the experience of the mystic as to the objectivity and reality, a philosophical problem is involved. It goes beyond the question of "what does the mystic have faith in and with what does he commune" to whether these are real. We cannot prove in the scientific sense from these rare inrushes and mystical openings that there is an actual spiritual environment surrounding us, but we believe this to be the best hypothesis for the explanation of the experiences of life. We see no good reason for limiting the boundary of the self to the experiences of the ordinary senses and not making the individual continuous with a larger self. Just because we cannot see all of the colour which must be beyond the red and violet ends of the spectrum by our

¹ *Journal of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 181.

sight, we do not deny the existence of such. These concern facts, and why not the same of ideal values? Jones believes that the most important philosophical issue of our time is on this question: "Whether values, ideal values by which we live, are spun of our heads, dreams of our own imagining, or whether they are objectively real, universally valid, sprung from the eternal nature of things, and thus grounded in that spiritual Reality from which the whole visible order has proceeded."¹

It is for this reason that Jones does not see any difficulty in the use of the terms "autonomic" or "projection," although he believes that these terms should be applied to abnormal and pathological phenomena and not the religious experiences which are the highest indications of health and normality. Modern psychology according to some interpreters finds nothing mysterious in the phenomena of the mystical experience. Professor Coc states that the "mystical revelation can be traced down to the formal conditions, physiological and psychological, of the mystic himself."² Likewise, Haydon³ states that all the phases, from the milder sense of presence to the ecstatic trance fit somewhere into the formulæ of psychological science. The actual psycho-physical mechanism of the experience is sufficiently accounted for by the activity of the fringe of consciousness or the sub-conscious by auto-suggestion or hypnosis, by unification of discordant elements of consciousness, or by the many phenomena of dissociation of personality. That the experience has a natural explanation may be taken for granted but what of the truth immediately realized in the experience? This simply explains that process and the outer experience which the individual has. It is the same answer Jones gives when he uses different terms. That auto-suggestion may be only another way of saying that God and man are conjunct, and that in the depths of soul,

¹ *Studies in Mystical Religion*, p. xxxiii.

² *Varieties*, p. 422.

³ *Religious Consciousness*, p. 458.

beyond our power of knowing how Divine Suggestions may come to human consciousness.¹

So ultimately the question comes back to where James viewed it when he said, "It must always remain an open question whether mystical states may not possibly be such superior points of view, windows through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world."² As also Professor Pratt³ adds, "while it is hopeless to look to the mystical experience for a proof of anything transcendent, nothing it can say should prevent the religious man who wishes to be perfectly loyal to logic and to truth, from seeing in his own spiritual experiences the genuine influence of the living God."

So even if the mystic does not receive revelation in the terms of facts which these mystics do not claim, yet *there is something contributed by the experience. There is a unifying fusing and intensifying of the self.* A soothing of a troubled self. Perhaps a unification of a dissociated personality. As Jones states, "It is the sudden transcendence of our usual fragmentary island of reality and the momentary discovery of the whole to which we belong." This enhances the life of the individual by the liberation of energy, and there is a consciousness of power to meet the problems of life. He has a driving enthusiasm for his daily work. Even those who would reduce mysticism to its minimum would admit this, that the mystical experience adds an emotional driving power, a glow of worth and enthusiasm to whatever religious interpretation of the world the mystic may adopt. A touch of mysticism and the most coldly rational view of reality takes on life and interest.

So long as religion is an affair between God and man, so long as man looks to an ideal for help and succour, then man and God will attempt to commune with each other. As James states,

¹ *Harvard Theol. Review*, Vol. 8, p. 105.

² *Varieties*, p. 379.

³ *Journal of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 608.

whenever we deal with personal things we are dealing with realities. This type of personal religion and communion is personal reality. James also states that personal religious experience has its roots and centre in mystical states of consciousness." Likewise, Buckham in an article on 'Mysticism and Personality' contends that "there is something mystical in all real and personal intercourse when it rises above the merely physical and gregarious level." Whenever the religious consciousness takes the form of direct communion with the spiritual world we have a degree of mysticism. This is using the term not in its historical sense, but rather in one of the meanings which Jones gives to it, namely direct communion with God. This is more than religious experience as the latter is generally understood, because religious experience may or may not involve direct communion with God and the sense of the presence of God, and may or may not have a joyous feeling of being at home in the universe and really enjoying the sonship. Religion is alive only so long it issues from the centre of personal consciousness and has a throb of personal experience in it. Such a man's religion is an inward, first-hand conviction, rooted and grounded in experience, a religion which makes religious experience mystical experience. The type of personal religion is mysticism.

Inner personal religion need not be mystical, but when it rises to such heights, there are made possible an intensity in religion for personal and social creativity, and moral vigour of untold power. These springs of energy are within reach to-day as they have been in times past. Religious geniuses have been able to draw their source of power therefrom. And why should not power come from there now?

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NYĀSA-VIDYĀ

BY

K. C. VARADACHARI, M.A.

Nyāsa¹ Vidyā or *Ātmasamarpaṇa* Yoga has been the special practice of the Vaishnavites of South India and of some of the Tantrics also. The claim of the *Rāmānuja-Gītā-Bhāṣya* was that the Gītā propounded in its ultimate synthesis this Yoga rather than the Jñāna or Karma or even the Bhakti Yoga. But this point is more clearly made out by Śrī Vedānta-Deśika in his *Tātparyya-candrikā*, a gloss on the former. It is the opinion of some people that the distinct contribution of Vedānta-Deśika to the Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita was this theory of Nyāsa, and that Rāmānuja vaguely hinted at it in his works.

Nyāsa is not as much a theory but a practice, and is not as much a practice as an act of surrender to the Highest a man feels governing him internally and powerfully, and sustaining him through life, through death, through eternity. It is an act of effacement, a merging of one's personality in the Higher personality, one's individuality in a higher Individual. Almost a complete way of such a surrender and the incident development of such a consciousness is sketched out by Śrī Vedānta-Deśika in one of the chapters of his monumental work the *Rahasyatraya-sāra*.² It is interesting from two points of view. Firstly, it sketches the ideal of action which closely corresponds with the theory of Christ, of non-resistance to Evil, and secondly, it sketches the theory of a new kind of Yoga for the

¹ Vide Note on p. 333.

² Ch. XV, *Śvaśiṣṭhābhijñānādhikāra*. This chapter it will be interesting to know corresponds at certain points in its development and method to the small but epoch-making brochure of Aurobindo Ghose, namely '*Yoga and its Objects*.'

attainment of supramental status and bliss. The two theories are now having their expression from such great men as Gandhi and Aurobindo Ghose, and therefore it is not out of place to add this as an ancient contribution to a modern problem.

The very knowledge of our actual nature, dependence upon world-life, relations and our final goal is enough, says Deśika, to make us feel the joy of consecrated life more than what actual freedom (*moksha*) might give. One should know the *svarūpa*, one's nature, *upāya*, the way, and *artha*, the thing to be attained, at least to a certain degree of certainty and be established steadily in such a consciousness. Such a steady cognizance that never falters at any stage is the *sine qua non* of any progress. (*Svarūpōyārtheshoavitathanivishṭa sthiramātēh.*) With this counsel of some true steadfastness born out of even a little of this knowledge (*svālpamāpyasya dharmasya*), one should try to grasp the peace that grows out of such a practice of knowledge. The individual religiously-awakened man is confident of his ideal which he recognizes as an immediate fact, call such an ideal God, power, or Kali or as 'that something in the marrow of the cosmic life from which we came and which laid this necessity upon us.' It is this recognition of religious feeling towards the object of expectation, and later, the actual realisation that not anything but the ideal itself is the path and the goal of all effort, and that everything else is subsidiary to that goal of all ideals and ends, that awakens the growing and living consciousness of perfection. Without this religious *conversion* there can be no progress on the path of ascent or realisation of intrinsic perfection.

The question then is—How should a man act or exercise himself to be fit for the path so to reach the intrinsic determination of his being? It is of course necessary that he should know that in the world of cosmos he is but a speck, a part, almost a very dependent and subordinate existence. With this terrible consciousness of his own humility to the whole and the ever-perfect to which larger status he aspires, he must develop

the sense of universality and true individuality. It is just possible that the very same thing which makes us realise our true and very dependent status, may yield the inferiority complex that egoistically affirms the whole cosmos as dependent upon his own existence. It is just this inferiority-complex that ought to be avoided by the wise man who seeks to grow into the Divine.

(i) The practical instruction is suggested in three stages : When any person laughs at or sneers at or abuses you, know that to be something which is a reflection on that which attaches or criticises not your true personality, the Ātman, but something that in the cosmic make-up has endowed you with some defect. He sneers at something that is not the Ātman. Comfort yourself in that knowledge. Secondly, know that in the world, the man that causes an evil to be done invites the evil defect on to himself when that evil is not reciprocated or returned in the knowledge that it is done to something that is not his true personality but to something that is *anātman* or as Buddha would say the *anatta*.¹

Thirdly, the person who thus through ignorance causes evil is more to be pitied, because he draws unto himself all the bad effects which such an act sets free or releases. This kindly feeling of sympathy to the foe or wrong-doer must be fostered in the act of knowledge. Nor should the person stop at that mere expression of sympathy. He should recollect that in the world of activity, it is activity ignorantly done that binds and destines each unto such acts of good or evil as one has evolved, and therefore a person cannot act otherwise than he has done or he shall do. All ignorant people are wheeled by a necessity and a divinity that shapes the world, and governed by such a stern necessity that no one can escape its law or rule. Out of such a knowledge and through constant practice of this outlook on life, the aspirant should develop a peace and equality (*samatvabhāva*)

¹ *Saṃyamānasya yatpāpam sapantamanugacchati.*

and joy that appreciates the universal movement, hating nothing, fearing nothing, and rejoicing in everything. If one is established in this state and acts in that knowledge at all moments, then he can be certain that he has got at self-mastery (*svarūpa-nishṭhā*). He is established in himself.

(ii) The second development on the path of attainment is the recognition of the Path and the Goal. The Upāya or the means is also to be known. The Highest Person or God or *Īśvara* alone and not any other person, however highly placed or endowed with virtues, can be the saviour of the devotee. In the words of Patañjali the *Īśvarapraṇidhānāt* is supremely a requisite consciousness. Not even on pain of death should the devotee surrender that consciousness of affection and consequent loyalty to the Divine Saviour, and His ability to save us through his *Śakti*. With that consciousness, one must be fearless of all accidents and events in life.¹ With that consciousness one must be able to say that only the divine presence and command make him refuse to destroy, even though having the power to so destroy, his opponents without the express will of God.²

It is with the same consciousness and religious reverence one must also know that such a procedure as the previous, namely destruction of the unrighteous and evildoers, is inconsistent with the supremacy and is questioning of the power of the supreme Being.³ These three stages of fearlessness, supremacy of the *Īśvara*, and essential dependence of the individual on the *Īśvara*, a superiority which the individual

¹ Śrī Vedānta-Deśika here quotes the instance of how Śrī Sītā behaved during her exile. The whole Rāmāyaṇa has got according to the Vaiṣṇavas an esoteric meaning. The whole life of Sītā is an instruction as to how a devotee has to behave in life towards the Divine.

Guṇajapvā vikṣhepa sūpham vā vyāghraṃ vāpi varānaṇi, nābhinnyati samprāsani bālū Rāmasya samāritā.

² Asapdeśātu Rāmasya tapascānupapālanāt, natvāmkurmidasagriva bhasmārha tejaś.

³ Śaraistu samkulūp kṛtvā laṅkāṃ parabalārdanaḥ,
Māp nayed yadi kākutsthas tat tasya sadṛśam bhavet,

ought to reverence, and which dependence he must more and more correct and foster, not through servility, but through imitation, so to use to the level of equal behaviour with the Divine, all these stages which lead to that wonderful consummation and fruition and richness of perfect experience. That stage is reached when one does not attempt to save oneself, or seek to destroy others, but only is intent on hearing the command and exalt the power into whose hands he has surrendered through that life-giving knowledge which knows no caste, no limitation, and no regulated method. This path of Direct ascent is the surest path through which one attains to the Higher Consciousness and Absolute Unity with the Highest.

Having sketched out the threefold way of realisation of one's self-hood as a universality and passive instrument in the world for the functioning of the Divine, having also shown that the Divine ought to be worshipped in threefold ways of absolute trust in His Strength and Superiority, Knowledge and Governance, Vedānta Deśika conveys the third instruction as to the way of life till that Life is realised completely.

In the practice of these things, there is of course the necessity for earning one's livelihood. The Nyāsa Vidyā does not counsel the path of sanyāsin-hood which seeks to make every man carry his begging bowl. On the other hand, it says that "nothing can happen without effort and all effort can give only that which we deserve." This is also the view enunciated by the famous sloka of the *Gīta* which Tilak makes so much of, "to work you have the right but not the fruits thereof."¹

As such one should not either get dispirited or disappointed, but hope that all things are happening for the best of each individual according to the Will of the Divine. He awakens to the divine consciousness that all are channels of the divine power consciously, or unconsciously, and that there is no meaning in acting for anything that is against the most noble and

¹ Karmaṇyevādhikāraste mā phaleṣhu kadāchanaḥ.

the best. It is this shifting of the plane of ordinary activity to the cosmic heights that transforms and transvalues all values in the world. Already with the dawn of the immediate consciousness and recognition of the intimate bond that is very flexible in its different relationships, so as to make the relation convertible to any human relation of wife or husband, father and son, brother and sister or brother and brethren, friend and relative, *Guru* and *Sishya*, mother and son or even master and servant. In any relation the bond can work, the bondage transforms itself into a very significant bond of affection and reciprocal Love. God can no more refuse to give his Love, than you can reconcile your life without His stimulating intensive presence in yourself. One must enter into the duties of his order daily with the everpresent consciousness that though duty ought to be done, yet it is as an interesting piece of work, to the divine. The food that he takes is verily the result of his sacrifice to the God of his Love. But his sacrifice is everything that is earned through good and true methods. Abandoning all that are impossible of getting lest they should yield displeasure and attachment to objects other than the Divine, one should keep a steady intent and peaceful meditative mind, neither sorrowful nor glad, about one's failure or success about what may turn out. The little pinpricks in the daily life merely strengthen powers of steadiness. The only eagerness that points its finger to the Ocean of Bliss that is perfection should take hold of the *Jogin* on the path of *Nyāsa*. His works are worship.

With this eagerness for the Divine supramental experience, all fear of the future, all fear and revolt against the present, all anger against the past and the future will vanish. Such is the initial and final evolution of the method of *Nyāsa*-consciousness. *Nyāsa* means the absolute surrender of the burden of all individual experience (*bhāra*) at the altar of the Divine Life and consciousness, for the sake of his expressing His own Uniqueness being unhampered by the limitations of the individual's egoism,

emotion, vital being and memories. It is the invitation of Life to Life to fulfil itself in and through the individual channel consciously for the double fruition of the *Īvara* and the *Jiva*. It is this initial surrender and aspiration to the level of equal enjoyment and richness of experience that awakens the soul-chords in the Divine and strangely, powerfully and in and through easy and direct lines, leads, sustains, and powerfully alters all the past, all the future, and lifts the self to higher planes of immediate consciousness of His own Supreme status (*Parama Padu*).

This is the willing, free and absolute renunciation, *sannyāsa*, not the giving up of life and its activities, not the giving up of fire and Yajña, as Śrī Krishna aptly remarks criticising the *Sannyāsa* of the orthodox type. It is also spoken of as *Bhāraṇyāsa*, which is one of the foremost practices of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavites in South India.

Note on Nyāsa.

Nyāsa according to the Tantra Śāstra comes from the root 'to place' and means accordingly the 'placing the tips of the fingers and palm of the right hand on various parts of the body accompanied by particular *mantra*. By Nyāsa one places the different *mantras*, words and letters at the specified places so as to invoke the Deity in such forms at each of those places: "By Nyāsa (the *sādhaka*) places his *abhishṭa-devatā* in such parts and by *vyāpaka* Nyāsa he spreads its presence throughout himself. He becomes permeated by its losing himself in the Divine Self. Nyāsa is also of use in effecting the proper distribution of the *Shaktis* of the human frame in their proper positions so as to avoid the production of discord and distraction in worship. Nyāsa as well as Āsana are necessary for the production of the desired state of mind and of *chitta śuddhi* (its purification)" (*Introduction to the Mahānirvāṇa tantra*.—A. Avalon, pp.cxi). It would be seen that the meaning Deśika develops out of Nyāsa is that of placing oneself at the entire disposal of the Divine (*vyāpaka nyāsa* as it were) so as to fulfil life as He, the Supreme Nārāyaṇa, wills with the grace of Śrī.

ARCHETYPES AND INTRINSIC BEAUTY.

There are many problems of aesthetics, that find as many solutions but strangely there is one problem which has not had the fortune of being criticised with any amount of acuteness. This paper is intended to criticise that undiscussed problem, namely, the problem of archetypes.

Some of the greatest of artists have always held that true beauty consists in the representation of the archetypes or the perfections in the world of experience. Some of the artists have also held that it consisted in the true and exact representation of the actually perceived objects. And some of them held that it consisted in the specific inducement of the artistic product which lifted the perceiver to a higher degree of sympathy with the world of manifestation than the original has been capable of giving. There are still some others who hold that the beautiful is not limited to the desirable or the sensual appeal of a picture but also to the appreciation of the ugly and the terrible. In one sense all of them are right but all are partial views, except perhaps the third view which insists that beauty is not perfection of form but perfection of sympathy with creation and the artist can do only that much to lift us to the level of sympathy with the original through his representation and suggestion equal to his own. The beautiful character consists not so much in the representations of perfect types, as it is in the awakening of the life in each to respond to the life in all.

If then perfection of form is not the intrinsic meaning of beauty then what is the relation between beauty and the archetypes? Therefore we must be able to answer this question with some definiteness as on this subject there is so much of loose thinking. What are the archetypes and how can they be exemplified in existence? In the first place our ordinary notion of the archetypes is that they are something behind and beyond the forms that are exemplified in existence, the latter being their instances. They are the complete and

perfect prototypes of the particular kinds or genus which are exemplified in existence, through the fleeting and vanishing particulars. In the second place as they are behind the fleeting and vanishing particulars, they are eternal and unchanging. We are now strongly recalled to the view, or rather question, whether these are active or passive, or is the nature of their exemplification in existence of the nature of reflexion as Plato describes in his parable of the cave, or is it the inexhaustible activity of the Universal or essence which these archetypes are said to be, which descends into matter to make it beautiful and good and harmonious ?

In considering the dual nature of the archetypal conception, we see that the archetype is a general idea. And to be a general idea is to be merely a conceived descriptive label or symbol given to a perceived form exemplified by particular objects. This is the psychological standard stimulus, namely a general idea of form. General ideas thus are invaluable to thinking and acting in the world and therefore the general ideas ought not to be taken to be either the archetype or even existence. We never reach the idea of the perfect except through the intuition of it. We can never get at it by an observation of the passing and evolutionary forms, even though the latter have sufficient vitality and tenacity to persist as race-traits or characters so as to appear unchanged through even aeons of ages. The general idea is a psychological product and a biological instrument. It is the conservative influence of life-activity, and is also an expression of the evolutionary influences of life. The general ideas or concepts are merely the average of certain types of forms that recur in evolution, substantially accurate and consistent amalgams of the chief characters that persist in evolution through a long period of time or experience in innumerable representations, or rather, occurrences of particular types. The general idea is the psychological conception of the evolution of the archetypes in existence. Though we should not say that the general idea is not the conception of the archetypes, yet it is identical with the archetype, since archetypes are evolving entities *in the world*, and though by

themselves perfect, their exemplification or mirroring being timed the general idea of such series of representations is vitiated rightly by the character of evolving of the former.

Therefore the general idea is not identical with the archetype, but is merely the subjective composition of the innumerable occurrences of the representation of the archetype, an amalgam, an average arrived at by taking the common features of different numerically distinct objects, and therefore a reduction of the unique quality of the single.

No amount of experiments with the geological and biological reconstruction of the history of the evolution of a particular type will give the archetype, which is unique, individual and single in its perfection. The archetypes, undoubtedly conceived as products in the sense of being capable of intuition and realization in intuitive experience, are not amenable to inductive treatment and composition. They are realizable only by an imaginative effort, and are objective visualizations and perception for imagination.

It is true that the attainment to the levels of the archetypal vision is preceded by a careful scrutiny of the variant manifestations of the same but that is different from the really intrinsic imagination of the archetypes. The scrutiny of the general manifestations of the archetypes is not absolutely necessary but it serves a useful purpose, namely, that it marks out for us whether our intuition is absolutely lawless and vitiated by the several manifestations. After all, what is sought by the inductive treatment is a unique, single, the archetype, but what is something that is a mongrel offspring, which is neither the one nor the other. It is not the actual perceived unique single, nor is it the unique beauty of the perfect which is purely ideal and intuitional.

In the distinctive measure as the mongrel offspring is one or the other, the artistic product is judged and ranked.

It is held that artistic products are universally appreciated or condemned. It is true for the reason that the general actual occurrence of the several manifestations of the archetypes in the

world makes the general populace get the idea of the perfect, in some degree through them, and initiates their own hankering for perfection on such lines, though that is not the perfect in the absolute sense of archetypal perfection. For them the general mode is the criterion of judgment. Therefore there is a standard called the general idea, a social æsthetic criterion, but that is not really the absolute. The absolute criterion is intuitively realized but unexpressed in manifestation of the truly single experience of the archetypal.

The artists' creation is the artists' effort to arrive at the true and the real released from the merely factual (which are merely the instances or snatches of the really perfect at a moment of its manifestation) and the accurate and exact picturing of such a concept.

In one sense the archetypes remain merely the spectators of the world, and as it is (in a second sense), mirrored by a too willing and accommodating existence, it becomes the ordinary man's general idea—or particular—as the case may be. In the former sense they are, as Plato fully stressed, absolutely impeccable forms, full and therefore passive in their perfection, as Spinoza held it to be the case with his *Dei*, with no development in their character or nature. If they occur, it is by a process of reflexion or mirroring. But in the second sense, they are as Aristotle enunciated the forms that are never absent from existence and the mere matter. The merely formal are never available in existence. The second heaven is therefore an unnecessary appendage. But we find that both are legitimate conclusions and none of them are absolutely true, by themselves. Plato as the æsthetician *par excellence* suggests the utter perfection of the single and the impeccable form; Aristotle as the metaphysician and logician *par excellence* is the exponent of the general idea, and only acknowledges the final perfection of God as a necessary free formal existence. In both cases if they stress, as they did stress, the final reality of absolute form or archetypal perfection then they expound the non-existence of

the Absolute, and therefore truly become idealists of the first degree.

Our problem now is—Is there such a thing as absolutely beautiful? And if there is such a thing as that, is that identical with the archetype? On the first issue there can be no doubt that we do hold that there is such a thing as intrinsically beautiful and that this can be found only in the individual who recognizes and evokes in himself the beautiful. On the second issue we have to hold that it is because the archetypes are intrinsically perfect and absolutely ideal according to definition and in conclusion to the arguments advanced already—a definition that is fallacious in the same degree as the definition of straight line by Euclid—they are capable of being brought into existence and within manifestative limits by that life which animates us, because life is intrinsically simple and sympathetic. It is the perfect character fulfilled by the intrinsically simple experience of Life that gives to artistic products the appeal of beauty. For the beautiful is that which has the intrinsic capacity to soothe and make one sympathise with life and make us one with all that it pervades or manifests. The beautiful is not the mere perfect representation of the archetypes though it is not without the power to make us admire life. But admiration is not sympathy or being at oneness with life, though it happens that we sympathise with an object we invariably admire (or pity which is an inversion of the same feeling or emotion), especially with regard to brilliant things and persons. Brilliancy is the stimulus to appreciation and agreement and finally recognition of the beautiful. Forms either archetypal or imperfect, are thus the stimulus to feeling, being in their character desirable or ugly according to the perfectness or disproportionateness of the original. They do not form the essential significance of the object. This significance is an exclusive character of life that manifests the forms and evolves them and weaves them into the woof of the world.

In fact the unity with life that is displayed in an artistic

production by an artist who in his turn calls us to the unity of ourselves with that life, is the characteristic mark of genius and beauty. This characteristic is not individual and finite or even personal ; it is the unique quality of reality, and it is freedom from the bondage to the foci of individual perceptions, though the creation itself is an absolute creation of an individual artist.

In any future development of art then this question should be deeply borne in mind that the artist should not be bound to the archetypes or to the desirables, not even to the personal expressions, but to the ideal awakening of the sympathy with all life in all its harmony and divergence in emergence and evolution. Holding to the creative ideal of fulfilling life by drawing inspiration from its variant phases and manifestations he should create art for the sake of art and the universe. In the intuition of Life or 'Brahman' consists the future development of true and harmonious art, not in the contemplation of the biological ascents of form from the geological ages can be drawn the intuition of creative expression and mystic experience. That alone is the truly and integrally beautiful ; that alone is intrinsic beauty.



SECTION OF HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY : ITS FUNCTION, SIGNIFICANCE AND SCOPE

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

BY

DR. P. D. SHASTRI, I.E.S., *Vidyāsāgar*.

The history of philosophy is the sum total of the fundamental conceptions of man's views of the universe and his judgment of life and universal values. Whether we define philosophy as 'the pursuit of Absolute Truth,' or as 'the scientific treatment of the general questions relating to the universe and human life,' or as 'an inquiry into those values of universal validity which are the organising principle for all the functions of culture and civilisation and for all the particular values of life,' or as 'the study of wisdom and truth,' or after Kant as 'Begriffswissenschaft als Wissenschaft von den Prinzipien des Erkennens und Handelns,' in other words 'Vernunftserkenntnis aus blossen Begriffen,' or after Fichte as 'Wissenschaftslehre,' in other words 'Erkenntnis der gesamten Erkenntnis,' or after Schelling as 'eine absolute Wissenschaft,' or after Troxler and Steiner as 'Anthroposophie,' or after Hegel as 'denkende Betrachtung der Gegenstände' (Formal) and as 'Wissenschaft des Absoluten' (Material), whatever be our conception of the meaning, function and problem of Philosophy, the fact remains that no adequate study of philosophy is possible without its *history*. There was a time when such history was looked upon as a mere collection of the outbursts, reflections and confessions of individual thinkers or a mere catalogue of opinions of various sages about all kinds of subjects. A string of names was cited and we were asked to study the opinions of

those people without making any attempt to discover any inner relation between their various views or the influence exerted by their life on their philosophy and by their philosophy on their life, and without any attempt to study them in their general and special environments. That type of study of the history of philosophy based on an entirely erroneous view has long been abandoned, and we are happily in a better position to-day to understand the significance and function of the history of philosophy. It is a matter of general knowledge that it was Hegel who for the first time emphasised the importance of the history of philosophy, making it an independent science by itself. However fantastical may be his utterances in attempting to reduce God, Man and Nature into mere pulsations or dialectical movements of a single principle of thought, he doubtless rendered great service to philosophy in emphasising the idea of 'system' or 'organisation,' in his reflections on the philosophy of Right ('Recht'), in his conception of the value of negation, in his psychology of the rational and the real, and above all in his conception of the manifestation of the Absolute in *history*. The philosophy of history, which existed only in stray cogitations of the Greeks and some other thinkers of the mediaeval times, gained an importance and value of its own in Hegel, as human thought and action in its totality was looked upon as a movement of Reason in time, thereby constituting a rational history. According to this view, every historical event, the rise and fall of nations, the passing away of empires, the various types of civilisations, and even such events as the non-co-operation movement in India and the youth movement all over the world, could be adequately understood, if not quite solved, by a careful analysis of the situation as a whole, which must reveal the *raison d'être* of every movement. The history of philosophy thus becomes a necessary logical process through which Reason has gradually attained distinct consciousness and reached the form of 'Begriff.' Hegel accorded to the history of philosophy a recognition which it fully deserved, and made it a very

important and integral part of philosophy itself. Germany did not very much care for Hegelianism and practically kicked it out across the channel to her cousins in Great Britain, where it had a suitable reception and gradually permeated the academical atmosphere in the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Glasgow, Edinburgh and London. All the same, Germany did recognise in full the importance of a study of the history of philosophy, and made this subject occupy the most prominent place in all her universities. While most of our Indian universities pay little attention to the subject and sometimes require a study of metaphysics and its various schools and theories without any preliminary study of the history of philosophy, it is quite otherwise in the universities of Continental Europe, especially Germany. There every student must begin with a study of the history of philosophy and continue it throughout his four years of study along with the other branches he might take up later. Even in the oral test for their degree of 'Doktor,' they require a good knowledge of the history of philosophy and in fact call upon the candidates to discuss every problem first historically in its proper context before dealing with it critically.

Kucken aptly refers to the great value of a study of the thoughts of great thinkers in the introduction to his "Problem of Human Life." He says : ' We are not concerned with the reflections of these thinkers about life, but with life itself as it fashioned forth in their world of thought. We ask what light they have thrown upon human existence, what place and purport they assign to it, how they combine its active with its passive functions, in a word, what is the character of human life as they conceive it? This question draws together the different threads of their thought and reveals to us the very depths of their soul ..From the abundance of those great personalities, must there not be some overflow of strength, something that will purify, ennoble and level up our own endeavour ? '

These great personalities have pursued the path of creative activity and constructive power with a self-confidence that their

genius bestowed upon them. They were the products in part of their historical environments, and they in turn profoundly influenced their times and their surroundings. The sign of a great thinker is that he is not the mere expression of his age, but as Eucken puts it ' he brings about an inner transformation : he ennobles the whole message of the age...In so far as the Eternal can be apprehended under time-conditions, it is so apprehended by the great man ; it is he who first frees it from its temporal setting to become a possession for all time. If then the creative geniuses of humanity are the true foci of all spiritual life, if in them its rays, else scattered, are concentrated to burn thereafter with an intensified, inextinguishable flame that in turn re-illuminates the whole,—then surely we may take comfort and rest assured that in studying the work of such men we are touching the very pulse of all creative activity.'

As a word out of its context might mean several things entirely irrelevant to our purpose, so might a system of philosophy taken out of its historical setting be sometimes entirely misunderstood. Systems of philosophy are living thoughts, but studied in an unsystematic way they appear dead and unmeaning. The context has distinctly a value of its own. We must study a philosopher in the environments in which he released his philosophical thinking, and we must study his philosophy in relation to its place in the general thoughts and culture of the times. In order to understand aright the thoughts of a great thinker, it is also necessary to enter into his spirit and to study him in relation to his predecessors and the channels through which he received his own inspiration. In this connexion a good deal of light could be thrown by philological study as well, although we must always guard against this being overdone. Language and thought are so intimately connected that a close and careful scrutiny of some of the special terms used by a philosopher sometimes throws a flood of light on the implications of his philosophy. This activity has been given the greatest impetus in Germany, where for instance societies like the *Kantgesellschaft*

have taken pains to compile a complete lexicon of Kantian terminology, collecting and collating all passages wherein a certain term occurs and is used in a particular sense. It requires a very great amount of time, energy and patience to do this kind of mechanical work, yet German scholars have accomplished the stupendous task with incredible patience not only in the case of Kant but also of several other philosophers. This kind of philological study was first introduced in Sanskritic research by the combined labours of Bothlingk and Roth, who brought out the well-known St. Petersburg *Wörterbuch der Sanskrit*, a work that has proved of inestimable value to all Sanskrit scholars since. Some German philosophers, Kant and Hegel in particular, use a very difficult terminology in their works, and sometimes it is not at all clear in what sense a certain word is used. Translators have felt this difficulty very acutely, and a number of commentaries have also appeared. While we are not wanting in our admiration for the great philological studies that have been so successfully pursued recently, it must be added that in the true interpretation of a philosopher such philological study should always be given a secondary place, as it is more imperative that we enter into the spirit of the author than simply confine ourselves to the jugglery of words. As Boutroux rightly pointed out : ' In order to understand an author's work in the way he meant it to be understood, *i.e.*, to understand it aright, we must make it our constant endeavour not merely to search into the visible letter of the text and all the details of documents, but also to think and live with the author himself, to enter into his spirit. In reality, it is this interior principle of development—which, in truth, cannot be isolated from the visible forms but rather governs them and gives them their particular aspect,—it is the active, ever-present soul of the author, that the historian should endeavour to set before us, enabling us to enter intuitively, as it were, into that soul and attain to direct participation therewith.' To cultivate the history of philosophy in this way is not only to learn to know philosophers but also to become

more capable of philosophising ourselves. To what heights might we not aspire, what claims might we not make, if something of the genius of the masters could really live again within us and enter into our thought ?

It is not necessary for me to build upon this thought at any length before a distinguished gathering like this, as you are all aware of the necessity of studying a philosophy in its historical setting in order to discover its true meaning. Unfortunately this has not been done in the right spirit, and some of us jump from the study of one philosopher to another without making any attempt to unravel the inner thread that usually binds together various thinkers. One reason that contributes to this kind of neglect is the careless manner in which our students study the history of philosophy. They try to secure a smattering of knowledge about a philosopher without at all acquainting themselves with his works, his thoughts, his language, and the setting in which he built up his system. Only a few study the life of the philosopher whose thoughts they analyse and discuss. It is certainly very desirable, as I have said above, that we should study the philosopher's life and individuality in order to know his work more accurately and appreciate it more easily. "Cartesianism is indebted for more than one of its characteristics to Descartes, *the man*" (Boutroux), but it does not imply that the study of the individual alone could solve all our problems of interpretation. Cartesianism was not merely the history of an individual mind but much besides. The same applies to Kantianism and Hegelianism.

We must not expect that a philosopher must necessarily add something *new* to the pre-existing stock of philosophical knowledge. In a sense, every philosopher, nay every man, does add something new to the world's thoughts, but mere novelty as such is not the aim of the great thinkers. Especially in the domain of philosophy where God, Man and the Universe have offered the eternal problem since the very infancy of speculative thought, it is not possible to expect a completely new philosophy. The

problem of philosophy is an eternal problem. No final solution is ever possible or ever expected. In the realm of the mysterious lies the special charm of philosophy. The only thing that a great thinker could expect to achieve in philosophy is to offer a clearer statement of the problem itself. As Hegel said, Reality is self-illuminating. Hence, if a question is rightly put, it will probably suggest its own answer itself. Our whole attempt is to so state the problem that it partakes of the nature of the self-illumination of Reality and brings to us a vision of its underlying truth. If philosophy is an endeavour to conceptualise the inconceivable, to intellectualise that which transcends the intellect, we have no reason to feel downhearted if we have to remain content with a provisional solution, leaving the rest to the realm of the mysterious. So says Vidyāranya Swami in his *Pañcadaśi* :—

“ Acintyāḥ khalu ye bhāvāḥ, na tān tarkeṣu yojayet.”

The true nature of Reality would only be revealed in our Intuition, and not in the Impulse that precedes our intellectual effort to know the Unknowable, but the rich Intuition that comes after the stage of Intellectualism is not the mere negation of the intellect but its complete culmination and fulfilment into something where no subject-object relation exists and thereby precludes the possibility of speech.

Now, I come to the question of the history of philosophy or philosophies. I was once talking to Windelband at Heidelberg as to the utterly false conception created in the minds of our students when they are told in the various histories of philosophy that Thales was the father of philosophy, and when they are informed that all that went by the name of philosophy previous to that in China and India or elsewhere was nothing but mythology. He saw the point quite and regretted that the knowledge of eastern philosophy was practically non-existent in western universities and added that as their background was Greek philosophy, so they naturally looked back to Greek philosophy as the earliest beginnings of thought. He was however very willing to learn, if there were any suitable and reliable books,

something very definite about Indian philosophy in order to make use of such knowledge. The same was the upshot of the conversations I had with Eucken at Jena and with Höffding at Copenhagen. But now there seems to be no special difficulty in the way of finding suitable books on Indian philosophy. Several excellent text-books and other expositions of Indian philosophy have appeared since the original impetus so ably given by the late Paul Deussen to the study of Indian philosophy. What I wish to see, however, is the publication of Histories of Philosophy which would treat philosophy as a whole, instead of treating the eastern and western as two separate watertight compartments. Deussen attempted such a work and completed it more than 20 years ago, naming it *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, but it can hardly be said that he has discussed Indian or European philosophy in such detail as would be desirable. Besides, such a work can hardly be undertaken by a single soul. Yet such a work is most desired. Let me appeal to this Congress to organise a Board that will undertake the publication of such a History of Philosophy.

About a dozen or more scholars might co-operate in carrying out the scheme. That will be a kind of encyclopaedia, very desirable as a book of reference. It need hardly be said that there is no necessity of preparing any history of western philosophy, as so many books already exist, since I believe that a scholar who thoroughly studies Indian philosophy in original and also specialises in some part of western philosophy in originals is in a better position to interpret and expound western philosophy than a mere western scholar. A scholar for instance, who knows the Vedānta very thoroughly through original Sanskrit texts and also studies Kant in his proper setting through all his published and unpublished works, would be a far better expositor of Kant than any English, French, German or Italian scholar would. In the light of our own philosophy some of the most abstruse concepts of western philosophy appear to us so very clear and easy.

Besides, there is a great necessity in our own country of studying Philosophy not merely as a general knowledge of western thinkers but an intimate knowledge of our own philosophers as well. More is needed in the way of acquainting our students with the general development of philosophical thought from the Vedic times down to the present day. It is on the basis of a knowledge of Indian philosophy that all further study of western thinkers should be put. That is bound to lead to a better appreciation of either.

It is only when philosophy is studied in this way, when students feel the sense of security when they discuss any problem, when they are in a position to draw upon their knowledge of Indian philosophy as well while engaged in the discussion of any philosophical problem, that soundness in scholarship will result. At present a mere smattering that is the lot of a large number of students without any depth of intensity of thinking is to a great extent responsible for the depreciation of philosophical studies in our universities. With a sound knowledge of philosophy and the development of a real philosophical temper should we be in a position to apply our philosophy to all the problems of our political and social environments. Applied Philosophy is very desirable, as we have such excellent results in the present day from Applied Psychology. But there need hardly be too much of a polemic against abstract philosophy. No doubt philosophy should be closely related to life, in fact in India philosophy was always made part and parcel of our everyday practices and observances, and the division of the householder's life into four *āśramas* was based upon a philosophical idea, but on the other hand, the soul does feel at times the necessity of sublime thinking, of transcending the hum and buzz of the world and partaking of the bliss in the Elysian heights of its own spiritual pyramid—to decri all such attempts as mere abstractions and belittle their value would, it seems to me, be tantamount to transforming philosophy into a mere profit-and-loss calculus. Man is a member both of the sensuous and the

supersensuous worlds. He does not live on bread alone. The claims of the spiritual with him are as paramount, if not more urgent, as those of his sensuous side ; hence we cannot confine his philosophical thinking to merely the considerations of worldly needs and worldly problems. That would be a mere bread-and-butter philosophy, but we want values of universal validity and universal application, and so while we are prepared always to apply our philosophy to national and social and political problems, as they used to do in ancient Greece, we should also be left free to rise to our full spiritual heights in our humble attempts to train ourselves in the true science of Yoga, which affords the highest bliss and joy to the spiritual in us. Except that, our philosophy will remain wanting in that magic and fervour of its own, without which it is likely to be turned into a kind of higher Casuistry

Lastly, let a study of the history of philosophy convince us of the fact that the majority of the world are fools, that the truth of any doctrine is not to be determined by merely counting heads, that we should aspire to be in the spirit of some of those great thinkers whose works inspire us with strength and hope, that the true message that philosophers can impart to us is that we should always yearn after a thoroughgoing consistency between Theory and Practice.

“ Paropadeśe pāṇḍityam sarveshām sukharam nṛṇām ” etc.

It is quite easy to prescribe but extremely difficult to practise. By our teaching as well as by our personal example let each student thinker be a *Yogi* in his humble way, let him practise the vow of Truth above all, and with that will come everything that is noble and beautiful in his character. Let our pupils imbibe this spirit from their contact with us, so that we might in a true sense be moulding the character of our youth for the good of our country in future. Let us, in a word, talk little but do much more. Let us not only preach philosophy but turn ourselves into an embodiment of the doctrine that we preach. Then and then alone will there be Peace and Joy in us and around us and with those that come in touch with us.

BRADLEY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ŚAṂKARA- VEDĀNTA.

By

SREEMATI TATINI DAS, M.A.

Bradley may be taken to be the most influential representative of the idealistic movement which began in England in the nineteenth century and which proceeded in the reverse direction to the 'insular' philosophy. The distinguishing characteristic of the 'insular' philosophy had hitherto been its empiricism. Along with this characteristic the English Philosophy had certain characteristic deficiencies which became the more glaring the more it entered into reciprocal relation with other lines of thought. Among these is the mechanical atomistic notion, which passed over from natural to mental science, and induced it to regard psychical life as the product of independent psychical elements. Bradley was the most influential, if not the only, opponent of this notion.

Bradley's first published work was his *Ethical Studies* which appeared in 1876. It was in this book that he attacked the atomism of English psychology. In his opposition we find a remarkable similarity with Śaṁkara's opposition to the atomism of the Vijñānavādins. The arguments of both are also almost the same. In opposition to the atomism of English psychology the English philosopher maintains that consciousness cannot be described as a mere collection of elements, for it would be impossible to understand how such a collection could become aware of itself,—and *Vijñāna*, urges the Indian Philosopher against the Bauddhas, cannot be consciousness or the self, for this *Vijñāna* cannot be aware of itself, for in order to be known, it must be known by something else—विज्ञानस्य स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तग्राह्यत्वात्.

The most remarkable of Bradley's works, however, is his *Appearance and Reality*. It is impossible to convey in a summary a clear idea of its teaching. The main discussions concern themselves with the nature of 'Reality' and of 'Appearance' as is sufficiently indicated by the title of the book. His arguments in the book as to the nature of Reality may be summed up in the following words: "Ultimate Reality is such that it does not contradict itself." We find this characterisation of Reality in certain philosophers belonging to the Sāṅkhya Vedānta school, if not in Sāṅkhya himself. Dharmarājadvarindra's definition of प्रमात्वम् as अवाधितार्थविषयज्ञानत्वम् may be taken as an instance thereof; and it appears by implication, from Rāmānuja's criticism of Sāṅkhya's view of Reality that Sāṅkhya himself held this view of Reality: सत् परमाद्यम् अनुवर्त्तमानत्वात् रज्जुमर्पादौ रज्ज्वादिवत् । घटादयोऽपरमार्थाव्यवर्त्तमानत्वात् रज्ज्वाद्यधिष्ठान सर्पादिवदिति, etc., quoted, by Rāmānuja, are supposed to be Sāṅkhya's arguments.

Again, by way of giving a concrete determination of Reality, Bradley calls it Experience. By 'Experience' in this context Bradley did not mean 'consciousness,' if the term 'consciousness' be taken to signify 'awareness' of an object, on the part of an individual subject. Consciousness in this sense is 'thought' which implies a severance of the subject and object and always points to something more inclusive than itself in which the distinction of subject and object would be transcended. Rather, he urged, is 'experience' to be identified with 'sentience,' and sentience while including, after a certain stage of development has been reached, thought or consciousness, includes also much besides. 'Experience' in Bradley's sense of the term, is more akin to 'feeling' than to 'thought' inasmuch as in feeling also there is no such severance of subject and object as in thought. Here, in Bradley's characterisation of Reality as 'sentient experience' as distinguished from 'consciousness' in the sense of awareness on the part of an individual subject, we find a strong point of resemblance with Sāṅkhya's characterisation of Reality as 'Chaitanya,' i.e., an all-pervasive universal Intelligence. Of

course in default of a better term we cannot but translate Śaṅkara's 'Chaitanya' as 'consciousness' or 'self-consciousness' but in its inner significance it is as comprehensive as Bradley's 'sentience.' Consciousness in Śaṅkara, does not mean awareness on the part of an individual subject but an impersonal universal consciousness which comprehends everything.

Bradley's characterisation of appearances is sometimes positive but sometimes it tends to become comparatively negative. The comparatively positive arguments are somewhat like the following. Although appearances are not real in the form in which they now appear to us, still they are not altogether false and illusory. If they are 'appearances' still they are not *mere* 'appearances' but appearances of Reality—finite forms under which Reality is partly revealed. If they themselves are not Reality still they are *indications* of Reality. They are called 'appearances' because Reality appears in them.

This characterisation of appearance as a mixture of reality and unreality, reminds one of Śaṅkara's famous statement in the introduction to his commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*: सत्यावृते मिथुनीकृत्य नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः । Reality is, according to Bradley, the ideality of the finite, or to use a Hegelian phrase, Reality is the 'truth' of the appearance—appearances are Reality in the making, *i.e.*, the stages through which Reality is gradually manifesting itself. Statements similar to this are not altogether absent in Śaṅkara,—ज्ञानेष्टव्याभिव्यक्तिः उत्तरोत्तरेण भूयसी भवति,—this seems to be an exact parallel of the corresponding statement in Bradley. According to some Vedāntists,—the idea embodied in this is *the* true interpretation of Śaṅkara's philosophy.

But as in the case of the Indian philosopher, so in the case of Bradley, we cannot unhesitatingly conclude that this positive view-point is the last word of either system. There are lines in the arguments of both which go directly against the above statements, and seem to explain away the world as altogether illusory and false. There are passages where Bradley argues that 'appearances' are,—more strictly speaking—seem to be, only

owing to the impotence of our finite point of view, but they are quite unreal from the side of the Absolute. Sāṅkara also argues in a similar strain that Brahman alone is the true Reality,—and the world of appearance is only a Māyā and due to our ignorance (अविद्या). अविद्याकल्पित (or 'fancied by ignorance'), अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापित ('brought about by or due to ignorance'), अविद्यात्मक ('consisting of avidyā') are the usual epithets most commonly used by Sāṅkara with reference to the world of names and forms (नामरूपे) that constitute the realm of our experience, and it is curious to observe that the same objections have been urged against both. Rāmānuja, for example, criticises Sāṅkara's conception of the world as the product of ignorance on the ground that this ignorance has no substratum in which to reside (this objection, by the way, is technically known as आश्रयानुपपत्तिः), for the finite self being itself a product of ignorance cannot be the seat of the ignorance. Similarly Western critics have urged against Bradley the objection that there cannot be illusion which is to explain the finite world unless it be proved first of all that finite selves really exist as such, in order to be the seats or victims of this illusion.

Not only in this conception of the relation of Reality to appearance in general, but also in that of the more particular relation of Reality to the finite self (which is one of the appearances), a similarity may be traced between the two philosophers. The finite selves exist, according to both, only in appearance. From the side of the absolute they are nonentities. "The plurality of souls in the absolute," says Bradley, "is appearance, and their existence is not genuine. To gain consistency and truth they must be merged, and recomposed in a result in which their speciality must vanish." Not that the finite selves are annihilated altogether but they cease to exist as separate individuals. The materials of which the individuals are constituted are taken up and re-arranged and blended together in the absolute. 'Merged,' 'blended,' 'fused,' 'absorbed,' 'run together,' 'transformed,' 'dissolved in a higher unity,' are

the synonyms plentifully used by Bradley in this connection. Sometimes he goes to the extent of using even the more sinister terms, 'suppressed,' 'destroyed,' and 'lost.' In a similar strain Śaṅkara also argues that the individuality of finite selves is only apparent and is due to *upādhis* which are the products of illusion. From the standpoint of Brahman there is no individual self as such—there is no distinction of one self from another. All are blended together in one complete homogeneous identity.—
यत्तु सर्वमात्मेवाभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत् केन कं विजानीयात् ?

But in spite of these similarities there is an important point of difference between these two philosophers. The 'self' with Bradley seems to be only an appearance among other appearances, and is in no way superior to other appearances. But with Śaṅkara the case is different. Though according to him also the 'self' is an appearance only and from the standpoint of Brahman has no separate existence still it is superior to the other appearances in this that as an appearance also it reflects the nature of Brahman. The same self-consciousness which is as it were, the stuff of Brahman, appears as an individual self when modalised. The difference between the two thinkers on this point is also obvious from the way in which each characterises the absolute. With Bradley, the absolute is simply a 'sentient experience'—an inclusive experience; whereas with Śaṅkara it is not only an all-pervasive *chaitanya*, but also the 'self.' The use of the same term 'self' for both the Absolute and the finite human being, shows that for Śaṅkara the relation between the finite self and Brahman is much more intimate than it is for Bradley. 'तत्त्वमसि' sums up the whole philosophy of Śaṅkara in a nutshell. The self is an appearance but still it is not a mere appearance,—in its innermost nature it is identical with Brahman—it is Brahman. Of course, in justice to Bradley, it must be admitted that though he has never identified his absolute in so many words with the finite self, the implication of some of his utterances amounts to it. To know the Absolute one has to be the Absolute. These

are Bradley's own words. If the human self can be the absolute,—if it has in it the *possibility* of being the absolute, that means that it is in actuality, the Absolute ; for, if the two were not essentially identical the one could never become the other,—and the exhortation to achieve the identity would also have no meaning.

Similar objections again, have been urged against those arguments of both Śaṅkara and Bradley by which they have sought to establish the position that the finite selves have to lose their separate individualities in the absolute. With an audacious irony Bradley speaks of the perfection which is to be striven after by the individual as “ the complete gift and dissipation of his personality in which *he* as such, must vanish ! ” But if the person as such has to vanish who will be there to enjoy the perfection ? Rāmānuja and others also urge the same objection against Śaṅkara's arguments for release. One attains release, so argues Śaṅkara, when one loses his individuality in Brahman,—when the ‘ I ’ ceases to exist. But if the ‘ I ’ ceases to exist who will enjoy the release, who will say ‘ I am released ? ’

As to the knowability of the absolute the arguments of both Śaṅkara and Bradley are sceptical, so far at least as *thought* is concerned. The Absolute is a self-consistent and harmonious totality and therefore beyond all relations because relations involve contradiction. But ‘ thought ’ works by way of relations—it always involves a separation of the ‘ that ’ and the ‘ what. ’ Hence thought can never grasp the totality of Reality. Śaṅkara also argues in the same strain नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया or अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तास्तर्केण योजयेत् ; लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च नावुमानादीनाम् । But then, what is the conclusion ? Do these philosophers conclude that Reality is not knowable at all, in any sense of the term ‘ knowing. ’ No. The scepticism of both culminates in mysticism. Reality is not *graspable* by discursive thinking, but it is graspable by a higher form of knowledge,—*intuition*. We cannot know the Absolute by *thinking* but we

can grasp it by *identifying* ourselves with it. To know the Absolute we must *be* the Absolute—must lose ourselves in ecstatic intuition in it. (Of course, the terms, ecstasy and intuition are not to be found in Bradley.) Śaṅkara's arguments on this point agree, word for word, with Bradley's. Śaṅkara also identifies ब्रह्मविद् with ब्रह्मभू; to know Brahman is to *be* Brahman. There is no other way of knowing Brahman.

If we have to know Brahman we must leave our empirical lives behind us, and identify ourselves with the Real. The knowledge of Brahman is termed by Śaṅkara अनुभूति by which he means ecstatic intuition; for Bradley, the term is 'Feeling.' This feeling is something quite different from what we mean by 'feeling' in psychology. It seems to approach Śaṅkara's conception of अनुभूति though it has not for him the further sense of ecstasy.

Nevertheless, though thought by itself cannot get hold of Reality, both Śaṅkara and Bradley recognise the importance of thinking as a preliminary step. The feeling which is identical with absolute experience can come only at the end of a long process of thinking,—only when thought has done all that it could have done. So also with Śaṅkara,—अनुभवावसानत्वात् ब्रह्म-विज्ञानस्य—the *anubhūti* being only the culmination of the labour of thought in knowing Brahman. The feeling which comes before thought is too poor and unstable to be a fit instrument for the knowledge of Reality. It can become fit for this high vocation, only when it has gone out of itself into the region of thought, and when after the whole travail of thought, has returned upon itself, enriched and purified.

However, according to both, we can know Reality only as we leave our empirical lives behind. But, is there no aperture through which we can catch even a glimpse of this Reality, even while this empirical life endures? Bradley answers the question in the affirmative. For though he begins with the disheartening lines—"Fully to realise the existence of the absolute is for finite beings impossible. In order thus to know we

should have *to be* and then *we* should not exist,"—he adds a few lines below : " what is impossible is to construct absolute life in its detail, to have the specific experience in which it consists. But to gain an idea of its main features—an idea true so far as it goes though abstract and incomplete—is a different endeavour." And this general idea, he thinks can be got through the analysis of feeling. The reasons for this supposition have already been given. And if it is through psychological analysis that Reality can be approached according to Bradley, the same is true of Śaṅkara as well. But according to the latter, it is no longer the psychological analysis of *feeling*, but that of *dream* and *dreamless sleep* that is supposed to give us a general idea of Reality.

Reviewing the systems of Bradley and Śaṅkara as a whole, we are now in a position to wind up our comparative survey with a concluding reflection on their respective philosophical *methods* and *conclusions*. The method common to both may, in the absence of a better term, be styled the dialectical. Both start from an epistemological analysis of the primitive psychological datum expressed in the form of judgment. Accordingly for both the approach to metaphysics is not so much through Psychology as it is through Epistemology. According to Śaṅkara, all appearance from the epistemological point of view, is a case of *adhyāsa*, proceeding on the conjunction of truth and error (सत्यादृते मिथुनीकृत्य). Seized on its positive and metaphysical side Śaṅkara's Māyā answers exactly to the Bradleyan construction of 'appearance.' Śaṅkara's Māyā imports exactly what Bradley seeks to convey by his phrase, so happily worded "the ideality of the finite." This dynamic nature of appearance has its counterpart in the truly philosophic construction of the term "Saṃsāraḥ (संसारः) so often emphasised by Śaṅkara. By following up this common approach to the metaphysics of both we arrive at the same metaphysical *conclusions* with regard to their characterisation of Reality. The identity-in-difference which underlies every judgment falls far short of the

Real which characterised by inner coherence or comprehensive-ness is truly represented as an undifferenced identity. Discursive or relational thinking which proceeds by way of judgment, and seeks a completion beyond the sundering of the ' that ' and ' what ' fails to attain this identity. Thought has ultimately to give away to a higher intuition, which alone can grasp the Real. Intuition or *anubhāti* is the *terminus ad quem*, the last word of philosophy for both, *inasmuch* as it alone can grasp the nature of absolute Reality as a whole, as the goal of all aspirations, intellectual or emotional.

THE CONCEPTION OF NATURAL LAW IN ANCIENT INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

By

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I. *Introductory*

Those who are acquainted even with the broad outlines of the History of Indian Philosophy will recognise a *threefold trend* which it has and maintains during the different periods of its unfoldment.

(i) There is, *first*, the impersonal, abstract, absolute Monism of Vedanta. It is metaphysical and speculative, based on reason and Logic, and appealing to the Intellect. It is the typical national Indian Philosophy, whose beginnings one can trace in the earliest hymns of the Rigveda, and whose influence is paramount in all the hundred cults, creeds, and schools of latter-day India, down to the new formed Brahma Samaj and the mystic poetry of Rabindranath Tagore.

(ii) *Second*, there are the Theistic Religious tendencies, first observable even in the Rigveda, and culminating in Saivism and Vaishnavism, appealing more to man's Emotion than to his Intellect, but never abandoning Vedic ritual or some form or adaptation of Vedantic metaphysics. Vidyanaraya and Appayya Dikshita are the greatest Indian teachers who endeavoured to reconcile this second, popular aspect of Indian thought with its first philosophical and intellectual side.

(iii) *Third*, there is the atheistic, scientific—not mechanical, but Ethical, tendency—the conception of a uniform system

of law and orderly regulation of phenomena, both physical and spiritual—which again we can discern first in the Vedic seers, then in the systematic thinkers of the Mīmāṃsā school of Indian Philosophy, and lastly in the Ethico-philosophical system founded by Buddha. This conception of a world based on Dharma or law superior to personal influence, even to Divine power, naturally came into conflict with the Theistic Religious philosophies of India ; and never became popular or found universal acceptance. All the same, it is a dominant tendency of Indian speculative activity; and to it we owe the fundamentally Ethical and moral tone of all Indian Religion and philosophy from the very beginning. The typically Indian conception of an eternal Dharma governing both the physical and spiritual worlds, with its corollaries in the form of the law of karma and rebirth is common to all schools of Indian thought, and salvation or redemption from the universal sway of the law and its consequences becomes the chief problem they are called upon to solve—compared with these main tendencies, the Charvaka and other purely materialistic speculations have little or no philosophical interest. This paper attempts to give a brief sketch of the third main characteristic of Indian Philosophy mentioned above.

II. *Conception of Law in the Vedas.*

The ordinary view of vedic religion is that it was one largely based on Mythology and anthropomorphism—with the phenomena of Nature personified and magnified as gods, who rule the world by caprice, and who are propitiated and controlled by magical incantations and rites. This is the very opposite of the scientific view of reality, according to which nothing takes place by caprice or chance, but everything that exists or happens, exists and happens in accordance with immutable laws, whose apprehension by man gives him real power over nature to alter and control her phenomena to suit his ends. Thus Macdonel : ¹

¹ Vedic Mythology, p. 1.

“Myths have their source in the attempt of the human mind, in a primitive and unscientific age, to explain the various forces and phenomena of nature with which man is confronted. The basis of these myths is the primitive attitude of mind which regards all nature as an aggregate of animated entities. A myth actually arises when the imagination interprets a natural event as the action of a personified being resembling a human agent.” Again,² “The foundation on which vedic mythology rests is the belief that all the objects and phenomena of nature with which man is surrounded, are animated and divine. The true gods of the Vedas are glorified human beings, inspired by human motives and passions, born like men but immortal. They are, almost without exception, the deified representatives of the phenomena or agencies of nature.”

But such a picture is not true of vedic thought and religion. The mythology and anthropomorphism, so obvious at first throughout vedic hymns, must be regarded rather as the high-flown fancies of the vedic poets and singers, than as the confused faith of a pre-scientific mind, incapable of apprehending the rigour and majesty of law in the cosmic order that surrounded them. For the vedic thinkers often speak of *Rita* or the uniform succession of natural phenomena, which is under the control of the highest gods.

This *Rita* or cosmic order is conceived both as physical and moral, as governing both the physical and spiritual phenomena of the universe. For the vedic seers, unlike modern scientists, did not regard the physical world alone as subject to uniform sequences of causal law, and the spiritual and supersensual as mere epi-phenomena, beyond the pale of scientific explanation and physical causation. Hence they were not confronted as Kant was confronted in modern times, with the problem of a double world—a deterministic phenomenal world governed by laws of causation, and amenable to scientific

² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

explanation; and a transcendental world of freedom, or kingdom of ends, not subject to physical laws or the laws of cause and effect; and consequently with no bridge that can possibly connect the two worlds. For the Rishis of old, the world is one and indivisible; it is both physical and spiritual; and the same laws operate both ways,—and nothing, not even the Gods, are lawless and capricious. Hence mechanism is no more true than anthropomorphism. The spiritual is not in any conflict or opposition with the physical, both being subject to the same Rita, each following its own Dharma or Law. This will be apparent if we remember the several meanings of the word, 'rita'. Originally meaning merely 'the course of things' it next means what is 'straight,' what is proper. Then, it means what is 'true' (the op. 'anrita' untrue). With reference to the physical, 'rita' means the 'orderly;' and in moral matters, it means what is 'right.' It also means sacrificial 'rite;' for it was the necessity for the correct observance of the endless details of vedic ritual, and the belief that they automatically bring their ordained consequences, that first gave the Rishis the conception of Rita, or orderliness in all the affairs of this universe, mundane as well as spiritual.

The Rishis were not only poets and singers, but close observers of Nature. They gazed unceasingly at the daily and seasonal revolutions of the stars and planets, and were impressed by the great regularity of the seasons and other natural phenomena. While the observed natural events like rain and wind are subject to constant change, the uniform sequence which they observe in their occurrence is not itself susceptible of change. Hence the Rita is supreme, and superior to the very gods, who represent the natural phenomena; and we find that the Rishis often speak of it as the parent of the gods.

Hence the vedic gods are all moral. They never transgress the law of Rita. "All the Gods are true and not deceitful, being throughout the friends and guardians of honesty and righteousness. They are angry with the evildoer."

As illustrating the vedic conception of the one-ness of nature, and the entire subordination of the physical as well as the spiritual worlds to the same Rita, we may give the character of the vedic God, Varuna. By his ordinances "the moon shining brightly moves at night, and the stars placed on high are seen at night, but disappear by day." "By his power he establishes the mornings or days." He regulates the seasons—"He knows the twelve months." He causes the rivers to flow; they stream unceasingly according to his ordinance." "By his power the rivers flowing into the ocean do not fill it with water."

Varuna's ordinance are said to be always fixed, he among the gods being called 'Dhritavrata.'—The gods themselves have to follow Varuna's ordinances. "Mitra and Varuna are lords of order 'rita' and light; Who by means of order are the upholders of order;" (Ritasya gopta). The gods in general are cherishers of order or light.

Varuna is a moral Governor. His anger is aroused by sin or the infringement of his ordinances, which he severely punishes. He binds sinners with his fetters. He with Mitra forms barriers against falsehood. Varuna is praised as follows by the vedic sage—

"He who knows the place of the birds that fly thro' the sky, who, on the water knows the ships,—He, the upholder of order, who knows the twelve months, with the offspring of each, and knows the month that is engendered afterwards,—

"He who knows the track of the wind, of the wide, the bright, and mighty; and knows those who reside on high;—

"He, the upholder of order, Varuna sits down among his people; he, the wise sits down to govern.

"From thence perceiving all wondrous things, he sees what has been and what will be done.

"May he, the wise son of Time, make straight all our days; may he prolong our lives!"

Thus, the vedic conception of law includes the physical, moral, and spiritual orders. The gods are the visible embodiments of this law and order observable every where. They are the upholders of the law ; they never violate it ; they themselves are bound by it. Therefore, the gods are all righteous, just and moral, they enforce the right, and punish the wrong. The whole universe is based on, and governed by, one law, which is its Ritam or Dharma, from which it can't swerve an inch, and without which it can't exist. The vedic doctrine or postulate of Ritam gave rise to the later, universally accepted law of karma, according to which every action has its appropriate consequence ; and this doctrine, forming the basis of all Indian Ethics, is accepted by all Indian schools of thought ; and it is founded on the vedic belief that the same conception of law and causal sequence is equally valid of the physical and spiritual worlds ; that, in fact the world is a unity which is, at the same time, both physical and spiritual, and governed by one and the same law, call it Ritam or Dharma.

III. *The Mīmāṃsā View.*

The Mimamsa school of Indian Philosophy is based on Vedic ritual. It attempts a close, almost literal, interpretation of vedic texts ; and upholds the supreme authority and sanctity of vedic injunctions ; and enjoins the supreme necessity of observing vedic ritual in all its details. It is not so much a philosophy as a religion ; not so much a Religion, as ritualism and dogma. But the religious discussions and textual criticisms of this school are of great logical value ; and early Mimamsa exegesis forms the starting point of Nyaya, or the Indian school of Logic.

They carried the conception of natural law found in the Vedas to its logical consequence ; and held that law was superior to personality. They did not believe in an Isvara or supreme Being, one who, in any sense, could be superior to Law,—could create the law or the world ; or could break the law either, say

for the performance of a miracle. Nor was he needed to enforce the Law, or to bestow on individuals rewards and punishments in accordance with the law. The law is its own executor. It operates automatically, without the necessity of any human or superhuman agency to uphold it. In this they came nearer the scientific conception of Law than the vedic seers had done. But with the Mimamsakas, as with the Rishis, the law is both spiritual and secular. It is the Dharma enjoined by the Vedas, to be observed by man and to be conformed to by the gods, automatically fulfilling itself, complete in itself, and supreme over everything, subjecting the very Gods to its majesty.—Thus Bhartrihari,³ according to whom the members of the Hindu Trinity itself have to abide by the law of karma—"Let us salute the Gods,—but they too are subject to Fate. Let us say that Fate is to be saluted; but he can only yield the fruit ordained by one's Karma. Fruit is entirely dependent on Karma. Therefore, what of the host of gods; and what of Fate? Therefore, let us salute that Karma, whom even Fate cannot supersede:—"Let us salute that Karma, who has appointed Brahma as a potter over this Universe; who has thrown Vishnu into the great labour of the ten incarnations, by whom Siva is made a beggar with a skull as his begging-bowl; and who turns the sun in his diurnal revolution!" The Mimamsakas attached so much importance to the details of vedic ritual that the gods receded into the background;

McConnel, "Vedic Mythology," p. 18.

Rigveda, I; 24; 10.

" VIII; 41; 3;

" I; 25; 8;

" II; 28; 4

" V; 85; 6;

" VIII, 41, 7;

" I, 23, 5

" I; 2; 8;

" VII, 86, 3;

" VII, 65; 3;

" VII, 87.

³ Nitisaataka. (Telang), 94, 95.

and their propitiation and the prayers offered to them came to be regarded as the essential Karma which automatically produce their consequence, not depending on the pleasure or displeasure of the Gods. The personal factor, like devotion, was eliminated from the institution of vedic sacrifice, which was held to be potent in itself, capable of yielding fruit thro' the merit earned by the performer. The vedic rite was conceived to be a "kind of machinery in which every piece must tally with the other" (Haug); the slightest mistake even in an unimportant detail, like the accent on the wrong syllable in the pronunciation of vedic words, was regarded as spoiling the effect of the whole. The mere Karma is efficient, apart from the intention or devotion of the performer. When rightly performed, there was no power which could prevent the fruition of the act in its appointed time, and in the ordained manner. Therefore, the fruit of one's Karma was earned and enjoyed, not by the favour of any god, but as a direct consequence of the act itself. The fruition of one's Karma is the analogue in the spiritual world of the natural fulfilment of a law in the physical world. The Vedas and the institution of sacrifice are eternal and immutable, like the cosmic order of the physical world. Creation itself was the outcome of sacrifice. The Mimamsakas were believers in the uniformity of Nature. For them, the world was never very unlike what it is to-day; and miracles are impossible.

"There can be no doubt as to the ephemeral character of the sacrifice itself; it is born out by every day experience. Nor can the sacrifice be held to be laid down for the purpose of obtaining the favour of the deity, as there is no evidence in support of this. As a matter of fact also, sacrifices are never performed for that purpose. The deity is only one to whom the offering is made; and we could please a deity only by such acts as could reach him. Then again, it is not possible for any deity to get at all the offerings made by different men at all times,—as no deity is either eternal or omnipresent." ⁴

⁴ Tantarvārtika quoted by G. Jha in his *Prabhākara School*, p. 335.

The performance of the sacrifice produced an invisible consequence in the form of an *apurva*, which brought its appointed effect in due course.

Such a system, eliminating entirely as it does the personal factor in Religion, has little to appeal to popular sentiment. But it emphasises the ethical side, as Kant did at a much later date. For the Mimamsaka, as with Kant the performance of duty is above everything, including love and devotion,—and the objective or natural order makes this possible, and makes it imperative. The ultimate nature of the world is based on the law of Karma, and all its manifestations are bound by the constant operation of this principle. There is no God above righteousness or Dharma. The Vedas are the embodiment and revelation of this Dharma. One may find fault with such a mechanical Ethics. But the credit of making Dharma or the law of duty supreme⁵ above everything belongs to the ancient Mimamsakas—as it does in modern times to Immanuel Kant. It influences all subsequent Indian thought. In the face of the universal sway of the law of Karma, which the Mimamsakas taught salvation becomes the chief problem for Buddhism and for all subsequent schools of Indian thought and religion—they had to find some means of superseding the law, or, as modern lawyers do, of circumventing it. And the problem of salvation assumes the form of Release for the Universal operation and rigour of the law of Karma. This is the problem that the Buddha sought to solve, and for which the Bhagavat Gita offers a solution.

IV. *The Buddhist View.*

The supremely Ethical religion of Buddha, and its abstract and impersonal appeal to the intellect which it even now has, are due largely to the Mimamsaka interpretation of the law of

⁵ Jaimini begins his *Mimamsa-sutras* with the words "Athatho Dharma-
jijnasa."

Rita or Dharma. For the Buddha, nothing in the world is permanent—everything is a flux. There is no permanent entity, substance or reality behind the changing phenomena. Life or *samsara* is composed of momentary existences—it is a constant process of becoming, ever-changing, and never resting. In the midst of all this universal change, Dharma is unchanging and eternal. The law of Karma operates eternally and impartially, with its consequences—birth, desire, sin and suffering. Like the Mimamsakas, Buddha found no need for a supreme *Ivara* or Lord.—Everything that exists and happens is the result of an immutable law; and the only means of release or escape from its operation is *vairagya*, surrender of one's desires and passions which prompt one to act and consequently to incur the results of one's actions. Neither one's birth and life, the sufferings they involve, nor one's release from pain and death, one owes to any one but oneself.

The Vedantists differ fundamentally from this position of the Mimamsakas and Buddhists that one's Karma and Release are due to the automatic operation of a cosmic law and not to a supreme Being. According to Badarayana, the Brahman is the source and giver of the fruits of one's Karma,—and the source of one's release.

Similarly, Sri Krishna, who is the embodiment of the supreme being, claims, in the Bhagavat Gita, that he rewards the good and punishes the wicked; and offers the solution of Nish-kamya-Karma, or disinterested performance of one's duty, as the way of release from the ever-involving bonds of Karma.

This rapid survey makes obvious the fact that Indian Philosophy had always the conception of the operation of law in Nature; and that this includes both the physical and moral worlds. If modern scientists believe in the persistence of Force or the law of conservation of Physical energy, and in the unity or uniformity of nature, ancient Indian Philosophers extended these ideas to the moral and spiritual planes as well. If all Force is indestructible, why should moral force be an exception? If all Nature is one and uniform, why should we admit chance and

cataclysm in moral nature? Why should not the strict operation of the law of causation hold good of moral and spiritual phenomena as well?—Indian Philosophy has always answered these questions in the affirmative.

As a great modern seer⁶ says:—"Apart from all 'Transcendentalism, is it not a plain truth of sense, which the duller mind can even consider as a truism, that human things wholly are in continual movement, and action and reaction; working continually forward, phases after phases, by unalterable laws towards prescribed issues? How often must we say, and yet not rightly lay to heart; the seed that is sown, it will spring! Given the summer blossoming, then there is also given the autumnal withering; so it is ordered not with seed—fields only, but with transactions, arrangements, philosophies, societies, French revolution, what-so-ever man works with in this lower world. The Beginning holds in it the End. and all that leads thereto; as the scorn does the oak and its fortunes. Solemn enough did we think of it—which unhappily and also happily we do not very much! Thou there canst begin; the beginning is for thee and there; but where, and of what sort, and for whom will the end be? All grows, and seeks, and endures its destinies. Consider likewise how much grows, as the trees do, whether *we* think of it or not.—All that is with us will change while we think not of it; much even that is within us."

Again, how true that there is nothing dead in this universe. Our whole universe is but an Infinite complex of Forces; thousandfold, from Gravitation up to thought and will, Man's freedom environed with necessity of nature. The word that is spoken, as we know, falls irrevocable; not less, but more, the action that is done. "The gods themselves cannot annihilate the action that is done" (Pindar). No: this, once done, is done always; cast forth into endless time; and long conspicuous or soon hidden must verily work and grow for ever there, an indestructible new element in the Infinite of things.

⁶ Carlyle, *French Revolution*, p. 335.

ARISTOTLE ON PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

By

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[Not read before the Congress.]

1. Aristotle's complaint against Plato's theory of knowledge is that the Ideas or Universals, which according to him form the real objects of scientific knowledge, do not help us towards the knowledge of other things; for the Ideas are not the substance of things; and if they were substance, they would be *in* things and would lose their nonsensuous immaterial character. It may be remembered in connexion with Plato's theory of knowledge that Plato was first to distinguish 'Science' from 'Opinion,'—a distinction which affects the thought of succeeding philosophers. Plato further maintained that the world of Ideas was the appropriate object of Science, while the physical world was supposed to be the proper object for Opinion. Plato's Ideal world is, in fact, a system of clearly defined logical concepts, each standing in immutable relation to the rest. The physical world was not considered to be a fit object for science, as it cannot be analysed into pure logical concepts on account of the irreducible sensuous factor that it contains. Science, then, which deals with causal 'connexions,' gives you results that can be proved logically, and that are valid at all times and for all persons; while Opinion, which is satisfied only with 'conjunctions,' gives you only a probable account. Plato, therefore, regarded all true science as 'transcendent and beyond the range of any possible experience of sense.' Science, in fact, begins only where sensuous experience ends. Aristotle, Aristotle begins with Naturalism but ends with Platonism.

on the other hand, rejects the transcendent and exclusive reality of Plato's Ideas, or the 'cogitable Universal,' and makes the concrete individual the starting-point of his epistemology. He does not regard the Universals as standing apart from the individuals but as immanent in them, and places complete reality in the sensible particulars. He therefore makes experience of sense the foundation of his epistemology. He agrees however, with Plato in distinguishing the region of Opinion from that of Science, and in assigning the one to the sphere of the individuals, and the other to that of the universals. Like Plato, he thinks that there can be no knowledge of the individuals, since they are infinitely numerous and distinct from one another, and that there can be knowledge of the universals only. But, as Grote points out, 'his universals are very different from those of Plato: they are not Self-existent realities, known by the mind from a long period of pre-existence and called up by reminiscence out of the chaos of the sensible impressions' but they are first principles of Demonstrative Science (Grote, Aristotle, p. 208 ff). Aristotle explains the process by which we get the knowledge of the universals or the principles of Science in the following way: 'all men are naturally born with the faculty of sensation; from sensation memory is produced' (Met. 980. a. 29) and 'from memory experience; for many memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience' (Met. 980. b. 29). Science and art arise when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about a class of objects is produced (Met. 981. a. 5-7). While experience is knowledge of individuals, art is knowledge of universals (Met. 981. a. 16). Thus starting from the apprehension of the particulars we form some crude generalities which serve us as basis for what we may call experience, and then proceed from experience by induction, and get the universal propositions. But Wisdom, Aristotle tells us, is the knowledge of the first principles and causes (Met. 981. b. 28). Here in the explanation of the process of our knowledge of these first principles we see clearly

the Platonic influence on the Aristotelian theory of knowledge. When the discursive thought has done its work, the active intellect or Rational Intuition comes into operation, and apprehends the first principles or universal propositions directly, immediately, and intuitively. Here we may remark that to Aristotle belongs the great credit of having shown, as Wallace puts it that 'the last stage in the process of development may represent the original *a priori* conditions of the development itself,' and that what is last in knowledge may be first in existence. Experience and Intuition, then, are both equally necessary for the building up of knowledge. Discursive thought by itself is impotent; it must be confirmed and made valid by intuition. Thus the final authority lies with Intuition, which remains, even according to Aristotle, the faculty of first principles. Aristotle, therefore, though he begins with naturalism, ends with Platonism.

2. The second point of Aristotle's criticism is directed against the Platonic conception of Dialectic, the Science of all Sciences. Plato arrived at this conception by distinguishing the four grades of cognition which we find described at the end of the sixth book of the Republic. The first grade is that of 'inferior opinion,' representing the mental condition of the savage or the child, which Plato calls 'guess-work' (*εἰκασία*); images, which are its proper objects, are not here distinguished from solid physical realities, 'Superior Opinion,' which is the second grade, marks a more advanced stage of development, and is designated by Plato as 'belief' (*πίστις*), the mental state of a man who thinks the particulars of sense alone as truly existing and does distinguish the substance from shadow, the real from the unreal. 'The *πίστις* corresponds to what we may call the knowledge based on the induction from the experience of the particulars of sense.' A further stage in the development of knowledge is attained when we pass to the third grade of 'lower science,' which Plato terms *διανοία* which is the knowledge furnished by

the mathematical sciences which deal with pure logical concepts, using the particulars of sense, *e.g.*, the diagrams, as aids to the imagination. The highest ideal of knowledge, which these mathematical sciences only aim at, is fully realised in the supreme science of Dialectic, which forms the fourth and the last grade of knowledge. Dialectic deals with Ideas or Forms, pure logical concepts, without any aid of sensuous representation. Its procedure is two-fold—analysis followed by synthesis. It treats the ultimate principles of the other branches of mathematics as only ‘hypotheses,’ and by comparison of their principles reaches the most supreme principle, which is unhypothetical and self-evident. From this are deduced the principles of all other sciences, and through them their consequences. This supreme principle Plato calls the Idea of Good, which, as the Sun of the world of Ideas, is at once ‘the source of knowledge and illumination to the knowing mind, and the source of reality and being to the objects of its knowledge.’

Now Aristotle objects to Plato’s Dialectic first on the ground that it abolishes all other sciences ; for the Platonic doctrine, that the constituent elements of Ideas are also the elements of all things, leads him to suppose that the constituent elements of the objects of all sciences are the same, and therefore they all fall within the purview of one supreme Science, namely Dialectic, of which all other sciences are mere logical deductions. Aristotle, who was first to introduce a classification of sciences by distinguishing the speculative sciences from the practical, and ‘first’ philosophy from ‘second’ philosophies, naturally complains against the subsumption of all sciences in one supreme Science. Further Aristotle’s idea of Dialectic is quite different from that of Plato. He takes it to be an extreme antithesis of what he conceives to be the Demonstrative Science or Necessary Truth, inasmuch as the former ‘deals with an unbounded miscellany of subjects,’ while the latter confines itself to ‘a few special subjects ;’ and though the process of syllogism is common

(b) Aristotle’s criticism of Platonic Dialectic.

to both the conclusions of the former are only 'hypothetically true,' while those of the latter are 'true universally, absolutely and necessarily' (Grote, Aristotle, pp. 208-10). Again the universal propositions or the first principles are intuitively apprehended, and they cannot be demonstrated; and the Dialectic according to Aristotle aims at defending these first principles against the objections of their opponent by starting from his own premises and showing how they lead him to absurd consequences. Secondly, Aristotle contends that the process of analysis into constituent elements is applicable in the case of substances alone and not in the case of other categories; for substance Aristotle holds to be capable of being divided into two constituent elements, namely form and matter; but these elements cannot be found in other categories, for things that are not substances contain no matter (Met. 1044, b. 8). Plato, however, supposes that all knowable objects constituted of the same elements and that therefore there is only one science of them all. But, says Aristotle, one certainly cannot discover what are the elements of which activity or passivity or straightness is composed; therefore it is an error to seek the element of all existing things, or to think that one has found them. (Met. 992, b. 20-24.) Thirdly, Aristotle argues that granting that everything can be analysed into elements, *viz.*, the One and Great and the Small, as Plato supposes, how are we to suppose that these are the ultimate elements? In other words nothing proves that these are the ultimate elements of things, and that the analysis cannot be carried further. There will always be a difference of opinion among the scientists as to the ultimate elements of things. 'No result can, therefore, be *established* in this case' (Met. 993, a. 2-7). As Taylor well remarks, 'this objection of Aristotle against Plato holds equally true in the case of Aristotle's own analysis of a thing into form and matter.' Fourthly, Aristotle says that if all things are composed of the same constituent elements, one would know the objects of sense without having corresponding organ of

sense-perception (Met. 993, a. 7-10). Aristotle contends that on this theory it would follow that a Platonic philosopher, though born-blind, will have the perception of all the colours of the spectrum. But what is presumed by Aristotle in this argument is that every physical object is, according to Plato, completely analysable into pure logical concepts, since the elements of ideas are the elements of all things. But this is exactly antithetical to Plato's real view about the physical objects : Plato regards them to be incapable of being the objects of true science, exactly because they cannot be analysed into pure logical concepts on account of the irreducible sensuous factor they contain. Plato's contention in reality amounts to saying that the real objects of all exact sciences are pure logical concepts, and we find him to be substantially right in this respect.

3. The final point of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of knowledge turns upon the method of learning, and consequently on the Platonic Doctrine of Reminiscence. In the *Meno* the question of the possibility of learning is mooted, and the following dilemma is presented there ; ' if you already know a thing, then you need not learn it ; and if you do not know it already then you *cannot* learn it ; for even after learning it how can you determine that this was exactly the thing that you wanted to learn ? ' Plato's answer to this dilemma is that you do not learn anything new ; you simply recollect what you had already learnt in your previous lives, but have forgotten when you entered this life. All knowledge is, therefore, recollection of what had been learnt in former lives. Aristotle does not accept this theory as a solution of the dilemma, which he solves by distinguishing two grades of cognition, one complete and absolute, and the other incomplete and partial ; and he declares that learning is impossible in the first case, while it is possible in the second, when we bring to completeness our incomplete cognitions.' Aristotle, therefore, thinks that all learning presupposes and depends upon previous knowledge. Thus he says, ' all learning

Aristotle's criticism
of Plato's Doctrine of
Reminiscence.

is effected through previous acquaintance with some or all of the matters concerned. This is true alike of learning by demonstration, by definitions and by induction (Met. 992, b. 30-34). Demonstration involves the process of syllogism ; so to learn the truth by demonstration requires previous knowledge of the premises on which the proof is based ; similarly, learning it by definition presupposes previous knowledge of the meaning of the terms used in the definition ; and learning it by induction requires previous knowledge of the individual instances, on a comparison of which the induction is based. But, ' if, as the Platonists assert, there is a universal science of everything, he who learns it must have no previous acquaintance with anything' (Met. 992, b. 29), and this absence of all previous knowledge would, according to Aristotle, render the very process of learning impossible. ' But if it be suggested that the knowledge of this science is really innate,' Aristotle argues that ' it is surely a mystery how we possess the most excellent of sciences, and yet we are unconscious of the fact !' (Met. 993, a. 1-3). Taylor rightly remarks that Aristotle's arguments only prove the necessity of some self-evident truth, and are invalid as against Plato's Dialectic, since they involve a *pistis principii*. Further, Aristotle inconsistently, and perhaps unconsciously, accepts the doctrine of immediate, intuitive apprehension of the first principles, which is only another name for ' Innate knowledge ' that he is here trying to refute.

TIME AND ETERNITY

By

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Thanks to Bergson and Einstein time has become the central problem of philosophy. The crux of the question is presented by the antithesis between time as felt and time as thought. Perceptual time is agreed to be a continuous whole, whereas Conceptual time is supposed to be mathematical-discrete and infinitely divisible in character. Confronted by this problem philosophy has so far taken the usual methods of suppressing one or other of the aspects of the problem. The first to take time seriously was Bergson. He dismissed conceptual time as empty, spurious and 'spatial', and upheld perceptual time as the only concrete reality. Time becomes the very stuff of reality. But Bertrand Russell has a great suspicion of this easy solution. For him, analysis is the road to reality ; and the world can be analysed into a number of series of discrete moments. The mind is a succession of sensations and images, and the world a succession of 'particulars' (—a term which Russell adopts for his neutral entities in the Analysis of Matter). Thus present-day discussions on time display opposite abstractions. As usual, extremes meet, and both views commit the same fallacy—that of denying unity. Bergson seems disinclined to admit a unitary ground or essence, revealing itself in duration, and speaks of 'pure Duration.' And Russell is equally emphatic in denying continuity of essence between the succeeding particulars. As usual, the truth consists in the synthesis of opposites. Reality is both duration and succession. If we interpret time as the aspect of succession, we have to supplement it with the aspect of ground or essence to

render it adequate to reality in its fulness. This aspect is that of eternity. Reality displays both the aspects of time and eternity. This view renders Bergson's duration concrete as the creative self-expression of reality. It renders Russell's atomicity intelligible as referring to the successive stages of its growth.

Bertrand Russell's Analysis of time.

Russell develops his view of time in our Knowledge of the External World. He refers to this problem again in the Analysis of Matter only to reiterate the old views. Regarding the usual arguments for the unity and indivisibility of change based on perceptual experience, his answer takes three forms :—

1. Physiological,
2. Psychological,
3. Logical.

The physiological and psychological considerations are urged by Russell to prove that continuity of experience need not imply the continuity of the objects of experience, nor even continuity of sense-data. Snapshots may produce the illusion of change. The logical consideration is intended to prove that it is necessary to distinguish instantaneous states of objects and to regard them as forming a "Compact Series."

1. Physiological proof of discreteness.

"A motion is *perceived*, and not merely *inferred*, when it is sufficiently swift for many positions to be sensible at one time ; and the earlier and later parts of one perceived motion are distinguished by the less and greater vividness of the sensations" (Our Knowledge of the External World, pp. 139-40). Discrete stimuli may, therefore, produce continuous sensation.

Sensations have duration ; if stimuli occur faster than the duration of sensations, sensations fuse into each other, and produce the perception or motion.

1. This view assumes the discreteness of stimuli as Russell admits (E.W. p. 140).

2. Bergson points out that the discrete stimuli must be governed by a continuously changing apparatus, if they are to be successively presented. If change is not in the stimuli, it must be in their presenting or operating cause. "In order that the pictures may be animated, there must be movement somewhere. The movement does indeed exist here ; it is in the apparatus" (Creative Evolution).

3. And perception of motion or continuous change implies a close similarity between the stimuli ; they must have the same general character. This qualitative similarity precludes ultimate atomicity.

4. Further, the different staccato strokes of stimuli must occur in some pattern or order, if sensations of them are to fuse into one. Such a pattern or order implies a unitary source in the nature of stimuli—the twinkling of a star, the flight of a bird, the fluttering of foliage and so on.

Discrete stimuli cannot, therefore, produce perception of continuous change. Bergson's argument does not rest merely on perceptual continuity of time. It is metaphysical, showing the necessity of continuity. This physiological answer of Russell is not therefore conclusive.

2. *The Psychological considerations.*

This line of thought is the central interest of Bertrand Russell. He attempts to bridge the gulf between sense-data and physics.

He points out that we may have unperceived sensations. "In all cases of sense-data capable of gradual change we may find one sense-datum indistinguishable from another, and that other indistinguishable from a third, while yet the first and the third are quite easily distinguishable" (E. W. p. 141). There may be difference, therefore, when identity is perceived. "Such consider-

ations as the above show that although we cannot distinguish sense-data, unless they differ by more than a certain amount, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that sense-data of a given kind, such as weights or colours really form a compact series" (E. W. p. 142). By a 'Compact Series', Russell means a series in which there are infinite number of units between any two units. Between two sensations of weight or colour, there may be an infinite number of sensations of unperceived weight and colour.

(a) A sensation that is not sensed is a contradiction in terms. The intermediate stimuli are only physical stimuli.

(b) This consideration confuses sense-data with sensory awareness. Even if sense-data are discrete, sensations may be continuous.

(c) Even if we allow for marginal sensations in the sub-consciousness sensations cannot certainly be *infinite in number at every instant*.

3. Logical considerations.

Russell shows the possibility of giving an atomic interpretation to perceived motion. He points out that in a moving body, the extent which we see at one instant is different from that which we see at another. Thus he says we are brought back to a series of momentary views of the moving body, and that this series will be compact (E. W. 141).

(a) The difference is perceived as in the same moving body, otherwise these would be different perceptions of different bodies.

(b) Does the momentary state display change, a pattern of before and after? If it doesn't, how can static moments constitute change, even if they produce it in us?

(c) In an instant of the Cantorian Series, no compact series of sensations can be experienced—a veritable swarm of little perceptions in an instant which is infinitely divisible.

The possibility of an atomic interpretation is still dubious.

Russell proceeds to assert the necessity of analysis till we get static units. "So long as our analysis has only gone as far as other changes, it is not complete; if it is to be complete, it must end with terms that are not changes, but are related by a relation of earlier and later" (E. W. 151).

(a) Why should analysis be complete? For the mathematical theory of infinity and not for the analysis of motion.

(b) What is meant by changes, that are not changes, but related by earlier and later? A meaningless contradiction. Either it is change with a pattern of before and after, or it is a static point.

Russell has not shown the *Logical Necessity* of analysing motion into motionless units; nor has he shown the possibility of perception of change, if the stimuli are absolutely discrete.

Bergson is the protagonist of time. If continuity is perceptual illusion to Russell, it is the essence of Reality for Bergson. He maintains the integrity and indivisibility of change. If intellectual analysis leads to discreteness, to atomism, it is not a suitable instrument for revealing reality.

Bergson's descriptions of concrete duration imply and call for a unitary essence persisting in the changing phases, call for another "dimension of time" which is eternity. "Like radical finalism although in a vaguer form, our philosophy represents the organized world as a harmonious whole" (C. E. 53). "Life on the contrary progresses and endures in time" (C. E. 54). "..... this reality is undoubtedly creative, i.e., productive of effects in which it expands and transcends its own being" (C. E. 55). Something of the whole therefore must abide in the parts; and this common element will be evident to us in some way, perhaps by the presence of identical organs in very different organisms" (C. E. 57). "For our duration is not merely one instant replacing another; if it were, there would never be anything but the present—no prolonging of the past into the actual,

no evolution, no concrete duration. Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances" (C. E. 4 and 5). These expressions have no meaning if they exclude reference to an essence or material, connecting the several phases and revealing itself progressively in them. 'A harmonious whole,' endures in time, expands and transcends its own being, the common element evident in the presence of identical elements, prolonging the past, and gnawing into the future are phrases inexplicable if a central reality taking successive forms is denied.

Bergson proves the identity of impulsion by similarity of organs in divergent channels. He is thinking of the whole course of the evolution of life on the planet. But if we think of each organism and its life, we must postulate a central essence, a determinate nature revealing itself in the changing phases of its growth and decay. It need not have clear models of ready-made ends. It will forge its own purposes in the stress and strain of its life.

Accepting the lesson of relativity, we must think of the life of each organism as a whole. Momentary snapshots will not give us its true nature. Its full nature is revealed throughout the changing phases of its life. If we cannot describe a bit of matter adequately without reference to the time axis, the greater is the need of taking account of time in the case of living organisms. But time is not the whole story. The changing phases from birth to death reveal a unity of essence, a "continuity of interpenetration," which is the eternal background. The concrete reality cannot be fully described therefore in terms of change alone, but needs supplementation by another dimension. The real-in-duration, essence-taking-form is the full nature of the observed fact. This is what Gentile means when he speaks of Mind as Pure Act. Bergson does not draw this implication because he is absorbed in combating mechanism, and mechanistic finalism, and because he is afraid of the Cartesian substance, the string that runs through the necklace of beads. "Instead of a

flux of fleeting shades merging into each other, it perceives distinct, and so to speak *solid* colours, set side by side like the beads of a necklace, it (*i.e.*, the mind) must perforce then suppose a thread, also itself solid to hold the beads together" (C.E. p. 4). ".....As a matter of fact this substratum has no reality; it is merely a symbol intended to recall unceasingly to our consciousness the artificial character of the process by which the attention places clean-cut states side by side, where actually there is a continuity that unfolds" (C.E. p. 4). It is a strange meeting of extremes that both Bergson and Russell should inveigh against the same abstraction of substance, that both should feel the necessity of clearing the same lumber before proceeding. Instead of a permanent piece of matter, we have now the conception of a "Worldline," which is a series of events connected with each other in a certain way. "A light wave is analogous to a material unit; it differs in the fact that it spreads spherically instead of travelling along a linear route" (Russell—*Analysis of Matter*, p. 246). Both are unconscious that the work was done long ago. The transition from substance to subject, from pre-Kantian thought, both empirical and rational, to post-Kantian thought has not been assimilated in contemporary philosophy. The whole work needs to be done again with special reference to fresh regions of fact, physical and psychological. The alternative to "Substance" is not mere change or pure atomicity. It is obvious that both Bergson's "Continuity that unfolds," and Russell's "series of events connected with each other in a certain way" imply a reality that unfolds, a stuff or material that runs through the series of events. There needs be no hesitation in granting that there are no distinct beads, no motionless states, and no permanent substances hiding behind the series of events. But we are still left with the changing phases, with duration. To speak of a common impulsion at the beginning of life is insufficient unless it operates in the organisms every moment, and in every divergent channel of life. If it does, the vital essence in each organism reveals itself in its

changing phases; it cannot be identical with them. It is "Compresent" with its whole duration. It is its eternal background. Vital essence taking form, or manifesting itself in successive forms is therefore the concrete fact.

Thus in Bergson time and concrete duration are identified. The aspect of change is stressed so much that it comes perilously near the meaninglessness of mere change. Reacting against the old idea of substance as a static and indifferent entity binding together momentary states into a mechanical whole, Bergson seems to deny all ground of unity in duration. Duration as mere change without something that changes is as much of an abstraction as clock time, an infinitely divisible whole, empty of all events. But in Bergson himself there is a concrete view of time which needs to be freed from its excessive emphasis on mere change. Contemporary thought on time is involved in blind alleys. It is caught between the Scylla of mere duration and the Charybdis of a mathematical infinity of pure instants,—between an abstract interpretation of perceptual and conceptual time.

A true view of time is impossible without an adequate conception of eternity. A more concrete interpretation of duration will give a clue to a more adequate solution of the problem of time. Time is to be thought of against an eternal background. Of course discussion is bound to suffer from the necessary employment of metaphors. We must first get rid of the spatial conception of eternity as an endless line. The percept on "Take time seriously" has resulted in an onesided emphasis on mere successiveness. Perhaps Spinoza is a better guide than Alexander in this matter. At least we cannot afford to forget him even on the crest of the *elan-vital*, even in the *nisus* and churning of Space-Time.

Duration is a flow, certainly; but it cannot be a mere flow. There is something that flows. Bergson is afraid of admitting this aspect of duration, on account of the bogey of the Cartesian "matter," an inert substance, which might convert his flow

into a "necklace of beads." But the fear is groundless. Duration is a concrete process which has "*thickness*." Something is *realising itself in the process*. It is not hidden behind the outer wall of the process. Principle and process are one. Reality is life expressing itself. Mere expression is meaningless; mere duration is unthinkable. So is mere substance. The flower is a block of duration, an event or series of events, in the language of Relativity. The flower or any bit or reality is a set or system of processes in which its nature is expressing itself. Dr. Whitehead speaks of "Realisation as the becoming of time in the field of extension." (Science and the Modern World, p. 159.)

The very mention of "nature" or "essence" is enough to perturb contemporary thought, because science and philosophy have not been able to get rid of the paralysing influence of the old notion of inert substance. But here is no inert substance, but living principles, a plain fact of observation. The flower is not a mere process; it has a uniqueness and individuality, which is different from everything else, which it reveals through all its phases. The whole nature of the flower is not found at any one moment of its existence, neither in the bud nor in the glory of its maturity, nor in its fruitful seed. It is a growth, a duration. To appreciate the full nature of its reality, therefore, we have to take account of the essence or system of qualities and relations as well as the changing phases which constitute its life. This indwelling principle is found throughout the growth; its fullness is revealed in the complete life of the flower, not at particular stages of its growth. It is "com-present" to use Dr. Alexander's word for a different meaning with the whole process. It is its *eternal aspect*. If *before*, *now*, and *after* constitute the three dimensions of time, eternity may be said to be its Fourth Dimension, compresent with all the other three dimensions, just as Time is the fourth dimension of space, and "compresent" in a looser way with its three dimensions. This 'Compresence' of eternal essence with

temporal phases confers value on all the phases, in different degrees, but each unique in its kind. Childhood is not mere undeveloped manhood. The child is not a little man, a means to his future. Every stage of life is primarily an end in itself, and only secondarily a means to a later stage.

Every phase is a unique realisation of an aspect of the eternal essence which is not "thin," but "thick," not linear, but multiple in possibility. That is why the play of childhood has in its own way a final value. Every stage is to be lived, and not lost in retrospect or expectation. That is why romantic love is an end itself, and not a mere means to the good of the race. The flower is not a mere instrument for bringing about fruit and seed; it is an end in itself. It reveals a part of the eternal essence. Rabindranath Tagore had this truth in mind when in a poem in the Gitanjali he speaks of 'The unseen play-mate' pressing the signet of eternity on many a fleeting moment of careless joy.

The word 'compresence' is to be taken in a specific sense, more intimate than the relation meant by S. Alexander. For him, it is primarily spatial in its reference. The earth, and sky, floor and table, even mind and its object are examples of compresence in his meaning. It means the most universal fact of togetherness in the space-time manifold. The words *manifestation*, *expression*, *realisation* are nearer the intimate relation we are referring to, and indicate more nearly the nature of the relation between eternity and time, essence and successiveness.

This view of time and eternity is borne out by the principle of relativity. If time is essential to things, if the ultimate unit be the event, Space-Time-Particle, there are as many times as Space-Time-Systems.

1. Time matters to things, passage is an essential characteristic of things, of even "Dead Matter." It renders intelligible the idealist insistence that time is the form of manifestation, that process is necessary to realisation.

2. There is no one time, but many times as many times as there are relatively isolable systems in reality. This means philosophically the abandonment of a Unilinear Conception of Eternity as Endless Line. The Universe then "has no histories of its own, though it contains histories beyond number"...has no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, fruits and blossoms" (F. H. Bradley : Appearance and Reality, p. 199).

The recent developments in Physics in regard to the Quantum Phenomena also tend towards the Organic Concept of Nature. The particles of matter have become singularities in waves, foci of fields of force, rather than isolated billiard balls. Eddington points out that interspace is as essential as the centre; that the electron cannot be located definitely and that the same electron may never appear twice. That is to say, what is Constant is the balance of forces in patterns of field and centre and not self-existent particles.

Thus recent physics illuminates classical metaphysics. If the unit of reality is the event, it becomes rather meaningless to speak of points instants as though they could exist by themselves. As Vaihinger puts it in the mathematical view is an instrument of dealing with the world, not a picture of it. The universe therefore is a unitary fountain of energy giving rise to infinitely diversified events; each process is time, the fountain underlying it throughout its Eternity. Eternity is the Fourth Dimension of Time.

SPINOZA AND SAMKARA

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For the student of comparative thought Spinoza's Philosophy possesses a unique interest. Excepting Plato, he is the one great thinker in the west for whom Philosophy was no mere speculation. In the "Treatise for the Improvement of the Understanding" he unfolds to us his quest for an object the contemplation of which would fill his mind with eternal Joy and Blessedness. Very naturally, he comes to the conclusion that sensual pleasure, honour and riches pursued as ends are fruitful sources of obstacles, but love towards a Being eternal and infinite feeds the mind wholly with Joy and is unmingled with any sadness. All our action and thought must be directed to this one end (परमपुरुषार्थः) and the true method is that which directs us to the true idea-God. This is the typical Indian outlook—only more balanced.

Human bondage is due to the strength of the Passions—the Passive Emotions over the mind; they are nothing but confused ideas (Adhyāsa) and are overcome through true ideas. The Problem of Conduct is therefore the Problem of Knowledge and it is in the fitness of things that the metaphysical Absolute (substance in Spinoza) must be the Ethical Ideal as well (Sāṃkara ब्रह्मभावसौचः). The highest good is the knowledge of God (Ethics iv 28). We are also prepared for Spinoza's identification of the will and understanding (Ethics i, 49 Cor.).

It will be interesting no doubt to note the resemblances but the intention of this paper is to suggest that the inconsistencies of Spinoza can be got over by a judicious use of 'Sāṃkara's

doctrine of *Adhyāsa*—the usual criticism of Spinoza being predominately Hegelian (e.g., Caird Joachim). My criticism shall be mainly under two heads. First, that Spinoza due to his meagre analysis of Error fails to apply it more widely to his doctrine of Attributes and Modes as he has done in regard to Time, Measure, Free Will, Good and Bad. His explanation of the latter by his famous doctrine of “*Imaginatio*” should have been more universal and consistent.

Second, that his conception of the essence of Mind as Thought has led him into anomalies. I shall try to throw into relief the points which favour these criticisms. None the less I shall bear in mind that I am writing a ‘Gloss,’ not a commentary on Spinoza—just in the manner of Professor Alexander’s “Spinoza and Time.” More unambiguously I shall ask what consequences will follow if Sāṅkarism is introduced in Spinoza.

It cannot fail to strike us at the outset that Spinoza’s is a deductive system. Given the definition of ‘Substance’ as that which exists and is conceived by itself, etc., what consequences follow, as from the definition of a triangle? Spinoza is led to deduce that existence pertains to the essence of it (*Ethics* i 7, 20), that it is one and has infinitely of attributes, etc. It would seem that Sāṅkara has recourse to Śruti for proving the existence of his Brahman. As a matter of fact both understate their case. Spinoza gives four proofs for the existence of God, all of them resting on the assumption that existence belongs to the nature of Substance; but the real nerve of the proof lies in this that once you grant even contingent existence you will be led to accept God. The impossibility of denying some being is the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum*.

Sāṅkara is more explicit :

“सर्वेष्टात्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्व प्रसिद्धिः ; सर्वा हि आत्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति न नास्त्वस्मोति । यदि हि नात्मास्तित्व प्रसिद्धिः स्यात् सर्वो लोको नास्त्वस्मोति प्रतोयात् । आत्मा च ब्रह्म ॥ आत्मनश्च प्रत्याख्यातुमशक्यत्वात् य एव निराकर्त्ता तस्यैवात्मत्वात् ।”

Only our Self-Conscious existence guarantees the existence of substance (Brahman) though it may turn out that logically our existence is conditioned by the Absolute Existence. It is because Spinoza does not work from within, from the self that his substance and modes appear as imposed upon us *ab extra*.

Descartes began well—but he surreptitiously drew too much from his “Cogito.” He made out that the mind was a substance, whose essence was thought, that it was a person, finite, etc., thus exposing himself to the paralogisms of Kant. In fixing ‘Idea’—thought as the ultimate of mind Descartes gave a misleading turn to European philosophy. ‘Idea’ or Vrittijñāna is a conditioned thing—modification of the mind owing to its origin to empirical circumstances and so naturally requiring and ‘ideatum’ usually a modification of extension. We now see the origin of the Spinozistic doctrine of the correlation of Attributes. His view of the human mind as the ‘Idea’ of the body—the ‘ideatum’ is fully developed in the opening section of the second book of Ethics.

So if thought or idea is to be the ultimate of mind there must needs be extension. Some how, Spinoza’s conception of God is so exalted that it refused to be satisfied by the meagre attribution of Thought and Extension. He must invest it with an infinity of attributes each expressing it in infinite ways a perfectly gratuitous luxury.

Śaṁkara escapes all these chiefly because he adopts a critical stand point, he is keenly aware that to posit any predicate of the Ātman will be to make an object of the Pure Subject. It is a Function Dṛiṣṭi, the utmost that can be said of it is that it is Self Conscious Awareness—स्वयंज्योतिः स्वभावम्, the condition of all states of Cognition. It does not require an ideatum for its existence ; it is not tyrannised by the other. Śaṁkara draws a further conclusion that it is Free and Infinite as no limitation can be assigned to it

(देशकालाकारमैदः सर्विदो न युज्यते).

What more, Spinoza's doctrine of the Attributes is inconsistent with his own definitions. Attribute is the essence of Substance as perceived by the intellect. It is clearly far from Spinoza's thoughts that the attributes are human fictions. There is no antithesis in him between the thing-in-itself—the unknowable and the appearances. The attributes are real and the human mind knows it as such. But Spinoza shall have to admit that substance and Attribute are indetical. For, only Substance and modes are given—that is, either a thing exists in itself or in another Substance is Prior to its modifications and so we are left with substance. As Spinoza says that each Attribute is infinite in its own kind, i.e., not involving any other Attribute either for its conception or existence it is as good as substance. How can Spinoza escape Pluralism, as he admits an infinity of Attributes ?

The two known attributes and the imagined infinity are not shown to be connected, are not unified. They are merely juxtapose, jammed in the substance as if the latter is something over and above the attributes. What with his concern to do justice to the rich variety of the world of Thought and Extension and his equally exacting passion for unity Spinoza is led into these anomalies.

The device that can be adopted to keep Spinoza's Substance from disruption and preserve its single undividedness will be to develop his doctrine of imaginatio and apply it to the doctrine of Attributes and modes. We shall have to lay stress on their being relative to the Human mind. Extension shall have to be reduced to a shadow to a principle of Limitation which in some way infects the unique substance giving rise to the modes.

Thought as equivalent to a modification of the mind (Vrit-tiñāna) will become a conditioned product—the true nature of the mind being Self-consciousness.

That this innovation may not be quite unacceptable to Spinoza will be evident from his treatment of the Finite Modes from the unreality of Time, Measure, Number, etc. The Modes,

the emerging of the *Natura Naturata* from the *Natura Naturans* present the central difficulty in Spinoza in any Absolutist philosophy. We have to ask whether the modes can in any sense follow from the substance and what states can be granted them in his system.

Spinoza's conception of God as *causa sui* as the *Ens Realissimum* seems to give hopes of deriving a world of modes, extended bodies and minds. But we are mistaken. The ordinary concept of 'Cause' is not applicable to the Spinozistic God. Spinoza will repudiate with scorn any notion of a 'creator' fashioning after a design for some purpose. He condemns the ego-centric outlook (see *Ethics* I Appendix). The only manner of causal connection acceptable to Spinoza is that of the ground and consequence, e.g., the properties of the triangle following from its definition. Even this logical nexus is impossible for Spinoza. His substance is immutable and indivisible (*Nirvikāra* and *Niravayava*) and he expressly warns us not to attribute to God divisibility because we, by our imagination, are able to picture quantity as divisible (*Ethics* 12 and 13, Substance absolutely infinite and indivisible).

Any hope for deriving the Finite the modal existence in Space and Time is smashed by Spinoza's chief doctrine that duration is not applicable to the substance, time is a subjective fiction a mere aid to the imagination. The substance is timelessly Real the modal beings cotingent, they involve no necessary existence. "The essence of things produced by God involve no existence." The relation of ground and consequence is reciprocal and versible, but with Spinoza the relation between the Modes and God is strictly one-sided. "अनन्यत्वं व्यतिरेकसाभावः" The modes it is true, cannot exist without God but not *vice versa*. The essence of God involves existence but not that of the mode. Read with this, his repudiation of mind and body, will and intellect to God (*Ethics* I, 17), acosinism is complete. Spinoza realises only very partially that the category of causality or that of whole and parts is not applicable to his God. But Śaṁkara

is more explicit :

“ तत्रैवं सति विज्ञानात्मनः परमात्मनिवाचकाः शब्दाः परमानैकस्य द्रव्यं विविक्त्वः द्व. उप.”

But a finite mode, though not expressing fully and really the Absolute is some how real and persistent. It cannot fall outside the whole. True, it cannot be owned in its entirety nor can it be disinherited and disowned. Spinoza feels the difficulty, as is evident from the halting definition of a Finite mode. Modes are modifications of the attributes of God in so far as they are modified by a modification which is finite, and so on to infinity (*Ethics* I, 67). Even the Conatus of human beings is not the infinite Conatus of God but as it is modified by a modification. “ The idea of an individual actually existing is caused by God not in so far as he is infinite but in so far as he is considered affected by another idea of a thing actually existing of which he is the cause in so far as he is affected by a third idea and so on to infinity ” (*Ethics* II, 9). These are feeble recognitions of the fact that there is a Limiting condition present over and above the Substance. It is that which makes the modes feel as if they were independent, self-contained. Spinoza would have escaped the implications of such a position by saying that for God separateness and individuality do not exist through the modes—because they look at things from the ordinary common point of view feel they are self-contained much as “ a drunken man believes that he utters—found the free decision of his mind—words which when he is sober, he would willingly withheld.”

But if the modes are infected by illusion the substance too, which is their Cause. Spinoza does not see this clearly for he fails to take account of a positive distorting element (*Avidhya*) in Error. It is no mere Privation or want of knowledge as Spinoza's analysis of Falsity would imply (see his *De Intellectus* and *Ethics*—II. 35). It is something persistent and distesting thought ultimately unreal.

Spinoza's Ethical doctrine is based on such a positive conception of Error. If the human modes were inexorably fixed and followed the eternal necessity of God, that is, if they did not involve the positive distorting factor in illusion, there would have been no ethical question, no passions to infest the human mind. And Spinoza cannot speak of human bondage and the strength of passions. Nor can he speak of Human Freedom if the passions—"the confused ideas" held in exorable sway, were eternal in their affliction. When Spinoza has reduced Human bondage to Error and affirms the power of the understanding to form true ideas and overcome the confused ideas by the knowledge of the highest good—God—his basic doctrine is seen with little doubt.

Man, according to Spinoza, is a complex mode—a certain mode of extension and a corresponding mode of thought which is the idea or the Psychic side of the ideatum—the extensional mode. He is a composite product (इदमनिदंरूपः). Under the sway of passions—the human mind is passive, not fully itself ; it is affected by external conditions (अविद्यावश). The moral endeavour consists in getting rid of this externality—this contingency and substituting for it a true knowledge of oneself as the infinite or as Spinoza has it, to look upon every thing Sub Specie Aeternitatis (ब्रह्मात्मेकत्वं विद्या). Such a moral ideal is not imposed upon us ab extra by God. (There is no "Niyoga" in knowing the *Āsman*). Both in Śaṅkara and Spinoza the imperative holds, because it is a call to realise oneself to attain the highest good by identifying oneself with the True Idea ; this is a call which none can deny, lest he should deny himself in so doing. The passions cease when there is such an identification,—a love towards the Infinite Being.

“आत्मानं वेदित्वा नीयादयमस्मीति पुरुषः

किमिच्छन् कस्य कामाय शरीरमनु संज्वरेत् ।”

This state is not an effect (Kārya, see Br. Sūtr. I. I4) nor even a reward for virtue—it is not a transaction. “Blessedness

is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself. Neither do we rejoice therein because we control our lusts but contrariwise because we rejoice therein we are able to control our lusts'' (Ethics V. 42).

We have seen how if Spinoza is to be made consistent, if his conception of the infinite Time-less and indivisible God is to be maintained, his doctrine of Attributes needs rewriting. Extension is to be got rid of and the essence of mind be conceived as Pure self-consciousness. The existence and explanation of the modes—the Ethical problem—requires that there should be present in their constitution a Limiting condition which is not ultimate. It is also shown that with very little violence to the chief Spinozistic doctrines there changes can be introduced in his system.

But we shall hear the Hegelians crying out, that the Substance has become abstract, it is a nest of negations, bare and empty, that it is not a Spirit, etc., and that the entire thing savours of mysticism, which does not really explain the Phenomenal world, etc. Let us not be disheartened at these catch words. The Hegelian Absolute Idea or Spirit might be a concrete universal—a unity-in-difference but is the dialectic process—the logical evolution undergone by the Absolute Spirit. Or is it merely our construction? This is to ask whether the logical process implies a Temporal process as well, if not, how to account for finite existence in time. If that be an illusion where will that illusion fall? Hegel does not give any answer. Moreover if the Absolute Spirit is fulfilling itself logically and impartially it is incomprehensible whether we should or could hasten the process by our individual efforts. There is no demand for Self-realisation, logically no Ethical question (no *Sādhana*). The concept of unity in difference is more mysterious than that of the Limit. We may gravely doubt whether the Hegelian Absolute is to be called a Spirit. What his Absolute has gained in comprehensiveness in breadth, it has lost in depth in Spirituality.

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[Not Read.]

Name Title and Descent.

The forerunner of Muslim *falasita* was Abu Yusuf Yaqoob bin Sabah Al-Knidi,¹ one of the very few thinkers who was a true Arab by race, and is therefore called '*Failsūf-ul-Arab.*' He was descended from the yemenite kings of *Kīnda*, belonged to the *Qahtanite* branch of the Arab race, and his ancestors had been kings over Hadarmaut, Bahrein, and Kinda. One of his great-grand fathers *Aṭh' aṭh' bin Qays*, himself the king of Kinda, had embraced Islam, and become an associate of the prophet. His father *Is'ḥaq bin Sabah* had been governor of Kufa under Al-Mahdi and Al-Rashid.²

His Life.

Kindi was born in *Kufa*, in what year we cannot say ;³ and was educated in Basra and Baghdad, the great centres of

¹ Our philosopher should be sharply distinguished from the Christian *Abd-ul-Masih bin Is'ḥaq Al-Kindi* (D. circa 830 A.D.), who wrote at the court of Almamūn 'An Apology' in defence of Christianity against Islam, which has been translated by Sir William Muir and published in 1881 and 1887 as 'The Apology of Alkindy.'

² His full genealogy and other details about his ancestor are given in *Tarikh-ul-ḥukama*, p. 240 and *Tabaqat-ul-aṭibba*, Vol. I, pp. 206-207.

³ Dr. Boer's conjecture (Ency. of Islam, Vol. II, p. 1019) that he was born "in the middle of the 9th century A.D." cannot be right: for Al-Kindi served as a translator under Almamūn who died in 833, i.e., before the middle of the 9th century. The probability, therefore, is that Al-hindi was born in the 1st or the 2nd decade of the 9th century

education at that time. He made a thorough study of "Greek, Persian and Indian learning,"¹ and became a scholar of "Medicine, Philosophy, Arithmetic, Logic, Music, Geometry, Astrology, and Astronomy."² His special achievement lay in the knowledge of Greek language and Philosophy. This and presumably the connections of his father with the court, enabled Al-Kindi to establish himself in the Abbāsīd court, where he served as a Translator and editor of Greek works, as an astrologer, and as tutor to a son of Mutasīm named Ahmad. He was much honoured by Al-Mamūn, Mutasīm, and his son. In the reign of Mutawakkil, however, he was made to suffer owing to his Mutazalite tendencies: his books were confiscated and put in a house named *Kindia*.³ Later on he entered the court and his books were restored; but he does not seem to have regained the court favour. He died in the reign of Al-Mu'tamid (circa 260 A.H., 873 A.D.). *Ibn-i-Nadeem* tells us that he was niggardly; and *Ibn-i Abi-Uṣṣbaiyah* quotes a passage from his will, handed down from tradition, and adds that if the tradition is true *Ibn-i-Nadeem* was right in his opinion. (*Vide Tabaqat-ul-aʿibba* Vol. I, p. 209).

His Writings.

Al-Kindi was an encyclopaedic scholar and writer; and had absorbed the whole learning and culture of his time. Al-Mamūn had especially entrusted him with the superintendence of the Translation work in *Bayt-ul-Hikmal*; because he was a man versed not only in Greek language but also in the subject-matter of the books which had to be translated. Many translators worked under him, whose versions he revised; and he himself prepared several translations and wrote summaries, introductions and commentaries on most books of Greek thinkers.

¹ *Tarikh-ul-Hukama* by Al-qifti, p. 240.

² *Ibid*, p. 241—In this Al-qifti quotes Ibn-i-Jaljal of Spain as his authority.

³ This story is given in *Tabaqat-ul-aʿibba*, Vol. I, pp. 307-8.

His original treatises number 275.¹ These include books on diverse subjects—philosophy, logic, physics, politics, psychology, ethics, mathematics (Greek and Indian), astronomy, medicine music, optics, astrologogy, geography, phenomenology, history of civilization, and theology, etc., Unfortunately, however, “fewer than twenty.”² of these treatises are extant, little in Arabic, but more in Latin translations. Kindi was greatly honoured by the Schoolmen—“is placed by Roger Bacon in the first rank after Ptolemy as a writer on Optics,”³ was regarded by Cardon, a philosopher of the *renaissance* as one of the twelve subtlest minds,”⁴ and “was numbered among nine judices of Astrology.”⁴ This accounts for the translation of his works into Latin. “His work *De Somniorum Visione* was translated by Gerard of Cremona and another was published as *De Medicinarum compositarum gradibus investigandis libellus* (Strassburg, 1531.)”⁵ The Latin versions of “On the Intellect” and “On the five Senses” have been published by A. Nagy (Munster, 1897). His books on “Ebb and Flow On Optics,” and “On the Cause of the Blue Colour of the Sky,” are also preserved in Latin.

Al-Kindi's Philosophy.

This lack of sources makes it extremely difficult to give a systematic account of Kindi's philosophy. We attempt the task, however, deriving as much help as is available from the books of European authors who have studied the Latin versions as well as from the titles of his works preserved by Arabic authors.

¹ All the 275 titles are given in *Tabaqat*, Vol. 1, pp. 209-14. *Alpifti* (*Tarikh-ul-ḥukama*, pp. 261-264) has arranged his list according to the subject-matter of the books, but gives only about 215 titles, with a warning that the list is not exhaustive.

² *Ency. Brit.*, 11th edition, Vol. 15, p. 802.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 15, p. 802.

⁴ *Encyclopaedia of Islam*: Vol. 2, p. 1019.

⁵ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*: *Ibid.*, p. 802.

Proportional Relation between Stimulus and Sensation.

Mathematics according to Al-Kindi form the necessary introduction to philosophy, and he wrote a special treatise to say that "Philosophy cannot be studied without Mathematics" (انه لا تنال الغلبة الا بلم الرياضيات)¹. He also applied Mathematics to Natural Philosophy and even to Medicine with fruitful results. In the theory of composite medicines he advocated that the effect of the mixture, like the effect of music, depends upon geometrical proportion of the sensible qualities, hot, cold, dry and moist. If we want to make the mixture hot or moist in the first degree, we must give it heat or moisture double the heat or moisture of the equable mixture—in the second degree four times as much, and so on. This point according to Kindi has to be decided by sense, and here he gives us a hint of the proportional relation existing between stimulus and sensation. This idea, to the credit of Kindi, is quite original; and it was for this doctrine that Cardar regarded him as one of the twelve subtlest minds.

Metaphysics.

To come to Metaphysics, Kindi is fully convinced that the world is a work of God. The titles of some of his books show that he had philosophical grounds for this belief. But he also did a very interesting work in this connection, and anticipated a philosophical study of religions so much emphasised in modern times. He made a comparative study of religions known to him and found that they all agree in believing the world to be the work of an Agent who is One and Eternal. For anything we know, he was the first man to make a comparative study of religions and he wrote a special treatise on this subject, viz., (رسالة في افتراق الملل في التوحيد والنهم مجمعون على التوحيد وكل قد)². He calls God One and Eternal, and points out that

¹ *Tabaqat-ul-afibba*, Vol. I, p. 207.

² *Ibid*, p. 212.

no other epithet can be wholly applicable to Him, but the human intelligence must know this first real absolute Agent and know Him as a divine being. In this God has helped us by surrounding us with objects that speak of His divinely magnificent activities ; as well as by sending to us apostles who bear witness for him.¹ All the works of God without any exception are just; and Kindi wrote a special treatise to prove this.

Though God is the only Real and Actual Agent, and the world is His work, his activity is transmitted in many ways from above the world. There are different grades of existence, some higher, *e.g.*, the spheres, and some lower, *e.g.*, the material world; and all these existences are bound by the chain of cause and effect. Al-Kindi was a staunch believer in the Law of Causality and wrote special treatises to prove this. We cannot say what were his arguments; but presumably he argued from the goodness of God that the world—His work—is a system, and therefore its elements are harmoniously related and necessarily connected with one another. The higher existences affect the lower, but the lower ones cannot affect the higher, because the higher stand above them in the order of Being. Thus the higher become causes and the lower effects; all existence is bound by causality and the law of causality governs all events in the world, so that if we know the cause we can foretell the effect. In the world, therefore, which is a system built on causality, if we know a single existing thing thoroughly (*i.e.*, in all its inter-connections and inter-relations), we get a mirror in which we may behold the entire scheme of things.”²

The highest existence is Reason or Intellect which proceeds from God by way of emanation. It is not God because God

¹ Kindi wrote a special treatise to prove Apostleship, *viz.*, (*Vide Alqifti's History*, p. 244).

² *Tabaqat-ul-atibba* : Vol. I, p. 200.

³ De Boer's *History of Philosophy in Islam* : Eng. Trans., p. 101.

is its agent ;¹ but because it is the highest existence, it becomes the cause of all existence other than itself and God. The material world has no power, it receives all activity from Reason or *Aql* and conforms to its directions. Kindi seems to have been against materialism, and he wrote a special treatise : 'On the Refutation of the Atomists.'² Between *Aql* and the material world stands the world of soul ; and the human soul is an emanation from it.

Psychology.

Our soul is an uncompounded, imperishable essence,³ which was in the world of reason before its descent into the world of sense. Thus human soul has two connections—a higher and a lower. It is united with the body in its activities and thus is connected with the world of sense—the material world. But its essence is spiritual and thus it is connected with higher existence—the world of reason. It can thus have both sensible and rational knowledge.

Doctrine of the Degrees of Intelligence.

This brings us to Kindi's doctrine of the grades of soul or degrees of intelligence in the soul.⁴ These are four—three belonging to the human soul, and one independent of the body ; or in other words one directly connected with the higher rational world, and three with the lower.

¹ De Boer in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (Vol. IX, p. 880) states that this *aql* is "probably equivalent to God," but such a view seems to be erroneous, because Al-Kindi takes *aql* to be an emanation from God. This sentence has been specially written to guard against such a misunderstanding.

² *Tabaqat-ul atibba* : Vol. I, p. 212.

³ These are the titles of his treatises in which he proved this position. *Vide Tarikh-ul-hukama* of Alqifti, pp. 244-45.

⁴ This is dealt with in Kindi's treatise 'On the Intellect.'

(a) The first is the potentiality of the human soul, the mere capacity of acquiring knowledge. The soul at this stage is *capable* of acquiring knowledge, but it *has not* acquired any knowledge. The knowledge is latent in the soul, but has not manifested itself; *e.g.*, the man who has learnt to write has the knowledge of the art of writing latent in his soul.

(b) The second is the acquired or developed intelligence, as those properties of the soul which it can at any moment make use of. For example, the writer possesses the degree of intelligence required for the operation of writing and can at any moment bring this into activity.

(c) The third is the active intelligence, the intelligence in the state of outward manifestation—as when the writer actually puts this knowledge of the art of writing into practice. These are the three that belong to the human soul and are connected with the lower world.

(d) The fourth is the ever active Agent Intellect from which flows all reality and which is the cause and essence of all spiritual entities in the world. It is this ever active *aql* which effects the passage from (a) to (b), *i.e.*, develops the 'potentiality of the soul' into 'acquired intelligence.' This *aql* as we can already say is exclusively spiritual; and although it acts on the faculties of body, it is independent of the body, because it does not require the intermediary of sense in acquiring knowledge. The other three work through the senses, are connected with the body, and belong to the sensible lower world.

Theory of Knowledge.

This duality of the sensible and the spiritual is maintained by Al-Kindi in his theory of knowledge. If the soul has a double aspect, Knowledge also is of two kinds. Kindi wrote a special treatise: "On the Nature and Kinds of Knowledge."¹

¹ Alqifti's *History* : p. 241.

Knowledge (i) is given by the senses, and (ii) acquired by the reason. The particulars are given to us by the senses and the Universal—the species and genera—is conceived by the reason. The doctrine is interesting as an anticipation of Kant's thesis, because here we get a hint that sense and reason must unite in knowledge,—neither alone being sufficient. In Islamic philosophy this doctrine was developed on the idealistic side by *Abu Nasr Al-Farabi*.

Al-Kindi goes on to say that the concepts of reason are identical with reason, and the percepts of sense with sense perception. How Kindi explained the latter we cannot say. Some hints can be had from one of his works on Optics which is extant in Latin. We are told there that "the vision takes place through a bundle of rays, which sent out from the eye, expanding in the form of a cone, embrace the object.....The sense of sight grasps its object in an active and instantaneous way." ' We might thus presume that in identifying percept with perception Kindi must have looked to some realistic theory of direct perception.

Practical Philosophy.

Kindi's practical Philosophy is closely connected with his metaphysics and the metaphysical duality appears in Ethics also. We have seen that according to him Human soul is united with the body on the one side and has a spiritual origin on the other. Now in so far as it is combined with the body—an existence in the lower grade of being—it is affected by the heavenly spheres which are a comparatively higher existence. In its spiritual origin and being however, it belongs to the highest existence, and is therefore free. Freedom and immortality, thus, are characteristics of the world of intelligence only. It is interesting to compare here the dualist *faṭṭuf-ul-Arab* with the dualist Descartes who advocated

that "the body is subject to necessity, the soul endowed with free-will; being independent of the body it survives its destruction,"¹ and again that "the material world knows no other law than the the law of necessity."² From the above doctrine Al-Kindi drew a practical lesson. If we love material possession we shall be deceived; but if we turn to the blessings of reason—piety, knowledge and virtues—we shall get eternal possessions, attain to the highest and find eternal bliss.

Kindi's School.

Kindi had during his life-time a school and a body of disciples. Some of these have been enumerated by Al-qifti in his History (p. 246), the most important being *Abul Abbas Ahmad bin Muhammad al Sarakhsi* (D. 286 A.H., 899 A.D.). The list of his books which amount to more than fifty, is given in *Tabaquat-ul-alibba* which shows that he was a great scholar and had studied Philosophy, Mathematics (Algebra), Natural Sciences, Astronomy, and Music. But hardly any of his writings have survived, and it is doubtful whether he went any further than his master. Nevertheless Kindi left a permanent influence on Islamic Philosophy. He indicated the starting point and introduced metaphysical and psychological problems, which the *falsafa* who followed him never entirely gave up. Herein lies the importance of Kindi, and this justifies his claim to be the intellectual ancestor of the *falsafa*. His original researches, as we have already seen, are no less important; and seeing that he was the first *falsuf*, we must give him much credit for anticipating Modern European philosophers in so many directions.

¹ Weber's History of Philosophy, p. 315

² *Ibid*, p. 314.

GENTILE'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE SPIRIT AS PURE ACT—A STUDY.

By

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Campbellpur.

Introductory.

What follows is firstly a brief statement of Gentile's theory of the mind Pure Act. And, secondly, a brief enumeration of some of the main difficulties which bar the way to a complete acceptance of this metaphysic. This study is based on Gentile's most well-known book 'The Theory of the Mind as Pure Act' as translated by Wildon Carr. The writer has profited greatly by a study of Joad's article on Gentile in his 'Modern Philosophy' and Prof. de Burgh's article entitled 'Gentile's Philosophy of the Spirit' in the January number of 'The Journal of Philosophical Studies.' This latter article is mainly destructive in character. The present writer, has, mainly dealt with those difficulties which have troubled him and some of which are not, unfortunately, dealt with in de Burgh's able study. For Gentile's doctrine his own book has been relied upon. The writer greatly regrets that lack of necessary material has not allowed him to study Prof. J. A. Smith's article on 'The Philosophy of G. Gentile' in Vol. XX of the 'Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society;' and Bosanquet's discussion in his 'Meeting of the Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy.' A word of apology must be added. Exigencies of space and time forbade any detailed account of the Gentilian system. The result is that the statement of his doctrine here attempted is very often bald and, perhaps, incoherent.

Hegel imagined that his was the last word in Idealism. And it seemed for about half a century that he had not exaggerated matters. His disciples in England and Germany were only commentators and interpreters of the master's not-always-too-lucid dicta. There was no abrupt break or improvement in the main body of Idealist doctrine. But the last quarter of a century has witnessed the rise and popularity (in Italy mainly) of a new school of Idealism—a school which tries to carry out certain developments which are regarded as the logical outcome of the Hegelian point of view.

Hegel's point of view is prominently associated with two doctrines which he has bequeathed to Philosophy :—(1) Thought is the only existent of whose reality we are immediately assured. It is a living concrete reality. The whole of reality must be interpreted in its terms. (2) We are immediately aware of our thought and experience, but immanent in it and transcending it—behind it—is a total concrete unity of thought which gives all the reality to individual experience that it possesses. Now Neo-Idealism accepts the first of these two tenets but rejects the second. For it the only real thought is the thought of which we are most immediately aware. There is nothing beyond it or transcending it. No 'block-universe' as James trenchantly criticised in his 'Pluralistic Universe.' There is no absolute apart from 'mind, active, self-creative and self-creating.' Philosophy is nothing but this activity of mind (which it also interprets).

Reality is a perpetual becoming. To think of it as complete is to annihilate it. Croce says "the true conception of progress must fulfil at once the two opposite conditions of an attainment, at every instant, of the true and the good, and of raising a doubt at every instant, without, however losing what has been attained; of a perpetual solution and of a perpetually renascent problem demanding a new solution; it must avoid the two opposite one-sidedness of an end completely attained and of an end unattainable, of the 'processus ad finitum' and

'progress ad infinitum.' To account for the multiplicity of objects in experience Croce posits two sub-grades of mental activity. Mind being self-begetting and self-begotten, must create its own objects. This is done with the help of the sub-grades. The first is *Intuition* (with its corresponding science of Aesthetic). This is the form under which mind supplies the material. The second is *Conceptual Thinking* (with its Logic) which arranges the material supplied by the first. (This seems to be an echo of Kant's division in his Critique of the Pure Reason.) Now, Gentile agrees with Croce in the general doctrine of Neo-Idealism but he rejects his sub-grades entirely. These are regarded as no solution of multiplicity but rather a presupposition of that. The unity of mind cannot co-exist with sub-grades. Hence these must go. But here we must try to give Gentile's own metaphysic, as far as possible, in his own words and in some detail.

Gentile's Metaphysic of the Pure Act.

Gentile defines his Idealism as *Absolute*. He is a spiritual descendent of Descartes and Berkeley, *via* Kant and Hegel. 'I am conscious, therefore, I exist.' When I think of the 'I' I find that it is the sole existent. It absorbs all other so-called existents. It contains everything. The sole all-embracing reality is thus the 'I'! Hence, start with the cogito of Descartes and you land plump into the bosom of Absolute Idealism. Again the Gentilian form of Idealism is '*Actual*.' This, for two reasons:—(1) Because the history of thought has itself imposed this form on present thought; but also because (2) it is the concept of an eternal present—comprehending past and future—a comprehension of all history as present act determined by past act, eternal becoming.' So far the question of names.

Reality as Self-Concept.

Our conscious life is immediately apprehended by us. We feel the mind as a complete unity. This unity is retained throughout by Gentile and all the multiplicity that there is in actual experience is extracted from it. Mind is experience and it is the only object in the universe. The universe is mind or spirit. How does the unity develop a multiplicity? The latter is not as real as the former. Mind really makes all. It is self-creative. There is no world of objects outside mind. No thing-in-itself as against the mind. Consciousness is the all.

Gentile is confronted with two main problems :—

- (1) Who is the knower? What is the known? How does the knower know the known? Gentile answers: the Concrete Universal Mind. He must explain what that is.
- (2) How can this infinite mind function in the finite individual mind? How can the universal be effective in the particular?

To proceed. What is Knowledge? Gentile denies that it is any external relationship between mind and outside object. Here he agrees with Croce. The object OF mind is in mind or experience itself. Only that can be known which is *capable* of being known. An entity absolutely independent of the mind never can be known. Hence what is capable of being known must be of the nature of mind. The knowing subject and the known object must be facts of the concrete Universal mind. Gentile quotes with approval Berkeley's Doctrine of the ideality of the real. "Reality is conceivable only in so far as it is in relation to the activity which conceives it, and in that relation it is not only a possible object of knowledge, it is a present and actual one." Hence there can be no material reality. All reality is thus ideal, mental, spiritual. Well, but how are we to comprehend 'Spiritual reality?' To know it is to assimilate it with ourselves who know it.

The object should be resolved into the subject.

This is the law of the knowledge of the real. Thus the object of knowledge is in mind or experience itself. To detach the facts of mind from the real life of the mind is to miss Their inward nature by looking at them as they are when realised. Now, the spiritual reality which is the object of our knowing, is simply *mind as subject*. To be known its objectivity should be resolved in the real unity of the subject who knows it. To know is to identify, to overcome otherness as such. Subject must absorb object, it seems. (To understand a cake I must consume it, be one with it)? But who is this subject? It is the transcendental ego, in the Kantian sense. But 'the empirical ego' is not thereby annulled as in Mysticism. (Gentile fights shy of Mysticism.) This ego has no 'other' to exist independently of it. It is a *constructive process*.

We can only comprehend that which we ourselves create. To comprehend spiritual reality we must resolve it our own spiritual activity gradually establishing that self-sameness or unity in which all knowledge consists.

What is the type of such knowledge? *Self-consciousness* answers Gentile. Herein mind is both knower and known, subject and object, as well as the activity of knowing. As the Persian mystic sings: *خود کوزه ر خود کوزه گر و خود گل کوزه* 'Himself the pot, himself the potter and himself the clay of the pot. In self-consciousness the whole of mind is at one time subject, at another object. It is present as wholly itself in each phase. Herein also is mind both unity and multiplicity a One in the many, with the emphasis on the former. Self-consciousness is experience in its most intimate form. It is the type of the mind, hence the type of reality, hence also the type of the universe. Reality is mind and mind in its most phase is Self-consciousness. Mind as subject only is the subject-matter of Art. Mind as object purely is the subject-matter of Religion. Reality as synthesis of these two aspects of mind is

the subject-matter of Philosophy. In Philosophy, Art and Religion coalesce, unite, synthesise. Philosophy thus 'represents the Truth, the plenary actuality, the spirit.'

Mind being both knower and known, in knowing itself makes itself, adds to itself—*creates itself*. (This seems to be an echo of the *causa sui*?) Thought feeds on itself. Reality is thus thought about thought, *i.e.*, Philosophy. Thus the philosopher creates reality.

Is all individual experience real? It is in so far as it repeats in itself the structure of experience as a whole. The whole is immanent in each individual experience. But there is no transcendence. Experience is thus a free self-determining activity. It creates itself and its world; is the author of its unity and of its multiplicity. (It is a veritable phoenix-egg.)

Unity of Mind and Multiplicity of Things.

The ego, *i.e.*, experience, is a self-determining activity, a *constructive process*. Only this process is real, for it constructs both subject and object. In so far the subject is constituted a subject by its own act, it creates the object. Thought apart from its developing process does not exist. It is only in so far it develops. Mind is act or process, *never substance*. It has no existence apart from its manifestations. No *ding-an-sich*; no Lockian substratum of all things.

Spiritual reality never confronts us as external. We must appropriate it—'*work to find it.*' 'The God you can find is the God whom in seeking you make to be.' *انا الحق* (I am the Truth) said Mansur Hallaj, the Persian Mystic, and the Neo-Idealist echoes his words.

Gentile agrees that the concept of mind as process is difficult to grasp. By means of the immediate intuition of the spiritual life alone it is possible to grasp it. (This seems to be what W. James emphasised as the spiritual Me.)

Again, the unity of mind is real, not apparent. It is *unmultipliable and infinite unity*. It is unmultipliable because we cannot think of mind as decomposable in parts. Mind at each moment can only be thought of as a whole. (There is a *fusion* of the distinguishable parts or elements in one unique whole. There is no mental chemistry.) The unity of the mind is infinite, 'because the reality of mind cannot be limited by other realities' and still be or keep its own reality. 'Its unity implies infinity.' 'The without is always within.' 'There is for us nothing which is not something we perceive' (Berkeley). 'Whatever effort we make to think or imagine other things or other consciousness outside our own, they yet remain within the latter.' (This is what Titchener describes as one of the characteristics of mental process—it 'embraces the whole world'.) Even ignorance of so-called external objects is a fact of our own cognition. (We cannot jump out of our own shadow. Mind changes all it touches into mental. But here one may demur. There must be something to touch.) What is Nature? Is there any 'other' for mind to touch? How is it related to the 'I'? For Gentile Nature is immanent in the 'I'. 'In affirming reality, the subject which affirms it is the reality which confronts it in the affirmation.' Three concepts emerge: (1) the reality of the subject, (2) the reality of the object, (3) the reality of the mind as the unity or process of the subject and the immanence of the object in the subject. 'Thought without personality is inconceivable, and thought without something to think about is inconceivable. 'Hence whenever and in so far as the subject is conceived the object also is conceived!' But still, what is Nature? 'It is that obscure limit to our activity or spiritual being beyond which our spirit is ever passing out and to which it is ever-returning!' 'It is our own *non-being* which belongs to our act itself. What we are and what we must become, and which we bring into being by the act which posits it.'—Very eloquent, but it leaves one with a gasp—What is Nature? *Development as Unity of Unity and Multiplicity*. In development

there is an immanent relation between unity and multiplicity. The unity of life is the unity of an organism. The various elements are so fused that there is neither unity without multiplicity nor multiplicity without unity. *Unity lives in multiplicity.* Mind should never be regarded as perfect, either at the beginning or at the end of the process. *It is the process, the becoming.* If becoming had any antecedent or consequent it would cease to become. Multiplicity makes the unity concrete; the reality which is the mind is unfolded, actualised therein. 'Infinite unity is therefore infinite unification of the multiple as it is the infinite multiplication of the One! Ancient Philosophy failed to understand History because 'it never conceived a reality which is realised through a process which is not a vain distraction of activity but a continual creation of reality, a continual creation or increase of its own being.'

Multiplicity implies Space and Time. 'All that we distinguish or are capable of distinguishing and therefore of positing, in an actual experience is spatial.' Time spatialises space. 'Spatiality implies the point, which can only be thought as one, if thought as persisting through a multiplicity of instants.' 'The thought which is not spatial is that of the universal subject' (de Burgh). We are not in space and time. They are in us. They are in the Ego which is not empirical but transcendental. The unity of mind is thus neither spatial nor temporal, though they are essential forms of the multiplicity of the real. The unity of mind is not superimposed from without but immanent in its multiplicity. Mind as thinker is Pure Act.

To Sum Up.

Actual Idealism is the 'theory that mind, the spiritual reality, is the act which posits its object in a multiplicity of objects, reconciling their multiplicity or objectivity in its own unity as subject. It withdraws from mind every limit or space and time and every condition.' All reality is one: and the true

concept is the *Self-Concept* because it is the subject-centre of all things. The subject who in conceiving the whole universe conceives himself is the reality itself. The goal of the doctrine is '*Absolute Formalism*.' 'Science must rise from reality as Nature to a complete grasp of the concept of reality as mind.' 'These two concepts form a circle whose end is its beginning.'

Criticism.

It was mentioned above that the stability of Gentile's metaphysics of the Spirit (Pure Act) as the reality, rested on two contentions, to wit, (1) the existence of *the concrete universal mind* regarded as the synthesis of the subject-object, and (2) the functioning of the infinite (universal-absolute) mind in the finite individual mind. In what follows it is suggested that Gentile has not been able to substantiate his main contentions. It is quite possible—perhaps probable—that the present writer has entirely failed to grasp the trend of Gentile's thought in some essential respects and that the criticism in such respects is wide of the mark. The criticism may however be regarded as suggestive of the difficulties which can prevent people from swallowing the doctrine at one gulp. Let us begin with the second of the two points, *viz.*, the relationship of the one and the many, the infinite and the finite mind, or the unity in the multiplicity (with the emphasis on the former). (1) Gentile rejects the position of Croce in one important respect. Croce had postulated the existence of '*grades or moments*' in the unity of experience *to begin with*. Gentile emphatically denies this contention. The '*grades or distincts*' are not there to begin with. Were there such '*distincts*' in the mind from the very start then we should lose the unity of mind. Now, this criticism of Croce is quite sound negatively but Gentile does not provide us with any better solution of the mystery. His own attempt to evolve a multiplicity out of the original unity of the mind is similar to the production of the famous rabbit out of

the (more or less) empty hat. Whence the multiplicity after all ?

(2) Gentile denies the existence of Croce's grades (responsible for the multiplicity) in the original unity of (spiritual) experience. Well, if they were not there to begin with, how did they come into being? The so-called original unity of experience must have itself contained the bacteria of multiplicity. Or, are we to regard the multiplicity as a phase of Maya, as seeming but not real, in the sense in which the original unity is real? Are these descending orders of reality, like the concentric circles of Neo-Platonist being which changes into non-being the farther away they are from the central sun which is God—the sole reality? To regard multiplicity as seeming is not to explain it, but to explain it away. It is a denial of all real multiplicity. Gentile is here confronted with a dilemma. Either there is a pre-existing diversity latent in the original unfermented unity of mind, or there is a diversity (real, brute diversity) with no original unity.

(3) Even granting an original pure, unadulterated unity to begin with, the question remains what gave the primeval urge to this unity to develop into a multiplicity? Hegel escapes the difficulty because his 'opposites' had to transcend themselves and their contradictions by evolving to the whole. Aristotle escapes because his Pure Form actuates his matter (nothingness) into an hierarchy of reals. But there is no escape possible for Croce or Gentile. Gentile's activity of the mind is self-creating and, we may add, self-consuming. There is no 'to' and 'from' for him. It is pure cyclic movement—a vicious circle.

(4) Science accepts the multiplicity without denying the Unity. The Unity is the unity of the system. Both are real. On this basis does all scientific knowledge rest. But for Gentile this external world—regarded as 'other' to or as posited against the all-embracing mind—is sheer non-entify. Now Science is justified in its results and prophecies and a metaphysic which

ignores, or at least fails to explain rationally, this vast bulk of scientific knowledge stands condemned. The taunt urged by the 19th century scientists against Hegelian Idealism can be directed with greater force against neo-idealism.

(5) As a matter of fact, Hegel succeeds much better in explaining the relationship of the one and the many, the Unity and the multiplicity. His synthesis was not the synthesis of Distincts (as that of Croce) or the synthesis of subject-object (Gentile's) but a *synthesis of opposites*. In this last case, the clash of thesis and synthesis does lead to a higher unity—a real synthesis in which both are immanent and which yet transcends them. This continual evolution of a multiplicity into a higher unity ultimately leads to an absolute unity, the whole. The process is dynamic and contains within itself the seeds of its own evolution. As against it the distincts of Neo-Idealism are static and have no inherent urge in them. This criticism applies more directly to Croce than to Gentile, but strictly speaking, he is not more successful. Consider his synthesis.

(6) He has a thesis, *viz*, the pure-subject, an antithesis, the pure-object. The synthesis is subject-object. But what is the pure subject? If it is the 'empirical ego' it is a part of the object-world on Gentile's own showing. If it is the Universal or transcendental ego, then it is already the synthesis. The synthesis turns out to be illusory after all, because it is found to be identical with one of its terms. Gentile thus fails to explain the relation of the empirical to the transcendental ego.

(7) Gentile advocates an out-and-out immanence. But this tenet brings him perilously near Solipsism. Non-idealists would say that he is worse off than even Berkeley who had recourse to an objective God. Here again Neo-Idealists are no improvement on Hegel. His experience as a whole has, of course, nothing to transcend it. But he does not regard individual experiences as so happily placed. They are finite and partial. They are real in so far as they participate in the whole. The

rest is 'leather and prenello.' The existence of the whole thus gives to finite experience all the reality that is in it. But for Gentile with his denial of transcendence there is no such escape.

(8) Let us now consider his theory of knowledge. For him knowledge is creative of its own object. But is such knowledge worth the name? Knowledge cannot be regarded as a spider's web. Kant's criterion of true philosophical knowledge was the synthetical judgment *a-priori*. Gentile's seems to be analytical judgment *a-priori*. Analytical knowledge is no knowledge. It feeds on itself and cannot be fruitful. In fact, Gentile's position, if carried to its logical conclusion, may even be said to imply the impossibility of ever attaining to Truth. Nature is a mighty system. As such it can only be apprehended by the Absolute Mind. But this latter is nothing apart from its manifestations in the absolute mind. Hence Truth in its wholeness can never be known. It remains a chimera merely.

The neo-Platonist also conceived knowledge as constitutive of the being of its object. But there is one all-important difference between his position and Gentile's. What Gentile attributes to the individual mind, the neo-Platonist attributes, with greater success and show of reason, to God's intuitive understanding. That is regarded as alone constitutive of the being of the object. God creates what he apprehends and apprehends what he creates, in a single act. The same is true of Berkeley's God. He is the ground of reality for the finite percipient.

(9) Gentile cites self-consciousness as the mode of experience in which there is a unity in multiplicity *apart from all reference to any external object*. Self-consciousness is regarded as constitutive of its object. But Psychology does not bear out this contention. Self-consciousness always implies an object which gave rise to the original consciousness which later on itself served as an object for the 'I,' *e.g.*, in introspection. The mind is only quiescent when not in the presence of the object. There is a passivity to begin with. The mental sleep of the new-born infant must be shaken by sensa. It may be true to say that

sensa have the stamp of the mental on them but that is not all that they are.

(10) Gentile's metaphysics with its emphasis on immanence and complete denial of all transcendence leads him not only to Solipsism but also to Mysticism. In some passages where he is most eloquent he reads like a Persian mystic. Reference to this has already been made in the first half of this paper.

To Sum Up.

In their zeal the disciples often far outstrip their master. This is an old failing. Schopenhauer accused Kant of 'timidity.' Croce went 'beyond' Hegel. Gentile goes 'beyond' Croce. He carries Croce's position to its extreme logical limit and thus unconsciously provides its *reductio ad absurdum*. Gentile's peculiarity lies in his identification of the Spirit with the present act of human thinking. But he fails in stopping here. The Universal may be immanent in each particular mind but it must transcend it, too. As it is, Gentile's absolute mind or spirit is not much else than the individual human mind (with all its infirmities) raised to the infinite degree. And his progress turns out to be 'circular' motion. His is a strange fix: he cannot allow the ideal to be realised, for then it would be dead. Hence it must always be in the process of 'becoming,' but a becoming which is never 'become' turns out to be a chase of the will-o the-wisp.

The ship of Gentile's metaphysic founders on the same old rocks which have seen the destruction of many previous philosophies, *viz.*, the problems of the finite and infinite mind and of the one and the many.

(11) Above all, it may be disputed that consciousness is the sole reality. It is quite well to say that the reality we are most intimately conscious of is spiritual reality or mind or conscious-

ness. But to infer from this that consciousness is, therefore, the sole reality is a very illegitimate form of education, *viz.*, a simple conversion of A. Like the King-Midas-touch consciousness changes all it touches into mental, but the object touched does not thereby lose its other characteristics. What these characteristics are is another and a very controversial question.

MYSTICISM IN ISLAM

By

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Islamic Mysticism or Sufism as it is universally called is a subject with peculiarities of its own. The more one studies the subject the further one finds himself from any complete understanding of the real meaning of the writings of the Sufis.

(1) The trouble is that the Sufis are not very systematic in their writings. They use one and the same word in different senses and go ahead as the mode inspires them unhampered by any such restrictions as those of a formal consistency. Their purpose is more to express the emotion of the moment than to propound a system of thought. Poetry is the medium which most of the best Muslim mystics have adopted for the expression of their ideas and poetry being based more on emotion than reason can hardly claim to give us a consistent system which may be understood, judged, and criticised from a logical and a philosophical point of view. (2) Again in poetry an idea or theory is put forward in the form of generalizations by picturesque metaphors and similies but the concrete details are never worked out. Persian poets are thought to be the best representatives of Islamic Mysticism and about the Persian mind Sir Mohd. Iqbal rightly says, that it is "satisfied with a bare universality." (3) Besides this Sufi habit of generalization the student of Mysticism has to stumble against a still greater difficulty. In order to understand the nature of Sufism one must combine theory with practice. As Ghazaly says "to define drunkenness, to know that it is caused by vapours that rise from the stomach and cloud the seat of intelligence is a different thing from being drunk. So I found that Sufism consists in

experiences rather than definitions." Clearly then Sufism is not a dogma or a creed, but an immediate experience lived through and felt which language, even at its best can but imperfectly express. "The ways to God are as many as the souls of men." Thus Sufism is subjective and individualistic and any Sufi who tries to tell us what it is, only tries to tell us what he immediately feels or knows and there is no universal formula that sums up every shade of an intricate mystical experience. Thus even the writings of real and a true Sufi cannot claim to give us anything but the shadow of the emotions they themselves have felt and being individualistic one shadow need not be like the other. (4) Again, I may say, that the history of Sufism presents to the student a continuous growth and development from simple beginnings of asceticism and austerity to some of the most exalted of religious and spiritual feelings felt by the Sufis of later times. Sufism, being a growth and a development can hardly be understood apart from the social, political and religious movements of the times, and the extraneous influences that came to be exercised on the Muslim civilization and thought with the extension of their conquest and empire. (5) Another very great difficulty is the variety of the problems connected with Sufism, without a discussion of which we can hardly have a clear idea of what Islamic Mysticism is. As for example, I may mention the problem of the origin of Sufism or the question whether there is any mysticism in Islam at all, and if there is, whether the Sufis are the ideal sort of men that Islam wants to produce. In addition to this Sufism in itself presents to us a wide field for investigation in its various aspects. The idea of God, of matter, of the relation of divine personality to human personality, of divine love to human love are all problems each of which wants a paper to itself. My purpose at present is but to give you an idea of mysticism in Islam as a whole. I hope to write papers on every one of these different problems individually in future.

Muslim before Sufism. The most important and consequential factor in the mental life of the Muslims of the first century of the Islamic era, as it has been to this day, was the preponderating influence of the personality and the example of the Prophet. Major A. G. Leonard in his book "Islam, Its Moral and Spiritual Value," is justified in calling the prophet the soul of Islam. I strongly support the view that the life of the prophet was exactly what the life of the ideal man according to the Qoran ought to be. The spiritual and the material aspects were equally balanced in his life. He was given to very long speculations on the mount Hira before he received the first revelations. This shows that he was ever trying to reach the state of communion with the Almighty in meditation. The power and majesty of God was always before his eyes and his thoughts, but besides this he was also a practical man of affairs, a faithful servant, a kind husband, a dutiful father and so on. He always put his beliefs to the test of stern and rigid practice. His mission was as much spiritual as it was material. He gave due importance to both the aspects of human nature and did not want to sacrifice the one for the sake of the other. So did his immediate followers try to come up to the standard set before them by his life. For them the word of the Qoran and the example of the Prophet were the only things to be followed. To them life in this world was not an end in itself, but the end to them was obedience to the word of the Qoran. This was for them the good. Performance of duty was the ideal, and the duty was what the Qoran ordained. But the Qoran allowed them to enjoy the pleasures of this world within certain limits and so they did. When duty required that all the goods of this life and even life itself was to be sacrificed they seldom hesitated to do so. They were active men of the world bent upon the propagation of truth and the performance of duty. They were happy to gain the worldly pleasures but were not sorry to part with them if duty so required. Such were the men of Arabia who came out of their desert and conquered the mighty empires of Persia and Constantinople.

But having conquered great empires and being more and more removed from the example and influence of the Prophet, the Arabs were divided into the two natural divisions of temperament, those of Stoicism and Epicurianism. Some looked to the material aspect of the Prophet's teaching and became luxurious. Besides, there was political unrest of some sort or the other always present. Wealth and leisure had given rise to various philosophic schools which held controversies on philosophic and religious questions. The devout and simple faith of the early Muslims was now being questioned and substituted by a rational one. This political and mental unrest drove souls of a devout character to seclusion and laid the foundations of mysticism in Islam.

Origin of Sufism. There was no mysticism in Islam for the first one and half a century. The word Sufi or Tasawwaf does not occur anywhere in the Qoran or the Tradition. Nor is it anywhere to be found in pre-Islamic Arabic literature. Abu-Nasr has quoted one verse in his book *Kilab-Ul-Luma*, in which the word Sufi is used and he thinks that the verse was written in pre-Islamic time, but its language clearly shows that it is not so. The word Sufi and Tasawwaf begins to be used in the second century Hira. There is good deal of controversy about the etymology of this word but I have no time at present to go into the discussion. Let it suffice to say that Sufism is an after-growth in Islam and it was not present in the beginning. Scholars in the past and the present have held different opinions about the cause of the origin of Sufism. Some derive it from the Indian Vedanta and Buddhism, others from Christianity and still others from Neo-Platonism and so on. But the view held by Sir Mohd. Iqbal, in his "Development of Metaphysics in Persia" seems to be most satisfactory. From his point of view political unrest of our times, religious discussions among the representatives of various schools encouraged by Mamum, the unemotional piety of various schools of Islam, gradual softening of religious fervour due to the rationalistic tendency of the early Abbaside period, the rapid

growth of wealth which led to moral laxity and indifference, religious life in the upper circles of Islam, the sceptical tendency of Islamic rationalism, the presence of the example of the calm life of Christian hermits—all these combined to drive away spirits of a devotional character from such a scene of continual unrest to the blissful place of an ever deepening contemplative life. External influence may have helped the rise and growth of Sufism but it is rather in the political, social and religious conditions of Islamic life at the end of the 8th and beginning of the 9th century A.D. that the cause of Sufism lies. Some thinkers began to regard this worldly life as worthless and the calm of the speculative life enchanted their souls. Consequently they began to lead a more and more simple life, lessened their needs and spent all their time in prayer and devotion. Some of them denounced the world and mortified the flesh, this sort of life was that of quietism and asceticism. Thus the utterances of the early Sufis—men like Abu-Hashim, Ibrahim ibn-i-Adham, Attar and others, reflect little more than a devout quietism, and an earnest desire for something deeper and more satisfactory to the soul than the mere formalism practised in Islam. But these simple foundations were in future to develop into full-fledged pantheism of men like Rumi, Mansur, Hafiz, Jami and Ibn-i-Arabi, and in the identification of man with God. How is this ultimate goal of Union with the beloved, when we may say with Jammī that “now there abides neither the consciousness of self nor the consciousness of the absence of disconsciousness—may there abide nothing save One God alone,” to be attained.

Negative Aspect of Sufism. For this we have to consider what we have to give up and destroy before we are able to find ourselves face to face with God. This is the negative side or the Ethics of Sufism, the term Ethics being used in a limited and popular sense. “Apprehension of Divine Realities” or Union with the Beloved is to be attained after a very severe self-culture, self-sacrifice and ultimately by Fana, the passing away of individuality. Almost every step on the negative side has a corres-

ponding stage on the positive one. Fana has its counterpart in Baqa. In losing something we also become something. The first thing necessary for the seeker to start on the spiritual path is repentance which is described as the awakening of the soul from the slumber of heedlessness. The sinner becomes conscious of his evil ways and resolves that he will not return to them again. Not to talk of progressing in the spiritual path, even to start upon it, even to repent for the wrong done is the result of Divine Grace. "Man is but a pen in the hand of the Scribe." From the Sufistic point of view every body cannot fulfil this resolution of never falling back into sin. Only he, whom God wants, can do so. "Repentance comes from God to man, not from man to God."

The question whether sin ought to be remembered or forgotten after repentance is a very fundamental point in Sufi-ethics, and comes very near to the modern formula, "to get rid of a bad habit from a good one." Sin is ultimately to be forgotten and erased (out). Its very recollection is a veil between God and man.

Progress in the spiritual journey is represented as consisting of stages, one of which is poverty which is not understood in a purely material sense. To me it seems that poverty understood in the widest sense really covers all that is to be put on the negative side. To be poor would not mean not to possess anything material but to give up everything that a man has and that he is. Poverty is not lack of wealth, but lack of all desire for wealth, in fact lack of all desire. "To give up all desire and to want nothing but the Lord is to be really poor." The poor man has an empty hand and an empty heart. Rabia says, "O Lord, if I worship Thee for fear of hell, torture and burn me in hell, if I worship Thee for the sake of Heaven, withhold that from me, but if I worship Thee for Thy own sake, withhold not from me Thy Eternal Beauty." Thus all fear and all hope are but veils for the soul and ought to be removed before the seeker can attain Union with the Beloved. The seeker thus aims at giving up all

desires, all longings, in short, all reasons and will, to think these as so many hindrances in the way of spiritual progress, and to live in a state of emotional contemplation of and Union with God. To rely on our reason as a means of knowledge is to rely on our own ability to know. But according to Sufism man himself can know nothing, and reliance on reason is self-conceit. "The Sun is seen," they say, "by the Sun's own light." Whether such freedom from the past individuality is possible from the modern psychological point of view is a problem which deserves detailed study and may be left out for the present.

In short, the method of Sufism is not that of reason or intellect which are regarded as the greatest veils that cover the inner eye but that of intuition, and this intuition is the light that God sends to the human soul. In modern terms it may be said to be a certain capacity of the human mind which remains latent till God wills it to be active. Almost every Sufi condemns the accumulation of worldly wisdom and learning. Rumi says, "I am a lover, well-versed in lover's madness; I am weary of learning and sense." Thus the way of God is the way of love and not of reason.

Fana or the negative side of Sufism may be described in three progressive grades :—(1) A moral transformation of the soul through the extinction of all passions and desires. (2) A mental abstraction or passing away of the mind from all objects of perception, thought and action through its concentration on the thought of God. (3) The cessation of all consciousness. Here the consciousness of having attained Fana also disappears. This is what the Sufi means by Fana-al-Fana, the passing away of the passing away. The mystic is now rapt in the contemplation of the Almighty. This comes very near to what the Absolute Idealists of Europe call Absolute Consciousness.

Positive Aspect of Sufism. Let us now suppose the seeker to have reached this final stage and let us ask what he has become. At such a stage the Sufi is no less than a mirror in which God Himself is reflected. He has no will of his own.

Whatever he does is from God. His will is God's will. He is so much absorbed in the Beloved that he even does not know the fact that he loves. To a lover nothing exists but God and he himself does not exist as a separate conscious being but as a part of the Beloved, as a part of God Himself. A poet says :—

The world is God's pure mirror clear.
To eyes when free from clouds within
With loves' own eyes the mirror view,
And there see God to self akin,

This is a theory of perfection. Those to whom this description applies are above the shadow-shows of religion and morality. For them right and wrong are alike. They live in a world which is beyond good and evil. They are not to be restrained and coerced. They cannot do evil, for they do not do anything themselves. Here I is a figure of speech and there is no human will, action, feeling or thought. Here man has amalgamated himself with Absolute Being and has learnt what Hegel calls Absolute Philosophy. "He is the point where God and man meet and result in the creation of the god-man." To him all religions are alike. Sufism joins hands with free thought. A true Sufi is never a sectarian.

Now we have reached a stage at which we can discuss some questions of philosophic nature, such as the Sufi conception of God, matter, human soul, of the cause of creation and so on. I shall discuss all these under one heading : "God and the Universe."

God and the Universe. For this purpose let us take a typical quotation from Jammi which has been taken by most of the European scholars in discussing this point. He says :—

"Thou art Absolute Being all else is naught but a phantom, for in Thy Universe all things are one. Thy world-captivating beauty to display its Perfection appears in thousands of mirrors, but it is one. Although Thy beauty accompanies all the beautiful, in truth the unique heart-enslaver is one."

I do not want to add quotations. Sufis are Pantheists and Monists. Nothing exists except God. Not only true Being but beauty and good also belong exclusively to God, though they are manifested in a thousand mirrors in the Universe. God is pure Being and what is other than God only exists in so far as His Being is infused into it. He is also pure good and Absolute Beauty. Such is the Monism of Sufism. "Not only there is no god but God, but there is nothing but God." The world of Phenomenon or the world of sense is a mere mirage, a reflection of Being, in other words, the Not-Being, unreality, reflecting the attributes of Being as the reflection reflects its original, but not participating in its nature. Shams-i-Tabraiz says :—

"Poor copies of Heaven's original, these earthly pictures mouldering to decay; what care, although your beauties decay and fall, when that which gives them life endures for aye."

Cause of the creation of the world is found in the words of the Qoran. God says to David, "I was a hidden treasure. I wished to be known, so I created creation that I might be known." Thus God created the Universe in order to reveal Himself. But a thing is revealed by its opposite as light is revealed by darkness and so on. Being could only reveal itself through Not-Being, this phenomenal world.

From another point of view there are grades of Being, and these may be conceived as emanations of Eternal Being. These emanations become weaker, more unreal, more material and less luminous as they recede from the pure light of Absolute Being. This latter point of view introduces the conception of grades or degrees of reality, and seems to be inconsistent with the Pantheistic spirit. It was given up later on. To quote Jammi again, he says :—

"The Universe is the outward visible expression of the real and the real is the inner unseen reality of the Universe. The Universe before it was evolved to outward view was identical

with the real and the real after this evolution is identical with the Universe." Pantheism cannot be stated more clearly than this.

But if nothing exists but God, then the whole universe including man is essentially one with God. But a God who is all in all can have no reason for thus revealing Himself. Why should the One pass into the Many? The Sufi-answer to this objection that it is in the very nature of beauty or Being to desire to reveal itself seems to me to be no more than evading the difficulty and even evading it at the cost of many other difficulties, to which it leads.

Again Sufism says that Not-Being was created in order to reveal Being. But Being cannot be manifested by Not-Being alone. For this purpose Being and Not-Being both are required. Just as darkness alone cannot manifest light, though it is essential for such a manifestation. If God manifests Himself in the Universe, Being and Not-Being should both be present in the world. One is to be revealed by the help of the other and each by itself can neither be revealed nor reveal the other.

Again, just as God is absolute Being, He is also absolute Good and if the Universe is Not-Being and unreality created for the purpose of manifesting Being, it should also be all evil in order that God's absolute Goodness may be revealed. To the question whether there is any evil in the world or not and if there is what its real nature is, two answers are given. The first is that there is no evil in the universe at all. What appears to be evil, is merely an illusion. Just as we take the Phantoms of the world of sense for realities so we take evil to be existing. In fact, there is no evil at all.

The second answer is that the mystery of evil is identical with the mystery of creation and inseparable therefrom. The Eternal Beauty manifests itself through a negation, and evil is a necessary consequence of this manifestation for God is also Supreme Good, and evil is but a means for the manifestation of the Good, but as the Sufis regard the universe as well as all Not-

Being they do not regard the world as all evil. This again is an inconsistency.

Further on we may ask what is it that the Sufi means by annihilation in God, if there exists nothing but God? They want us by ethical self culture to return to the Beloved. This can only have a meaning, if there might be anything other than God. Here it is that Sufi Ethics comes into conflict with Sufi Metaphysics.

The trouble is that while criticising the Sufi Metaphysics we judge it by a method which the Sufi denounces as worthless. We use reason and want to be consistent. To him reason is worthless and itself leads to contradictions. The Philosopher and the Sufi are at two different planes of consciousness and I do not think that there is as much common element present between the two as may enable one to communicate thought to the other or to understand what the other says. We can only be able to do justice to the Sufi if we judge and criticize him by the same means which he employs. It is only due to this difference of outlook that a Sufi is never tired of saying that the uninitiated and the ordinary man is never able to understand what he says. To understand them one has to be like them and having become like them, I think, one ceases to be a philosopher.

Islam and Sufism. From the purely Islamic point of view the material and spiritual aspects of human nature are equally important. In the life of the Prophet we find them equally balanced. The duties of a true Muslim lie in the world and not out of it. To him even worldly duties are holy. The ideal man of Islam is one who cares for the good, improves his life and the lives of others, a man who practises the good and not one who remains sunk in the mysterious ocean of ecstasy.

To the Sufi the material side is worthless and something to be got rid of. Sufism certainly finds justification in some portions of the Qoran. For instance God says, "We are nigher to Him (man) than his jugular vein," again, "God is the light of Heavens and earth," and so on. But in laying undue

stress upon these the Sufis neglect the spirit of the rest of the Qoran.

In fact, as Pantheists, most of the Sufis are free-thinkers. From the higher Sufistic point of view all religions are alike. It does not matter what creed a man professes and what rites he performs. The sect of-lovers is distinct from all others. The lovers have a religion of their own. The Sufi calls himself a lover and so breaks the bonds of religion and creed.

“The true mosque in a pure and holy heart is built, there let all men worship God for there He dwells, not in a mosque of stone.”

WILLIAM JAMES AND NEW REALISM

By

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The purpose of the present paper is to show that some of the characteristic features of modern new realism, and particularly of American new realism, are derived from the speculations of William James. Two of the prominent American realists, R. B. Perry and E. B. Holt were pupils of William James, and it was not at all unnatural that their views should be largely shaped by the teachings of their master. The English realists, on the other hand, it must be admitted, were not directly influenced by the speculations of William James, yet the views of at least one of their prominent exponents, I mean Bertrand Russell, reveal the influence of James's teachings in some important particulars.

There are two distinctive features of modern new realism. Firstly, so far as their metaphysical position is concerned they are against all forms of substance philosophy, be it dualism, idealism or materialism; and secondly, so far as their epistemological theory is concerned, they reject the representative theory of cognition, and emphasise the direct and immediate character of all forms of cognitive experience. As we proceed it will be found that the new realists are largely indebted to William James for their metaphysical as well as epistemological theories. The germs of new realism were already scattered in the theories of William James and it was left to the new realists to bring them to fruition. There is nothing accidental or novel about the neo-realistic movement, and any credit for originality or novelty

contained in the neo-realistic doctrines should more properly belong to William James and not to the American new realists. By this assertion, however, I do not want to minimise or detract anything from the value of the new realist's contribution to philosophic thought. What I wish to stress is the fact that after all their theory is not so original as it may appear to one who studies it out of all relations to the speculations of William James.

Considering the metaphysical position of the new realists it is observed that they discard substance philosophy in all its variety of forms. Dualism as formulated by Descartes recognises mind and matter as two distinct and opposed substances having respectively the disparate attributes of thought and extension and the different forms of idealism and materialism also regard in various ways, mind and matter respectively in their theories as ultimate substances whereof everything else in the world is composed. The new realists deny the substantial character of both mind and matter and affirm that they are capable of being deduced from some more fundamental and primitive entities which are neither mental nor material, but neutral. The theory of neutral entities as formulated by the American realists particularly, and later on accepted by Bertrand Russell in its substance, owes its origin to the theory of *Pure Experience* of William James. For the first time in philosophic thought the campaign against substance philosophy was started by William James. In his famous essay called 'Does Consciousness Exist?' James led his crusade against the idealists particularly who held consciousness to be a substance. In this essay James explains how the conception of the soul in course of time gave place to that of the 'transcendental ego,' and how the latter gradually in the hands of such writers as Schuppe, Münsterberg, etc., "attenuated itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition," and was nothing but the name for the fact that the content of experience is known. It had lost its personal form and activity and had evaporated to a state of pure

diaphaneity and was on the point of disappearing altogether. Now it is nothing but the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing soul upon the air of philosophy (*cf.* *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 2).

James further explains that his views have not undergone a catastrophic change. "For twenty years past," he tells us, "I have mistrusted 'consciousness' as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to give them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience. It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded" (*ibid.*, p. 3). In thus denying the entitative character of consciousness James however does not deny the existence of thought. "Undeniably," he says, "thoughts do exist,.....I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function." There is no "aboriginal stuff" or "quality of being," contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. That function is knowing (*ibid.*, pp. 3-4).

What James wants to emphasise here is the fact that neither mind nor matter is endowed with any peculiar quality of being or any peculiar substantial character, and it is not possible to maintain that the stuff of which the world is made is of two sorts, one mind and the other matter. The raw material out of which the world is built up is something more primordial than either mind or matter, and the latter is to be derived from its different arrangements and interrelations. This is explicitly stated in the following quotation :

"My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure

experience' then knowing can be easily explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known'' (*ibid*, p. 4).

James, further, denies even the duality of subject-object distinction as essential character of all consciousness. He seeks to illustrate his meaning by the analogy of a paint as it appears in a paint shop and as it appears in a picture. In the one case along with other paints it serves in its entirety as so much saleable matter, while in the other case, spread on a canvas, with other paints around it, it represents, on the contrary, a feature in a picture and performs a spiritual function. Just so does a given undivided portion of experience, taken in one context of associates play the part of a knower, of a state of mind, of 'consciousness;' while in a different context the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, of an objective content. In a word in one group it figures as a thought, in another group as a thing. And since it can figure in both groups simultaneously we have every right to speak of it as subjective and objective both at once. (*Cf. Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 9-10.)

It would appear therefore that according to William James dualism in all its forms, be it of mind and matter, or that of subject and object, is untenable. The primal stuff of the universe is neither mind nor matter, it is pure experience which is something more fundamental than any of the latter. The theory of pure experience will be intelligible to us if we consider it in connection with the doctrine of radical empiricism as formulated by William James. Ordinarily empiricism is distinguished from rationalism by the fact that whereas the latter emphasises "the universals and makes wholes prior to parts, in the order of logic as well as in the order of beings, the former lays stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction" (*ibid*, E. R. E., p. 42).

Further in ordinary empiricism the term 'experience' is identified with the manifold of sense-perception and the relations are regarded as subjective beliefs, as figments of mind and not as parts of experience itself. James differs from this empiricism of the older school in his emphasis upon non-perceptual experiences and the reality of relations. For him the term 'experience' does not connote sense-experience merely, but implies non-sensible relations as well. Experience thus conceived as containing within itself not only the sensible qualities, but the relations as well, both conjunctive and disjunctive, is the ultimate stuff of the universe. In its purity, experience is not characterised by any distinctions, and is incapable of being broken up into clearly defined groups or parts. Pure experience is the immediate flux of life which furnishes the materials to our later reflection with the conceptual categories. The very immediacy of pure experience defies precise description. "Only new-born babes, or men in semi coma from sleep, drugs, illness, or blows, may be assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a '*that*' which is not yet any definite '*what*', though ready to be all sorts of '*whats*'; full both of oneness and manyness, but in respects that don't appear; changing throughout, yet so confusedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points, either of distinction or of identity, can be caught." This is how the nature of pure experience is described by James. As such pure experience contains neither mind nor matter. It is only our later reflection which elicits the distinction from pure experience. So in fact it is the pure experience which is fundamental, and not mind and matter.

From the exposition just given of the theory of William James it will be apparent that James does not explicitly say that his realm of pure experience is a neutral realm, yet it seems clear enough that his theory of pure experience suggested the neutralism of the American and some of the English realists. His denial of the substantial character of mind and matter and his insistence upon the externality of relations prepared the neces-

sary grounds for the construction of new realism. The word "experience," of course was dropped by such American realists as R. B. Perry and E. B. Holt in favour of the term "neutral stuff," and this was done because, as Bertrand Russell thinks, the use of the phrase 'pure experience'...points to a lingering influence of idealism, and "experience," like "consciousness" must be a product and not part of the primary stuff of the world. (*Analysis of Mind*, p. 24.) In his book entitled "The Concept of Consciousness," E. B. Holt advocates a theory which may be described as neutralism according to which certain neutral entities are conceived of as being the ultimate stuff out of which both mind and matter are constructed. The neutral entities are essentially conceptual in character, and as such are universals. It is not possible to ascribe any specific qualities to the neutral entities except the quality of being and they subsist in the realm of their own. The neutral entities are homogeneous as regards their stuff but they have distinct being from each other and in this sense there is a plurality of such entities. (*Concept of Consciousness*, p. 51.) As ultimates they are indefinable, whereas the less simple and fundamental entities are defined in terms thereof. Mind and matter being of a less fundamental and of a more complex character are defined as aggregates or complexes of more fundamental neutral concepts. It is pointed out that an analysis of the nature of mind and matter reveals the fact that they are not simple substances at all, but are complexes built up out of more fundamental entities. By an analysis of the various contents of mind Holt seeks to prove that mind or idea cannot constitute the ultimate stuff of reality, because the fundamentum ultimum must be such that nothing can be predicated of it, whereas it will denote each and everything in the universe and will suffer no predicates to be joined to it. (*Cf. Concept of Consciousness*, p. 96.) We can say that "some entities discoverable in the universe really are mind and idea, and some predicates can be asserted of mind and idea that cannot be asserted of other things," and

thus mind and idea are only special things in the universe and everything therefore cannot be deduced from it.

Holt seeks to prove the conceptual or neutral character of mental contents. He shows that there is nothing subjective or unique about them and they are as much public as any physical object. In the case of emotions difficulties seem very great and it seems impossible that their uniqueness and subjectivity could be explained away. Holt here falls back upon James-Lange theory of emotions and holds that such emotions as anger, love, fear, etc., are affections neither purely of body nor purely of mind, and they have thus a neutral character. Again such expressions as 'weary road,' 'jocund morning,' 'sullen sky,' etc., are cited by William James in an essay called 'The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience,' to prove that these feelings refer indifferently to objects as well as to certain subjective or mental attitudes. James, of course, "does not say that these predicates are neutral entities," but "a moment's" consideration,' Holt maintains, "makes it clear that neutral is precisely what they are." (Concept of Consciousness, pp. 112-113.) Thus the new realist's theory of the neutrality of emotions is suggested by James.

Further, the new realist's theory that the contents of mind taken distributively are neither mental nor physical and "coincide with other manifolds, such as nature, history and the contents of other minds," follows directly from the relational theory of consciousness formulated by W. James. (Present Philosophical Tendencies, R. B. Perry, p. 277.) James explicitly says that the mental content is not distinguished by the stuff of which it is composed, but by way in which these elements are composed, that is, by the composing relation. And this view, we have seen, has been explained by James by the illustration of paint as it appears in a paint shop, and as it appears in a picture. The elements or terms which enter into consciousness and become its contents are the same elements, which, in so far otherwise related, compose physical nature. Consciousness, as

Perry points out in explaining the view of James, "differs from other things as one grouping differs from another grouping of the same terms ; as for example, the Republican party differs from the American people." (P. P. T., p. 352.)

From the relational theory of consciousness advocated by James and accepted by the new realists another important feature of the new realistic doctrine is derived. Consciousness, James maintains, is an external relation, and as such the terms which it relates do not undergo any change or modification, but retain their self-identical character. The accession of a new relationship certainly means the addition of a new character to the term, but it does not mean that the related term in any manner loses its original character, or that its original quality is in any way, changed or modified. A particular term may be called by several names corresponding to the several relationships into which it enters. James maintains that "every smallest bit of experience is a *multum in parvo* plurally related, that each relation is one aspect, character or function, the way of its being taken, or way of its taking something else ; and that a bit of reality when actively engaged in one of these relations is not by that very fact engaged in all other relations simultaneously." . . . and further, "without losing its identity a thing can either take up or drop another thing, like the log . . . which by taking up new carriers and dropping old ones can travel anywhere with a light escort." (*Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 322-323.) Thus the being of things is not in any way changed or altered by the relations in which things enter, and this follows from the fact that relations are external to the terms which they relate. Consciousness, being also a kind of external relation, is incapable of altering the nature of the term which enters into it. The theory of the externality of relations is very important for the realist, because it proves that things are independent of knowing. If consciousness is an external relation, things certainly have being before they enter into conscious relationship. James also in his article called 'Does Consciousness Exist?' more or less explicitly

admits the independent reality of things and thus sides with realism. In that article he points out that while things are "what they are known as," they need not be known in order to be. Their being known is an accidental relation into which they directly enter as they are. It is apparent, therefore that in these respects the views of W. James are indistinguishable from those of the realists.

So far as the nature of conscious or mental activity is concerned, the views of W. James are in perfect accord with the views held by the American realists and by Bertrand Russell. It was W. James who for the first time raised objections against the conception of mental activity. Spiritual activity or the activity as such is for James a fictitious entity. But this does not mean that the word activity is a meaningless term which should be altogether discarded from our philosophical vocabulary. There is indeed a specific experience-complex for which the term activity may be rightly used. Experience does not reveal to us anything like mental activity ; what it reveals is only a feeling of bodily activity. The self or any spiritual entity is not the centre of consciousness ; "the body is the storm centre, the centre of co-ordinates, the constant place of stress in all experience-train." Everything circles round it, and is felt from its point of view. The word 'I' is primarily a noun of position, just like 'this' and 'here.' Activities attached to this position have prerogative emphasis. (*Cf. Pluralistic Universe*, p. 380.) For James, therefore, our "entire feeling of spiritual activity . . . is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked" (*ibid.*, p. 380). When introspection seeks to discover "manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can ever feel distinctly is some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head." The "I think" for James is nothing but the "I breathe." Holt quotes approvingly this view of James concerning the nature of mental act in his essay called "Response and Cognition," and Perry also quotes it in his "Present Philosophical Tendencies." But both Perry and Holt go a

step further than William James. Perry points out that "James is correct in supposing that the experience of bodily action is peculiarly significant. It constitutes a core or nucleus of content that is more constant than the rest." But in so far as it is the "feeling of bodily action" and not the bodily action itself, it belongs to the content of the mind, and "so prevented from serving as the agency which defines content as such, and gives it its characteristic unity." So Perry thinks that James should have defined mental action in terms of bodily action itself instead of defining it in terms of the feelings of bodily actions. (*Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 284-285). It would thus appear that the hint for the rejection of mental action and its identification with the bodily activity is taken by the neorealists from William James. Russell also accepts this view concerning the nature of mental act, and the arguments which he gives are very similar to those offered by James. Russell thinks that the mental act is neither empirically discoverable, nor is it theoretically indispensable. The 'act' is the ghost of the subject, or what once was the full-blooded soul. (*Analysis of Mind*, p. 18.)

It has been already pointed out that William James not only discards metaphysical dualism, but he is against epistemological dualism also which is usually expressed in the duality of content and the object. Does knowledge involve the duality of content and the object? James is emphatic in declaring that "our experience presents no such duplicity as the content of knowledge in contrast with its object; the content is the object" (E. R. F.—*Does consciousness Exist?*) An example may serve to make the point clear. Let us begin with a perceptual experience, the presentation of a physical object, our actual field of vision, the room we sit in, with the book we are reading as its centre; and let us for the present treat this complex object in the common sense way as being 'really' what it seems to be, namely a collection of physical things *cut out* from an environing world of other physical things with which these physical things have actual or potential relations. Now, at the same time it is

just those *self-same things* which our mind as we say perceives. Thus arises the paradox, namely how can that which is evidently one reality, be in two places at once, both in outer space and in a person's mind? The difficulty as to how one identical room can be in two places is at bottom the same difficulty as to how one identical point can be on two lines. It can, however, be on two lines if it be situated at their intersection. Similarly, if the pure experience of the room were a place of intersection of two processes, which connected it with different groups of associates respectively, it could be counted twice over, as belonging to either group, and spoken of loosely as existing in two places, although it would remain all the time a numerically identical thing. (*Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 11-12.) Similar also is the case with our conceptual manifolds such as, memories and fancies. James maintains that any single non-perceptual experience tends to get counted twice over, just as a perceptual experience does, figuring in one context as an object or field of objects, in another as a state of mind; and all this without the least self-diremption on its own part into consciousness and content. It is all consciousness in one taking; and in the other, all content. It was James thus who for the first time emphasised the numerical identity of content and object in knowledge and rejected the representative theory of cognition. The American realists are clearly indebted to James for the view that knowledge is direct and immediate cognition of reality and that there is no duality of content and the object. In explaining the difficulty involved in our knowledge of distant objects as to how one and the same object can be at two places at one and the same time, Holt seems to take his cue from James. Holt maintains that on the one hand we have the system of knowledge with its own spaces and times and the system of reality with its own events and objects, and the knowledge of the past or the knowledge of the distant object means only the intersection between the two systems, and the point of intersection is the idea of the past event or the idea of

the distant object. Just at the point at the intersection of two lines is a member of two lines at the same time, so the idea of the past or the idea of the distant object is at the same time a member of both the systems, the system of knowledge and the system of reality. The idea and the real object are thus numerically identical.

From his pragmatic standpoint James regards mind as essentially interested and selective in nature. When mind is viewed concretely it exhibits interest, activity, trial, success and failure as its generic characters. The action of the mind is not creative. Its ideas are not of its own making. The mind is essentially a selective agency 'a theatre of simultaneous possibilities.' (*Principles of Psychology*, p. 288, Vol. I.) In all its activities, such as, sensation, perception, thinking, volition, it is essentially selective in character. The new realists also agree with James in holding that mind is not creative, but is essentially selective in character. Mind is defined by Perry as the interested behaviour of the organism in relation to certain features of the environment. Holt also defines it as the "cross section" of the environment defined by the specific response of the nervous system. Mental action for both Perry and Holt is identified with the action of the physical organism. James also takes practically the same point. The action of the nerve-system is essentially selective in character and in conscious experience, it responds only to those features of the environment which serves its interests. The specific response of the nervous system to certain portions of the environment, does not mean any change or modification in the character of the real; it simply means revelation or discovery of something already given.

It appears from the foregoing considerations that the new realists, and particularly, the American new realists are indebted to William James for some of their important metaphysical and epistemological theories. James's theory of pure experience is responsible for the new realist's theory of neutral entities. The emphasis put upon the relational character of consciousness by

William James, and his denial of its entitative character, have all been unreservedly accepted by the neorealists. The denial of mental action as anything distinct from the feeling of bodily activity has also found support from the new realists. Further James's insistence upon the numerical identity of content and object as characteristic of cognitive experience has been one of the most important and essential features of present day new realism. And lastly, the new realist's view that mind is essentially selective and not creative urged particularly against the idealists, is clearly influenced by the account of mind given by James from the pragmatic point of view. We may say that most of the characteristic features of modern realism were anticipated in the speculations of William James.

SYMPOSIUM

G. R. MALKANT

Intellect and Intuition.

Intellect is the faculty of thinking or thought generally. The term intuition has many meanings. For the purpose of the present discussion however I shall understand by intuition "direct awareness of anything real not involving thought." This direct awareness is the basis of our knowledge of the physical world. That world, we believe, is given to us directly in awareness before its content is elaborated by thought. But here there is no antagonism between intuition and thought. We may disagree as to whether we have any pure sensation, unmediated by thought, and if we have such a sensation, whether it should be called knowledge but there is no disagreement as to the fact that there is such a thing as sense-intuition, and that it is on the basis of this intuition that thought constructs its structure of the knowledge of the physical world. We, in fact, regard intuition and thought as complementary functions of knowledge. Intuition is that which gives us contact with the *actual*. But the actual as such is not knowable. It is only when we raise it to the universal, by means of the universalising processes of thought that it becomes possible to know it. There is then so far more or less agreement. The disagreement comes when we speak of ultimate reality or metaphysical reality. Some writers hold that we do not know ultimate reality in direct awareness, and by its very nature, can never know it in this way. Direct awareness has certain limitations of its own, which thought alone can remove or make good. It is too narrow in its scope. Ultimate reality can therefore only be ideally indicated, it cannot be directly intuited. Others hold

that we do not indeed commonly have an intuition of ultimate reality; but it is by intuition alone that we can possibly know it. Thought is essentially abstract. It tries to grasp reality which is concrete by a round-about way,—by piling abstractions upon abstractions, so to say. Such an attempt is doomed to failure. Thought is therefore quite impotent to give us knowledge of reality as it is, and must, therefore, if we are to have this knowledge at all, be transcended in the end.

It is not possible for us to discuss at length the merits and the demerits of each side in the controversy. We ourselves recognise that anything that is real must be capable of being intuited. Ultimate reality can be no exception. There must be an intuition appropriate to ultimate reality, if anything is really ultimate. At the same time, no intuition that is intuition of reality can be opposed to thought. In fact, the intuition of ultimate reality can only be reached with the help of thought. If it is reached in any other way which involves the suppression of thought, it ceases to be intuition of reality. It becomes a form of error. All systems of mysticism then which seek to give knowledge of ultimate reality by the suppression of thought, are, in our opinion, misguided attempts at the knowledge of the real. This is one side of the conclusion which we want to reach. The other side may also be briefly indicated. It is an answer to the question,—can there be an intuition of ultimate reality at all, an intuition that in the end excludes all thought? Our answer is that there can be no such intuition, if we mean by reality a transcendent content and not the simple fact of intuiting which is completely realised in the simplest fact of knowledge.

We shall now proceed to bring out these conclusions at some length. We take the first part of our problem, namely the question whether we can have an intuition of ultimate reality without the help of thought, and in fact by the suppression of it.

Let us suppose that there is an intuition which is the intuition of ultimate reality. When we have this intuition, how

shall we know that it is the ultimate reality that we know in it? We may know a thing and still completely miss it, if we are not intellectually cognisant. Any kind of intuition whatsoever simply makes us aware of the content intuited. It does not criticise itself. It does not deliver itself as to the status of this content. We may therefore very well be knowing the Absolute *without ever knowing that we know It*. It does not matter if a particular intuition is very convincing to the person who has it. There are powerful hallucinations which are very convincing too. The truth is that an intuition which wholly supersedes thought has no epistemological value; and it can never be proved to the satisfaction of any one that it refers to anything real, much less to what is ultimately real.

We may, however, for the sake of argument, take it for granted that there is an intuition of this sort, and that we know in it that it is the ultimate or the absolute that is intuited. But how are our ordinary intuitions of reality to be related to it? Are they not equally intuitions of reality? Or, must we suppose that there are two different varieties of real being, absolute and relative? Then both must be ultimate, and thought must be capable of apprehending real being. It may indeed be contended that the intuition of the Absolute cancels all other intuitions, and that he who sees the Absolute literally sees nothing else beside it. But this fact, if true, can be very well accounted for on the hypothesis of a psychological incapacity on the part of the person who has the intuition. When he sees the Absolute, he is simply unable to see the rest of the universe which we see. An ultimate dualism in the nature of reality itself will thus not be ruled out; and with this dualism, the intellect will retain its place as a valid instrument for knowing reality.

Some one might argue here that the person who has an intuition of the Absolute indeed sees what we ordinary mortals see, but he knows that it is not what is real; it is phenomenal and unreal. But how does he decide between the two kinds

of intuition? What is his ground for believing that the one gives him truth and the other less than the truth? Have they not both the form of intuitive perception? If they have, there must be a reason, outside the simple fact of the intuitions themselves, that leads him to the distinction. This reason can only be found in thought, which thus becomes an integral element in the perception of truth. The fact is that any duality found in experience can only be reduced to unity by the method of analysis and interpretation. We have different experiences. But that there is only one reality that is known in all those experiences, or that there is only one experience that is the experience of reality while other experiences are not,—these are conclusions that can only be established by a certain interpretation of the facts of experience taken all together. Mere intuition, however convincing, has no truth-value. It is thought that determines this value, and gives us the ultimate conviction as to the nature of reality.

The contention that intuition is an instrument of knowledge superior to the intellect involves a fundamental misunderstanding as to the proper function of the intellect. The intellect by itself cannot know any kind of reality, sensible or super-sensible. All knowledge of reality must originally come by some form of direct experience or intuition. It is the business of the intellect to accept all the intuitions without denying any of them. It is only when doubts occur that its proper work begins; and this simply consists in removing the doubts by an interpretation of experience as a whole. Intuition then is the basis of all intellectual operations, and the intellect cannot question the validity of any intuition unless it conflicts with a more fundamental intuition. In the end, there must be one or more fundamental intuitions beyond which the intellect itself can never go, for without these intuitions the interpretative work of the intellect will not be possible. There is thus no reason to suppose that there is anywhere any antagonism between intellect and intuition.

It might however be said that we have admitted the reality of certain fundamental intuitions, or intuitions the truth of which is self-evident, and in respect of which thought can find nothing to criticise. Why then do we deny the possibility of an intuition that is indeed different from all our common intuitions, but which is truly fundamental and has for its subject-matter the whole of reality or the Absolute? It is the only fundamental intuition. Now this objection, as it appears to us, arises out of a misunderstanding. We certainly do not doubt the possibility of an intuition of this sort. But what is important is the recognition *by thought* of its fundamental character. Thought is not simply superseded. Its claim to self-satisfaction is not shoved aside. It is rather affirmed in its true rational meaning. The intuitions which thought accepts as fundamental and therefore beyond the possibility of doubt are intuitions rational *par excellence*; for they constitute the ground of thought's own rationality. It is only intuitions that are more or less hypothetical, or intuitions that cannot stand the criticism of thought but must simply be accepted on their own authority, that are in question.

What we want to emphasise is that thought alone can give objectivity to our experience; and by objectivity we mean "freedom from purely personal and hallucinatory elements." An intuition then is rational when thought recognises that any further doubt would defeat its own end; or in other words, that doubt itself would be irrational. And an intuition is irrational, when thought is not obliged to affirm it and finds reason to doubt its validity.

We have so far seen the limitations of intuition. Intuition cannot criticise itself, and cannot therefore vouch for its own truth. We must now see that similar limitations attach to thought. The proper business of thought, as we have said, is to criticise our intuitions of reality in order to determine valid knowledge. When however it proceeds to *construct* an experience, it revels in abstractions. It then goes beyond its true office, and ceases to convince. It must deal with experience as

we find it, and simply remove those natural doubts that occur in respect of it. The insight of reason consists not in any construction but merely in the interpretation of experience. It does not however require much imagination to see that this interpretation may make all the difference in our perception of reality.

We may then conclude this part of our reflections by saying that it is not the business of philosophy to lead us to any *new intuition* of the real or to evolve any *new instrument of knowledge* in the place of those that we have. If reality is not known here and now, it can never be known. I shall say that it is indeed adequately known. But on the basis of this knowledge, which all but the mystics share with each other, there are various systems of beliefs, all more or less warranted by certain aspects of experience. It is the business of philosophy to systematise experience, lead us to right beliefs and guard us against those that are erroneous. All the revelation of reality that philosophy can ever achieve will merely amount to a perception of the beliefs that are warranted by reason, and of the pitfalls of unreason or inadequate thought. The change will be all in our *understanding* of things, or our outlook upon them, not in our experience of reality as such.

We shall now proceed to the second part of our problem. Is there any intuition of ultimate reality? If there is, what sort of intuition must it be? In order to answer this question, I shall understand by intuition what Mr. Brahma understands by it. In his abstract which I received quite recently, he defines intuition as "an immediate non-relational mode of knowledge" which comes *after* the perception of relations. Knowledge which involves the distinction of the subject and the object is not intuitive knowledge. My contention here is that if we understand by intuition a non-relational apprehension, intuition will not be a distinct mode of knowledge as opposed to thought. By a mode of knowledge I understand a particular way of knowing a certain content. If there is knowledge which has no content, there is no meaning in saying that it is any mode of knowledge. Now,

if intuitive knowledge has a content, there will be necessarily involved in it the distinction of the subject and the object; and we can no longer speak of this knowledge as non-relational. If, on the other hand, it has no content,—which is what should follow from the definition,—it cannot be spoken of as a specific *mode* of knowledge. A non-relational mode of knowledge is really a contradiction in terms. There is only one way in which this idea of intuition as non-relational apprehension can be said to be justified; and that is when we conceive of intuition as *itself the reality*, and therefore knowing nothing apart from itself. We might even say that whatever we may happen to know, it is intuition that forms the substance of it. It really knows nothing apart from itself. Intuition as an epistemological concept is thus replaced by intuition as the very being, the ontological thing-in-itself that knows itself. There can be intuition of ultimate reality only in this most Pickwickian sense in which it is not the intuition of anything.

This way of thinking, it will be noticed, is sharply contrasted from that adopted by Bradley. We are all familiar with the main problem which he has set out to solve. According to his analysis, all knowledge implies the distinction of the "that" from the "what." But this form of knowledge he finds inadequate to reality which is concrete and not abstract. He therefore argues that the knowledge which is adequate to reality must be entirely different in character. It must be of the nature of a sublimated feeling or intuition; for in that form of knowledge the distinction of the "that" from the "what" can be supposed gradually to disappear, and we can then have knowledge of reality which can be said to be coincident with reality itself. Whatever now he may mean by this intuition, one thing is quite certain that this intuition of reality or the absolute experience is not empty and hollow experiencing, or intuiting. It is an experience that achieves the harmony and therefore the true unity of the appearances. It is, in short, an experience with a transcendent content. He explicitly says that it is an experience

of which we have just an inkling, or inadequate and transient glimpses. But if that is so, that experience can only be distinct from the experiences which we have by the nature of what is known in it, *i.e.*, by the nature of the content intuited. Experience as such remains quite distinct in each case from *what it is the experience of*. In the one case, it is the experience that relates to something *x*, namely reality; in the other case, it is the experience that relates to something *y*, namely appearances. That is all the difference. The essential nature of experience and the relations which it implies remain the same. The dualism of experience and its content, or of the subject and the object, is not superseded. The unity which the intuition of the Absolute was to have achieved, it has failed to achieve.

Our conclusion is that there can be no intuition of ultimate reality, if it is an intuition that we do not yet have, and which ~~is distinct from~~ the intuitions which we have by its transcendent content. Either the intuitiveness of our nature is itself the ultimate reality, and there is no need to try to know it in any way other than that in which it is already known to itself, or there is no ultimate reality that can be intuited in the aforesaid manner. The principal objection against this view will be that intuition taken by itself will be nothing; and even if it is something, we shall miss much that is to us what reality ought to be. I may concede the validity of this objection. But then let us admit that all experience, even the so-called absolute experience, is subjective; that the content which it includes, no matter how far transformed, is objective; and that there can be no experience which does not involve the distinction of the subject and the object. If we do not admit all this, and still want to retain within experience the reality of the appearances in some form, we are, in my humble opinion, simply deceiving ourselves with false hopes and empty phrases. Let us put to ourselves the question, in a straight-forward manner, "In the Absolute Experience there will indeed be experience, and *what else besides?*"

and let us see whether this "something besides" does not have the form of objective content. If it does not have that form, and is coincident with the intuition of it, it is just this intuition devoid of that richness which we associate with objective being, and which we are so anxious to retain in the totality of what is.



